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Elemental Narcissism and the Decline of Empathy: A Biocultural Reading of the Fall in 
William Golding’s Fiction 
Khadijah AlJabri  
 
 
This research began with the modest idea that bringing an evolutionary, cognitive and 
existential understanding to Golding’s novels is going to help to establish the universality and 
historical specificity of his writerly engagements as well as shed new light on his moral 
preoccupations and concerns. In fact, the endeavour was initially launched in keeping with 
the spirit of Literary Darwinism, a movement which sought to foreground the field of literary 
study on more scientific foundations, using the emerging discipline of evolutionary 
psychology as a means to bridging the gap between the sciences and the humanities, and to 
bringing the two cultures together. Of course, most of the past critical efforts dedicated to 
understanding Golding’s work tended to overlook or downplay the asserted relation between 
rationalism and biologism in the formation and articulation of Golding’s moral 
preoccupations in order to favour a broadly religious reading. This was especially the case 
given the overt biblical overtones in Golding’s novels as well as his confessed antagonism to 
the overwhelming rationalism of the sciences and the ubiquity of scientific reductionism in 
accounts and justifications of knowledge. Despite this antagonism, however—which included 
a confessed dislike for notions of Darwinian evolution and its progressive overtones—the 
rational dimension to Golding’s novels cannot be denied. It can be detected in his early 
writings where attempts at establishing the universality of evil are linked to an engagement 
with, sometimes even an endorsement of, some of the evolutionary propositions of his own 
period as well as those relevant to the periods that provided the contexts for his historically or 
prehistorically located fictions. There are even instances when Golding appears to be sharing 
not only the evolutionary literary theorists’ preference for examining human behaviour within 
a biological frame, but also their tendency to regard art as an innate propensity that 
constitutes an undeniable and definitive part of human nature. However, as illuminating as 
the field of evolutionary psychology initially proved in relation to Golding’s work, the 
completed thesis reveals how an attempt to frame his work entirely in terms of evolutionary 
theorizing is unhelpfully reductionist. This is particularly the case with his later creations that 
seem to be written intentionally to challenge simplistic or reductionist templates of 
interpretation as a way of asserting the necessary complexity of literary texts if they are to be 
an adequate exploration or reflection of the complexity of life itself. Consequently, it became 
necessary to move beyond the limited scope of evolutionary theory and incorporate a range of 
views from diverse, yet consilient schools in contemporary psychology that can help account 
for the increasingly diverse spiritual, social and cultural realities characterizing his creations 
in general, and his later novels in particular.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Golding’s Postmodernism, the Crisis of the Literary Humanities and the Rise and Fall 
of Literary Darwinism 
 
Ladies and gentleman, you see before you a man, I will not say more sinned 
against than sinning; but a man more analysed than analysing.  
William Golding, ‘Utopias and Antiutopias’.1 
 
 
This research began with the modest idea that bringing an evolutionary, cognitive and 
existential understanding to Golding’s novels is going to help to establish the universality and 
historical specificity of his writerly engagements as well as shed new light on his moral 
preoccupations and concerns. In fact, the endeavour was initially launched in keeping with 
the spirit of Literary Darwinism, a movement which sought to foreground the field of literary 
study on more scientific foundations, using the emerging discipline of evolutionary 
psychology as a means to bridging the gap between the sciences and the humanities, and to 
bringing the two cultures together. Of course, most of the past critical efforts dedicated to 
understanding Golding’s work tended to overlook or downplay the asserted relation between 
rationalism and biologism in the formation and articulation of Golding’s moral 
preoccupations in order to favour a broadly religious reading. This was especially the case 
given the overt biblical overtones in Golding’s novels, as well as his confessed antagonism to 
the overwhelming rationalism of the sciences and the ubiquity of scientific reductionism in 
accounts and justifications of knowledge. Despite this antagonism, however—which included 
a confessed dislike for notions of Darwinian evolution and its progressive overtones—the 
rational dimension to Golding’s novels cannot be denied. It can be detected in his early 
writings where attempts at establishing the universality of evil are linked to an engagement 
with, sometimes even an endorsement of, some of the evolutionary propositions of his own 
period as well as those relevant to the periods that provided the contexts for his historically or 
prehistorically located fictions. There are even instances when Golding appears to be sharing 
not only the evolutionary literary theorists’ preference for examining human behaviour within 
                                                          
1 A Moving Target, p. 171.       
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a biological frame, but also their tendency to regard art as an innate propensity that 
constitutes an undeniable and definitive part of human nature. Both Golding and evolutionary 
literary theorists can also be noted as similar in the sense that they both exhibit antagonism 
towards postmodernist considerations of art, explicitly expressed in Golding’s late 70s and 
early 80s productions when arguments regarding the decline of literary study and the 
controversy surrounding the emergence of theory became increasingly prominent. Of 
particular importance is Golding’s 1984 novel, The Paper Men, which not only addresses the 
author’s discomfort with the increasing amount of critical attention he was by then receiving, 
but also negatively associates much of this critical work with the poststructuralist creeds of 
dismissing originality and of denying the author any control or authority over his or her 
creations.   
     Golding’s relationship with the literary establishment was never a simple one. He was 
aware that the status of canonized author, achieved so early in his career as a novelist, was 
very much dependent upon the avid and dedicated attention of academics and literary critics. 
Though finally owing much to the singularity of his artistic talent, his successes also hung on 
the high degree of critical interest that had helped to highlight the ‘deep strata of ambiguity 
and complication’ in his novels, and that contributed significantly, as such, to his winning the 
Nobel Prize for literature in 1983 (Gyllensten; Golding, Target 169). Golding had even 
stated, on occasion, that it would be ‘disingenuous’ of him to pretend not to feel flattered by 
the intensity of the critical gaze and the rewards incumbent on this interest (Target 169). But 
his response to this degree of attention was also ambivalent; he still harboured a deep sense of 
aversion to and disdain for this kind of academic interest. Reviews, for one thing, continued 
to bother and irritate him to the point where he began avoiding them soon after publishing a 
book for fear that he might find his work misinterpreted, or even worse, misrepresented and 
put down as bad art as a result. There was also the realization that the experience of having 
become a source of ‘educational material’ for children and university students alike was not a 
wholly advantageous one because it seemed to turn him into nothing more than ‘the raw 
material of an academic light industry,’ or a perfect target for a feasibly promising doctoral 
thesis (169). Most distressing was the problem of his becoming an object for the merciless 
dissection and the gross misinterpretation of his brainchildren at a much larger scale than 
before, particularly so after the worldwide success of Lord of the Flies. Reductionist readings 
began to proliferate, ranging from Freudian, Neo-Freudian, Jungian, Marxist, and Catholic to 
Scientific Humanist (171, 198). There were times, too, when Golding found himself facing 
fallacious charges that included being labelled an ‘un-American’ author, a deeply religious 
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moralist with a Calvinistic orientation, or simply a pessimistic orchestrator of dystopian 
science fiction that provided little hope or assurance (Target 171; Golding in Biles, Talk 86).    
      As much as Golding was irritated by these concerns, however, they did not seem to have 
bothered him as much as what he perceived then as the death and ‘mummification’ of the 
author at the hands of the academic industry, communicated in many of his articles and 
lectures, especially those published in A Moving Target in 1982. He asserts in ‘Belief in 
Creativity’, for example, that fame is not all advantageous because the more he read the 
critical interpretations of his creations, the more he felt himself ceasing to exist as a living 
and changing human being, and perceived himself to be assuming, instead, a rather fixed and 
lifeless image as a paper man or a textual entity: 
For a quarter of a century now the person you see before you has undergone a 
process of literary mummification. He is not entirely human; he is a set book. Of 
course that is a great personal benefit but not without its drawbacks. The creature 
lives and breathes like some horrible Boris Karloff figure inside his mummy 
wrappings which year by year are tightened. A statue, an image stands in his place. 
To some extent we are all victims of a similar fate (Target 185).  
Most of Golding’s novels, particularly those that were published at a later point in his literary 
career, may also be classified, in one way or another, as a response to this problem; all fixate 
on the mystery of art and the complex living and changing nature of the artist that is set 
against the reductive attempts at exposition that Golding considered to be typical of the 
practice of literary criticism. The Spire (1964), for example, deals extensively with the 
complicated motivations underlying the act of creativity and the impossibility of pinning on a 
work any one exclusive interpretation that might claim to encompass all the potential 
meanings that Jocelin’s final creation may hold. Golding even takes the matter further by 
refusing to disclose what his initial thoughts were regarding Jocelin’s motivations and, later 
on, famously remaining entirely reticent about Darkness Visible (1979), which was almost 
unanimously considered to be the most challenging and perplexing of Golding’s novels to 
date. The Double Tongue, published posthumously in 1995, might also be seen to exemplify 
Golding’s ongoing preoccupation with this resistance to reductionist hermeneutics in its 
summation of his views on this matter and its presentation of what may be considered as a 
final assertion of the irreducible mystery of both art and the artist. However, the novel that 
deals most explicitly with the matter of the death and mummification of the author, which 
seems at times to be inextricably related to the complex relationship between the artist and 
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the academic world, is The Paper Men (1984), whose publication appeared strategically to 
follow the naming of William Golding as the Nobel Laureate for 1983.2 
     Though mainly concerned with addressing certain fundamental questions relating to the 
spiritual and the mystical—as in most of Golding’s novels—The Paper Men is unique in that 
it delivers a clear affront to the literary establishment by painting a somewhat negative image 
of its practitioners as a patristic tribe bent, for the most part, on making their careers out of 
the exploitation of artists and of explaining away the mystery of their creation. Rick Tucker, 
the principal critic in the novel, for instance, is not simply a professor of English who is 
dedicated to a structuralist investigation of art, but he is also presented as a self-serving, 
manipulative and resourceful critic, willing to resort to whatever means possible in order to 
make a name for himself in the academic world. His target resource for achieving his ends is 
the novelist, Wilf Barclay, a not so sympathetic figure in whom Tucker first develops an 
interest as a graduate student desperate for the fresh blood of a living artist as a subject for his 
supposedly original dissertation. As a result, he not only deceives the author into believing 
that he is an assistant professor interested in writing a critical study on his work, but also 
takes advantage of the invitation to rummage through the author’s dustbin late at night in 
search of some incriminating evidence or authentic sources that might contribute to the 
success of his dubious endeavour. Tucker is shown years later, now a full-fledged professor, 
committed to the callous dissection of Barclay’s creations and reducing the complexity of his 
novels to tedious enumeration of the frequency of its relative clauses, which he triumphantly 
claims to have dedicated the time and energy to counting, meticulously, book by book (Paper 
20). He even maintains, in a clear breach of scholarly integrity, that he has ‘a deep personal 
relationship’ with the author, allowing him not only Barclay’s own approval of his findings, 
but also the dismissal ‘from the author’s own lips’ of most of the scholarly efforts that 
preceded his; an evidently cheap way of granting validity to his claims (20-1). Tucker 
eventually becomes a literal as well as literary danger to Barclay when he decides to wrestle 
the novelist for control over both his books and life, by attempting to have the novelist sign 
an agreement granting him the right to stake his claim on Barclay’s journals, papers and 
manuscripts, to become his official biographer, and the sole authority in all literary matters 
                                                          
2 The Paper Men was published a year after Golding was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1983, making 
it Golding’s first novel as a Nobel Laureate. It may also be the one novel containing his clearest statement 
regarding the controversy that erupted soon after he was nominated for the prize, and which raised the question 
of whether ‘a little English phenomenon of no special interest’, such as Golding, was deserving of such an 
honour (Carey, Golding 430-1; qtd. in Bufkin, ‘The Nobel Prize’). In fact, Golding clearly maintained in an 
interview that The Paper Men was his way of putting his ‘tongue out to the whole literary world’ and of 
‘[telling] it to go piss up a rope’ (qtd. in Carey, Golding 470).    
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relating to his life and oeuvre. The result is an ill-fated pursuit across Europe, encompassing 
episodes of mutual suspicion, humiliation and paranoia before culminating in the artist’s 
decision to deny the critic his biography by writing it himself, and in the critic’s retaliation as 
he shoots Barclay dead in mid-sentence, quite literally bringing about the death of the author.  
     Not much is known, of course, about how much of Tucker’s style of harassment was 
inflicted on Golding in real life. It seems, however, that Golding was inspired to create both 
the novel and the character of Rick L. Tucker by an American professor of English who 
continued to hound and irritate him for years ‘as if he had a sort of God-given right to 
[Golding’s] words and the understanding of them simply because he wrote a bad book about 
them about fifteen years ago’ (qtd. in Carey, Golding 409). It is also evident, considering the 
commonalities between Barclay and his creator, that much of Barclay’s character and career 
seems based on Golding’s own. Barclay, after all, is depicted as sharing his creator’s 
physique, age, his fear of heights as well as a more than occasional love for a drink (Carey, 
Golding 423). He is also shown as a renowned artist whose career was defined by his first 
creation, Coldharbour which, like Lord of the Flies, is noted as a far more popular book than 
any of his later novels. Moreover, both Barclay and his creator are revealed as private 
individuals who detest the idea of having their biographies written. They are also particularly 
opposed to being regarded as no more than potential dissertation sources for those graduate 
students who believe a living and breathing target to be a far more interesting research 
subject than a dead one (Target 170).3  
     Despite these similarities, however, with their suggestion that Barclay’s antagonism to 
critics and the literary industry is Golding’s own, there are definite moments when Golding 
appears to be distancing himself from his supposed alter ego as a means of including a certain 
conception of the artist as well as the critic in the attack. Barclay, for one thing, is not exactly 
depicted as a helpless victim in his affair with Tucker, but is rather highlighted as similarly 
villainous, capable of tormenting and humiliating his pursuer to breaking point. He is 
different from Golding, his creator, in that he is a morally and spiritually lacking individual 
whose opposition to the writing of his biography is not merely the desire for privacy, but also 
a fear of having his sinful past exposed and his image forever fixed as a plagiarizer, harasser, 
and maybe even a murderer. He is also different from Golding in that he is incapable of 
regaining inspiration or of maintaining his engagement with serious art, and so he finds 
                                                          
3 It was Golding’s concern, in fact, that there might one day be ‘some pussy-footing graduate student from 
Ashcan’ who would gain access to his journals, write his biography, and ‘either silently (unobtrusively) correct 
[his] spelling, or even worse, interrupt the text with brackets and sic in italics’ (qtd. in Carey 409, xii). 
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himself at one point drawn into dubious kinds of derivative writing or what Barclay would 
prefer to describe as an ‘[exercise] in how to cheat the public,’ in order to maintain his 
successful profile (Paper 23-4). This takes the attack on the academic establishment back 
full-circle for idealizing an artist so morally bankrupt in his actual life, or for even showing 
any interest at all in the kind of art he produces. However, the fact that Barclay’s negative 
depiction was taken to a point where he seems deserving of his own annihilation suggests that 
there might be more to the novel and its engagement with art, after all, than merely Golding 
relieving his personal frustrations and simply delivering an attack on literary academics. 
     The Paper Men is first and foremost a product of its age. As such, it is not only an attempt 
at highlighting the declining authority of the artist over his brainchildren, but also a means of 
critiquing the conditions of moral and spiritual decline that are identified for Golding with the 
forces of postmodernity which he regarded as now pervading every aspect of post-war 
English life, including the arts.4 Consequently, it might seem logical to classify The Paper 
Men as primarily belonging to Golding’s later and more social novels where the focus on the 
spiritually barren age and its lack of a moral foundation is tackled in order to reflect on the 
question of free will, and the almost inescapable inevitability of certain individuals such as 
Barclay and Tucker succumbing to the lure of moral relativity and embracing rather than 
interrogating a condition of spiritual deafness. It is also possible to consider The Paper Men 
as Golding’s way of highlighting what he considered then to be a critical regression in the 
arts by mirroring the entropic quality of the age in its artistic production. There are even 
instances when Golding appears to be linking the decline of serious art with the emerging 
spirit of postmodernity and the culture industry which strove not only to prioritize the 
commodification of art, but also dissolve the boundaries between high and low culture 
(Crawford 166-7; Golding, Gates 123).5 This is accomplished by depicting Barclay’s later 
career as lacking the originality and creativity that is associated with his earlier literary output 
as his work has become more oriented, instead, to superficial sketches or the regurgitation of 
art forms associated with mass culture (Paper 23-4). It can also be detected in Golding’s 
subtle reference to a mass-produced media industry or the massification of popular culture, 
                                                          
4 Paul Crawford, in fact, presents the most extensive exploration of how both The Paper Men and Darkness 
Visible were Golding’s way of critiquing postmodern England in his book Politics and History in William 
Golding: The World Turned Upside Down (2002).  
5 In fact the notion of postmodern art being a regression or a decline from the seriousness, depth and relevance 
of modernism can be said to have been shared by some of the prominent critics who were interested in Golding 
such as Terry Eagleton, Gabriel Josipovici and Frank Kermode. See Eagleton’s ‘Capitalism, Modernism and 
Postmodernism’ in Against the Grain (1986), Josipovici’s What Ever Happened to Modernism? (2010) and 
Kermode’s ‘Objects, Jokes and Art’ in Continuities (1968).  
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particularly in those moments when Barclay is seen as relying on imagery associated with 
film and television in writing his biography (Golding, Paper 13, 128; McCarron, Golding 47; 
Crawford 184), or in the instance when Johnny informs Barclay that his becoming a TV host 
has granted him more success, profit and recognition than actually being a writer (Golding, 
Paper 135-6; McCarron, Golding 47). Similarly, reliance on ‘scatological references’ and 
trash imagery in describing both the art and the artist are noted by Crawford to deliver 
something of the same effect, not only in terms of Barclay’s moral descent as an individual, 
but also in terms of his loss of motivation as an artist in a post-war world that is continually 
numbed by the increasing growth of its culture industry (184).6  
     This further highlights the novel as less of a ‘misdirected revenge’ or a ‘personal vendetta’ 
against the literary establishment, as critics such as Bernard Dick have maintained (133-4), 
and as more of a statement on a ‘postmodern English literature industry dominated by 
depthless writing and criticism that, like Barclay’s journal, might as well be set down “on 
lavatory paper”’ (Crawford 184; Paper 131). Golding’s attack on critics, in other words, 
might have been a means of not only foregrounding what he believed to be a serious 
affliction in the arts, but also tackling the academic industry as one of the principal factors 
contributing to the problem rather than offering any mitigation. This is particularly 
pronounced in one of the key scenes in the novel where Barclay is shown as attending a 
literary conference in Seville where he is supposed to present a lecture only to discover that 
the critics have obviously found a suitable target for their critical scrutiny in his fictional 
creations. They have, for one thing, declared his work unoriginal because they have been 
operating under the postmodernist assumption that ‘there is nothing new,’ and that one of the 
most important questions to ask when engaged in the study of a text is ‘what other books 
does it come from?’ (21-22). They also appear to have developed a knack for the merciless 
dissection of his creations, considering their commitment to the process of understanding 
‘wholeness by tearing it into separate pieces’ or by regarding it through the narrow, but 
supposedly illuminating lens of theory (21-22). Burdened by the critics’ evident lack of 
integrity, their apparent dedication to the superficial in art, and their commitment to 
explaining away the mystery of his creativity by insisting on tracing his creations to other 
                                                          
6 The critique of mass produced media seems to have been shared by the Frankfurt school whose subscribers did 
not think much of popular culture and its products due, for the most part, to the association they perceive 
between such products and the rise of capitalism. In fact, they seem to think of mass produced media as some 
sort of propaganda aimed at catering to capitalist interests. F. R. Leavis had also been an early opponent of the 
standardization of media and the blurring of boundaries between high and low culture in his 1930 renowned 
manifesto ‘Mass Civilization and Minority Culture’.   
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texts, Barclay finally finds himself forced to accept the sad reality that he has no use for 
inventiveness, nor does he have much of a need ‘to dive, suffer, [and] endure that obscurely 
necessary anguish’ that comes with the act of genuine creativity (21-22). As a result, he not 
only ends up writing his subsequent novel ‘in next to no time, and with no more than five 
percent of himself’ (22-3), but also dedicates himself to a career of potboilers that do not 
demand a great deal of effort, nor do they contain much originality, truth or literary value. 
     Most of Barclay’s observations regarding Tucker and the academics in the conference 
register a sense of the degradation of literary study either through the relativizing effects of 
the postmodern or the collapse of scholarship into a pointless analytic reductionism that 
fixates on the frequency of relative clauses in Barclay’s works, the change in his accent (121-
2), or the ridiculously non sequitur such as how and why Barclay and his wife laugh a lot 
(39). They also perfectly sum up Golding’s own beliefs and views regarding art and the 
mystery of the act of creativity, noted frequently in his novels and lectures as well as some of 
his articles and interviews, as a response to critics’ constant efforts to understand his 
creations in terms of other texts and to deny him his own sense of originality by insisting on 
tracing his works to what they believe to be influences or intertexts that bred them.7 When 
asked about whether such a process bothered him, Golding maintained: 
[t]here may be a degree of truth in source-hunting, since in literary terms I’m highly 
educated; but equally I’ve spent my life as a human being living among other human 
beings. One of the defects of the scholastic literary critic who doesn’t know his arse 
from his elbow is that he invariably deduces the making of one book from the 
making of another, without ever considering who, in that case, made The Original 
Book. In other words, that sort of critic – either through ignorance or jealousy – tries 
to explain away the act of creativity. I think it’s possible that my books sometimes 
have a kick-off in other books, but only because my human experience has made me 
feel that, in those circumstances, I know better. Lord of the Flies had a sort of genesis 
in seeing how ridiculous a picture of human nature Coral Island is. But I have to say 
that as a child I took refuge in books like Coral Island (in Haffenden 101).         
This brings in the rise of theory as one of the principal factors infecting the critical pursuits of 
the age, and contributing, as such, to the regression of the arts, at least for Golding, who 
                                                          
7 The article ‘Rough Magic’ in The Hot Gates, in particular, is dedicated to establishing the mystery inherent in 
the act of creativity. As for novels, there is, as already stated, The Spire, The Double Tongue, and of course, The 
Paper Men. 
12 
 
considered its rise as responsible for the collapse of criticism into an ‘intertextuality’ that is 
mere source hunting, and the dissolution of boundaries between high and low culture. Tucker, 
as a representative of the critical industry of the age, for instance, is repeatedly shown as 
dismissing the inferiority of popular culture as ‘a common misconception’ (47), and insisting 
on holding an author such as Barclay in high esteem, even going so far as to regard him as 
‘part of the Great Pageant of English Literature’ (38). Golding’s critique of theory can also be 
detected in Tucker’s continuous attempts to rob Barclay of his control over his life and 
creations, or rather in his success at shooting the author dead mid-sentence, especially given 
how the event resonates in what it symbolizes with Barthes’ proclamations regarding the real 
role of the artist in the study of literature and his declaration of the death of the author. 
Furthermore, there is the parallelism between Golding’s choice of the title, The Paper Men, 
and Barthes’s use of the phrase ‘paper-author’ in his seminal work ‘The Death of the Author’, 
which makes Golding’s critique of the poststructuralist creed of dismissing the artist as 
irrelevant to the interpretation process seem a little less coincidental and somewhat more 
intentional (McCarron, Coincidence 148). According to Barthes:  
[i]t is not that the author may not ‘come back’ in the text, in his text, but he does so 
as a ‘guest’. If he is a novelist, he is inscribed in the novel like one of his characters, 
figured in the carpet; no longer privileged, paternal, aletheological, his inscription is 
ludic. He becomes, as it were, a ‘paper-author’ (161).      
     Adopting such a perspective, for Barthes and the poststructuralists alike, was supposed to 
break the limitation imposed on the text by the traditional view of authorial control, and 
revolutionize the field of literary study by allowing for the exploration of a multitude of 
potential readings made possible by relocating the ‘text’s unity’ in its ‘destination’ or 
recipients rather than its origin (148). The same thing can also be said about most of the 
proclamations associated with interdisciplinarity and the adoption of continental philosophy 
in relation to the study of literature, considering how they, too, were meant to revitalize the 
art of criticism and take it beyond its state of imprisonment within the safe confines of the 
traditional paradigm. However, although these theoretical reformulations were initially 
expected to aid the growth of the art of criticism by their proponents, their supposedly 
promising outcomes were not consistently materialized. Propelled by cultural, economic and 
political forces, the practice fell into the infamous ‘Theory Wars’ where subscribers to 
different traditions fought fiercely to ensure the prominence of their beliefs and the 
supremacy of their factions by setting the annihilation of their opponents as their ultimate 
13 
 
goal. A good example of this process was the McCabe affair of 1981 that took the wars 
fought on the academic front out to the popular media world and triggered a wave of concern 
over the status of the academic literary field, not only in terms of its being made to appear as 
if it were being attacked from within by alien thinking, but also in terms of the propagated 
image of its scholars as intolerant of the revolutionary propositions of younger academics 
(Barry 268-70). This triggered a public debate regarding how the study of literature is to be 
defended and developed in educational institutions across the country, with some still 
insisting on rejecting the jargon-laden pursuits associated with theory in favour of a more 
traditional approach to the task, while others urged the birth of a new interdisciplinarity and 
revolutionary approach to knowledge and value (269). For a writer such as Golding who was 
generally not comfortable with criticism, evident in his vicious critique of academe in The 
Paper Men, the more recent critical proclamations associated with poststructuralist thought 
were unlikely to be favourably perceived. After all, their dismissal of authority in general 
entailed compromising traditional and classical considerations of art that had established the 
principles by which literature might ideally be studied and evaluated. According to Crawford, 
the development of ‘newer’ and more ‘radical approaches’ in the field of literary criticism, 
for Golding, most likely resulted in his perceiving the practice as having: 
reversed the values that he thinks should count in all literary endeavours, that is, 
elitist conceptions of the ‘great tradition’ or canon of English literature and the 
commonsense ‘value’ of literature that reveals universal or eternal aspects of human 
living. This view of literature was, of course, subject to radical attacks from the 
1960s onward, particularly with the development of cultural and communication 
studies that began to examine popular fiction, television, film, and so on. In The 
Paper Men, an antipathy to those critics who attack fictional authority fits in with 
Golding’s critique of social values in Darkness Visible (174-5). 
This sense of concern regarding the status of the field in the wake of theory would again 
emerge in Golding’s 1995 novel, The Double Tongue.8  It can be detected, too, in a number of 
publications that foregrounded and worried over the problem in a later context where the 
humanities in general had come to seem under threat or at least on the back foot, accused in a 
scientific and consumer-oriented society of being increasingly irrelevant to knowledge or 
                                                          
8 In The Double Tongue, Golding mirrors the continuous drop in high culture and the regression of serious art of 
the early 90s in the declining status of Delphi that happened to coincide with the increasing political and cultural 
dominance of the Romans in the first century BC (Stape). 
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profit.9 The concern would also result in the emergence of the evolutionary paradigm, known 
as Literary Darwinism, which began with Joseph Carroll’s attempt at presenting a systematic 
approach to the study of literature (in 1995) in an effort to ground the field of literary study on 
more solid foundations, to bring it out of its state of autonomy, to establish a dialogue with 
the sciences, and to finally put an end to the reign of postmodernism. 
Crisis in the Humanities in the 1990s and Beyond 
It is unquestionably the case that after the era of ‘high theory’ of the 1980s, the humanities 
seem perpetually to have felt under pressure to justify themselves. This has been particularly 
the issue in the U.S. where the number of enrolments in humanities programs has significantly 
dropped, presumably in light of declining career opportunities, especially compared to 
training in business, the sciences and the social sciences (Gottschall, Science 1). There also 
appears to have been a steady decline in governmental interest in the field, judging by the 
significant cutbacks in humanities programs, especially in the U.S. but increasingly in Europe 
and the U.K., contributing to the serious concern over the fate of literary study in an age of 
profit. For some commentators, however, such as Steven Pinker, Blaine Greteman, and 
Sander Gilman, this notion of a crisis might simply be hyperbole. The decline in culture, for 
one thing, seems a perennial modern concern given how it can be traced to as far back as the 
1600s when Robert Burton voiced his lament for the loss of inspiration and the drop of the 
traditional artistic taste in his ‘bastard age’ (qtd. in Greteman). In fact, Pinker notes that the 
concern might simply be another case of how each era mourns the artistic productions of its 
past and fails to appreciate the nature of the innovative art forms that are emergent (Pinker, 
Blank Slate 403; Gilman). Moreover, other commentators have pointed out how statistics 
reveal that the reported drop in enrolments happened in the period between the 70s and 80s, 
and that numbers began to creep back up afterwards, neglected and unnoticed (Bérubé). 
Gilman and Pinker also insist that although the economic recession had certainly played a role 
in agitating the cultural wars and reinforcing the divide in the field, the economy was now 
considerably better than during former periods when the humanities had evidently flourished 
(Gilman; Pinker, Blank Slate 401). This should reinforce the argument that whatever 
perception of crisis there was, might have simply been an exaggeration after all. Coming to 
accept such a conclusion, however, does not mean denying the fact that there are certain 
                                                          
9 Examples of such publications include Alvin Kernan’s The Death of Literature (1990), Carl Woodring’s 
Literature: an Embattled Profession (1999), John Ellis’s Literature Lost: Social Agendas and the Corruption of 
The Humanities (1997), and the 2004 winter issue of Critical Inquiry which was specifically dedicated to 
tackling the problem.  
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disciplines within the humanities that are in desperate need of reformation, especially when it 
comes to the esteemed focus of literary criticism and analysis.   
     For the Literary Darwinists, there are good reasons to believe why there might be some 
truth to the traditionalists’ claims concerning the loss of the field’s status as a consequence of 
the poststructuralist turn. Fundamental to the challenge mounted by theory was that the 
precepts upon which the field of literary study is built had proven themselves to be self-
contradictory, not only prioritizing the notion of a reality governed and constructed solely 
through language and culture, but also placing too much emphasis on the denial of all claims 
to truth, and then demanding the acceptance of this disavowal as itself a truth (Scatamburlo; 
Carroll, Darwinism 16). A further argument put forward by Literary Darwinists is that the 
radicalisation of literary study under theory had produced an abstract discourse that avoided 
‘any serious engagement with real-world historical events’ (Scatamburlo). This resulted in the 
transformation of the field of criticism from a practice ‘valued for its explanatory powers,’ or 
its capacity to inspire ‘social change,’ to an art that ‘can be used to "playfully" decenter, 
deconstruct, or otherwise disrupt established meanings and presuppositions’ (Scatamburlo). In 
addition, the postmodernist denial of truth and its distrust of the idea of correspondence 
between language and the world, and even the existence of an objective real, seemed, at least 
by implication, to question the reliability of scientific inquiry and its claim to epistemological 
certainty. The field known as ‘Science Studies’, where cultural critique is carried out in 
relation to scientific knowledge, was one direction that seemed to take cultural critique over 
from literature to science itself, and thereby widen the epistemological gulf between the arts 
and humanities, and the sciences. Moreover, for its opponents, the habit of distrust and the 
burgeoning appeal of social constructivism seemed to have endowed critics with ‘a defensive 
force field that renders [their findings] impervious to empirical criticism’ (Carroll, Darwinism 
29). This, according to Latour, led critics to fall under the spell of this power and to believe 
that they alone possess the capacity to expose ideological constructions masquerading as 
truth, and that they alone are able to uncover the questionable nature of what is commonly 
passed off as indisputable fact. Also noted by postmodernism’s opponents is the undeniable 
temptation to sacrifice integrity and to give in to subjectivity, to label all that is not approved 
of as a ploy, to favour the certainty of science when it serves a certain purpose, and to admit 
to reality if it involves the existence of what is valued (Latour). The end result is a practice in 
danger of not only dismissing the study of literature in favour of ‘literariness,’ or discourse 
supremacy (Barry 274), but also subjecting itself to the scorn and ridicule of the sciences as in 
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the case of the Sokal affair.10  
     Having come to an agreement of sorts on the root cause of the malaise, both the 
traditionalists and the literary Darwinists hold it necessary to abandon theory if the field of 
literary study is to be saved from its state of irrelevance and its continual decline; but whereas 
traditionalists propose the restoration of the classical paradigms as another important step to 
recovering the centrality of literary study,11 the Darwinists believe that there is still hope for a 
new interdisciplinarity, provided that it is grounded on new and more considered foundations. 
This is crucial, they maintain, because the problem of an autonomy that leads to trivialization, 
irrelevance and marginalization stems, for the most part, in their view, from the fact that most 
of the theories that are still operable in the field of literary criticism had long been discarded 
and deemed as fallacious by their parent disciplines. An example of that, of course, would be 
the psychoanalytical approach and its outdated Freudian principles, or better yet, 
poststructuralism and its flawed Saussurean linguistics (Carroll, Darwinism ix; Nordlund). 
Literary Darwinists also maintain that the problem of autonomy can further be blamed on the 
standards that govern the uses of theory, considering how this commonly involves selecting 
and employing an approach based on the promise of producing interesting readings in one 
                                                          
10 According to Carroll, the distrust of scientific inquiry and the fixation on outdated theories, made possible by 
the field’s state of autonomy, have subjected the practice of criticism to ridicule. An example of such an attempt 
would be the Sokal affair. Alan Sokal set out to demonstrate that the editors of Social Text would publish an 
article ‘salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' ideological preconceptions.’ 
He claims that the editors were unable to tell that his article was meant as a parody of the postmodernist denial 
of the existence of an objective reality and the belief in the unreliability of the scientific method. The article 
‘Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity’ was actually 
published in the Spring/Summer 1996 issue of Social Text. See ‘A Physicist Experiments with Cultural Studies’ 
in Lingua Franca May/June 1996.   
11 Scholars who are more dedicated to traditional norms when it comes to the study of literature adhere to 
different principles in their scholastic pursuits, and as such, they cannot be simplistically associated with one 
school or approach. However, they seem united to a certain extent in their belief that the western canon contains 
most of the values, standards and norms that can be brought to the study of literature, and in their opposition to 
some of the key principles that have come to define theory-driven or poststructuralist approaches (Carroll, 
Darwinism 31). There are the new critics or subscribers to the school of close reading, for example, who believe 
in the autonomy of texts and that the interpretation process does not require consulting any sources outside the 
text (31). Their opposition to poststructuralism can be said to be stemming from their ‘dislike’ of how it 
‘[dissolves] texts into the amorphous mass of textuality,’ or of how it extends textuality, in its new historicist 
form, to the ‘social context’ (31). There are also subscribers to the historical-biographical approach who might 
oppose the manner by which poststructuralists undermine the authority and control of the author or the capacity 
of texts to genuinely represent their times (31). Pragmatic criticism also retains some traditional elements in that 
it rejects the poststructuralist theory in favour of the kind of theory derived from canonical works, and which is 
normally regarded as a ‘much more complete and adequate “criticism of life”’ than any other deconstructivist 
approach (32). After all, the canon is believed to contain ‘the best that is known and thought in the world’ 
(Arnold 19; Carroll, Darwinism 33). Philosophical, religious or psychological systems might be brought to the 
text, but since they are regarded as incapable of accounting for the full complexity of texts and the human 
experience, pluralism is encouraged (Carroll, Darwinism 32-3). Judging by Golding’s views on art, he might be 
classified as a champion of not only traditional notions of literary study, but also pluralism as I will later on 
show.    
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area, but elsewhere granting validity to an entirely different and contradictory methodology, 
or skewing the theory if it resists application to a particular text (Nordlund). Given this 
condition of fragmentation, it became necessary for theoretically inclined critics to call 
increasingly for a metatheoretical framework in order to save literary criticism from its turf 
wars and to recover a condition of stability and consistency, both within itself and in its 
relation with other branches of knowledge (Nordlund).  
      But a key difficulty for the foundation of a new interdisciplinarity is the overcoming of 
problematic earlier conceptualizations of human nature, especially those exhibited in what 
came to be known as what Stephen Pinker referred to, alluding to David Hume, as the blank 
slate or the standard social science model (SSSM). This conception, though carrying a long 
history within empiricist philosophy, took a cultural turn from the 1930s and 40s with the 
development of sociology, cultural anthropology and behaviourism. It continued to prevail in 
the humanities and social sciences given its powerful and persuasive political and social 
appeal, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War and the fall of Social Darwinism 
(See Pinker, Blank Slate 139). The most important culturalist models are founded on some 
belief that evolution created human nature which, in turn, created culture so that it had 
become possible for human beings to change from biological beings to cultural ones, and for 
cultural energies to become the sole autonomous driving force in the moulding process that 
shapes humanity. Given how this appealing dogma of the ‘blank slate’ seems to release 
humans from scientific determinism, it found a welcoming home in the social sciences before 
it became absorbed widely into the humanities and the study of literature. And though 
cognitive neuroscience and psychoanalysis, with their reliance on biological facts, posed their 
own set of challenges to the doctrine of the blank slate, it was not as easily threatened as when 
E.O Wilson published Sociobiology in 1975 with the hope of reviving arguments for the 
continuing relevance of human origins and our ancestry in the animal world. Wilson’s book 
caused a furore in its aim to challenge the blank slate view, not only in demonstrating how 
most of our behaviour is still governed by biology as much as culture, but also in committing 
what was considered then to be the unforgivable taboo of analysing human behaviour in terms 
of evolutionary processes. Needless to say, Wilson was accused of harbouring a political 
agenda—a charge which he and his proponents denied—and of being committed to a 
reductionist biological determinism that denied the complexity of human behaviour and held 
the danger of legitimizing slavery, paving the way for another genocide, locking people into 
cast systems, and risking all the positive prospects that the doctrine of the blank slate could 
ever offer humanity (Pinker, Blank Slate 106-8). Despite all the negative criticism, however, 
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Wilson did manage to acquire supporters for his effort to achieve the integration of 
evolutionary biology with the social sciences, and for utilizing the synthesis in bridging the 
gulf between the natural sciences and the humanities. This support gradually took shape as 
adaptationist literary theory, Evocriticism, or what is more commonly known as Literary 
Darwinism. 
     The integration of an evolutionary understanding of human nature with the humanities in 
general and the study of literature in particular is not, of course, a recent achievement. The 
effort began in Victorian criticism following the publication of Darwin’s theory of evolution, 
and first made a full appearance in Hippolyte Taine’s contribution to literary criticism before 
it later appeared in the works of Emile Zola, Leslie Stephen and Carl Jung (Carroll, 
Darwinism xiv; Ryan). However, in 1995, Joseph Carroll presented a more systematic and 
cohesive approach to the study of literature in an attempt to produce the kind of findings that 
are ‘not only new but true’ (Reading 29), but that are also in accordance with the aim of 
realizing Wilson’s vision of consilience, of having ‘an integrated body of knowledge 
extending in an unbroken chain of material causation from the lowest level of subatomic 
particles to the highest levels of cultural imagination’ (5). The basic principle that can be said 
to underlie the adaptationist program is that most critical pursuits involve, in one way or 
another, a view of human nature, even the postmodernist view that there is no human nature. 
And since a faulty theory of human nature would only render further faulty findings, it is 
considered necessary first to formulate an understanding of the human mind that is in 
accordance with what is currently known and established in the evolutionary study of human 
behaviour (Reading 32; Darwinism 24). This resulted in the initial consideration of the 
Integrated Model, which was proposed by psychologist Leda Cosmides and anthropologist 
John Tooby in the early 90s as a way of countering the prevalence of the blank slate by 
emphasizing the human mind’s massive modularity and highlighting the innate complexity of 
its structure. The model’s core premise is that the processes of evolution by natural selection 
has resulted in the emergence of the kind of structure that is more akin in its design to that of 
a Swiss-army knife in that it is composed of different specialized modules, each targeting a 
set of problems that our ancestors had to deal with as early as the Pleistocene period (165-6). 
     Carroll’s reliance on the model, however, had to come to an end due to a set of 
problematic notions associated with the very heart of the theory. One problem, for example, is 
the claim that mental evolution stabilized and ceased in the Pleistocene period, leaving the 
descendants for the next 1.6 million years with a hunter-gatherer mentality that engendered a 
mismatch between the human brain and the current environments, and resulted in a certain set 
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of behaviours becoming maladaptive (Carroll, ‘Revolution’).12 There is also the problem of 
how the theory had failed to take into account the earlier evolutionary environments that lay 
further beyond the Pleistocene, or even to consider the Pleistocene’s fluctuating 
environmental elements that would have surely made the hypothesized stabilization of mental 
functions impossible (‘Revolution’). In addition, there is the theory’s inability to address the 
emergence of art and technology some 60,000 to 30,000 years ago, especially given its 
advocacy of the persistence of a Stone Age mentality in a modern world. It makes it difficult 
to provide a convincing argument as to why a brain that had supposedly ceased evolving 
during the Pleistocene period would suddenly be capable of creating the revolution of art or 
culture (Carroll, ‘Revolution’; Mithen 20). Finally and most importantly, it would be difficult 
for the theory to explain adequately how a massively modular brain allows for the demanding 
engagement with art, culture and technology in the absence of general intelligence, given that 
such cognitive manoeuvers require a certain degree of mental flexibility that cannot be 
afforded easily by the automaticity of cognitive modules, even if they were to tackle these 
tasks ‘in aggregate’ rather than individually (Carroll, ‘Revolution’; Tooby and Cosmides, 
‘Foundations’ 113).  
     In an effort to solve the riddle of art, religion and culture, archaeologist Steven Mithen 
proposed a model of the human brain which, though it may initially seem to support the 
extreme modularity view of the evolutionary psychologists, is still uniquely different in that it 
emphasizes the emergence of a general intelligence as one of the essential phases in the 
evolution of the human mind. By utilizing research on primate behaviour, archaeology and 
anthropology, Mithen maintains that it is possible to imagine the structure of our common 
ancestor’s mind as not particularly oriented to dealing with specific tasks because it was yet to 
be presented with the selective pressures that allowed for the evolution of the much more 
efficient domain-specific modules commonly noted as geared towards more specific forms of 
behaviour. This phase, he explains, is possibly the first phase in the evolution of the human 
mind. Since we are characterized by a highly social nature which we share with our primate 
cousins, it is highly possible that a module for social intelligence was the first domain-specific 
module to evolve before other forms of intelligence such as natural history intelligence, tool-
use intelligence, and language intelligence came to follow. Mithen states that our homo-
sapiens ancestors might have initially been imprisoned in this second phase of mental 
                                                          
12 One such behaviour is the craving for diets that are rich in sugar and fat that is believed to have served our 
ancestors well in the demanding environment of the Pleistocene; however, now that such diets have become 
abundant, our evolved preference for fat and sugar has led to increasing obesity rates (Carroll, ‘Revolution’). 
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evolution when they first emerged 100,000 years ago and were not in possession of the mental 
flexibility needed to address tasks that require the integration of different modules. In order to 
illustrate this, he pictures the brain as a church with multiple compartments and chambers 
separated by thick walls that are supposed to symbolize how the ancestors caught in the 
second phase found it hard to use one kind of intelligence to aid in fulfilling the purposes for 
which another intelligence evolved. For the third phase of evolution, however, such walls or 
cognitive barriers would eventually break or collapse, allowing for the compartments to 
communicate finally with one another, and ultimately to give rise to the important process of 
‘cognitive fluidity’ which Mithen believes to be responsible for facilitating the creation of the 
demanding constructs of culture, art and technology.13 
     Mithen’s cognitive fluidity eventually came to replace massive modularity in Carroll’s 
Literary Darwinism in 2004 as a model that takes into account the structure and stages of 
mental development that made the evolution of art possible. Despite the progress that was 
garnered by the adoption of the new model, however, adaptationists still found themselves 
incapable of concluding the debate on one of the most controversial areas in the field relating 
to the question of why the arts evolved. A simple answer would be because engagement with 
the arts, or more specifically, fictional creations, is pleasurable. But why would the 
consumption of nonfactual information be regarded as such for beings who should supposedly 
be more attuned to factual data if they wanted to survive? Most of the evolutionary theories 
proposed were found to argue either for an adaptationist stance or an anti-adaptationist one. 
Those who consider fiction in its most literary sense as an adaptation were inclined to think of 
it as such because they believe that any costly behaviour that diverts resources away from 
other vital behaviours is an adaptation, or it would not have continued to be naturally selected 
over the course of the many years that marked our struggle for survival (Austin 12; B. Boyd, 
Origin 73). They also believe that the presence of certain consistent art forms such as music, 
dance or poetry along with fiction across both primitive and advanced societies around the 
globe is likely to be indicative not only of a set of biological roots that were possibly fostered 
                                                          
13 This shift in perspective, however, demonstrates one of the field’s controversial aspects, exemplified in the 
difficulty of keeping up with the sciences. The theory was found to require constant updating in accordance with 
recent findings in the collective discipline of evolutionary psychology as well as those of the social and natural 
sciences. Although this does not constitute a negativity in itself, it had caused some misconceptions about the 
theory’s potential in accounting for the complexity of the humanities, and as such, it had resulted in a reluctance 
to adopt it. An example of this can be seen in Jonathan Kramnick’s ‘Against Literary Darwinism’ in which he 
associates the Literary Darwinists’ arguments for art as an adaptation with massive modularity, the theory they 
have abandoned in favour of cognitive fluidity. It should be noted, however, that there are actually prominent 
figures in the field who until recently were seen to be associating their evolutionary arguments regarding art 
with massive modularity as Kramnick explained in his reply.  
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by natural selection for the purpose of aiding the development of the arts, but also of a hidden 
function that justifies its evolution and persistence (B. Boyd, Origin 73). They even cite the 
fact that it is a pleasurable activity that ‘develops reliably in all humans without training,’ and 
that it arouses a marked emotional response in its recipients to be suggestive of a crucial 
significance or a survival value because pleasure and emotional arousal are nature’s way of 
encouraging the organism’s engagement with behaviours that should supposedly promote its 
genetic fitness (B. Boyd, Origin 73; Dissanayake, ‘Ideology’). Despite this apparent 
agreement among supporters of the fiction as an adaptation claim, however, there is no clear 
consensus on why exactly our capacity for arts, or more specifically fictional creations, 
evolved. Ellen Dissanayake, for example, proposes that one of the chief functions of art is that 
of ‘making special,’ of exaggerating or setting off important elements out of their usual 
context in a manner similar to play and ritual, as a way of highlighting the body of objects or 
behaviours that are important for survival such as hand axes or social cohesion (Art 126-7). 
Then there are psychologists Tooby and Cosmides who maintain that art, or more specifically 
fiction, serves an important survivalist function in that it promotes mental organization, and 
allows human beings to contemplate navigating possible life-threatening scenarios in advance, 
without having to resort to the costly measure of putting themselves through any actual risk or 
danger (‘Beauty’). Similarly, Joseph Carroll maintains, in clear support of E.O. Wilson, that 
because the evolution of intelligence has marked our estrangement from the instinctual world, 
and because ‘[there] was not enough time for human heredity to cope with the vastness of 
new contingent possibilities revealed by high intelligence,’ the arts evolved as a means of 
carrying the important function of ‘[filling] the gap’ (Carroll, Darwinism 81; Wilson 246). For 
Brian Boyd, however, the development of the arts should not be restricted to serving one 
single function because it is possible to see them as playing an important role in improving 
the brain’s plasticity and neural wiring, as well as promoting and honing a variety of skills 
and activities that are essential for group-living such as the capacity to track intentions, beliefs 
and connections, detect cheaters, and avoid the costly outcome of falling victim to defectors 
(‘Theories’ 151-3).   
     All of these theories, of course, contend that art is a biologically rooted behaviour with an 
enormous survival value. However, for Geoffrey Miller, an evolutionary psychologist who 
traces the development of large brains to factors of sexual selection and mate preference, it is 
possible to regard the arts as not so different from a peacock’s tail or a bower bird’s nest in 
that they are products of sexual selection that mainly fulfils the function of advertising sexual 
fitness. As for Steve Pinker, Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould, it might be an 
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overstatement to consider the arts as anything more than a highly elaborate outcome of other 
adaptations, based on the condition of complexity or the pleasure factor alone. In fact, they 
maintain that it is not impossible for a by-product to assume a highly sophisticated 
manifestation without having evolved to serve a certain function specifically, or for a complex 
behaviour to arouse pleasure without its being nothing more than a drug or a ‘mental 
cheesecake’ (Pinker, Blank Slate 405; Gould and Lewontin).14 For Michael Austin, though, 
our capacity to consume and produce art, or rather fiction, should not be solely regarded in 
terms of a mere adaptation or an elaborate by-product, but should rather be considered along 
the lines of a useful tool that makes use of the complex design and structure of the human 
mind for the purpose of helping us cope with our world (14-5). This theory, in particular, 
while not specifically favoured as providing a more accurate account of the function of fiction 
than any of the other propositions, will be revisited later given its association with the 
functions of memory, anxiety and cognitive bias. It will prove vital to both analysing the 
novels in question and debunking the claim that an evolutionary theory of criticism can never 
be reconciled with the postmodern or poststructuralist approaches to art. 
     For an artist such as Golding who was deeply interested in the matter of art as a behaviour, 
and who had written extensively on the issue in an attempt to highlight its status as both a 
common and a mystical act, no clear answer seems to have presented itself as to why people 
are driven to the consumption and production of fictional creations aside from the simple fact 
that there is a deep sense of pleasure and delight to be gotten from such acts (Target 158-9). 
However, although Golding had always been the kind of artist who insisted on the mystery of 
the act of creativity, and who opposed any scientific or reductive explanations of the human 
condition, particularly those that were aligned with Darwin, Freud or Marx (186-7), there are 
moments when he appears to be clearly favouring a naturalistic view rather than a cultural one 
(131). In his 1976 lecture, Golding maintains: 
                                                          
14 Pinker believes that people who are involved in the arts usually argue in favour of the arts-as-an-adaptation 
view perhaps to emphasize their importance, grant them validity, or ‘protect them from budget-conscious 
politicians seeking to cut them from school curricula’ (‘Consilient Study of Literature’). He warns, though, that 
adaptive, in strictly evolutionary terms, does not have to necessarily mean good because there are a lot of 
behaviours that although have proven themselves to be contributing to our species’ reproductive success, are 
still deemed as deleterious such as killing or stealing as I will later on show. For Brian Boyd, however, Pinker’s 
by-product argument, or rather his famous ‘cheesecake for the mind’ view, is rather lacking because it only 
addresses the consumption of art. It does not explain why humans are willing to make the effort to create art that 
does not necessarily instruct, and it does not adequately answer the question as to why it is universal. Boyd also 
found Pinker’s art analogy with our appetite for diets that are rich in fat and sugar to be suggestive of a 
prophesized maladaptivity, given how this propensity is normally tackled as an example of the mismatch 
between our Pleistocene brains and our current environment (‘Theories’ 13-4). 
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[we] like to hear of succession of events; and, as an inspection of the press will 
demonstrate, have only a marginal interest in whether the succession is minutely true 
or not. … More simply and directly still in the examination of our nature; when 
children holler and yell because of some infant tragedy or tedium, at once, when we 
take them on our knee and begin—shouting if necessary—‘Once upon a time’, they 
fall silent and attentive. Standing as we do in some way tiptoe at the apex of the 
animal kingdom, story is in our nature. There will always be stories written and 
published (158-9).     
Golding also appears to be of the opinion that whatever the mental faculties that are involved 
in the art behaviour, they were most probably ‘thrust on us’ by nature ‘for the exercise of the 
craft itself’ (195). One such faculty is what is commonly known as the ‘willing suspension of 
disbelief’ that generally involves the ability ‘to accept the scraps, the hastily gathered 
observations [and] the leaps and gambols of language’ for the purpose of sinking into an 
alternative world or ‘[sharing] some level of reality’ (195). He even proposes the phrase ‘the 
reader’s instinctive complicity’ as an alternative to the term ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ 
because he wants to downplay the implications of the ‘conscious decision and effort’ 
associated with the first term and emphasize, instead, our natural and unconscious readiness 
‘to receive writing’ (194). All of these observations help in lending credence to the argument 
that art for Golding might have been a biological phenomenon and ‘a distinguishing mark of 
[the human] mind’ (131). And although little was said regarding the motivations or instincts 
driving the creative act, rather than the reception of it, the fact that Golding associated the 
persistence of art with the continuity of human conflict, selfishness and aggression seem to 
suggest that it is human nature, for Golding, that is both the source and subject of art and 
literature (184). 
     Such a view is actually one of the most crucial foundations upon which the adaptationist 
programme is built, a fact that can be seen in its proponents’ tendency to regard art as a 
biologically-rooted behaviour that might have evolved to fulfil certain important functions. It 
can also be detected in their insistence on restoring the artists’ authority over their creations 
by classifying them as among the ‘best psychologists’ of our history (Carroll, Darwinism 
109). Literature, states Carroll, can be one of the most readily available sources of 
information on human nature (109). In fact, he maintains that novelists, poets and playwrights 
possess an intuitive understanding of what makes us human that gets translated into their 
depiction of their characters, their lives and their experiences within their own little fictional 
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worlds with a great accuracy (109). This basic knowledge of human nature also appears to be 
allowing the artists some sense of control over their audience, considering how necessary it is 
to know exactly how to keep a hand ‘firmly on the nape of the reader’s neck’ (Golding, 
Target 131), how to never let go of the reader’s attention once secured (131), and how to 
manipulate the reader’s response, emotions and sympathies in a manner that serves the 
purpose for which the work was created (Carroll, Darwinism 109). Following this logic, 
attempts at locating the text within an evolutionary understanding of human nature might 
prove illuminating in terms of deducing the common psychological factors involved in the 
assessment, evaluation and the general reception of the text as a whole. They can also prove 
helpful in terms of understanding the basics underlying how characters, as ‘a locus for the 
organization of human experience’ (19), are judged and perceived. Moreover, adaptationists 
emphasize that characters in literary texts should not to be regarded as ‘autonomous textual 
creations,’ but should rather be tackled as ‘reflections of genuine human beings who—
consistently confronted with conflict and choice—must make decisions that impact their 
capacity for survival’ (Mallory-Kani and Womack). According to David Barash and Nanelle 
Barash: 
Even the loftiest products of human imagination are, first of all, emanations of that 
gooey, breathing, eating, sleeping, defecating, reproducing, evolving, and evolved 
creature known as Homo sapiens. We aren't idealized, ethereal essences but genuine 
biological beings, shaped by evolution and twisted and gnarled by life itself. This is 
why the most damning observation that can be made about a character in a novel (or 
play or movie) is that he or she isn't believable, which is another way of saying that 
for fiction to make sense, it must accord with a kind of evolutionary reality. Too 
much artificial straightness won't do (8).15  
     For Golding, the novel is an excellent vehicle for testing and exploring common accepted 
notions about human nature, a thought experiment for proving their validity or the lack of it 
through realistically designed characters, placed in carefully constructed social and 
environmental conditions that are supposed to highlight how some of the essential or 
                                                          
15 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but they are noted by the Barashes as rare. They maintain, in fact, 
that even these rare examples offer a ‘paradoxical confirmation’ of the rule of imitation (7-8). Achilles, for 
example, though ‘physically inhuman,’ is still granted a realistically human psychology (8). He possesses many 
recognizably human traits like ‘intense competitiveness, a penchant for sulking…and a tendency toward anger 
when deprived of a loved one’ (8).   
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universal aspects shared by all of mankind foster a certain response or behaviour. He states in 
‘Belief and Creativity,’ for example, that one of the essential factors driving the creation of 
the novel for him is his desire to know, understand and reveal what humanity is really about: 
What man is, whatever man is under the eye of heaven, that I burn to know and 
that—I do not say this lightly—I would endure knowing. The themes closest to my 
purpose, to my imagination have stemmed from that preoccupation, have been of 
such a sort that they might move me a little nearer that knowledge. They have been 
themes of man at extremity, man tested like building material, taken into laboratory 
and used to destruction; man isolated, man obsessed, man drowning in a literal sea or 
in the sea of his own ignorance (Target 199).16      
Golding also maintains to Haffenden that the novelist is always ‘unwillingly…engaged in the 
process of being human’(106), and that it follows from there that almost everything the 
novelist writes would, in one way or another, be concerned with some of ‘the basic questions 
of human behaviour and human life’(119), or ‘else you’re writing articles about chess’ (106). 
Writing about the human condition means exploring human relations, and this is where the 
novel as a vehicle for communicating and exploring moral conceptions and questions comes 
in (Golding in Grove); but if the novel is to succeed in fulfilling this particular purpose, it 
first has to present a realistic depiction of humanity or communicate its premises, morals and 
purposes through ‘people who convince’ (Golding in Biles, Talk 8). This principle, Golding 
states, was basically the governing factor driving the creation of his first and most successful 
novel Lord of the Flies (1954) where the use of ‘the literary convention of boys stranded on 
an island’ was only secondary to his decision to utilize his knowledge of how boys behave for 
the purpose of proving that it is human nature, not the social system, that is the root cause of 
our problems (Gates78-9). Golding’s familiarity with boys was made possible, of course, by 
virtue of his being a father, a son, and a schoolmaster. This, he maintains, not only allowed 
him ‘to understand and know [boys] with an awful precision,’ but also granted him a position 
from which he could revise Ballantyne’s flawed conception of human nature by using ‘real 
boys’ instead of the lifeless ‘paper cutouts’ that Ballantyne relied on (78-9). Nevertheless, 
although realism seems to have been the preferred fictional mode for Golding, as with others 
of his generation such as Iris Murdoch, there is often a gap between his stated preference and 
                                                          
16 What is interesting perhaps about this quotation is the idea that extreme situations expose the essential being 
of human individuals, requiring that they throw off socially acquired habits or disguises, a theme that is of 
course explored in Shakespeare’s plays such as King Lear. 
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his literary practices, suggesting that in order to convey his vision of human nature, he had to 
push beyond the conventions of social or psychological realism. For several critics, 
particularly when it comes to characterization, there are moments when Golding’s characters 
appear to be falling short of his own standards, possessing a prophetic vision, a profound 
insight into the human condition and an essential and indisputable goodness that is 
uncharacteristic of the instinctual cruelty that is argued for elsewhere by Golding. Their 
creation, Golding maintains, however, is supposed to be an amalgamation of all the good and 
kindness that he had found in the people around him. They are a device or a ‘plot mechanism’ 
within the context of the novel that can help in foiling his other more realistic characters and 
in highlighting the unfortunate, yet universal and instinctual roots of their fallen nature 
(Golding in Baker, ‘Interview’).17 It is possible, of course, to detect the same tendency even 
in the construction of the supposedly realistic characters in the early fabular works given how 
they sometimes appear to have been cast as a type rather than granted the depth and marked 
individuality of the characters of Golding’s more social novels. It is important to note, 
though, that such characters are meant to be Everyman figures in a fable, and as such, they 
do, in the end, help in reinforcing the claim of universality and in highlighting the instinctual 
roots of humanity’s ailments. 
Problems with the Evolutionary Paradigm 
Examining Golding’s novels through a pure adaptationist lens is not unproblematic. The field, 
for one thing, is fraught with controversies stemming for the most part from its reliance on 
evolutionary psychology as the pivotal discipline offering a bridge between the humanities 
and the natural and social sciences. Evolutionary psychology has been subjected to vigorous 
critiques over the years.18 This is possibly the case because a good number of the hypotheses 
proposed regarding the development of certain behaviours by evolutionary psychologists are 
regarded as ‘just so stories’ that are difficult to verify and test and that are not adequately 
                                                          
17 In an earlier interview with Kermode, Golding maintained that Simon would most definitely be 
‘comprehensible’ and understandable to the illiterate reader who believes in the reality of the spiritual realm and 
the existence of a good God (‘Meaning’ 9-10). His analysis of Nathaniel, who is as much of a saint as Simon, 
years later, however, seems to contradict this very notion to a certain extent, considering how he refers to him as 
more of a plot mechanism and less of a realistic depiction.  
18 For Brian Boyd, author of On the Origin of Stories (2009), and one of the main contributors to the 
adaptationist program, a clear distinction must be drawn between the narrow discipline of Evolutionary 
Psychology that is normally associated with concepts such as massive modularity or mismatch theory, and with 
the much broader research program of evolutionary psychology that includes: ‘evolutionary theory, ethology, 
linguistics, artificial intelligence, game theory, evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary economics, 
neurophysiology, analytic and experimental philosophy, evolutionary epistemology, and many branches of 
psychology—clinical, comparative, developmental, evolutionary, personality, and social’ (39). 
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backed by solid evidence (Crews). As a result, employing them in a program that claims 
consilience to be one of its principal aims might not help much in realizing the program’s 
goals because it contradicts its logic of ‘[using] the most up-to-date and agreed-upon science’ 
in its attempt to rescue the field of literary study from its state of autonomy and irrelevance 
(Kramnick, ‘Reply’). Evolutionary psychology has also been criticised for its reductionist 
account of human behaviour, its tendency to focus on genetic rather than cultural factors and 
its propensity to seek universals and ignore individual cases (Lickliter and Honeycutt). The 
same charges were also directed against the adaptationist program in its application of 
evolutionary psychology to literary texts, or rather in its seeking confirmation of the 
discipline’s hypotheses in artistic creations (Kramnick, ‘Reply’), to be focused on human 
universals and to be reducing the depth and richness of literary creations to matters of survival 
and reproductive success (Kramnick, ‘Reply’; Goodheart). Moreover, there was very quickly 
increasing dissatisfaction with the way the adaptationists use the discipline to study texts 
‘empirically,’ as in the case of Eugene Goodheart who questioned the ability of the language 
of science to capture the branching intricacy of the humanities. Science, after all, almost 
always seeks regularities and is likely to result, as such, in compromising the complexity of 
literature and the practice of literary criticism (Jannidas). Similarly, Fredrick Crews’ 
‘Apriorism for Empiricists’ claims that studying literature from an adaptationist perspective is 
like extracting data for the fields of anthropology and psychology without recognizing the 
features that make a work of art unique. Crews also accuses the adaptationists of selecting 
texts that obey a Darwinian logic and of refusing to admit the limitations of the field by 
examining more challenging texts such as ‘Kubla Khan’ or Waiting for Godot. 
     In responding to these charges, adaptationists note that their initial focus on human 
universals was deemed a necessary counterargument to the postmodernist view of social and 
cultural constructivism, as well as an effort to establish the biological roots of art so as to 
analyse it as a behaviour. They also note that reductionism is inescapable in any attempt ‘at 
producing real knowledge,’ and that ‘[even] the most rudimentary form of literary 
commentary—analytic summary or paraphrase—constitutes an exercise in reduction’ 
(Carroll, Reading 29).19 Moreover, Carroll maintains that he is aware that an evolutionary 
                                                          
19 This, they maintain, is most definitely the case because interpretation is a highly dynamic and complex 
process that requires considering different relations between the text, the world and the reader, and the 
enormous and almost infinite possibilities and directions that such relations can hold (Nordlund). As a result, 
‘both traditional humanists and poststructuralists’ can be considered as possessing ‘their own typical forms of 
reductionism’ which they might have set up in accordance with the kind of elements, relations, or possibilities 
that they are attuned to stressing in the interpretation process. Consequently, they may be regarded as different 
from the adaptationists ‘only in the terms to which they seek to reduce texts’ (Carroll, Reading 29; Nordlund).  
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understanding of human nature is not without its flaws or ‘absolutely true’ because no account 
of the human experience can ever attain such a status (Darwinism 24). He still notes, 
however, that because an evolutionary account of life and human experience is the most 
‘adequate’ and ‘complete’ explanation provided so far, it was adopted as a basis for the 
evaluation of any consideration or theory of literature and culture before it is allowed 
integration into the Darwinian paradigm (24). He also seems to suggest, judging by his 
reservation regarding the field of Cognitive Poetics, which he believes tends to stress its 
cognitive engagements more so than its evolutionary affiliations (Reading 8), that any 
interpretive effort must ‘overtly’ ground itself on a Darwinian or evolutionary logic because 
‘muting’ or ‘minimizing’ such aspects means downplaying ‘the explanation that matters’ 
(Jackson). This created a problem for the other adaptationists who share Carroll’s vision of 
consilience, but who do not agree with his extreme version of adaptationism. In fact, Carroll’s 
insistence on Darwinizing every explanation and on tracing it to a biological level have 
resulted in the negative reception of the program’s proponents as a group of fundamentalists 
who are intolerant of other valid approaches to the study of art, and who are set on converting 
non-subscribers to their extreme and ultra-Darwinian ways (Gottschall, ‘Consilience’; 
Jackson). There is also Carroll’s antagonism towards postmodern theory, his ambitious goal 
of altering the literary paradigm and his insistence on subordinating all other approaches to an 
evolutionary metatheory to consider, and which seem to have either fuelled doubts regarding 
the theory’s potential of enriching the field of literary study, or contributed to the total 
rejection of adaptationism altogether (Carroll, Reading 5; Gottschall, ‘Consilience’; Jackson). 
     In an attempt to argue against Carroll’s ambitious take on consilience, scholars who are 
somewhat drawn to an adaptationist persuasion such as Jonathan Gottschall, Marcus 
Nordlund and Edward Slingerland strictly emphasize that the purpose of the program is to 
help the field of literary study emulate the success and cohesiveness of the sciences. They 
believe it would be helpful to ground its existing schools and approaches on a firmer basis and 
to ameliorate its academic pursuits with more empirical methods that can further nourish its 
disinterested spirit and contribute to the production of progressive and objective knowledge 
(Gottschall, ‘Consilience’; Nordlund; Slingerland). They strictly maintain, however, that 
studying literature within such a frame of reference does not necessarily entail that every 
explanation has to appeal to some Darwinian logic or be ‘be carried out in the terms of some 
discipline farther down the explanatory hierarchy’ (Gottschall, ‘Consilience’). On the 
contrary, they assert that although evolutionary investigations can often prove insightful, 
certain scholastic literary efforts might benefit more from being conducted ‘within the 
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traditional bounds’ of the humanities rather than being carried in accordance with ‘the new 
sciences of the mind’ (Gottschall, ‘Consilience’; Slingerland). Moreover, moderate 
adaptationists, they assert, do not wish to subsume all other investigations of art, replace 
existing schools, or even realize Carroll’s ambitious aim of taking the Darwinian paradigm to 
a point where literary criticism and adaptationism can become ‘synonymous’ (Gottschall, 
‘Consilience’; Nordlund; Slingerland). On the contrary, they do believe that there are other 
ways of attaining consilience and that an evolutionary literary theory is not the sole or 
ultimate way of doing so (Gottschall, ‘Consilience’). A similar sentiment was echoed by 
Jonathan Kramnick and Gabrielle Starr, who though they are clearly in favour of exploring 
the different relations between the sciences and the study of literature and how such relations 
can prove illuminating for both fields, are still of the opinion that adaptationism is only one 
possible relation to explore and a very limited one. Their reasoning behind such a conclusion 
is that adaptationism dictates, ‘as it is currently configured,’ that ‘no form of literary study 
should take place without being at least in conformity with the principles of evolutionary 
theory’ (Starr; Kramnick, ‘Reply’). Furthermore, both Kramnick and Starr maintain that the 
problem of relying on a faulty conception of human nature and the mind, a matter which had 
been specifically targeted by adaptationists as one of the fundamental reasons why the 
humanities are in decline, may, in fact, be solved by paying more attention to what had been 
uncovered and established in different fields of psychology, and not specifically the 
evolutionary discipline. In fact, they assert that just because the arts are produced by a mind 
that had been shaped by natural selection, does not necessarily dictate that every literary 
investigation be conducted within the bounds of an evolutionary paradigm, especially when 
there are other disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience that can provide much firmer and 
less controversial foundations than evolutionary psychology. They also believe that ‘there’s 
no need’ for literary scholars to ‘give up what [they] do best should [they] care to look at what 
others do’ (Kramnick, ‘Reply’), considering how there are times when there is ‘more 
explanatory power’ to their own means of inquiry rather than those dictated by the sciences, 
or derived from other disciplines (Starr). 
     My interest in the adaptationist program sprang out of the desire to develop an 
understanding of fiction in general and Golding’s creations in particular through a 
psychological scope that is more in accordance with contemporary psychology than the 
commonly deployed yet outdated Freudian, Lacanian or Jungian frameworks. Indeed, it was 
the field’s scientific spirit as well as its proponents’ insistence on opening the humanities up 
to the most current and up-to-date contributions in other fields of knowledge that initially 
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appealed to me given the promise that such an initiative held in relation to bringing the two 
cultures together and to helping the humanities break out of its state of autonomy. There was 
also the focus on the adapted mind as the source of the creative act that further motivated me 
to engage in the adaptationist paradigm, not only because of the insightful input that such a 
focus had rendered in relation to the origin and function of art, but also because of the 
significance it held regarding restoring the author’s authority and asserting his or her 
importance against the notion of the author’s death or dismissal. Moreover, evolutionary 
psychology seemed to offer particularly promising perspectives through which to explore 
Goldings’ novels, especially his more fabular creations, focused on asserting the universality 
of evil against the prevailing efforts at associating it with social systems such as Nazism 
rather than human nature. Indeed, it was after reading The Inheritors (1955) that it occurred to 
me that Golding’s work provided a rich source for thinking through evolutionary theory as it 
has developed since the postwar years, and also as it was developing at the time when 
Golding began to produce his novels in the early 1950s. However, aside from the problem of 
just how controversial the field actually turned out to be, I discovered, after I began to 
examine Golding’s entire oeuvre, that sole reliance on an evolutionary perspective would be 
highly reductionist, and not in a good way. This is particularly the case for his later creations 
which seem to have been intentionally written as a way of challenging simplistic 
interpretations in order to assert the complexity of texts as a reflection of the complexity of 
life itself, and to encourage a pluralistic approach to both life and art (Redpath 30; Clements 
95). This necessitated moving beyond the limited scope of evolutionary theory, and 
incorporating a range of views from diverse, yet consilient schools in contemporary 
psychology as a means of addressing the complex spiritual, social and cultural realities that 
Golding was becoming increasingly interested in, particularly at the later point of his career as 
a novelist. My interests in this thesis, to put it bluntly, are not strictly in line with the 
adaptationists’ views and vision, but are more of an attempt at exploring one possible way out 
of many possible others by which interdisciplinarity can illuminate certain aspects of the texts 
in question, and locate the author in the scientific contexts of production of his time. If I 
appear to be focusing on an evolutionary dimension in specific arguments at certain points of 
my research, it is not because I hope simply to appeal to a biological level of explanation in 
keeping with the ambitious version of adaptationism. On the contrary, most of the 
evolutionary arguments I engage in are supposed to explain how Golding’s knowledge of 
evolution, which he had obtained by virtue of his training in the sciences and his being raised 
by a Darwinian father, is being utilized and critiqued in subtle ways in his novels.         
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     My goals for this thesis are simple. I hope to analyse Golding’s conception of human 
nature in his fictional writings, and in close detail in three of his novels: The Inheritors 
(1955), Pincher Martin (1956) and Free Fall (1959). This involves providing the biological 
and cognitive foundations for the views that Golding had clearly conveyed within the confines 
of these novels and outside of them. It also involves tackling his characters as representations 
of genuine human beings whose dispositions are basically a product of a mind naturally 
selected for, interacting with unique environmental and social conditions. An important step 
towards accomplishing this goal is to locate Golding’s work, particularly The Inheritors, in 
the scientific, psychological and evolutionary thinking of his age, and to try to understand the 
kind of arguments that Golding might have been advocating, opposing or even employing in 
his experimental exploration of human nature. My preference for biological, cognitive and 
experimental existential psychology stems, for the most part, from a concern with producing a 
reading that is that is in accordance with what had been known and established in the social 
and natural sciences, and that is in keeping with a desire to at least entangle if not reconcile 
the field of literary study with other fields of knowledge. My choice of novels is designed to 
demonstrate most clearly a pattern in Golding’s grasp of cognitive development, with The 
Inheritors providing the foundation upon which the interpretation of the other two novels is to 
be based. Pincher Martin and Free Fall are read as attempts to construct two fictional 
characters as individuals who, though they have so much in common by virtue of their 
inherent nature and their shared morally and spiritually barren age, are deliberately shown as 
diverging in two different directions by choices that are freely made. A common theme tying 
all of my chapters together is morality, or the biological understanding of it, not only because 
of Golding’s interest in moral questions, but also because he clearly considered humanity to 
be as instinctually moral as it is evil (Golding in Baker, ‘Interview’). 
     The first chapter of my thesis will mainly provide an evolutionary understanding of the 
fall, a running theme in virtually all of Golding’s novels, by associating evil with the rise of 
modern intelligence. Such an association will be examined, first, in relation with the historical 
events and turbulences characterizing the age, and second, in terms of the archaeological, 
anthropological and biological findings of both the period that marked the production of the 
texts Golding was reacting to, and the one framing his own. The second chapter will deal with 
the simultaneous rise of evil and morality within the context of The Inheritors. It will present 
the Neanderthals’ lack of a clear and strict moral code as a major indication of their innocence 
or unfallen state, based on the evolutionary proposition that the enforcement of morality is a 
behaviour that evolved to counter the rise of aggression. The third chapter will deal with 
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pathological exceptions by holding Christopher Martin’s immense self-centeredness and 
egotism as representative of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It is a pathological condition 
tackled evolutionarily as a maladaptive manifestation of a supposedly adaptive trait that 
fosters in Christopher’s case an antisocial attitude and an incapacity to tolerate those 
compromising his self-image. The fourth chapter will once again address the connection 
between evil and modern intelligence, this time from a developmental perspective. The matter 
will be targetted, first, by comparing Sammy’s psychological and mental state as a child to 
that of his teenage days, and second, by highlighting how his experience of guilt as an adult is 
notably different from that of his child self. Finally, I will once again address the significance 
of interdisciplinary research and its constructive purpose of establishing some points of 
productive conversation in the relation between the sciences and literary theory. In fact, the 
issue will be undertaken in light of Golding’s later novels which contain some of his clearest 
statements regarding literary criticism and art as an instinct. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 The Biological Psychology of Evil 
 
We must produce homo moralis, the human being who cannot kill 
his own kind, nor exploit them nor rob them. Then no one will need 
to write utopias, satires or antiutopias for we shall be inhabitants of 
utopia as long as we can stay on the bicycle; and perhaps a little—
not much, but a little—dull. 
William Golding, ‘Utopias and Antiutopias’. 20  
 
 
Following the war, Golding developed a deep interest in the idea of human nature that might 
be regarded as eventually producing in his fictional writings a familiar mood of the 
pessimistic. The war to Golding was an experience of growing up, of seeing things clearly, of 
abandoning certain beliefs and embracing others, and most importantly, of having ‘one’s nose 
rubbed in the human condition’ (Golding in Biles, Talk 33). Golding went into the war with 
the conviction that the perfection of humanity is achievable so long as the pursuit of an ideal 
social structure is possible; however, the war experience destroyed his earlier vision and left 
him feeling it had been nothing more than a naive illusion, simply a denial of the reality of a 
tradition of regarding human nature through the lens of original sin. One might think that a 
summation of the effects of that newest experience, therefore, would be analogous to some 
sort of a conversion, a radical change of belief marked along the lines of a typical before and 
after transition, but to put it in those words would be oversimplifying it. The five years of 
service had gradually built upon what he already knew, confirmed his harboured uncertainties 
and showed him a side of human nature that he may have initially refused to believe existed 
(34).21 It was perhaps then that Golding became convinced of the inadequacy of the Wellsian 
tradition and the naive optimism that he had acquired from his father and his scientific 
training at Oxford in explaining the human condition; and though he turned to religiousness, 
                                                          
20 Moving Target, 184.  
21 Golding’s views regarding the rigidity and inadequacy of rationalism that so characterize his novels, for 
example, are also found in the poetry he published prior to the dreadful experience of serving in the navy 
(Baker, Study xiii). 
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he did not seek solace in any of the established religions for he found them to be 
characterized by the same misleading selectivity that marked the rationality of the sciences. 
     Golding returned from the war a changed man who wished to speak of his new found 
realizations but was reluctant to do so for he was doubtful of his capacity to communicate 
with readers. He did not think it was possible to bring people to understand what he took then 
as a ‘private idea’ of his; and even though he pursued what he thought was best at the time, 
which is to engage with what people wished to read rather than what he wanted to say, he did 
not find the undertaking as fulfilling as he had hoped it to be. It was only when the three 
books he wrote out of this misconceived notion were rejected that he began to realize that it 
was time he wrote his ‘own books and nobody else’s’ (15). The first of these books was Lord 
of the Flies (1954), which might be viewed as a perfect depiction of his belief that that any 
investigation into human nature should be more concerned with why man has a capacity for 
evil rather than dwelling on the question of ‘why he sometimes does good’ (106). Golding 
thought it logical to take on the task of holding a mirror up to humanity ‘when everybody was 
thanking God they weren’t Nazis’ in order to show that the atrocities that mankind are 
capable of are made possible by ‘certain deficiencies’ that could turn even the proclaimed 
good into the very same scorned eugenicists (34-5). For Golding, these defects came to be 
seen as an inextricable part of what defines mankind and not simply to be explained in terms 
of social ills; nor could they be purely blamed on the forces of history.22 It was with this 
novel that Golding resurrected humanity’s original sin and announced the demise of 
Rousseau’s noble savage. 
     Lord of the Flies was first rejected by twenty-one publishers before it caught the attention 
of Charles Monteith of Faber and Faber; though it took time to rise to critical acclaim, it won 
much praise from prominent critics and literary figures soon after it was published 
(McCarron, Golding 2; Carey, Golding 150-2). The novel tells the story of a group of 
schoolboys whose evacuation plane crashes on a deserted island with no sign of civilization 
or the restraining presence of the social sanctions they once knew. The boys initially hold on 
to the remnants of the civilized world within them, elect their own leader, and proceed to 
build a shelter and a signal fire, but they soon give in to their inner demons and descend into 
savagery. Gripped by a terror of their own creation, the boys lose sight of a common purpose 
and can only think of appeasing an illusory beast through a destructive ritual of hunt, blood 
                                                          
22 However, Golding strictly stresses that these two factors remain crucial for they could either nurture this 
inherent defect or supress it (in Biles, Talk 38, 45-9).  
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and violence that not only leads to the murdering of one boy and the crushing of another, but 
also to their setting the whole forest in flames in a mindless pursuit of the desire to smoke out 
the leader they once elected in order to kill him. Fortunately, the arrival of the naval officer 
brings this barbaric frenzy to an end and saves the life of the boy, but Golding refuses to 
grant his readers peace or closure for he insists with the reminder of the loss of innocence that 
mankind’s internal flaws will ensure the persistence of evil and its haunting realities. 
       Having his ‘fable’ end with such a note of uneasiness might have been meant to force 
readers to ponder the shaky basis of morality and humanity’s bleak future, but that is not all. 
The reference Golding makes to ‘the days of innocence’ is fraught with irony given the fact 
that the horrendous events of the novel were acted out by a group of boys who—according to 
what Golding perceives as a common misconception—should know nothing of evil (Golding 
in Biles, Talk 39-40). He clearly states that people’s tendency to mourn the age of innocence 
is a mere self-deception, a denial of their own terrifying capacities, and an escape from their 
mad reality into a time when evil was non-existent (40). Bent on robbing mankind of this 
kind of delusion, Golding published The Inheritors (1955) a year after Lord of the Flies, 
where he paints a vivid picture of a pre-fallen stage of innocence that precedes the corrupting 
existence of sin and evil. Ironically, however, the two radically different states of purity and 
sin are not portrayed as phases that our ancestors go through, but are brought in sharp 
contrast to one another with the additional inclusion of the Neanderthals as a distinct species 
in a manner that brings to mind the progressionist Victorian fiction of H.G. Wells. Golding 
seemingly abides by the Wellsian tradition in his depiction of a prehistoric setting where a 
group of Neanderthals whose appearance brings to mind the ‘pre-men’ of The Grisly Folk are 
pulled into a clash with the rational, intelligent and advanced Homo Sapiens. However, 
despite the fact that Golding subjects his ‘people’ to the same fate as Wells’ folk, he does not 
do so out of sheer belief in the superiority of modern man. By having the simple, naive and 
innocent Neanderthals meet their death at the hands of Homo Sapiens, Golding not only 
denies his readers the ‘bogus history’ of innocence that they might have expected to 
encounter in their ancestors (39), but also highlights the possibility that those same ancestors 
might be held responsible for bringing the quality of innocence to its demise. 
     Shattering humanity’s myths about its place and existence in the universe remains 
Golding’s primary concern, but his preoccupations gain a whole new depth and intensity once 
readers come to the realization that the plots Golding uses to deliver his knowledge of 
humanity’s original sins are derived from past texts that he regards as reflecting false 
ideologies. However, lecturing readers about their delusions, states Golding, is not an easy 
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endeavour since that would require certain techniques by which readers experience the full 
emotional impact of the process rather than having the point made clear by direct statement 
(66-7). One technique that Golding uses to fulfil this purpose is that of goading the readers’ 
expectations in one direction before shocking them with the revelation that they were being 
fooled into creating their own misconceptions due in part to the same defects that they share 
with his characters. The novel that exhibits this tendency the most is Pincher Martin (1956) 
where Golding reveals at the end that his main character has been dead all along, and that the 
painful events which span the entirety of the book are more of a purgatorial experience of a 
person who does not believe in the existence of God. The fact remains, however, that some of 
the success of achieving this kind of effect is partially dependent on the readers’ familiarity 
with the same past plots that Golding had engaged in rewriting. The most notable examples 
of such texts are perhaps R.M. Ballantyne’s The Coral Island (1858) and H.G. Wells’ The 
Grisly Folk (1921) which Golding uses to test the false assumptions of their creators and 
prove their incomprehensibility in light of the madness that was brought about by the 
subsequent world wars. The Coral Island follows the adventure of three English boys who 
are the sole survivors of a shipwrecking incident at the Pacific and depicts their effort at 
living under seemingly challenging conditions while maintaining an ordered society. As in 
Lord of the Flies, the presence of evil is of crucial significance and is shown to disrupt the 
peaceful life of the boys; however, it does not reveal itself as part of the boys’ nature, but is 
rather introduced in the stereotypical depiction of the natives as cannibalistic savages, an 
aspect that is believed to be aimed at serving the function of reinforcing the supremacy of the 
colonizers and the legitimacy of imperialism. Because evil in The Coral Island is externalized 
and located in some lesser race that was not fortunate enough to attain the intellectual and 
moral progress of the white race which kept the boys from descending to barbarism, Golding 
found it logical to reproduce Ballantyne’s island for the same group of children and show 
how they would actually behave given the same circumstances. Similarly, Golding’s 
disagreement with Wells’ Outline of History (1919) and The Grisly Folk—which depict 
humanity’s rise to intelligence and rationality as some fortunate attainment that brought about 
a superior being to the bestial and cannibalistic Neanderthals—gave rise to The Inheritors 
where Golding goes further in internalizing evil within the claimed superiority of modern 
man by utilizing the same evolutionary argument that Wells used to cast evil out of the 
human race. 
     Golding’s commitment to exposing the roots of evil and the myth of innocence along with 
his belief in the doctrine of original sin, the fall, and free will have earned him the reputation 
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of being a moral and religious author. Monteith actually recalls feeling surprised when he met 
Golding for the first time to discuss the changes that should be made to Lord of the Flies, 
titled then as Strangers from Within, for he expected to see a clergyman due to the evident 
theological nature of the work (Monteith 60). However, critics such as Redpath, Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor warn against declaring Golding a Christian moralist for that would 
obscure his desire to show reality for what it actually is and which could only be possible, 
according to Golding, if the writer frees his mind from the ‘rigid patterns’ imposed by ‘any 
accepted belief,’ being political, moral or even religious.23 Though Golding is claimed to 
have found in Christianity the metaphors that could capture the truth of the human condition, 
interpreting his works through a purely biblical lens can blur the significance of some other 
sources that are either located within the literary realm or drawn from certain other 
disciplines (Baker, Study 15-7).24 Moreover, succumbing to a rigid theological inclination 
may not only restrict the richness of the texts or fail to capture the magnitude of Golding's 
creations fully, but also result in a reading that partially ‘applies’ and ‘with a great deal of 
“squeezing” to each novel’ (Redpath 207). These statements are not meant to undermine 
Golding’s reliance on biblical allusions, but are rather intended to show that overindulgence 
in the search for a theological structure may obscure the fact that Golding is criticising 
Christianity as much as he is drawing on it. The best examples that perhaps illustrate 
Golding’s tendency to entertain a concept while questioning it at the same time are his first 
two novels whose titles initially communicate an adherence to a biblical perspective before 
they acquire an ironic reality that is bound to emerge as the plot engages in the simultaneous 
assertion and betrayal of the biblical notion in question. The title assigned to Golding’s first 
novel brings to mind the demonic figure of Beelzebub (literally translated as lord of the flies) 
whose rapport with evil in the Judeo-Christian tradition earns him a similar affinity in the 
novel, evident in the haunting chaos that breaks out on the Edenic island as the boys give into 
his influence.25 Unlike what is commonly believed in the Judeo-Christian sources, though, 
                                                          
23 Baker, Study 15-6; Redpath 207; Kinkead Weekes and Gregor 86; Golding in Webster 15.  
24 The fall, for example, is not only communicated in biblical terms, as Baker notes, but is also derived from the 
Greek tradition (Study 15-6). Actually, Baker’s work is more focused on showing how Greek literature 
influenced the fiction and poetry of William Golding. Charles De Paolo also dedicates a whole chapter to 
studying the evolutionary sources that Golding might have consulted in the creation of The Inheritors. 
Moreover, Carey suggests that the existential writings of Erich Fromm might have played a role in moulding 
Golding’s belief regarding the fall of mankind (Golding 122). There are also other views in support of the notion 
that despite Golding’s dislike of Freudian theories, his work seems to be Freudian, or rather psychoanalytical, in 
essence (Sugimura; Rosenfield; Crane). Some of these possible influences, mainly the existential and the 
evolutionary, will be explored in detail later. 
25  The title Lord of the Flies was not actually chosen by Golding, but was suggested to him by Alan Pringle. 
This does not mean, however, that Golding did not rely on the concept in the novel (Monteith 62).  
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Beelzebub is not portrayed as a typical devilish figure that has to be battled and overcome, 
but is rather identified as the inner darkness that compels humanity to lock itself in a history 
of violence and bloodshed.26 In the key scene where Simon confronts the pig’s head, Golding 
actually has Beelzebub himself mock people’s denial of his being a part of their nature and 
their relentless effort to cast him out as some external entity that can be annihilated:  
‘Fancy thinking the Beast was something you could hunt and kill!’ said the head. … 
‘You knew, didn’t you? I’m part of you? Close, close, close! I’m the reason why it’s 
no go? Why things are what they are?’ (177).  
It is also important to consider Golding’s decision to include among his cast of characters 
members of a Christian choir who despite the tradition they represent, end up being the first 
to display the symptoms of humanity’s illness and become the most violent group on the 
island. Targeting Christian boys in particular may have been partially motivated by 
Ballantyne’s choice of characters and his simplistic association between violence and 
paganism; but there remains a possibility that Golding might have intended the subverted 
relation to vanquish the comforting illusions that are offered on The Coral Island by the 
Christian tradition (McCarron, Golding 5). A support for this assumption is found by Baker 
in the parallelism between the succession of the catastrophic events revealed by Golding and 
the prophetic biblical account of the apocalypse that is disclosed in the Book of Revelations. 
In this Christian source, the birth of two is announced, with one rising from the sea, waging 
war against God and killing the saints before a second beast appears from the earth, erecting a 
figure in the image of the sea demon and calling people to its worship. The revelation 
foresees each beast reigning for a generation before the arrival of the second coming that will 
deliver humanity out of its brutish nightmare. This second coming is mirrored in Lord of the 
Flies in the appearance of the naval officer who initially seems to be offering the promise of 
putting an end to the boys’ nightmarish reality in about the same manner as that of the 
biblical prophecy. A careful look, however, shows Golding’s second coming as offering little 
of the comfort of the biblical revelations, for it is brought about by a malignant rescuer who 
carries the same defects that led to the escalation of violence in the first place (Baker, Study 
16-7).  
     Golding’s second novel, much like its predecessor, carries on the defamiliarization process 
that has become so characteristic of his novels, and continues to address, test and experiment 
                                                          
26 The fact remains, however, that while it is possible that Golding might have opposed the idea of an external 
satanic agent, he still found the biblical notion of original sin an accurate diagnosis of the human condition.  
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with certain accepted beliefs and assumptions to reintroduce them in a new light. What might 
be noticeably reminiscent of Lord of the Flies, however, is that its treatment and questioning 
of certain biblical elements in particular are as evident in the title as they are in the text. 
Whereas Golding’s choice of The Inheritors communicates humanity’s attainment of 
aggressive dispositions and reaffirms the doctrine of original sin that has become a marked 
feature of mankind’s history, it still raises an alarming opposition to the biblical prophecy 
‘Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth’ (Matthew 5:5), whose optimism, 
brought in association with that of Wells, adds a sting of irony in light of the devastating fate 
that Golding’s meek undergo (Bufkin, ‘Ironic Art’). This prophecy, however, is not the only 
biblical assumption that Golding seeks to assess. One of the central aspects of The Inheritors 
is its attitude towards the biblical fall which is communicated in a distinguishably unique 
alteration of the account in a manner that not only violates the orthodox version with its 
omission of the temptation of an external Satanic agent, but also raises doubts about the 
validity of the claimed past innocence of humanity’s ancestry. Though claims of an early 
treatment of the biblical fall were raised in relation to Lord of the Flies, the fact remains that 
The Inheritors is far more elaborate in that regard due to a number of factors, the most 
important of which is Golding’s assertion of it as the most important idea in his 
correspondence with Monteith over the emended version of the novel, and his insistence that 
it be clear (Carey, Golding 178). Other factors are presented in the possibility that the island 
The Inheritors shares with Lord of the Flies as the primary setting for the unfolding events 
may also stand for the lost Garden of Eden given the striking similarity between the biblical 
account of corruption and the re-enactment of it in a number of key scenes where the 
Neanderthals stumble upon the existence of evil (Dickson 31). Further support for this notion 
can be located in the claimed symbolic representation of the tree from which Lok and Fa 
watch the horrendous acts of the Homo Sapiens as the biblical tree that granted Adam and 
Eve the knowledge of good and evil. It can also be detected in the crucial symbolic function 
of the waterfall whose monstrosity is brought in a subtle association with the cruelty of 
modern man’s ancestry before it is revealed directly in the Neanderthal’s perception of the 
new people as like the fall. Though a number of critics seem to be in agreement over the 
allegorical nature of the work,27 differences arise in the manner by which Golding’s treatment 
is to be tackled and interpreted. Peter Green, for example, highlights Golding’s mockery of 
                                                          
27 See Dickson; Babb; Kinkaed-Weeks and Gregor; Baker, Study; McCarron, Golding; S. Boyd; Medcalf, 
Green.  
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the human illusion of external evil by allegorizing the scene where the Neanderthal couple 
drink the Homo Sapiens’ fermented honey and give in to a rush of aggressive tendencies. 
Linking this scene to the temptation of Adam and Eve is said to represent the Homo Sapiens 
as the real devils or ‘serpents’ whose presence and creations pose something akin to a bad 
influence that compromises the innocence of the Neanderthals and tempts them into the 
forbidden acts of savagery, cruelty and aggression (Green 68). As fitting as that may sound in 
light of Golding’s views of humanity, however, Bufkin seems to be of the opinion that 
though the fall is the central theme of The Inheritors, reading the novel as an allegory of the 
story of Adam and Eve is an ‘irresistible temptation’ that should not be given into (‘Ironic 
Art’). One reason why he opposes the notion is his belief that neither species exhibits a fall or 
a loss of innocence, and that a more logical function to creating them is to have them brought 
into contrast to one another so that the defects of mankind can be highlighted. Bufkin finds a 
support for his reading in the fact that the Homo Sapiens are shown as carrying their 
characteristic violent traits from the first moment they make their appearance on the island, 
an aspect thought to be perfectly appropriate given Golding’s denial of a past innocence. But 
what is more interesting in Bufkin’s reading is his conclusion that the Neanderthal’s 
momentary conversion to the new people’s ways should not be read as a fall since their 
succumbing to that state is not brought about by an internal defect, but by an external force 
whose effects wear off as soon as it is expelled out of their insides. The irony that this reading 
offers lies in its attempt at highlighting the essentially good nature of the Neanderthals 
through utilizing the same illusion of external evil that has come to characterize humanity’s 
religious worldviews and belief systems (Bufkin, ‘Ironic Art’; Babb 41-2; Kinkead-Weekes 
and Gregor 106).28 
     Aside from striving to disintegrate the pattern of self-deception provided by the 
comforting illusions of the biblical prophecies and history of mankind, Golding’s novels are 
also meant to target the opposite extreme of scientific rationality that created the Victorian 
optimism exhibited in the creations of Ballantyne and Wells. Despite claims of scientific 
objectivity, Golding found in Victorian optimism a naive rationality, motivated by a diluted 
philosophy that the survival of mankind throughout the long history of evolution and 
environmental fluctuations should not be taken as less than a testament to the superiority of 
modern man. Moreover, the belief that the human race has advanced since ancient times in its 
                                                          
28 In an interview with Baker, Golding states that there is hope that some goodness has survived through the 
little Neanderthal baby that the Homo Sapiens are shown to have taken with them. His statement actually 
supports Bufkin and Babb’s reading that the Neanderthals do not fall.  
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‘heroic’ struggle to conquer the obstacles to its survival has resulted in the emergence of not 
only the false assumption that the process of evolution is driven towards the perfection of 
species, but also the misconceived association between evolutionary forces and progress. 
Golding’s engagement with these assumptions began at an early age due to the rationalistic 
upbringing that he had undergone at an atheist ‘science-worshipping’ home, but he states that 
such an involvement, which had ultimately led to his majoring in science at Oxford, was done 
against his ‘instincts’ in order to placate his Wellsian father (Carey, ‘Talks’ 171; Carey, 
Golding 179). It was what Golding described as ‘a condemnation … of a human relationship’ 
that led him to embrace rationalism despite his struggling against it as a child, a notion that he 
explores and communicates in his fourth novel Free Fall (1959) through Sam’s relationship 
with the schoolmaster Nick, whom Golding admits to have based on his father, Alec (Baker, 
‘Interview’; Carey, ‘Talks’ 171-2).29 One of the major outcomes of the influence that 
compelled Golding to somehow ‘half-convince’ himself that he was an atheist and a 
rationalist was his coming across Wells’ Outline of History which proved to be quite 
influential in not only shaping his youth, but in creating his novels as well (Golding in Carey, 
‘Talks’; 171, in Biles, Talk 4). The Outline, to Golding, was more like ‘the rationalist’s 
gospel in excelsis’ which was held by his father as ‘pure truth’ despite its ‘nonsensical’ 
pronouncements of evolution, progress and perfectibility (qtd in Baker, Study 20; Carey, 
Golding 179; Baker, ‘Interview’). It should be noted, however, that although Golding came to 
reject Wells’ reductive vision, he maintains that his scrutiny is solely reserved for Wells’ 
optimistic accounts of the evolutionary history of mankind and some of the fictional creations 
that carry this limited ideology (Baker, ‘Interview’). In fact, Golding clearly states that he 
holds Wells in high esteem and regards him as a great novelist, and that his rejection of 
Wells’ ideologies does not run in contradiction to his appreciation of Wells’ undeniable gift 
of imagination and his vivid depiction of life (Baker, ‘Interview’; in Biles, Talk 11). Wells’ 
influence as a novelist on Golding can indeed be detected in the projects that Golding had 
undertaken after Lord of the Flies which, despite not being published, still survive as 
manuscripts that exhibit Golding’s experimentation with merging two of his favourite genres 
together, Greek myth and science fiction (Carey, Golding 171-4). The manuscript of In 
Search of My Father, in particular, contains many elements that Golding eventually decided 
to pursue in the creation of The Inheritors, the most noticeable of which is the Wellsian 
                                                          
29 It is worth noting, though, that Golding emphatically maintained that his father was not quite as ‘rigid’ as he 
made him seem and that his denial of God was based on a deep religious sensibility (Golding in Baker, 
‘Interview’; in Biles, Talk 83).  
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propensity represented in the creation of a distinct breed in a manner that brings to mind the 
Morlocks of The Time Machine (1895) (Carey, Golding 171).30 It is also worth noting that 
despite Wells’ proclamations of progress, he still created disturbing futuristic accounts and a 
horrific testament to mankind’s cruelty best exhibited in The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896) 
and The Time Machine. Golding had noticed, of course, how some of Wells’ novels stand in 
stark contrast to the optimism expressed in The Outline of History and The Science of Life 
(1929), leading him to conclude that Wells was ‘a divided person,’ and that his conflict is 
understandable since contradictions are part of what defines human nature (Baker, 
‘Interview’). However, Golding did not offer a firm confirmation to harbouring a similar split 
upon being confronted with the question if his scientific education and his instinctual sense of 
religiousness had created a divide or a conflict of sorts (Carey, ‘Talks’171-2). Nevertheless, 
Carey reports that a trace of conflict can actually be detected in The Inheritors, particularly 
when compared to the original draft which Golding had first written with the intent to refute 
Wells’ simplistic assertions of progress before he came to stress ‘the evolutionary life force 
which drives the new people upwards “at a higher level of energy” than the Neanderthals 
possess’ (Carey, Golding 182). The notes Golding wrote to plan his altered version support 
this notion since he seemed to have wanted to stress the evolutionary cause rather than blame 
the Neanderthal’s plight solely on the Homo Sapiens’ cruelty. This becomes distinctly 
manifested in the way Fa dies in the original version, which is by one of the new people’s 
spears, as opposed to the later version where she is swept by the waterfall to her death. Carey 
concludes that: 
[i]t is almost as if the first version of The Inheritors were written by the religious 
Golding, who mourns the destruction of innocence, and the revised version by his 
Wellsian, rationalist, scientific father Alec, who pitied the victims of evolution, like 
the dying rabbit he found (‘Poor little beggar’), but believed firmly in evolution 
nonetheless (Golding 183). 
Moreover, Carey notes that although Golding tended to describe himself as anti-scientific on 
more than one occasion, he still retained a scientific imagination, evident in the very structure 
                                                          
30 One interesting occasion which shows Golding’s respect for Wells as a novelist is when he was prompted to 
define what science fiction means after he stated that he did not think of The Inheritors and Lord of the Flies as 
science fiction. Golding chose the word ‘irresponsibility’ as one synonym for the genre since he believed that 
science fiction usually involved either ‘ideas that don’t actually matter’ or ‘people that don’t matter’ (Golding in 
Biles, Talk 3-5). He regarded Wells as an exception, however. In fact, he maintained that he could not find any 
‘post-Wells’ science fiction that could address both ideas and people (3-5).  
43 
 
of his novels: in The Inheritors where he masterfully constructs the Neanderthals’ 
intelligence and consciousness; in The Spire (1964), where he explores how a cathedral spire 
might have been built in medieval times (Carey, ‘Talks’183); and in Lord of the Flies where 
he experiments with the lives of a group of children on an isolated island and investigates the 
reputed goodness of human nature in the absence of civilization.  
     A similar divide can also be detected in Free Fall where Golding struggles with the split 
between the rational and the irrational and expresses his belief that the experience of living in 
two worlds, one being a coherent physical reality, the other being an incomprehensibly 
chaotic spiritual one, is what characterizes the human experience and is ‘what living [feels] 
like’ (Golding in Biles, Talk 79). Though Golding ends the novel on an ostensibly hopeless 
note where his protagonist Sammy Mountjoy attests to the reality of both worlds but fails to 
conceive of a bridge that could tie the two worlds together, Biles takes Golding’s fixation on 
the issue as proof that he was still hoping to bring the rational and the spiritual together 
because it was Golding who stated that hope is what motivates the creation of a work of art 
(Talk 101). It makes sense to conclude then that Golding’s treatment of the controversial 
issue of the inherent sinfulness of humanity is an effort at diagnosing the moral condition of 
the human race and possibly uncovering the factors responsible for triggering the fall from 
innocence in hopes of controlling the problem. Golding admits to Carey, however, that the 
task of defining and clarifying original sin is not an easy one (‘Talks’ 174). This might 
explain the inclusion of the rational and the religious in most of Golding’s novels as crucial 
for highlighting such a difficulty in addition to demonstrating the partiality of both 
worldviews in accounting for the human condition. However, although Golding strictly 
emphasized the shortcomings of such systems when dealing with a problem so complex, the 
presence of the two worlds seems to have motivated the interpretative efforts to fall within 
the two strains with some leaning on one set of views over the other. In order to take on the 
task of defining original sin within the context of Golding’s novels and evaluating the 
interpretations offered, it is important first to set a starting point from which the roots of evil 
can be unearthed and begin by the work that best exhibits Golding’s views on the matter. 
Since The Inheritors is the one novel that offers the most elaborate account of the fall through 
its depiction of an evolutionary past and its analogy with that of the biblical times, it should 
prove to be the most helpful in shedding light on the roots of what is mistaken to be a present 
ailment. 
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The Evolutionary Fall and the Illusion of Progress 
Most of the interpretations offered for what qualifies as original sin in The Inheritors 
acknowledge both the biblical and the evolutionary due to the overt symbolism of the fall and 
the ironic subversion of Wells’ views.31 However, efforts that claim the novel as a religious 
allegory remain heavily dependent on the biblical tradition in explaining the nature of 
original sin and in explicating the factors that have supposedly led to the inevitable loss of 
innocence. As a result, man’s defects had come to be localized in either his desire to gain 
knowledge, to obtain wisdom and be like God (Fitzgerald and Kayser), or in the experience 
of aggression itself as an instance of the corrupting knowledge that leads man to becoming 
aware of evil’s presence in the world (Hynes 21; George 92-3; Kulkarni 5).32 Both of these 
readings entertain the assumption that the tragedy of the Neanderthals is a re-enactment of the 
fall of Adam and Eve, and that the phase of ‘pre-knowledge’ which precedes that of 
experience, rationality and awareness embodies a period of innocence (Kulkarni 71).33 
However, it seems implausible to blame the Neanderthals’ plight simply on the desire to gain 
knowledge, even if it were to be located in their curiosity to learn more about the Homo 
Sapiens, because that would be failing to notice one of the distinct differences that sets the 
Neanderthals apart from the Homo Sapiens, and that is their lack of desire to be more than 
what they are. Furthermore, operating out of the possibility that the change the Neanderthals 
undergo following their encounter with humanity’s ancestors could come to symbolize the 
biblical fall would be overlooking the fact that they never resort to the violent ways of the 
new people to defend themselves, even after being subjected to their cruelty. Moreover, 
following this simplistic association would be committing one of the fallacies that Golding 
warned of, and that is of equating ignorance with innocence or in effect offering a purely 
Wordsworthian idealisation of childhood and dismissing the fact that, for Golding, the roots 
of evil may be just as present in the child as they are in the adult (Carey, ‘Talks’ 174). 
                                                          
31 See Josipovici, ‘Source’; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor; S. Boyd; Baker, Study; and Carey, Golding.  
32 In the book of Genesis 3:7, the desire to obtain the knowledge of good and evil is what led to the first sin and 
the disobedience to God: ‘For God knows that when you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be 
like God, knowing good and evil.’ However, Bufkin notes that this passage: ‘she [Eve] took some and ate it. She 
also gave some to her husband [Adam], who was with her, and he ate it. Then the eyes of both of them were 
opened’ entails that creatures who did not eat from the tree of knowledge were not able to attain the same 
experience and wisdom that Adam and Eve’s descendants obtained and are, as a result, unwise and unaware of 
the presence of evil (Bufkin, ‘Ironic Art’). This conclusion lends support to the notion of knowledge as 
experience within the context of the novel since it establishes the acquisition of it as a necessary condition for 
the loss of innocence. 
33 Critics who support reading the novel as an allegory find the new people to be standing for either the biblical 
tree of knowledge for their manifestation of the good and evil in the world (George 92-3), or the serpent who 
tempts the innocent people into the forbidden experience of evil (Green 68). 
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However, Golding is not just suggesting a kind of Augustinian idea of an innate evil, but also 
demonstrating how experience acts as a shaping force for it does result in some profound 
changes in the intellectual capacities of his Neanderthals and brings their consciousness 
closer to that of the Homo Sapiens (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 103-4). Lok, for example, 
develops some of the abilities that allow the new people the sinful control of nature such as 
the capacity to use ‘like’, form analogies, connect mental images and arrive at conclusions 
(Golding, Inheritors 194; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 103-4). This makes Lok feel that he 
has ‘discovered the power of the new people in him’ that ‘[he] was one of them, [and that] 
there was nothing he could not do’ (Inheritors 202). Still, unlike a child with a modern mind, 
Lok is unable to retain this kind of consciousness or even exercise the newly acquired 
capacities to their fullest. This helps highlight the difference between innocence and 
ignorance as well as suggest that there is something essentially different about the 
Neanderthals that keeps them from suffering the fall.34 Experience, then, might only be 
influential in promoting the dark side of human nature if the inherent conditions that nurture 
it are present.  
     Attempts at examining the novel in analogy with Wells’ Outline of History have 
reinforced the biblical notion that it is rationality that grants individuals the freedom to 
choose, turn away from God and fall. As a result, these critics have shifted the interpretive 
focus from that of knowledge to one of the proclaimed evolutionary virtues that have 
supposedly distinguished the human race from the animal world.35 The novel, then, can be 
taken as a reflection of an endeavour at rewriting the evolutionary history of humanity in 
light of a newly confirmed perspective of their nature. Moreover, since Golding intended The 
Inheritors as a refutation of the association that Wells had drawn between progress and 
intelligence, it makes sense to define the evolutionary fall as a point in the phylogeny of man 
when his intellectual capacities evolve at the expense of his moral development. To highlight 
the resultant cruelty of the possession of intelligence, Golding creates the innocent 
Neanderthals as a species that live mainly through their senses and instincts rather than 
reason. This limitation not only deprives them of the capacity to connect mental images, form 
deductions and conceive of causal relations, but also endows them with a sense of 
automaticity that compromises their chances of breaking free from the mechanistic and 
                                                          
34 Bufkin, Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor have actually stated that despite the changes the Neanderthals 
experience following their encounter with the Homo Sapiens, they remain unfallen (Bufkin, ‘Ironic Art’; 
Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 105) 
35 See Josipovici, ‘Source’ 240; S. Boyd 27; Clements 76; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 68. 
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instinctual responses to environmental cues. Though their pictures seem to demonstrate some 
degree of rationality, Golding emphasizes, especially in Lok’s case, that these pictures are 
mostly elicited as direct reactions to some stimuli in their surroundings: ‘There built up in 
Lok’s head a picture of the man, not by reasoned deduction but because in every place the 
scent told him – do this!’ (Inheritors 77). This actually creates a problem for the Neanderthals 
because the environment their instincts evolved to adapt to is no longer the same, presumably 
intended by Golding to be read as the reason why only a small band of them survives prior to 
being annihilated by the Homo Sapiens. Similarly, because they are denied causal reasoning 
as well as the perception of a complex stream of time, they are unable to achieve the freedom 
and the flexibility needed to create tools or alter the environment to serve their purposes. Lok, 
for instance, is incapable of sorting through his mental images, a task that other members of 
his band are able to tackle with a great deal of difficulty, and this usually puts him in a 
position where he desires Mal’s capacity to ‘[join] a picture to a picture so that the last of 
many came out of the first’ (96). It seems, however, that even the supposedly wise Mal is 
unable to address adequately the problems that the changing weather patterns have imposed 
on his people. As unfortunate as that may be, it is important to stress that the absence of most 
of what are now regarded as higher cognitive capacities suggests why the Neanderthals are 
unable to imagine and compare different states of being as well as visualize future scenarios. 
Consequently, it is not in their nature to be gripped by feelings of superiority, and as such, 
they do not experience lust for power or feel the need to subject others to their will and 
control. This perfectly shows in their belief that all life, including their own, came out of Oa’s 
belly, a conception that forbids the killing of other creatures because the Neanderthals’ lack 
of analogical reasoning skills, among others, have made it difficult for them to perceive one 
life as more important than another. 
     Putting this representation in contrast with the intelligent, arrogant, and selfish Homo 
Sapiens should not only highlight how the near absence of modern intelligence in the 
Neanderthals reinforces their state of innocence, but also reveal human intellect as the one 
faculty responsible for the externalization of the knowledge of evil and rationalizing its 
existence as emanating from some external entity that can either be appeased or annihilated. 
However, despite Golding’s admission of the role of intelligence in facilitating the sinful 
control of nature, he does not firmly assert that the ‘operation of intelligence upon 
knowledge’ is all there is to the moral decay of mankind (Golding in Biles, Talk 109-10). 
After all, possessing any kind of knowledge, including that of evil, entails some level of 
awareness, a matter that should bring consciousness into focus as a ‘biological asset’ that has 
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not only contributed to the reputed progress of humanity (Kermode, Puzzles 206), but also 
promoted the development of the aggressive tendencies targetted by Golding in most of his 
creations. It is at this point, states Bufkin, that the anthropological and the biblical 
interpretations intersect in The Inheritors, for it is only after Adam and Eve gain the 
knowledge of good and evil that they become conscious of their differences, and it is only 
through the biological possession of consciousness that humans come to obtain this distinct 
sense of self-awareness that allows them to exploit others to further their own interests 
(‘Ironic Art’). Consciousness’s role in bringing out the worst in individuals and societies is 
explored in most, if not all, of Golding’s novels. Still, it achieves its full complexity and 
exhibits its potentiality in nurturing the selfishness of modern man in Pincher Martin whose 
rationality’s struggle to ward off the reality of his dying state is shown to be driven by his 
distinct sense of identity or what Golding chose to label as his dark centre. Golding might not 
have brought up the sinful possession of self-awareness as a trigger for the Homo Sapiens’ 
cruelty in his discussion of The Inheritors with Biles.36 There are moments, however, when 
he appears to be targeting it quite explicitly as being integrated with intelligence, and as such, 
being responsible for evil:  
[W]ith our awareness of ourselves as individuals inescapably comes in this other 
thing, this destructive thing, the evil, if you like. It seems to me that this self-
awareness, intelligence, with these come the defect of their virtue (Baker, 
‘Interview’).   
      Golding notes on more than one occasion that he is not strictly Machiavellian in his views 
on human nature, and that he acknowledges the complexity presented in the fact that though 
societies restrict the vicious tendencies of man, they are, along with the moral systems they 
                                                          
36 Golding’s treatment of consciousness in The Inheritors, in particular, has almost always constituted a major 
focus of interest for critics of the novel, especially in relation to the Neanderthal’s perception and how Golding 
masterfully renders it accessible through his brilliant manipulation of language (See S. Boyd 27; Baker, Study 
23; Carey, Golding 180; Medcalf, 14; Babb, 43; George, 81; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor, 71). However, it had 
not been given equal attention in The Inheritors as being a possible cause of the ‘morally deceased’ condition of 
mankind, nor had its relationship to experience and intelligence been fully explored within the evolutionary 
context of the fall. An exception would be Gabriel Josipovici’s views on the problem in The World and the Book 
which was originally published in 1971. Despite his insightful comments on the role of self-awareness in 
promoting the violent side of human nature, however, he maintains that the Neanderthals in The Inheritors are 
without self-consciousness (253), an opinion that I disagree with and that will form the basis for my reading. 
Furthermore, I believe that re-examining the matter in light of recent studies in the field of evolutionary 
psychology and consciousness can prove illuminating. Another more recent treatment was given by James 
Clements in Mysticism and the Mid-century Novel (2012). His brief but brilliant account, though, does not get 
into detail on the role of the existential anxiety that is brought about by the complexity of self-awareness in 
creating the worldview that externalizes evil and sustains group living, but brings about the destruction of 
outsiders. 
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impose, a human invention whose efficiency is governed by the whims of whomsoever are 
the individuals driving the construction of that society (Golding in Biles, Talk 44; Baker, 
‘Interview’). Nevertheless, Golding emphatically states that even if individuals do not 
subscribe to a moral code, they still retain something akin to a moral instinct, evident in the 
guilt they experience when they hurt or use a fellow human being (Baker, ‘Interview’). Most 
interpretations, of course, have been loyal to Golding’s belief that any investigation into 
human nature should be more concerned with the question of evil because ‘good can look 
after itself’ (Golding in Webster 6). It is important to note, though, that given how our 
paradoxical state is an outcome of the biological possession of intelligence and self-
awareness which makes morality as much of an inherent tendency as that of evil, the 
biological roots of morality remain crucial to disclosing the complex psychology of evil that 
can override the moral code just as easily as being subsumed by it. 
     Although Golding had clearly stated to Carey that he is ‘convinced of original sin … in 
the Augustinian way’ (‘Talks’ 174), he seems to maintain a rationalistic perspective on the 
problem that shows in his recurring reference to humanity’s ailments in the commonsensical 
terms of ‘deficiencies,’ ‘flaws’ or ‘defects’ (See Biles, Carey and Baker’s interviews with 
Golding). A clear support for this notion can be found in an incident that Golding recounted 
to Baker about how his passing allusion to original sin on a television program had once 
angered one of the scientists present, and how that set him off on a path to offer a more 
accurate diagnosis of the human condition that does not involve the absurdity of religion. 
This scientist, whom Golding believed to have been Julian Huxley, stated that man is ‘a 
creature who suffers from an innate inability to live a proper and satisfactory life in a social 
circumstance,’ a statement that Golding did not conceive of as being contradictory to the 
notion of original sin, but as more of an ‘elaborate definition’ of the idea (Baker, ‘Interview’). 
Despite Golding’s belief in the biological roots of the problem, though, he still found the 
theory of evolution objectionable due to a set of flaws that he believed to have been an 
outcome of mankind’s search for a favourable pattern to impose on the world rather than its 
readiness to admit to the reality of the human condition. One such instance of the self-
deception that humanity allows itself in its history is that of the illusion of progress which had 
often been pointed out as being associated with the Victorian view of evolution that Golding 
found to be most pronounced in the writings and fictions of H.G. Wells. With progress comes 
the belief that the human present is an improvement on the past, and that the future holds a 
better promise for the human race. This explains why Golding breaks out of the stereotypical 
depictions of the pre-historic man as a cannibalistic savage and refuses to portray human 
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ancestry in a favourable light. What he does, instead, is show, as Baker has noted, that the 
process of evolution did not lead to any significant improvement in human nature (Study 19), 
an observation that clearly captures how Golding chose to view the biological operation that 
underlies the adaptations of life forms to their environment, and which he clearly articulated 
to Baker as being more about change than progress (‘Interview’). Furthermore, Golding 
stated that it is better to refrain from using the word ‘evolution’ for it ‘presumably implies 
progress in one direction or another’ (‘Interview’).  
     Such an association can be said to be logical in light of the current confusion that 
surrounds Darwin’s beliefs regarding the concept of progress, for he was found to be in 
support of the notion sometimes, but objecting to viewing evolution in such progressive terms 
on other occasions (Shanahan 176). An example of that is illustrated by Shanahan in two 
statements that were cited in two different sources as either lending support for the belief that 
Darwin was a progressionist, or as disproving the claim altogether. In his B notebook, 
Darwin is clearly of the opinion that the classification of the species as being high or low is a 
notion that should not be entertained: ‘It is absurd to talk of one animal being higher than 
another. — We consider those, when the intellectual faculties [/] cerebral structure most 
developed, as highest. — A bee doubtless would when the instincts were’ (qtd. in Shanahan 
176).37 However, in The Origin of Species, Darwin makes a statement that opposes the 
previous position: ‘The inhabitants of each successive period in the world’s history have 
beaten their predecessors in the race for life, and are, in so far, higher in the scale of nature’ 
(345). This contradiction, according to Shanahan, had led some researchers to endorse the 
view that Darwin actually believed in evolution as progressive, but had to resort to 
downplaying his belief sometimes so as not to have his ideas rejected. Others, on the other 
hand, believed that Darwin had to express his evolutionary views in progressive terms to 
keep up with the age’s cultural beliefs and to have his views accepted by the scientific 
community at the time (Shanahan 176-7). 
      Resolving the confusion surrounding Darwin’s belief in progress, as interesting as it 
seems, is a matter that is beyond the scope of this thesis, but what is important to stress for 
now is that whether one wishes to side with the former position or the latter, the fact remains 
                                                          
37 This anti-progressive view may be the one Golding adopts in his presentation of the Homo Sapiens as being 
superior to the Neanderthals in terms of their possession of the intellectual capacities that allow them higher 
adaptability to the environment, but inferior when it comes to the Neanderthals’ instinctual capabilities and their 
unparalleled access to the rich world of the senses. Such a presentation, in other words, is not aimed at treating 
one species as superior to the other, but at delivering another take on the evolutionary history of mankind that 
does not contribute to the illusion of progress. 
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that Darwin did at a certain point express his theory of evolution in progressive terms. This 
could offer some perspective, too, on why certain prominent Victorian figures like Galton 
and Spencer had also come to read the proposed principle of natural selection as a mechanism 
that could ensure the perfection of the human race as well as explain ‘the moral and 
intellectual progress’ of the Victorian age (Pinker, Blank Slate 30). Furthermore, when 
Darwin formulated the theory of evolution in The Origin of Species, he pointed out the 
similarity between the mechanism of natural selection and the practice of animal breeding by 
which the breeder selectively encourages the persistence of advantageous traits rather than 
those that cause the animal weakness (87). This led proponents of the theory among both 
Darwin’s contemporaries and the generations that followed to use his observations in 
justifying certain ideologies pertaining to the legitimacy of colonization, the slave trade and 
the inferiority of women, instead of simply taking it as a theory that explains the evolution of 
adaptations in different organisms in response to the selective pressures of their environment 
(Pinker, Blank Slate 30). 
     It is at this point that the more impactful ramifications of the illusion of progress begin to 
reveal themselves. Herbert Spencer claimed to have inspired Social Darwinism with his 
proposition of the mechanism of natural selection in the terms of ‘survival of the fittest’, one 
which would ultimately lead to a pressure to refrain from charitable actions towards the 
‘unfit’, for that would slow down the drive towards perfection and ensure the persistence of 
undesirable traits in the human race (Spencer 444-7). Soon afterwards, intellect, which 
Golding initially targeted in The Inheritors, and which was considered by Darwin to be a 
biological phenomenon just like any other heritable trait, was taken as a measure of the 
superiority of one race against another, and as such, as a fundamental criterion for applying 
the principles of animal breeding to humans (Grossman and Kaufman 10). The call to 
eugenics was championed by Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton, who believed that the 
perfection of the human race might be brought about through discouraging the unfit from 
breeding so as to ensure the supremacy of good traits, the most important of which is 
intelligence, and the disappearance of bad ones (Galton 1-24; Grossman and Kaufman 11). 
Similarly, Paul Broca, a contemporary of Galton and renowned for his discovery of the 
localization of certain language functions in the brain, reinforced the false assumption of 
superiority that was granted to the white race as opposed to other races by establishing the 
fallacious association between intelligence and characteristics like race and skin colour 
(Grossman and Kaufman 11; Gould, Mismeasure 116). Broca also concluded—based on his 
examination of the skulls and brains of females and males—that gender differences in terms 
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of intelligence exist, and that males are more intellectually advanced than females (Grossman 
and Kauffman 11; Gould, Mismeasure 136). Another investigation into the prized possession 
of intelligence that carried the call to eugenics into the twentieth century can be seen in H.H. 
Goddard’s inclusion of issues relating to class in his claim that those who are at the top of the 
social ladder are in their rightful place since he took their position as being indicative of their 
mental capacities as opposed to those who belong to the lower classes (Grossman and 
Kauffman 11; Zenderland 277). Goddard’s call for the enforcement of exclusion and 
breeding control on the intellectually inferior also came to include the immigrants whom he 
perceived to be mentally deficient as well (Grossman and Kaufman 11; Gould, Mismeasure 
197).38 
     These examples show that scientific inquiries in the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
were sometimes tempted into anthropocentrism in their association of evolutionary progress 
with intelligence. Even more than this, they often harboured racist assumptions that 
ultimately led to the abandonment of any measure of objectivity and a tendency to succumb 
to beliefs in racial supremacy. This might suggest further reasons why Golding sought to 
deconstruct claims of progress by taking intelligence and the supposedly advanced cognitive 
capacities of modern man as potentially sinful possessions. It should be stressed, however, 
that some of the alleged scientific and objective pursuits of the past can be noted as having 
taken a racist turn before Darwin’s theory of evolution came to be published and integrated 
into the scientific investigations of the age. Most of the pre-Darwinian attempts at explaining 
the lineage of distinct races, for example, account for the diversity of observable traits by 
tracing them to either the phenomenon of degeneration, or the equally dangerous assumption 
of speciation which could just as easily lead to claims of racial supremacy, given how it 
encourages targeting each race as a distinct species (Gould, Mismeasure 71). In fact, such 
arguments can be found in Charles White’s Account of the Regular Gradation in Man (1799), 
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s On the Natural Variety of Mankind (1775), and Samuel 
Stanhope Smith’s Essay on the Causes of Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human 
                                                          
38 Such matters might have been especially infuriating for Golding who was raised by socialist parents and who 
had also admitted to being something of a socialist himself (Carey, Golding 14, Golding in Biles, Talk 49). He 
also stated, upon being confronted with the question of why there are no female characters in Lord of the Flies, 
that ‘women are foolish for pretending to be equal to men [and that] they are far superior and always have been’ 
(See the audio version of Lord of the Flies). This view of superiority is reflected in The Inheritors where the 
women of the innocent species are seen to be occupying a status that is equal in importance to that of the males, 
if not more. It can also be found in Golding’s short story ‘Clonk Clonk’ where women are depicted as wiser than 
men. Whether Golding meant to criticize the habit of objectifying women as one of the negative outcomes of 
owning complex intellectual capacities, is not clear, but my reading will show that such a conclusion is highly 
possible.   
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Species (1787) to list a few. This helps show the theories of evolution as having been 
possibly used to justify the ideologies of the age, including those of cultural, intellectual and 
moral progress, as well as the imperialistic assumptions rooted in the stereotypical depictions 
of the colonizers as civilized and the colonized as savages. In fact, an example of the negative 
outcomes of the ‘pseudo-science’ of the age can be seen in Ballantyne’s The Coral Island—
published before The Origin of Species—whose author claimed to have objectively based his 
portrayal of the natives’ practices and rituals on facts, but whose treatment of the natives as 
cannibals shows that the work was mainly motivated by the imperialistic ethos of the age 
(Dutheil). Though the theory of evolution was taken to grant the supremacy of the white race 
biological roots, the physical evidence was ostensibly ushered with the discovery of the 
Piltdown man which De Paolo believes to be responsible for Wells’ depiction of the 
Neanderthals in The Outline of History and The Grisly Folk as primitive cannibals (46-7).39 
      In 1911, Sussex, England, Charles Dawson announced the discovery of the remains of 
what soon came to be taken as the missing link between ape and man since the remains 
include what appears to be a simian-like jaw and a skull the same size as that of modern 
humans (43). This finding was regarded as controversial when it was first revealed, but it 
gradually began to receive wide acceptance and influence among the scientific community of 
the time that lasted for almost forty years before it was disclosed as a hoax in 1953 (44). It 
was then that fluorine and x-ray tests revealed that the bone fragments were actually those of 
a modern human’s skull and an orang-utan’s jaw, and that their ancient appearance was the 
result of being stained before they were planted at the digging site to be excavated (44-45). 
Before the hoax was revealed, however, a group of scientists believed that the bones 
belonged to one single relative, leading them to take the forged skull’s size as indicative of 
the possibility that the ancestors of modern humans evolved large brains as early as the 
Pleistocene period. This, in turn, led to the exclusion of the Neanderthal and the Java man 
from the human line of evolution and to the belief that the ancestry of Homo Sapiens was 
quite ‘distinct’ from that of the former two (Washburn; De Paolo 43-7). However, misleading 
researchers into forming the wrong conclusions about the evolution of the human race is not 
the only danger the hoax imposed. The discovery of Peking man in China, which had 
                                                          
39 De Paolo stresses that Wells’ depiction of the Neanderthal in The Outline of History and The Grisly Folk was 
not the result of the misrepresentation of facts to preserve a certain ideology, but was actually the result of an 
effort to keep up with the common opinion of the scientific community of the time. De Paolo supports his 
finding by sighting The Science of Life (1929) and A Story of the Stone Age (1897), published before and after 
the discovery of the Piltdown man, as presenting a more accurate depiction of the Neanderthals that does not 
invoke the stereotypes of savagery and lack of intelligence (47-49).   
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followed that of the Piltdown remains, gave rise to serious racial implications despite the 
challenge the discovery posed to the authenticity of the Piltdown man (De Paolo 46). Peking 
man, which was taken to be the ancestor of the modern day Chinese, was found to be buried 
at about the same depth as that of the Piltdown remains, a factor that was considered to be 
indicative of their evolution at about the same time. However, since Peking’s man’s skull was 
noticeably smaller than that of the forged Piltdown skull, an observation that was considered 
to be indicative of a difference in intelligence, it followed that racial conclusions were formed 
about the white race being more advanced than the other races, and that ‘whites crossed the 
threshold to full humanity long before other people’ (Gould, Panda’s Thumb 117; De Paolo 
46-7). Furthermore, the discovery of the Piltdown man in England led to the assumption that 
the English were the ‘progenitors of the white race’ and that non-whites were the descendants 
of other distinct ancestries like Erectus, a matter which De Palo believes to be responsible for 
the imperialistic undertone that Wells’ Grisly Folk carries (De Paolo 46-7). De Paolo’s 
observation supports that of McCarron, who states that one possible way of reading The 
Inheritors is through digging for issues of colonialism and subordinating them to beliefs in 
the evolutionary scale of nature. He writes that: 
[i]f one is at the top of the evolutionary ladder, then one has no moral obligation to 
respect the rights, or even the lives, of those who have yet to reach this plateau. 
Instead, there is a moral duty to impose one’s superior values on all those people 
who remain in a state of unenlightened savagery, and if they remain obdurate then it 
is permissible to kill them (Golding 10). 
      This connection should point to the possibility that the Piltdown issue could have 
contributed to shaping both Wells’ and Golding’s views on evolution since the Piltdown 
discovery is believed to have influenced Wells’ representation of the Neanderthals in the 
Outline of History and The Grisly Folk, and its being exposed as a hoax in 1953 could have 
pressed Golding’s attack on progress, intelligence and national pride in both Lord of the Flies 
in 1954 and The Inheritors in 1955. Golding subverts the nationalistic assumption of 
superiority that was exhibited in The Coral Island and later reinforced by the Piltdown hoax 
by showing the English boys as being inflicted with the same universal defects that the 
cannibals displayed in The Coral Island. The attack was then carried on in The Inheritors in 
which Golding shows that the anthropocentric perspective that sought to measure the 
progress of a species in terms of intelligence had turned a blind eye to the catastrophic 
consequences of owning it. One such consequence is the capacity for analogical reasoning 
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which allows for the establishment of the superiority of one organism or individual over 
another, and which is ironically responsible for the very same Victorian conclusions of 
progress and racial supremacy that resulted in the escalations of the Second World War. 
Moreover, the belief that the Piltdown hoax is responsible for Wells’ treatment of prehistoric 
man can be said to have made the hoax partially and indirectly responsible for Golding’s 
reaction to the notion of progress in both of his early novels since they were both written, as 
Golding admits, in response to the depiction that the Piltdown finding is said to have 
compelled Wells to construct.    
     Beliefs in the innate drive towards inevitable progress and the perfectibility of the species 
were eventually overshadowed by the modern evolutionary synthesis (Shanahan 220). 
However, although some scientists like Gould rejected defining evolution in progressive 
terms and described the phenomenon as being ‘culturally embedded’ (Gould ‘Trends’, 
Shanahan 174), others like Dawkins continued to carry the notion of evolutionary progress in 
their discussion of adaptations and biological processes (Shanahan 208). Still, even with 
modern assertions of evolution as progressive, the idea that not every concept and definition 
of progress captures the process of evolution accurately also persists as demonstrated by the 
rejection of the racist and narrow perspectives of the Victorian age as well as those of the 
early twentieth century (Shanahan 186). Such proclamations were actually made in the 1940s 
by the influential palaeontologist George Simpson, who regarded the Victorian interpretation 
of progress as being a fallacious assumption that was ‘imposed’ on what had been uncovered 
about the workings of evolutionary processes (Simpson 260-1; Shanahan 205). Simpson also 
notes that anthropocentric perspectives on evolution tend to consider progress in terms of one 
‘single standard’ rather than admit to ‘a multitude of possible points of reference’ (242). As a 
result, they are unable to consider the possibility that evolution holds many different 
examples of progress rather than the one kind that is usually defined in terms of the human 
capacity to gain flexible adaptability through controlling and altering the environment in 
accordance with human needs (242). This shows that even when Simpson admitted to the fact 
that some sort of progress does indeed take place, he did not believe that it can be captured 
and defined objectively, evident in his view that ‘progress is not an intrinsic quality, that 
exists independently of human thought’ (242).  However, in 1953, Julian Huxley sought to 
offer a more objective measure of progress through presenting a more general definition of 
the phenomenon as a biological ‘improvement which permits or facilitates further 
improvement; or … as a series of advances which do not stand in the way of further 
advances’ (Huxley 86; Shanahan 202). This, in turn, led him to conclude that progress is an 
55 
 
unavoidable consequence of the mechanism of natural selection since it is, as Darwin stated, 
a process that ensures the production of biological improvements in response to the selective 
pressures of the environment (Darwin, Origin 97; Shanahan 202-3).  
       This shows that there were indeed scientists in the mid-twentieth century who strove to 
distance themselves from the imperialistic assumptions of the Victorian age by presenting 
alternative views that are more or less free of racial implications. However, the fact that 
notions of progress continued to persist, whether Golding had encountered them in Darwin’s 
Origin of Species or found them in the writings of his contemporary Julian Huxley, might 
help explain why Golding continued to hold on to his antagonism to Darwin and his view of 
evolution. In an interview with Baker, Golding stated somewhat abrasively that the proposed 
mechanism of natural selection does not present a sufficient explanation for the complexity of 
a certain species or even provide a convincing argument as to how such a simple process can 
solely be credited for the diversity of traits. He also added that even though it ‘seems to 
work,’ which is probably the reason why it continues to persist, researchers are bound to 
stumble upon flaws and contradictions sooner or later. Moreover, Golding believed the 
resulting production of a not so small number of mutations to be more of a disadvantage to 
the species, and that he cannot conceive of a supposed adaptation that might be described as 
entirely advantageous. Though Golding notes that he cannot provide adequate support for his 
argument since his dismissal of Darwinian evolution is based on some sort of an ‘instinct’ (in 
Baker ‘Interview’), current views in the field of evolutionary psychology are actually in 
support of Golding’s position regarding the claimed efficiency of natural selection’s 
engineering and the false assumption that evolution is driven towards the perfection of the 
species. Psychologists such as Pinker and Buss state that it is important to keep in mind that 
natural selection is not a guided process, but is best described as ‘a blind watchmaker’ whose 
creations are driven by the collective operation of the principles of efficiency,40 economy and 
unpredictability rather than a drive towards perfection. Consequently, one cannot 
conclusively state that a certain mechanism evolved for the purpose of fulfilling a certain 
function because necessity is not a strict condition for the emergence of a particular trait. 
Furthermore, not every aspect witnessed is an adaptation in the rigid sense of the word since 
steady by-products of steady adaptations are highly probable. It is also important to stress that 
the mechanism does not operate in terms of the simple selection of the advantageous over the 
                                                          
40 It was Richard Dawkins who called natural selection ‘the blind watchmaker,’ a phrase which Pinker alters to 
‘the blind programmer’ in reference to the design of the mental functions of the brain (Pinker Mind 36).  
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disadvantageous. Natural selection is about costs and gains. If the gains outweigh the costs, 
the trait will be selected for regardless of the unfavourable consequences that may arise. This 
explains why certain traits, as Golding had observed, appear to assume more of a 
disadvantageous manifestation than an adaptive one. In fact, even if the mechanism turned 
out to be an adaptation, one should not be tempted to think of it as ‘optimally designed’ by 
natural selection because evolution is an economic process that has to work with what the 
organism already has (Metzinger, Ch. 2; Pinker, Mind 41; Duntley and Buss 117-8). Finally, 
it is crucial to keep in mind that there is no moral essence to the process of natural selection. 
If a behaviour or a trait increases the organism’s chances of survival and reproduction, it will 
be selected for regardless of its moral implications (Pinker, Blank Slate 61; Duntley and Buss 
103). There are, of course, views that are in support of the biological roots of morality (see 
De Waal, Good Natured; Broom). It seems, however, that even those clearly postulate that 
the moral instinct, if one can call it this, is mainly selected for because of the important 
function it serves in promoting social cohesion and in contributing, as such, to the survival 
and reproductive interests of the group as a whole (Broom 22).     
     This final observation about the mechanism of natural selection being ‘value-free’ is 
perhaps the most important in the context of this research since it could provide an 
explanation as to the continued presence of a set of behavioural tendencies that are often 
regarded as wrong, unjust or immoral (Duntley and Buss 103). Based on this conclusion, 
evolutionary psychologists such as Buss and Duntley have come to consider the possibility 
that certain behaviours like cheating, stealing, soiling reputations, injuring another individual 
or even killing might have evolved as adaptations aimed at handling the conflicts resulting 
from competition over limited resources (Duntley 228-31; Duntley and Buss 107).41 And 
since these reputed adaptations involved the infliction of significant fitness costs on others, 
especially in cases of murder or homicide, they have turned the human race into one of the 
most aggressive forces in the history of evolution; humans then conform to a kind of 
Hobbesian picture of war of all against all, necessitating the emergence and the co-
                                                          
41 Buss and Duntley note that killing is definitely not adaptive in all cases and circumstances and that it had 
evolved as a solution to specific situations in which pursuing it will not impose high costs on the killer (Duntley 
232; Duntley and Buss 108). They also add that though this conclusion might seem outrageous since it grounds 
evil in human biology and might consequently be misunderstood to mean that people cannot be held 
accountable for their aggressive behaviour, it is worth mentioning that evolutionary psychology does not 
commit itself to the naturalistic fallacy, and as such does not consider these kind of acts as tolerable, or 
uncontrollable. Moreover, the moral code that condemns such acts is actually biologically rooted and shows 
clearly in the psychological and emotional states of ‘disgust, moralistic anger and contempt’ which are normally 
directed against aggressive and violent acts and which are believed to have been designed to motivate the 
imposition of a moral code (Duntley and Buss 119).     
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development of a set of defences that are aimed at guarding themselves against suffering the 
costs imposed by other members of their species (Duntley 224; Duntley and Buss 108). Fear, 
for example, is one of the psychological states that is often claimed to have evolved for the 
purpose of forcing individuals to avoid contact with certain threatening conditions and 
entities in their environment. Since recurring threats are claimed to have been biologically 
internalized as normal fear responses such as fear of snakes, and fear of heights, it makes 
sense to assume, based on the paleontological evidence of past human aggression, that 
humans have developed psychological mechanisms and fear responses against other humans, 
especially the ones who are perceived as different or unfamiliar (Duntley and Buss 109; 
Duntley 227). There are also other psychological states such as anxiety, stereotyping and 
ethnocentrism which have been classified, along with the capacity to interpret another 
individual’s state of mind based on an understanding of one’s own—known as theory of 
mind—as universal defences against the threats imposed by other humans. Such states, 
according to Duntley and Buss, may have played a significant role in turning the murderous 
behaviour into a difficult measure to employ (109). Moreover, they note that the human 
tendency to categorize and classify certain acts as either good or evil is highly likely to have 
emerged as an adaptation that would either deter individuals from pursuing behaviours or 
circumstances that could be harmful, or promote acts that contribute to the collective good of 
the group (111). This led them to conclude that the concept of evil could be defined in terms 
of the severity of the fitness costs inflicted on a certain individual or group; the bigger the 
costs, the greater the evil. However, other variables were also found to be influential when 
striving to classify the nature of some acts such as the genetic relatedness of the individual 
upon whom the foul act was carried to the one who is involved in evaluating it (104). To the 
victim’s relatives, acts that involve severe fitness costs are usually considered evil as opposed 
to the other party for whom the infliction of such costs may seem necessary, or sometimes 
even moral. The best example to illustrate this tendency is the long human history of wars in 
which each nation believes itself to be engaged in the righteous defence of itself against the 
threats imposed by other nations or races (104). Moreover, Buss and Duntley note that given 
the subjectivity of the concept of evil, it could so easily become exploited to serve personal 
interests or political aims that are usually the leading cause behind wars since declaring a 
nation, a group, a race or even an individual as evil can serve as a motivation to have others 
join in the attack and reduce whatever expected damage the opposing party might inflict 
(115).  
     Given these observations on the morally indifferent process of natural selection and its 
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subsequent creation of an innately aggressive human nature, one can see the many ways by 
which evolutionary psychology’s account of evil can help explicate the violent strain in 
Golding’s fiction in general, and The Inheritors in particular. To begin with, it can show that 
the Neanderthals’ tragic fate was more of a consequence of their naivety and their falling 
victim to the Homo Sapiens’ psychological defence mechanisms and their fear responses 
rather than a result of pure cruelty on the Homo Sapiens’ part. Golding actually grants his 
readers this perspective through Fa who makes the observation that ‘the new people are 
frightened,’ that ‘they stand and move like people who are frightened,’ and that ‘they heave 
sweat and watch the forest over their backs’ (Inheritors 206). Moreover, evolutionary 
psychology can offer a supporting claim for Golding’s belief regarding humanity’s tendency 
to externalize its inner evil since it postulates that it is human violence that had reputedly 
exerted the selective pressure that favoured the evolution of the cognitively biased defence 
mechanisms of ethnocentrism and stranger anxiety (Duntley and Buss 109). In addition, 
evolutionary psychology’s claim regarding the subjectivity of evaluative systems and its 
resulting in adaptive yet immoral outcomes can prove rather helpful in reinforcing Carey’s 
note about Golding’s belief in the necessity of evolutionary change despite the costs it might 
incur on the moral state of mankind (Carey, Golding 183).  
     However, relying solely on this account in addressing the violent capacities of modern 
man may leave some crucial issues inadequately addressed. After all, it is important to 
understand the role of abstract thought, symbolism and analogical reasoning, all of which 
were emphasized by Golding as fostering the sinful in mankind, in contributing to the moral 
devolution of the human race. It is also important to address the role of self-awareness in 
promoting both the evil and the moral in human nature, considering how it was specifically 
signalled by Golding as another crucial cognitive function that has contributed to nurturing 
the narcissistic side of human nature and to reinforcing a sinful state of selfishness or self-
centredness. Moreover, given Golding’s depiction of the Neanderthals in a manner that 
reinforces their affinity with a highly instinctual animal existence, marked by a lesser degree 
of individuality and rationality, it might prove helpful to provide a workable definition of 
intelligence and to understand the kind of factors that took human cognition beyond that of 
the animal. One way of addressing all of these concerns is to widen the evolutionary 
investigation of evil and to incorporate the field of animal intelligence so as to highlight the 
difference between the Neanderthals and the Homo Sapiens as well as show how self-
awareness or the lack of it can either encourage or discourage the severity of innate 
aggression.   
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The Evolution of Complex Intelligence, Self-Awareness and the Emergence of Evil  
Imperfections in the design of natural selection and the possibility of its resulting in 
undesirable outcomes and maladaptive side effects for adaptations are best exhibited, in the 
context of this research, in the evolution of intelligence since Golding did imply that one of 
the issues he aimed to raise in The Inheritors is the connection between cognitive 
development and the emergence of evil (Golding in Biles, Talk 109-10). However, a 
connection of this sort cannot be easily established in an evolutionary frame before settling 
the controversy regarding the meaning of intelligence which stems out of the difficulty of 
setting a clear criterion for what can be passed as intelligent behaviour (Sternberg, Criteria 1-
3). One problem with resolving the issue is what had been noted as a common tendency to 
give in to anthropocentrism and define both intelligence and its parameters in singularly 
human terms. Since anthropocentric standards could rule out animal instincts as intelligent 
behaviour due to their lack of sophistication compared to the human capacity for language, 
reason and planning, one can see how anthropocentrism could condemn animals to either 
being less intelligent or not intelligent at all (Godfrey-Smith 223; Budiansky xiii). For 
advocates of the continuity principle, however, which postulates that a simpler form or a 
precursor to any behaviour of a certain complexity can be detected in other life forms 
(Velmans 265; Bradshaw 67; de Waal, Good Natured 82), intelligence is not a unique human 
capacity because many of the cognitive skills that have long been regarded as uniquely 
human such as self-awareness, theory of mind and even reason have been noted to exist in a 
certain degree in animals as well (Flanagan and Hardcastle 207; Roth and Dicke). In fact, the 
principle of continuity which establishes the mental and emotional connection between man 
and animal was proposed by Charles Darwin in The Descent of Man where he explains that: 
the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly 
one of degree and not of kind. … [and] that the senses and intuitions, the various 
emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, 
etc., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient or even sometimes in a well-
developed condition, in the lower animals (101).  
Taken in the context of The Inheritors, such observations might prove helpful in reinforcing 
the affinities shared between both species, particularly when it comes to empathy, than in 
highlighting their essential differences, an argument that will later be utilized in 
understanding the continuity of morality and possibly even evil. What should be noted for 
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now, however, is that given the large difference in degree between man and animal, evil can 
just as well be located in the complexity of intelligence rather than the mere possession of it. 
This conclusion, in fact, seems to be more in accordance with Golding’s views since he did 
mention to Biles that he is not quite sure if the beginning of the ‘operation of intelligence’ 
was sinful, but that he is certain that it had gotten to a point where it definitely is (110). There 
are also other clues in both the interview and the novel that lend further support for this 
reading, but before venturing into that area, it is important to provide a definition for 
intelligence that will guide the interpretation of The Inheritors and the other two novels, as 
well as clarify what Golding had in mind when he blamed the moral condition of the human 
race on its intellectual capacities.    
     As discussed earlier, one difficulty in the study of intelligence is presenting a 
‘conventional definition’ that captures it accurately (Sternberg, Criteria 2-3). Despite the 
varied range of definitions and perspectives proposed by both experts or laypersons, as 
Sternberg shows, however, there seems to be an agreement regarding the function of 
intelligence and its role in aiding different organisms in adjusting or adapting to their 
environment (2-3). Taking this factor into consideration should show modern man as far 
superior in terms of flexibility to any other mammal or primate in the animal kingdom 
(Bjorklund and Kipp 28), a view that is indeed reflected in The Inheritors, particularly in the 
Neanderthals’ inability to keep up with the environmental fluctuations that are responsible for 
reducing their number to eight prior to their tragic death and annihilation. What makes this 
flexibility possible is humankind’s ability to impose its will on the natural world through 
intelligence, an aspect that Golding communicates in the novel through his characterization 
of the Homo Sapiens as being able to shape and use objects and other life forms in the natural 
world to serve their purposes. It does not seem, however, that Golding was aiming at 
depicting these capacities in a favourable light, especially given how he was insistent with 
Biles on the tragic consequences that controlling the environment through intelligence could 
bring to the moral condition of mankind, and which he believed to be responsible for its state 
of alienation and guilt (109-11).42 
     Given these observations, it seems sensible to begin by adopting Sternberg’s view of 
intelligence as ‘the mental activities necessary for adaptation to, as well as shaping and 
selection of, any environmental context’ (‘Concept’). This helps show that ‘intelligence is not 
                                                          
42 The element of control over the environment and its being associated with intelligence had been considered 
by Julian Huxley in the 1940s as a criterion for measuring the progress of a certain species (Shanahan 200).  
61 
 
just reactive to the environment but also active in forming it,’ and that ‘[it] offers people an 
opportunity to respond flexibly to challenging situations’ (‘Concept’). What this definition 
basically does is to provide two criteria for what qualifies as intelligent behaviour: one being 
the ability to respond to the environmental cues and modifying or engaging in a particular 
behaviour accordingly, and the other being the capacity to shape the environment based on 
the needs of the individual or the group. Employing the first criterion should bring to 
attention the fact that most living organisms are capable of detecting certain cues in their 
environment and of responding to them efficiently. Since instincts, as Godfrey-Smith 
maintains, ‘can involve perception, and a good deal of processing and feedback to ensure the 
right match between behavior and circumstances’ (224), it should be safe to assume that 
animals whose behaviour is mostly hardwired and instinctual do in fact possess intelligence. 
Consequently, examining The Inheritors through this perspective should establish the 
Neanderthals who are shown throughout the novel as being mostly dependent on their 
instincts and their powerful sense of smell as intelligent despite their inability to employ 
sophisticated forms of certain cognitive functions such as language or reason. In his 
discussion of The Inheritors, Golding states that the ‘Neanderthal man knew as much as 
Homo Sapiens, in terms of knowing. He knew one flower from another, he knew one bird 
from another, he knew how to get in out of the rain, that there was a hole in the rock, and so 
on’ (in Biles, Talk 110). This further demonstrates that both the Neanderthals and the Homo 
Sapiens are in possession of the instinctual form of cognition that Godfrey-Smith believes to 
be indicative of some level of intelligence (224). Golding, of course, classifies these 
capacities as knowledge rather than intelligence. However, his use of the word in this context 
appears to be aimed, like the second criterion, at marking the difference between the complex 
cognitive functions and the instinctual ones. 
     Having clarified what intelligence means within the context of Golding’s fiction should 
leave one last question to tackle, and that is how the development of cognitive complexity 
encourages the emergence of evil. I have already shown that Buss and Duntley have taken the 
human tendency to engage in aggressive behaviour as having originally evolved as an 
adaptation to resolve conflicts in a social setting. They are also of the opinion that even the 
psychological defence mechanisms that were supposedly designed to protect humans beings 
from aggression can themselves be contributing to the very same problem they evolved to 
solve. Building on this argument, I will tackle the problem of evil in Golding’s fiction in 
relation to the cognitive functions that Golding had specifically targeted in The Inheritors 
such as symbolic thought, memory and self-awareness, and show that even though they have 
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proven their adaptive value, they still retain some malignant aspects and maladaptive side 
effects that could be responsible for what Golding saw as the moral devolution of mankind. 
     Self-awareness, which should not be confused with consciousness, is a cognitive capacity 
that can be said to exist in both animals and humans alike (See Leary and Buttermore, Morin 
‘Levels’).43 What marks its distinct uniqueness in the human race, however, is its inextricable 
connection to other higher aspects of human cognition such as the capacity for symbolic 
thought, analogical reasoning and memory (Blackmore 126, Leary and Buttermore). One 
important function that self-awareness fulfils is that of facilitating acts of social interaction, 
cooperation and reciprocity since they are claimed to be dependent on constructing a sense of 
identity and on defining the boundaries between one individual and another in any given 
social setting (Leary and Buttermore). Self-awareness can also be regarded as crucial to the 
development of theory of mind which allows people to introspect and develop an 
understanding of themselves so as to comprehend, predict, and manipulate the behaviour and 
thoughts of those around within the contexts of both cooperation and competition (Leary and 
Buttermore, Morin, ‘Self-awareness’). Moreover, given its connection to memory and 
temporal reasoning, self-awareness can grant the advantage of mental time travel, thereby 
allowing individuals to not only project themselves into the future and imagine possible 
outcomes, but also develop the capacity to recall past experiences and utilize them for 
learning as well as constructing a stronger sense of identity (Metzinger Ch. 3, Leary and 
Buttermore). This particular ability to predict future outcomes is noted by Leary and 
Buttermore to be tremendously crucial to empathy and morality since it grants individuals the 
capacity to imagine themselves in other people’s circumstances and experience what it feels 
like to be them. It is also important in that it allows people to break free from the immediate 
cues and the ‘automatic’ responses to the current setting because it makes it possible to 
anticipate the outcome of certain actions and withhold from exercising them if they were to 
be perceived as harmful to either the self or other individuals (Leary and Buttermore). What 
further promotes the moral element in the human race is the ability to evaluate the self in 
relation to other individuals and to aspire to emulate altruistic behaviours that could better 
                                                          
43 Given the capacity for attention, it is useful to make the distinction between consciousness and self-awareness 
in terms of directing attention outward, that is towards the surroundings or the environment in order to 
successfully navigate through the ecological setting, and inward which ultimately results in the creation of the 
self-model and developing a concept of self (Morin, ‘Self-awareness’; Metzinger Ch. 3; Velmans 268). Based 
on this distinction, it makes sense to assume that animals do possess consciousness and since being able to 
respond to environmental cues requires the construction of a self-model, one could safely assume that animals 
are also in possession of some semblance of self-awareness (Morin, ‘Self-awareness’; Metzinger Ch. 1; 
Velmans 268). This would classify consciousness and self-awareness as the sort of functions that exist in 
degrees which actually go against another common view that regards both as an all or nothing phenomenon.    
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serve the collective interest of the community to which one belongs (Morin, ‘Self-
awareness’).  
     Unfortunately, however, the full experience of self-awareness is not all advantageous. For 
one thing, the aspects of self-awareness that are responsible for promoting the moral side of 
humanity can also be targeted as responsible for the same moral ills that Golding specifically 
targeted in his fiction. One such aspect is the distinct sense of identity which together with 
analogical reasoning could create the human desire to become a better person that upholds the 
moral code of the social group (Morin ‘Self-awareness’). However, this process of self-
evaluation can turn maladaptive since it could either result in the emergence of superiority or 
racial supremacy, or give rise to self-critical behaviour that can ultimately create the sense of 
inferiority and the desire to self-destruct or contemplate suicide (Morin ‘Self-awareness’). In 
addition, engaging in analogies along with the capacity to perceive the self in a future setting 
can lead to greed, lust and envy since they make it possible to compare the self to others, to 
imagine possessing what they have and to possibly even end up seeking the means by which 
to feed the self’s needs and desires (Josipovice, ‘Source’ 241). Moreover, possessing an 
extended self, an aspect that reinforces control over automatic impulses by allowing 
individuals to contemplate the ramifications of their actions, is usually targeted by terror 
management theorists as the leading cause behind the uniquely human experience of death 
anxiety since it allows the self to foresee its death, realize its inevitability and experience the 
terror of possible annihilation (Landau et al.). This existential concern is a specifically human 
one because man is the only animal who possesses the aspects of intelligence that can 
comprehend the problematic nature of death and fear its process and ramifications. In The 
Denial of Death (1973), Ernest Becker maintains that: 
[m]an is literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own splendid uniqueness in 
that he sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he goes back into the 
ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear forever. It is a 
terrifying dilemma to be in and to have to live with. The lower animals are, of 
course, spared this painful contradiction, as they lack a symbolic identity and the 
self-consciousness that goes with it. … [I]nside they are anonymous, and even their 
faces have no name. …The knowledge of death is reflective and conceptual, and 
animals are spared it. They live and they disappear with the same thoughtlessness: a 
few minutes of fear, a few seconds of anguish, and it is over. But to live a whole 
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lifetime with the fate of death haunting one’s dreams and even the most sun-filled 
days—that’s something else (26-27). 
      The struggle with the eventual reality of death constitutes an existential dilemma because 
it conflicts with the biological propensity for ‘continued life’ that both humans and other 
animals share (Landau et al.). What makes the inevitability of death a major problem for 
humans, though, is not only their ability to predict, perceive and comprehend its reality, but 
also the fact that they alone are able to attain the full conscious experience of living as 
distinct individuals with a unique sense of identity (Landau et al.). To guard against this 
anxiety, humans are claimed to have relied on the construction of a cultural worldview that 
defines a common purpose to life, grants meaning to their existence and sets them apart from 
the animal world (Pyszczynski, Greenberg and Koole 18, 43). With that humans attain a 
sense of transcendence since upholding the cultural worldview can either grant them literal 
immortality represented in the belief in life after death, or the symbolic immortality that 
comes with being part of something greater, a bigger community, a belief system or a nation 
that will keep on living even if the individual departs this world (Landau et al.). Sustaining a 
cultural worldview and fulfilling its unique standards of value can also help in guarding 
against the potential anxiety of existence since it can grant the individual a sense of self-
worth and boost his or her self-esteem (Landau et al.). However, the downside to these 
defence mechanisms is that they are fragile symbolic constructs that are based on abstract 
representations of reality, and as such, maintaining their effect in battling the potential terror 
of annihilation may demand a collective recognition of their validity (Landau et al.). This 
could help explain why humans throughout history were found to be mostly intolerant of 
those who do not maintain the community’s belief system or those who subscribe to a 
different worldview, especially given how such acts can bring the authenticity of their own 
into question (Landau et al.). Consequently, it might be possible to classify the defence 
mechanisms that humans have constructed to manage the potential terror of annihilation as 
another reputed adaptation that can contribute to promoting the aggressive strain in human 
nature (Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg 12). 
     One area that experimental existential psychologists are interested in pursuing is the terror 
management propensity that they believe underlies most human behaviours and which they 
seek to explain in accordance with evolutionary findings (Landau et al.) They posit that the 
process of natural selection has resulted in psychological adaptations such as fear and anxiety 
which have proven their adaptive value by steering individuals away from any source of harm 
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that might compromise their genetic fitness. Certain fears and anxieties such as stranger 
anxiety or fear of heights are believed to have evolved as solutions to specific problems that 
human ancestors were compelled to face repeatedly; however, death anxiety is different in the 
sense that it continually operates out of conscious awareness, even in the absence of 
immediate threats or dangers. It is also different in that it is not associated with one problem 
in particular, especially considering how death is an inevitable reality no matter what the 
circumstances. This led terror management theorists to conclude that problems such as death 
anxiety should not be classified as an adaptive psychological response, but should be targeted 
instead as an undesirable by-product of the advanced cognitive functions of the human race 
(Landau et al.). They also suggest that although cultural constructs, ideologies or patterns are 
likely to be the result of humans’ utilizing the very same faculties responsible for the problem 
to solve it, such symbolic constructs cannot be regarded as fully functional adaptations as 
previously explained (Landau et al.). 44 
     The additional inclusion of experimental existentialism in explaining humanity’s innate 
aggressive tendencies can help build on evolutionary psychology’s account of evil and 
explicate the role of human intelligence and self-awareness in promoting the violent strain in 
the human race. In addition, existential views of aggression can help explain why Golding, as 
Baker reports, is sometimes perceived as an existential novelist, and why critics are 
sometimes tempted to read his creations in an existential frame. Baker, of course, does not 
seem to be fully supportive of such efforts given his view of them as too simplistic and 
constricting to be applied to works as complex and intricate as Golding’s novels (Study xvi). 
Despite this opposition, however, there remains a strong possibility that Golding might have 
been affected by the wave of existentialism that happened to rise to prominence in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, especially in the 50s and 60s. It is also possible to cite 
the existential writings of Erich Fromm, who is renowned for authoring Escape from 
Freedom (1941), as having contributed to shaping Golding’s fiction and his perception of the 
concepts of the fall and free will, given Golding’s familiarity with the author and the manner 
by which he handled the problem of freedom (Carey, Golding 122). Consequently, examining 
humanity’s ills in an existential frame will not necessarily undermine Golding’s core premise. 
                                                          
44 It is important to note, though, that a cultural worldview is only invoked as a defence mechanism when death 
reminders are not consciously perceived. Consequently, it is highly unlikely for an individual to resort to his or 
her cultural worldview when immediate threats to survival and reproductive success are clearly present (Landau 
et al.). Moreover, the fact that most cultures are based on beliefs that arouse this fear rather than suppress it 
should not be taken as contradictory to their role as anxiety buffers against the possible terror of annihilation 
because cultures did not solely evolve to address this one problem.   
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On the contrary, the inclusion of experimental existentialism can highlight the anxiety of 
existence as one of the basic drives behind human behaviour as well as show that the terror of 
annihilation is not solely unique to Christopher Martin’s narcissistic self.   
     Seeking the source of human aggression through an evolutionary perspective would make 
both The Inheritors and Lord of the Flies seem like equally plausible stages from which to 
begin the investigation into the triggers of the violent tendencies of the human race since they 
are both meant to affirm the wicked side of the proclaimed evolutionary virtues against 
Wells’ progressionist views. However, whereas Lord of the Flies is concerned with 
highlighting the roots of cruelty and tracing their development in the child, The Inheritors is 
surely aimed at digging deeper into the phylogenetic history of the species and providing an 
imagined evolutionary backdrop for the development of consciousness and intelligence, and 
their role in the creation of moral ideas of good and evil. Nick Furbank actually notes 
similarities between The Inheritors and Kipling’s Just So Stories (1902), in that both seem to 
be concerned with how things came to be. Although he did not exactly specify what he was 
referring to, it seems logical to conclude in light of Golding’s interests that The Inheritors 
could be taken as his account of the precursors of those states of evil and guilt which 
dominate most of his later fictions.45 This would suggest the value of an intensive exploration 
of The Inheritors since it might be regarded as a foundational text in this light and laying 
grounds for those further explorations in the next two novels. As a result, it seems wise to 
disrupt the chronology of the oeuvre in order to trace the birth of the boys’ beast to the 
moment of its earliest conception. 
  
                                                          
45 I first came across this argument in Jack Biles’s Conversation with William Golding (1970). He mentioned it 
to Golding and stated that he had asked Furbank what he meant by the statement. Furbank’s reply was that both 
The Inheritors and Kipling’s Just So Stories are centred on ‘how things came to be made’ (Biles, Talk 107). 
However, Biles couldn’t quite remember if the statement refers to anything the Neanderthals created throughout 
the course of the novel. My conclusion is that The Inheritors could be taken as Golding’s own evolutionary 
account of how and why language, intelligence, morality, and evil are born in a manner that brings to mind 
evolutionary psychology’s tendency to reverse-engineer behaviour.      
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CHAPTER 2 
The Inheritors and the Search for a Biological Morality 
 
The belief in a supernatural source of evil is not necessary; men 
alone are quite capable of every wickedness. 
 Joseph Conrad, Under Western Eyes.46  
 
 
When The Inheritors was first published in 1955, it met with a largely positive critical 
reception that recognized its sheer brilliance and originality in representing a prehistoric 
mentality and worldview, and capturing the paradoxical nature of modern humankind. The 
critical acclaim it received, however, did not exceed that of its predecessor which had not 
only quickly earned a merited inclusion in the literary canon, but was the text most translated, 
and as such, most responsible for Golding’s worldwide fame and renown. Still, despite not 
having measured up to its predecessor in terms of success, The Inheritors was deemed by 
Golding himself to be his best and most favourite creation, an opinion echoed in Monteith’s 
view of it as, ‘a more original, and more powerful [masterpiece] than Lord of the Flies’ (qtd. 
in Carey, Golding 173, 177; Baker, ‘Interview’). Other Critics such as Joseph Carroll, Ian 
Gregor and Mark Kinkead-Weekes also came to express a similar sentiment deeming The 
Inheritors as ‘the most perfect’ of Golding’s novels and as a superb piece of Palaeolithic 
fiction with ‘rare literary merit’.47 What seems to have given The Inheritors such a status in 
the eyes of these critics and many others is the psychological adventurousness that sought to 
humanize Wells’ negative portrayal of the Neanderthals as barbaric brutes by relying on the 
innocent and naive perception of one of their own in recounting the annihilation of his race. 
In fact, it was Golding’s attempt at rendering the Neanderthal mind and consciousness 
accessible to modern readers that attracted the most attention from literary critics and 
linguists alike, considering the sheer genius by which the task was accomplished. This can 
most clearly be detected in Golding’s careful and tact handling of language, or his choice of 
                                                          
46 P. 149.   
47 See Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 118; Carroll, Darwinism 174; Carey, Golding 185; Ruddick 97-8.  
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diction and structure.48  
     One particularly important engagement with such an aspect of the novel is that of Halliday 
who sought to roughly classify the language of the text into three categories. Two of these 
categories, language A and C, he associated with the distinct point of view of each species, 
and one of them, language B, he tended to consider as marking the transition from A to C 
(349).  Language A, he maintained, is the medium most heavily relied on at the beginning of 
the novel and the one capturing the limited intelligence and linguistic capacities of Lok and 
the other Neanderthals. It is a language characterized by limited diction, represented most in 
the Neanderthals’ use of simple words that are normally associated with natural objects such 
as ‘stick’ or ‘log’ to refer to the inventions or weapons of the new people like their arrows 
and boats. It is also characterized by the significant lack of transitive verbs, or the reliance, 
when transitive verbs are used, on the Neanderthals’ body parts as subjects for these verbs. 
One crucial function of such a choice is to communicate the Neanderthals’ lack of agency or 
their instinctual automaticity in responding to their environment as in those cases when Lok’s 
senses take control and tell Lok what to do: ‘Lok’s ears told him they were hungry and his 
eyes assured him they were alone’ (Halliday 349-50; Inheritors 119). There are also moments 
when inanimate objects act as subjects for transitive verbs such as ‘welcomed’ and ‘watched,’ 
or are paired with action verbs like ‘grumbled’ and ‘blinked’. These tactics might have been 
intentionally resorted to in order to reflect the Neanderthals’ anthropomorphic perspective of 
their natural surroundings or their inability to act or force their will on their world, 
particularly when it comes to the elements of fire and water over which they have little to no 
control. Some of these stylistic choices, though brilliant in the rendering of consciousness and 
point of view of the Neanderthals, constitute a major cause of the difficulty that many readers 
experience in grasping the events and occurrences of the novel which may initially be 
perceived as clouded in obscurity in spite of the simple linguistic constructs employed in their 
communication. In fact, it is the simplicity of the language and the modesty of its diction in 
particular that are responsible for the encountered challenge in reading the novel since they 
are again intentionally represented as too limited to capture the array of complex events that 
begin to unfold as the Neanderthals encounter the new people and their incomprehensible 
hostility. It should be stressed, however, that such challenges are instrumental in 
communicating the novel’s main thematic concerns given how they aid in arousing readerly 
                                                          
48 See Halliday; Hoover; S. Boyd 27; Baker, Study 23; Carey, Golding 180; Medcalf 14; Babb 43; George 81; 
Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 71.  
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empathy or the sharing of the frustration of Lok as he struggles to comprehend the complex 
other that has invaded the serenity of his home island and brought most of his tribesmen to 
their death. They are also instrumental in providing the only means of assessing the 
consciousness and intelligence of a species that is innocent of the knowledge of aggression 
forced upon it by modern humanity.  
      Choosing to refute the myth of evolutionary progress through creating a simple minded 
Neanderthal rather than an intelligent being is understandable given Golding’s views on 
modern intelligence and its inextricable connection to humanity’s destructive aggression. One 
cannot help but wonder, though, if Golding’s rendition of the inner workings of a primitive 
mind had made any use of the scientific opinion of the age, considering Golding’s opposition 
to scientific rationality and his view of its tendency to force favourable illusions on the world. 
There is also the important question of how much of Golding’s depiction of the prehistoric 
mind is accurate in light of the more recent anthropological conceptions and theories 
concerning the Neanderthals’ capacity to adopt the higher modes of cognitive functioning 
that are normally attributed to human beings as a species. Addressing such questions may not 
be directly related to the primary concern of this research which involves investigating how 
the moral instinct of both species operate in an evolutionary frame. The fact remains, 
however, that engaging in such matters can help locate the work in its historical context, 
explain how and why Golding endorsed or opposed some of the evolutionary views available 
at the time he wrote The Inheritors, as well as highlight the essential features responsible for 
asserting the work’s status as a distinguished fictionalized Palaeolithic creation to this day.    
     It is well established that Golding initially created the work as an explicit rejection of the 
basic premise of H.G. Wells’ The Outline of History and The Grisly Folk. Yet for some 
reason, Golding still chose to depict his Neanderthals in a manner that in many respects has 
close affinities with those Victorian assumptions responsible for reinforcing the misconceived 
association between evolution and progress. The physiology of Golding’s Neanderthals, for 
example, is described as that of hairy reddish creatures who have ape-like features and who 
walk on all fours. This image is not far removed from the physiognomy Wells believed the 
Neanderthals to have possessed in The Outline of History. There is also the child-like 
mentality and the pictorial thinking of Golding’s Neanderthals that can be said to have been 
inspired, too, by some of the possibly biassed assumptions of the Victorian age regarding the 
Neanderthals’ mind and mentality. Indeed, it is in Wells’ Short History of the World that such 
an image emerges, evident in the view that ‘[p]rimitive man probably thought very much as a 
child thinks, that is to say, in a series of pictures’ (Raine 107; Wells 60; Carey, Golding 179-
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80). Golding’s adoption of these elements, in spite of his avowed rejection of established 
stereotypes of the primitive mind, can be justified as a deliberate narrative strategy designed 
to seduce readers into building certain expectations so as to deliver the core premise of the 
book in a much more shocking and effective manner. By having a typical Wellsian 
characterization systematically following on from an epigraph which quotes Wells on the 
barbaric nature of Homo Neanderthals, Golding can direct readers into believing that his plot, 
too, will involve brutish, cannibalistic, uncivilized cavemen who get to be justifiably wiped 
out by the arrival of our intelligent ancestors. The representation may even be perceived as 
having been intentionally employed to feed the ego of modern readers, using a strategy of 
deliberately provoked confirmation bias that is then exposed, in order to forcefully bring 
readers to the realization of their egotistical folly and delusion. It is also possible to argue that 
it might have been Wells’ vision of a child-like mentality that inspired Golding to rely on 
commonly held Rousseauian notions of childhood in creating the pre-fallen state of 
innocence that he associates with his primitive beings. Since children are commonly held as 
an icon of a past innocence uncorrupted by social ills, relying on a being that reminds readers 
of a child not only serves in better communicating their state of innocence, but also helps in 
bringing out the viciousness of modern humanity unmasked when this child being is savagely 
annihilated by none other than our own ‘civilized’ ancestors. Thus perceived, Golding’s 
ostensibly ‘simple style’ engages complex multi-functional play of perspectives; but read 
carelessly, the text may be interpreted as dedicated to a similarly ideologically motivated 
construction as the previously held Victorian assumptions regarding the nature of prehistoric 
man. That this seems highly unlikely might be corroborated by bringing into consideration 
Golding’s correspondence with Monteith regarding the authenticity of his depiction and his 
concern whether he should have an expert check the novel before its publication so that 
unintentional inaccuracies are avoided (Carey, Golding 178). 
     The anatomical features of Golding’s Neanderthals might have been credited to Wells’ 
construction of them in The Outline of History; however, depictions of Homo Neanderthals 
as apish archaic creatures was actually a Victorian notion that continued to enjoy full 
prominence up to the 1950s, in part due to the authoritative views of Marcellin Boule whose 
theories were found to have attained significant ‘credibility’ in 1955, the very same year The 
Inheritors was published (De Paolo 70; Drell).49 In fact, the portrayal drawn by Boule of 
Neanderthal man in 1911 as a savage creature with a sloping posture, bent knees, ‘protruding 
                                                          
49 Boule’s views were disproved in 1957 (De Paolo 70; Drell).  
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face’ and ‘large brow-ridge’ was so influential that it became the standard image that 
pervaded most of the theories and fictional creations dedicated to representing prehistoric 
life, including those of H.G. Wells and the generations that followed (Drell). Moreover, 
Boule’s conclusions regarding the cognitive deficiency of the Neanderthals are highly likely 
to have been the source of Golding’s unique construction of their mentality in The Inheritors 
since it was Boule who stated, based on his research on cranial remains, that primitive minds 
must have been in possession of advanced sensory functions despite the cognitive limitation 
that compromised their capacity for abstract thought (De Paolo 65-6). After all, results of 
measuring intelligence through studying the shape and size of the cranium were considered to 
be credible back in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (See Gould, Mismeasure). 
Since it was believed that ‘“higher” mental faculties ‘were in the front of the brain while 
sensorimotor capacities were in the rear,’ it seemed logical to conclude, based on the shape of 
the recovered skull fragments, that the Neanderthals must have possessed sophisticated 
sensory capabilities, yet were unable to measure up to modern intelligence (De Paolo 65-6).  
     The negative Victorian perception of the Neanderthals would have been abandoned earlier 
given the presence of number of opposing views, including those of Arthur Keith in 1911, 
which sought to replace the mainstream image by arguing in favour of a more humanized 
model of prehistoric man (Drell). However, the discovery of the forged Piltdown remains in 
1912 which happened to follow Boule’s misrepresentation not only granted more credence to 
the brutish caveman hypothesis, but also compelled those who initially opposed such 
stereotypical depictions to abandon their humanized Neanderthal in favour of what was 
perceived then as a more scientific reconstruction (Drell; De Paolo 43). In fact, Wells’ Story 
of the Stone Age (1899), published before Boule’s construction and the Piltdown findings 
were made public, shows the Neanderthals as capable and intelligent beings, a perspective 
which Wells later on replaces with the supposedly more credible uncivilized ogre of the 
renowned Outline of History and The Grisly Folk (De Paolo 47). Even Arthur Keith, who 
initially held the belief in 1911 that the Neanderthals must have been in possession of a semi-
modern anatomy as well as the level of intelligence necessary for the creation of tools, came 
to reject his own findings in favour of the ‘accurate’ representation endorsed by Boule, and 
became one of the notable defenders of the authenticity of the Piltdown man discovery (Drell; 
De Paolo 43).50  
                                                          
50 Keith’s advocacy of the mainstream image of the Neanderthals are expressed in The Antiquity of Man (1915). 
This should not be taken to mean, however, that sceptical claims have been totally eradicated by the hoax’s 
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      Attempts at re-humanizing the Neanderthals in the 1920s eventually began to overshadow 
the misconstrued implications of the Piltdown finding due to the subsequent paleontological 
discoveries of remains thought to be of a much earlier origin than that of the Neanderthals 
(De Paolo 48-9). This had reputedly made it easier to abandon claims of savagery because it 
brought the Neanderthals closer on the evolutionary scale to modern humans (Drell; De Paolo 
47-9). By the 1950s, the Neanderthals were almost exorcised of their viciousness and 
brutality, and they were beginning to be viewed more as simple minded benign creatures who 
still maintained the bent posture and the hairy form that are typical of their apish figure. In 
fact, perceptions of the Neanderthals as furry creatures reflect the prominent beliefs of the 
decade regarding their mental capacities since formulating their image in such a light seemed 
to provide an answer to the question of how they survived the harsh weather conditions of 
Europe without granting them any shred of the intelligence needed to make clothes or create 
tools and items (Drell). This shows that paleontological and anthropological efforts in the 
early 1950s, though focused on humanizing the Victorian ape, still tended to view 
Neanderthal man as possessing an apish form (Drell); and it is precisely this view that 
Golding adopts in his unique depiction of the Neanderthals as ill-formed, simple minded, yet 
highly moral and compassionate creatures. Consequently, it should be safe to conclude that 
Golding’s representation of Neanderthal man is consistent with the prominent views and 
research of the immediate post-war age. The conclusion can also be supported by the fact that 
Golding did state to Biles that he had done some considerable research prior to writing the 
novel, and that whatever discrepancies or inaccuracies found in his depiction are more likely 
to be thrown up as a result of the studies made after The Inheritors was published (Biles, Talk 
106-7). 
     Surveying the common views and misconceptions regarding Neanderthal man suggests 
that both Wells and Golding drew on basically similar models since both maintained the 
image of Neanderthals as cognitively deficient beings with primitive archaic bodies and apish 
features. Similarly, both seem to be of the opinion that it is the Neanderthals’ lack of 
intelligence that led to their extinction at the hands of Homo Sapiens since that was the 
prominent view in the 50s and 60s, and the one championed by Boule in the early twentieth 
century as an answer to why they went extinct (De Paolo 70-6; Drell). This scenario, 
however, carried different implications for each author. On the one hand, Wells chose to 
                                                          
appeal (See E. Ray Lankester in De Paolo 44). De Paolo points that Lankester had actually warned Wells in a 
letter in 1918 about the questionable authenticity of the Piltdown discovery (44). 
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depict the achievement of annihilation as heroic given his own age’s preoccupation with 
imperialistic conquests and colonization. In fact, Drell states that claims of extinction were 
particularly appealing at the time of European colonization since they grounded the hope of 
‘displacing’ the lesser races around the world the same way our superior ancestors replaced 
the primitive cannibalistic Neanderthals. Golding, on the other hand, not only handled the 
proposed scenario of annihilation as tragic, but also regarded the once virtuous capacity for 
higher intelligence as the real reason why we are the cruel species we are.51 It seems then, 
that even though the ‘scientific’ models utilized by Wells and Golding in their prehistoric 
accounts were similar in many ways, the drastic differences between the conceptualizations 
of each age regarding progress, evolution and human nature are highly likely to have been 
responsible for the large differences in perspective adopted by each author regarding human 
intelligence and the premise of perfectibility. This should provide sufficient insight into the 
historical context of the novel as well as explain the connection between Wells’ stereotypical 
portrayal of the Neanderthal and the unique psychological account provided by Golding. 
However, one intriguing question remains unanswered. How much did Golding get right in 
light of the modern conceptions of Neanderthal man? 
     Because Golding’s account is fundamentally a moral one, concerned with examining the 
sins of modern intelligence in an evolutionary frame, answering this question requires a 
thorough analysis of his construction and representation of the Neanderthal’s cognition and 
consciousness, in other words, his depiction of the relation between psychology and morality. 
The question of the moral instincts will be examined in detail later, but for now, it is 
important to acknowledge that some of the choices Golding made in creating his 
Neanderthals’ mental capacities are actually in accordance with present-day research. The 
limitation Golding’s people suffer from in communicating through the linguistic medium, for 
example, seems to fall in line with some of the proposed theories in the 1990s regarding the 
Neanderthals’ vocal anatomy and the possible limitation this could have imposed on their 
                                                          
51 Actually, prominent figures in the twentieth century were in support of the view that aggression is an instinct. 
Sigmund Freud, for example, classified mankind’s aggressive tendencies in the 1930s as instinctual and 
considered them defence mechanisms aimed at protecting the self from predatory acts (59). In 1953, Raymond 
Dart presented his conclusion regarding the primitive remains that were uncovered at the time, and stated that 
they seemed to indicate the presence of savage and predatory behaviour. Contrary to stereotypical claims, 
though, Dart did not confine this instinct to earlier stages of evolution, but stated that predispositions to violence 
are shared by all descendants, including humans. The argument, of course, was carried into the 1960s, and most 
specifically in the works of Robert Ardery and Konrad Lorenz, who came to consider the connection between 
intelligence and aggression. Ardery’s reflection on the issue, though, did not result in deeming intelligence as 
responsible for the aggressive tendencies of humanity (31).        
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capacity to articulate the range of sounds required by a fully-developed language.52 There are 
also claims which take the relatively large Neanderthal brain to be indicative of the degree of 
social complexity necessary for the development of ‘gossip’ language, but not a ‘full 
symbolic language’ (Aiello and Dunbar; Finlayson 128). This would make Golding’s people 
whose linguistic skills are so underdeveloped that they are incapable of metaphorical 
language an interesting fictional reflection of such claims. In fact, Golding’s Neanderthals are 
not even able to use the linguistic medium as their primary mode of communication, but have 
to rely on picture-sharing, signs, dances and gestures to get the message across. Moreover, 
the discovery of what was believed to be a Neanderthal’s burial ground in 1956 was 
associated with the possibility that they might have been able to form some perception of life 
after death, especially since some of these graves included tools that were mostly interpreted 
as items to be used by the buried individual in the afterlife (Drell; Schrenk and Muller 84; 
Leary and Buttermore). This finding with all its inconclusive implications was captured 
perfectly in Golding’s fictional representation of the ceremonial-like burial of the people’s 
leader, Mal, in which the Neanderthals are shown as placing meat and water in his grave 
despite their uncertainty of the possibility of life after death. The archaeological evidence for 
the burial practice was taken by Leary and Buttermore as proof that the Neanderthals were 
capable of some level of self-awareness, a conclusion which I believe falls in line with the 
limited consciousness that Golding has granted to his people. In fact, speculations over the 
Neanderthals’ limited self-awareness are mostly based on lack of evidence for solid traces of 
their capacities for artistic creations or a symbolic culture (Leary and Buttermore), additional 
aspects that Golding’s people were denied.  
     Such conformity, however, does not mean that Golding’s account was without its flaws. 
For one thing, historical claims concerning the Neanderthal’s archaic appearance and their 
utilization by Golding in the creation of his people did not hold for long after The Inheritors 
was published. In 1957, William Strauss and A. J. E. Cave discovered that the Neanderthal 
remains—those that Boule had examined to arrive at his primitive physiology theory—were 
actually distorted due to an arthritic condition (De Paolo 70; Schrenk and Muller 13). As a 
result, conclusions made based on these remains could not be established as the norm since 
they evidently could no longer be taken to provide an accurate representation of the 
Neanderthal species (De Paolo 70). Strauss and Cave’s work helped rectify the prevailing 
view held in the 1950s which established the Neanderthals as simple minded creatures caught 
                                                          
52 See Carroll, Darwinism 167; Stinger and Gamble in Finlayson 128.  
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in an apish body, and made it possible to consider a more humanizing view of them given 
what was considered then as a possibility of their being the closest stage of evolution to that 
of modern humanity (De Paolo 70; Drell). This should provide some background for Calvin 
Wells’ 1966 criticism of Golding’s portrayal which deems the ape-like physiology of 
Golding’s Neanderthals to be ‘completely inaccurate,’ and considers the representation of 
their reliance on their powerful sense of smell (regarded as the lowest of the senses and 
located near the brain stem) to be associated with a much earlier stage of evolution (qtd. in 
Carey, Golding 178). Carroll also notes that the scavenging habits of Golding’s primitives 
might have been consistent with the findings of the age (Carroll, Darwinism 177; Finlayson 
56). Still, research based on the recovered weapons and remains of hunted game show that 
the Neanderthals were not only good hunters capable of initiating organized group hunting, 
but also omnivores heavily dependent on meat for nutrition (Schrenk and Muller 81). These 
findings are significant because they support the hypothesis that the Neanderthals were 
capable of a level of social development that can only be managed by a modern-like 
intelligence (Schrenk and Muller 57). The possible dependency on meat for a steady diet can 
also be considered additional evidence for a high degree of cognitive complexity given the 
fact that higher mental functions are relatively highly demanding in terms of calorie intake 
(Schrenk and Muller 56-7; Finlayson 57). In fact, it would be impossible to account for the 
Neanderthals’ survival in the old harsh weather conditions of Europe through the 
unintelligent caveman hypothesis since dealing with such circumstances must have 
necessitated group living, organized hunting as well as the construction and the creation of 
tools and clothes, and the capacity to control and manage fire, all of which are skills that are 
congruent with recent archaeological findings.53 It should be safe to assume then that Homo 
Neanderthals might not have been as mentally deficient as early researchers were led to 
believe, but are highly likely to have been almost modern in their mental capacities.54 
Furthermore, Leary and Buttermore take the archaeological evidence for Neanderthal tool use 
to be indicative of some degree of self-awareness and an ability to plan ahead to some extent, 
an observation that further reinforces the current conception of them as closer to Homo 
Sapiens than previously thought. It should be noted, however, that claims of modern-like 
intelligence were not only recently established. In 1968, Ashley Montague criticized the 
indecisive method of theorizing the level of intelligence based on the shape and size of the 
                                                          
53 Leary and Buttermore; De Paolo 66-7; Schrenk and Muller 57.  
54 Carroll, Darwinism 177; Leary and Buttermore; Schrenk and Muller 57; Finlayson 205.  
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cranium, and proposed instead that the available anatomical evidence pointed to a level of 
intelligence that is almost on a par with that of modern humans (De Paolo 66). Judging by 
Biles’ interview with William Golding, published in 1970, Golding seemed to have had some 
knowledge of the paleontological findings regarding the mental capacities of Neanderthal 
man that followed the publication of The Inheritors. In fact, he explicitly stated to Biles that 
he is aware of the evidence in support of the Neanderthal’s capability to create tools, but he 
was no longer concerned that his portrayal of them had run to the opposite end and shown 
them as completely ‘uninventive’ (107-8). This should raise yet another important question. 
Should such discrepancies in fictionalized and historical accounts pose difficulties in reading 
prehistoric fictions through the scope of evolutionary or cognitive science? Or better yet, how 
are these inaccuracies going to be tackled if a biocultural reading is to be engaged?    
     The answer to the first question is of course ‘no’. Representations based on beliefs that are 
no longer scientifically established should not be treated as an obstacle. On the contrary, they 
help in locating the work in the context of the age’s scientific findings as well as show how 
the author’s personal beliefs interact with the interpretations of the archaeological discoveries 
of the time in order to construct a fictional account that points to a moral or political or other 
kinds of internationalized readings and constructions. Moreover, fictional attempts at 
capturing the prehistoric realm are very often heavily dependent on the prominent scientific 
views of the age. And since both science and fiction can succumb to the influence of cultural 
and political ideologies, as in the case of Victorian pseudo-science and the effect it had on 
Wells’ fiction, works of the genre can be used to measure the moral and indeed the 
‘intellectual climate’ of the period that helped shape them (qtd. in De Paolo143; Ruddick 33-
4; Drell). They can also provide support for efforts directed at examining the historical 
development of science in addition to tracing the evolution of certain concepts pertaining to 
the biological and cultural underpinnings of human nature (De Paolo xxi). Furthermore, 
engaging in such pursuits and measuring the authenticity of prehistoric constructions can 
highlight the authors’ basic premise, explain their faithfulness or lack of it to the available 
research, if acknowledged, or their manipulation of it as it serves the poetic logic and 
underlying themes of the work, as well as explain why exclusion of certain data necessarily 
supports other elements in their fictional creation (De Paolo xv-xvi).55 
                                                          
55 According to James Clements, some of the choices Golding made in creating the Neanderthals’ mentality 
were made out of necessity. Language and self-awareness, for example, are among the functions associated with 
the capacity for abstract thought and the sinful control of nature, and as such, they should not have been granted 
to the Neanderthals because they are not the sort of features that would help distinguish a species as innocent. 
However, it would have been impossible for Golding to fictionally represent a being devoid of any trace of self-
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     The cumulatively progressive nature of scientific thought can mostly be considered 
responsible for inaccurate representations of prehistoric life. However, there is a possibility 
that inauthenticity might come about as a result of the author’s ignorance or misinterpretation 
of the available research of the age. One should also not rule out the claim that whatever 
findings that were available to the author at the time might have been intentionally 
overlooked or distorted to serve a certain function. This, as I have shown, is not likely to be 
the case for Golding, but whether the misrepresentation is intentional or not, the resulting 
account should be handled or evaluated in the same manner as any other literary 
representation. Fictional works are, in the end, highly subjective creations that are more about 
communicating a personal perspective than depicting an objective reality. Consequently, 
critical efforts should not be solely dedicated to tackling the authenticity of the 
representation, but should be more focused, instead, on how the work reflects the author’s 
effort at understanding the origins of humanity, or in Golding's case, the moral devolution of 
our species. As Carroll shows, the need for coherence and commonsensical order are 
cognitive needs that play a significant role in both the creation of a work of art and evaluating 
it as well (Darwinism 162). Fulfilling these standards do not necessarily demand factual 
accuracy since the final questions are about the degree of ‘internal’ or ‘psychological 
coherence’ of the created characters, as well as the level of coherence or logical 
correspondence between the represented characters and the imaginative environments they 
occupy (Carroll, Darwinism 163-4; Ruddick 25). The simple intelligence of Golding’s 
Neanderthals might no longer be in line with modern paleontological conceptions; however, 
it is still in a logical accordance with the level of complexity that Golding has granted to their 
self-awareness, social structure, linguistic capabilities, empathic tendencies as well as their 
inability to comprehend the complicated behaviour of their invaders or to even adapt fast 
enough to the new demands of their ecological realm. To successfully be able to bring all 
these elements into a cohesive whole so that the emergent benign psychology might be 
contrasted with a more complex and aggressive one reflects Golding’s profound 
understanding of human nature and the inner workings of the human mind. The effort also 
attests to the level of artistic flair and genius by which he tackled the subject matter of human 
aggression.        
                                                          
awareness and incapable of communicating through the common medium of language. The result, as Clements 
has shown, is a species who possess a less complex rendition of such capacities (79). As logical as this 
conclusion seems, I still maintain the belief that Golding is more likely to have aimed at locating the problem in 
the complexity of these cognitive functions rather than the simple possession of them, a matter that I have 
already addressed in the previous chapter.  
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     These standards should provide some answers to the question of how the problem of 
inauthenticity is to be addressed when interpreting Palaeolithic fiction in an evolutionary 
frame. Although my interpretation of The Inheritors will draw, from time to time, on current 
conceptions of the Neanderthals as well as those of Golding, they will only serve a secondary 
function to my primary concern which is to show how Golding’s fictional construction of the 
primitive mentality succeeds in communicating the basic premise of the novel concerning the 
disintegration of the certainty of evolutionary progress and the false assumption that it is the 
emergence of modern intelligence that allowed humanity to rise above the barbaric 
tendencies of earlier species. Contrary to past efforts at interpreting the novel, though, my 
account will not be concerned with uncovering the evil in human nature as much as it will be 
directed at tracing the moral instinct in both species and uncovering the psychological 
conditions and adaptations that might overpower it. In order to do that, it is important to 
show, as I have previously mentioned, how the cognitive functions that Golding deemed 
responsible for promoting the violent tendencies of the human race have developed in both 
the Neanderthals and Homo Sapiens, and to explain how their presence and level of 
complexity bolster the morality of one species and obstruct the other’s.   
The Moral Instinct and the Erosion of Empathy 
The evolving conceptions of Neanderthal man from the Victorian age up to modern times 
reflect a persistent and strenuous effort to redraw and define the boundaries between man and 
animal in a manner that might preserve mankind’s unique status as superior reasoning beings. 
In fact, most of these efforts, as previously shown, were motivated by the appealing ideology 
of progress more commonly associated with the scientific pursuits of the Victorian age. It 
seems, however, that even if the principle of cognitive continuity between man and animal is 
subscribed to, there remains the tendency to seek out certain propensities, define them as 
uniquely human and declare them as unattainable by the animal world (Drell). This is surely 
reflected in present day scientific pursuits as is evident in the ongoing controversies regarding 
the possible animal capacity for consciousness, theory of mind, reason, and most importantly, 
morality, which specifically seems like a biological impossibility given the dominant view of 
nature as ‘red in tooth and claw’ (Drell; Rosas). In fact, it is the dedicated attention to 
competition over limited resources for survival and reproductive success as one of the most 
basic principles underlying most innate inclinations that made it difficult to reconcile selfless 
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codes of conduct with the characteristic selfishness born out of the replication drive.56 As a 
result, it became more logical, even for those who are more attuned to explaining human 
behaviour in biological terms, to regard morality as a construct that is firmly rooted in 
culture. It is also possible to trace this conception to the need to maintain morality’s sacred 
status as a human creation, designed by high intelligence to help humanity rise above its 
animal instincts and baser urges (Broom 195; T. Huxley 204-5).57 However, there are still 
those such as Hauser, de Waal and Broom who take the universality of moral actions and the 
presence of what can be considered as precursors to morality in our closest primate relatives 
to be indicative of not only an innate biological foundation, but also of a long history of 
development and evolution that is much older than previously thought (de Waal, Good 
Natured 2, 218).58 This view of an innate drive towards moralistic acts might be perceived as 
contradictory to Golding’s perception of human nature as innately evil, especially when 
considered in relation to Lord of the Flies where Golding explores mankind’s inherent 
aggressive tendencies in the absence of the social sanctions that keep them in check. It seems, 
however, that even Golding was in favour of the concept of a moral instinct since he also 
expressed the belief that:  
man is … by nature a moral creature, and when he’s in free fall he, so to speak, 
stumbles over his morals without knowing they are there. He exploits people and 
then finds that with this comes guilt and that you can't be free of right and wrong 
because you know by some kind of instinct when you've exploited somebody, when 
you've hurt somebody, when you've cheated somebody. You know when you lie and 
all the rest of it. It's no good saying none of these things matter. They do. They 
                                                          
56 See Dawkins, Nagel, Williams and Alexander in Broom 195; Sober and Wilson, Unto Others 5-6; T. Huxley 
204-5. 
57 There are other reasons, of course, for why denial of a biological morality seems more appealing. Jesse Prinz 
has cited Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinism as a possible effort at defining moral values in terms of nature 
and as another possible reason why there had been so much objection to viewing morality as a biological 
possession moulded by natural selection (246). Spencer believes that the reason why there are moral ills is that 
people are mostly designed to live in an environment that requires them to be aggressive. This would make 
morality an evolved mechanism aimed at helping human beings adapt to civilization (Prinz 247). Since the 
process of evolution is progressive, such ills are bound to disappear sooner or later, but in order to ensure and 
hasten moral progress, natural selection must be aided. One way of doing that, according to Spencer, is to help 
natural selection by refraining from any charitable actions towards the unfit since that would slow down the 
process of eliminating imperfections (246).    
58 It is worth noting, however, that opinions have diverged over how much of morality is biological and how 
much of it is cultural. Prinz, for instance, believes that we are biologically predisposed to developing certain 
values, but rejects the concept of an innate morality (245). Hauser, on the other hand, seems to adopt the view 
that morality is mostly biological. His conclusion, though, should not be taken to entail genetic determinism 
because Hauser clearly rejects such rigidity. What he proposes, instead, is that we are equipped with a universal 
moral grammar from which we derive our moral laws and that such an innate propensity is responsible for the 
universality of certain codes of conducts in different races and different parts of the world (viii).       
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matter intensely to man because he is not just man, he is a social being (Baker, 
‘Interview’).  
     The association that Golding draws between morality and the social nature of man is 
crucial because the origin of mankind’s moral sentiments had been noted to lie, as Darwin 
had observed, in the evolution of the social instinct and the sensitivity it installs in individuals 
to the needs of others (Descent 68). This would make social inclinations quite influential in 
directing some behavioural tendencies towards more empathic and altruistic ends despite the 
claimed selfishness inherent in the interests that nurtured the evolution of sociality in the first 
place. Being a part of a social group, after all, can not only compel individuals to develop an 
emotional attachment to others and to learn to lend a helping hand whenever it is needed, but 
also prove rather crucial in conditioning individuals to make the effort to restrain their selfish 
acts for the collective good of the group (Darwin, Descent 79; de Waal, Empathy Ch. 1). It is 
important to note, though, that the development of the human level of sociality is inextricably 
associated with the emergence of the higher cognitive functions that have long been claimed 
as uniquely human or as having evolved to an unprecedented extent in the human race. It is 
this that seems to validate the crediting of human intelligence for mankind’s unique 
possession of a sophisticated moral code just as it had been condemned for the emergence of 
humanity’s aggressive tendencies. In The Descent of Man, Darwin maintains that ‘any animal 
whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being 
here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its 
intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man’ (68). One 
such intellectual ability is the capacity for a full-fledged language given the role it plays in 
codifying the ethical responsibilities and the moral principles of right and wrong in addition 
to the advantage it grants to groups in keeping track of cheaters and moral transgressors in 
situations of social exchange (Bohem). This would also mark memory as equally important to 
morality and to navigating the social realm since success of acts of reciprocity in both the 
human and the animal world, especially the ones that involve a risky expense to the actor due 
to the delayed repayment of favours, necessitates the ability to remember who would be 
reliable in contexts of collaborations and social exchange, and who would not (Axelrod and 
Hamilton). In addition, the complexity of memory in modern intelligence and its association 
with other advanced cognitive functions like analogical reasoning, self-awareness and theory 
of mind have made it possible for mankind to develop the distinct capacity for guilt and 
moral conscience since they allow the individual to ponder and evaluate past behaviour, to 
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understand how it had affected others and to measure the self against a held ideal (Kagan; 
Gilbert). Most of these functions, of course, are integrated within a concept of a distinct 
individual self which is fundamental to sociality because handling social ties requires the 
capacity to recognize others as unique individuals with their own sense of being. A distinct 
conception of the self is also crucial because dealing with the complexity of social 
interactions requires developing what is often referred to as cognitive empathy or the ability 
to interpret people’s beliefs and intentions based on an understanding of one’s own. 
Cognitive empathy, otherwise known as theory of mind, is of course, another fundamental 
component to morality since it makes it possible to assign moral responsibility by evaluating 
the intentions of conspecifics and deciding whether a harmful act should be handled as an 
accident or a moral transgression (Blair and Blair 147). There is also emotional empathy 
which, together with cognitive empathy, can help individuals recognize emotional distress in 
conspecifics and develop an appropriate emotional response to the victim’s suffering (143). 
     All of these components help illustrate how the complexity of higher cognitive functions 
has maximised the moral capacity in mankind and made the development of their unique 
moral sense possible. As a result, it might be logical to conclude that Darwin might have been 
right in holding high intelligence as one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of a 
moral conscience. It should be noted, however, that although this argument might initially 
seem to deny animals the capacity for moral development, it does not negate the fact that 
most of the cognitive functions that support sociality such as self-awareness, memory and 
empathy have been noted to exist in a certain degree in social animals as well (See de Waal, 
Good Natured). This means that while animals might not be moral in the human sense, their 
possession of some of the cognitive functions that are crucial to morality in addition to their 
capacity for prosocial behaviour should at least be regarded as a reflection of an earlier and 
more basic stage of moral development (212).  
     Taken in the context of The Inheritors, one might see how this applies to the Neanderthals, 
or ‘Homo moralis’ as Golding chose to call them, since they seem to maintain an empathic, 
peace-loving, harmless community despite the difficult conditions under which they are 
forced to live (Baker, ‘Interview’). They are first introduced to us as a small band of simple-
minded naive beings who are not even able to devise a simple solution to a problem as basic 
as crossing the river, an activity that seems to have been undertaken repeatedly over the 
years. Their new dilemma stems from the fact that the log which they had previously relied 
on in crossing the river is no longer there, introducing with its disappearance a level of 
novelty that they are initially represented as unable to comprehend, address and tackle. It is 
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from here that readers get their first clue into the kind of intelligence the Neanderthals 
possess, and the fact that it does not provide them with any semblance of control over their 
environment. They are unable to build their own shelter which is why they have to put 
themselves through the danger of migrating between the forest and the sea in search of the 
protection of the cave and the overhang which nature has provided. The tools they use are all 
natural objects that have not even been altered or tailored to suit their needs: a thorn bush for 
self-defence, ‘a splinter of stone’ for a knife and a boulder for a hammer (Inheritors 53). 
They use fire for cooking and warmth, but since they cannot start one on their own, they have 
to be extremely careful in nourishing and maintaining the flame they had secured from 
natural causes (30). They also seem to struggle with the difficulty of locating and obtaining 
food, a problem which they normally tackle through scavenging for dead animals and putting 
themselves through the danger of being hunted and eaten themselves, especially since they 
cannot fashion the weapons that could aid them in defending themselves. The Neanderthals 
cannot even bring themselves to kill other beings, even when they suffer hunger, considering 
their lack of capacity, perhaps even desire, to control an environment that is represented as 
changing too fast for their simple intelligence to cope with. This clearly shows in their 
perception of a time when ‘it was summer all year round and the flowers and fruit hung on 
the same branch,’ a conception which they sometimes find themselves compelled to mourn 
due to their current hardships and their leading a life full of new danger, risk and difficulties 
(35). 
      Despite all these complications, however, the Neanderthals do not appear to be 
psychologically or emotionally exercised about their limitations, nor do they show any signs 
of aggression, discord or conflict, even when the resources available for nourishment are 
limited and hard to secure. This can be seen in their lack of a sense of possession and their 
dedication to sharing everything they have, out of genuine concern and affection for one 
another, whether it is their limited resources of food, or sometimes even their own bodies. 
Their sex life, in particular, may initially be considered immoral when regarded in light of 
our terms since neither Lok nor Ha appears to have been faithful to one particular spouse at 
all times (32, 95). It is important to remember, though, that their sexuality is not merely an 
extension of the animal in their nature, but also an expression of the unique oneness and lack 
of individuality in a group existence where one is willing to give his or her all to others 
(Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 76). This is clearly manifested in the manner in which they 
take care of their elder and father figure Mal, who becomes so sick at a certain point that he is 
no longer able to feed himself without the help of his kin and spouse (Inheritors 87). 
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Although they express doubt of his capacity and wisdom as a leader and can only conclude 
that he is ‘sick in his head’ (46), especially when he orders a child to join them in the hunt, 
they do not openly question his authority or rebel against him. What they experience instead 
is an overwhelming concern for his wellbeing and an anxiety over his prophesized death 
which compels them to ask Fa to make an offering on his behalf to their goddess Oa, and to 
huddle around him in hopes that the warmth of their bodies might help ease his suffering and 
avert his imminent death (70). Furthermore, the Neanderthals’ dedication to their group 
members is indiscriminate and is revealed in their willingness to put themselves at risk rather 
than abandon a fellow member in need. This shows in the instance when Lok and Fa take the 
dangerous task of scavenging for meat to feed the sick Mal and the others, or when Fa gives 
her life to rescue the kidnapped Liku and the new one from the hostile capture of the new 
people despite the fact that they are not her own children.  
       Such a level of social cohesion and the lack of discord in the Neanderthals’ community 
does not seem to be resulting out of the enforcement of a complex system of laws and 
sanctions since the limited intelligence of the Neanderthals had left them lacking a 
sophisticated moral code to regulate their in-group relations. They do, of course, possess this 
one social law relating to their obedience to their father figure Mal as the patriarch of the 
group whose word, once spoken, must be obeyed (37), but they are unable to meet the 
cognitive demands of guilt and conscience since these require advance processing of memory 
that their intelligence is unable to perform. Though they are seen as capable of recollecting 
past events to a certain extent, as is evident in Mal’s ability to recall using a dead tree to 
replace the log that has gone missing, they are unable to rationalize or reflect upon these 
events in any way that might aid them in building upon their experiences or developing a 
moral sense. This might explain why Lok and Fa are not tormented by the act of gutting and 
slashing the doe for long after the deed is done despite its having been a major source of 
anguish, evident in their desperate attempts to rationalize and justify their actions while the 
deed is still being carried out (56). They would say that it has to be done because ‘[there] is 
little food and there are not yet berries nor fruit nor honey nor almost anything to eat,’ and 
that they need meat ‘for Mal who is sick’ despite their not liking the taste of it (56). Their 
actions, of course, are not done in violation of the one rule regulating their ties to the natural 
world, and which forbids them from taking the life of another animal unless it had died of 
natural causes. Nevertheless, their inclusion of such an exception demonstrates that they have 
some understanding of intentionality and moral responsibility that makes the task of gutting a 
dead animal emotionally taxing. In fact, Lok’s belief that ‘there is no blame’ if a ‘cat has 
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killed [an animal] and sucked its blood’ shows that the Neanderthals are willing to appease 
their craving for ‘sweet wicked meat,’ which they later on profess to not liking out of moral 
anguish, if some other agent absolves them of the moral responsibility that comes with the 
intentional act of taking a life (37, 24). It is important to note, however, that although the 
Neanderthals seem to possess the capacity to set a simple system of laws in accordance with 
their understanding of the natural world and their own sense of moral responsibility, there 
does not seem to be any component in their rudimentary moral code that has to do with the 
enforcement of these laws or the punishment of those who might break them. This would 
classify most of their selfless actions, especially the ones that are directed towards other 
members of their group, as more altruistic or empathic than moral since they come naturally 
to them without their ever feeling the need to codify their selfless behaviour in terms of a 
moral system. 
     One could say that Golding intends us to see that the harsh environmental conditions and 
changing ecological patterns have contributed to bringing them closer as a group and 
developing their emotional attachment to one another. Their survival, after all, is dependent 
on their being a part of a community in which they work together to secure the basic 
necessities of life, provide food, collect wood and take care of their own sick and needy. 
When it comes to the Homo Sapiens, however, who are seen as living under what they 
perceive as life-threatening conditions, and are struggling with hunger just as much as the 
Neanderthals if not more (143), their society does not appear to be as cohesive as that of the 
less intelligent species despite their possession of the intellectual capacity for a sophisticated 
moral code. Moreover, the Neanderthals’ selfless behaviour and their lack of desire to do 
anyone any harm does not seem to be confined to their own community, but can actually be 
seen to be extending to include other beings in their natural setting. Such a tendency can most 
clearly be detected, as previously shown, in their inability to bring themselves to take the life 
of another animal, even if it meant that they would continue to struggle with their hunger for 
meat. This shows that to them, the lives of other animals are just as important as their own, a 
belief that is translated in Lok’s perception of their actions towards the dead doe as ‘very bad’ 
because the same goddess who had given birth to them had also ‘brought the doe out of her 
belly,’ making their actions a transgression against a being whose existence is as valuable in 
the natural world of Oa as their own (54). Lok and Fa’s emotional turmoil, to put it simply, is 
not solely the result of a violation of what they consider to be the natural order of things, but 
is more the result of a strong sense of identification that they have established with all life 
forms, and which makes hurting any other being tantamount to hurting one of their own. This 
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makes their benign attitude less of a consequence of their capacity to comply with their 
simple religious perception which dictates that all life, including their own, has been created 
by a mother goddess, and more of an outcome of a strong affinity with the natural world 
made possible by their unique sense of empathy. 
      The capacity for empathy, as already shown, is one of the crucial components to group 
living in all social animals as well as one of the core functions that encourage the 
development of ethical behaviour or the precursors to morality in animals and humans alike. 
However, the use of the term empathy may cause some confusion given the wide range of 
cognitive functions that can be classified as empathic in one way or another. Mimicry or 
imitation, for example, which can be quite involuntary and automatic involves adopting the 
posture of other individuals and is sometimes labelled as motor empathy.59 There is also 
cognitive empathy, or theory of mind, as well as the more common emotional empathy, 
which is associated with experiencing the affective and emotional states of other 
individuals.60 Given the sociality of the Neanderthals, their sense of physical unity as well as 
their evident affection for one another, it is possible to deem the people as capable of 
engaging in cognitive, emotional and motor empathy in a manner that is similar to a large 
extent to the more intellectually advanced modern Homo Sapiens. It should be noted, 
however, that although this helps in bringing Golding’s Neanderthals closer to their 
intellectual superiors, the expression of empathy for both species within the context of the 
novel cannot be simplistically tackled in the same manner. For one thing, the Neanderthals’ 
sense of empathy seems to be operating indiscriminately due to an underdeveloped awareness 
which in the absence of an advance form of other cognitive functions such as temporal and 
analogical reasoning have resulted in a definite lack of what Golding calls an ‘acute sense of 
identity’ (Baker, ‘Interview’). As a result, they cannot quite perceive strict boundaries 
between themselves and others, and as such, other creatures are not conceived as lesser 
                                                          
59 See Batson 4-5; Blair and Blair 139; Hatfield et al. 20.  
60 Batson lists eight common definitions or uses for the term empathy, but I found that most of the included 
definitions involve the use of these three categories or sub functions in one way or another (4-8). Moreover, 
some researchers such as de Waal are careful to point out when tackling the concept of empathy that it should 
not be confused with sympathy since the former generally involves recognizing and comprehending somebody 
else’s emotional and mental states, whereas the latter entails concern for other people’s welfare (Good Natured 
41; Empathy Ch. 3). However, the two notions sometimes seem to be used interchangeably as two 
interconnected components for moralistic tendencies with recognition being instrumental to eliciting the 
emotional concern that can motivate a person to act in a manner that would relieve the suffering of others or 
ensure their wellbeing (See Lauren Wispé in de Waal, Empathy 61; Baron-Cohen 16). This can be reflected in 
Simon Baron-Cohen’s position, for instance, which classifies what de Waal has regarded as empathy and 
sympathy as two basic stages to most empathic responses, a position which seems less confusing and more 
practical for the purpose of examining the association between morality and aggression in the context of The 
Inheritors (16). See Blair and Blair 143; Batson 18; de Waal, Good Natured 41.    
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beings or even perceived as distinct breeds, but are rather regarded as extensions of their own 
selves. This can clearly be reflected in their tendency to refer to snails as ‘snail people’ and to 
their invaders as ‘new people’ despite their outward hostility and aggression (Inheritors 63). 
It can also be reflected in their inability to grasp the violent nature of their invaders because it 
is the people’s benign nature and their evident lack of the capacity for any aggressive 
behaviour that provide the model upon which they base their understanding of the natural 
world and the inner workings of the beings who occupy it. In fact, when it comes to the 
Neanderthals’ in-group relations, they are normally seen as compelled most of the time by 
their lack of a distinct sense of identity and their powerful sense of empathy to involuntarily 
mirror and live whatever experiences other members of their group are going through. This 
clearly shows in their inability to consciously remind themselves that the difficulty Mal is 
experiencing in walking should not affect them, too, yet as they continue ‘to pay attention to 
his weakness,’ they begin to helplessly and unconsciously mirror his affliction: 
Mal lifted his legs like a man pulling them out of mud and his feet were no longer 
clever. They chose places of their own unskilfully, but as though something were 
pulling them sideways so that he reeled on his stick. The people behind him followed 
each of his actions easily out of the fullness of their health. Focused on his struggle 
they became an affectionate and unconscious parody. As he leaned and reached for 
his breath they gaped too, they reeled, their feet were deliberately unclever (23).     
     This kind of unconscious imitation highlights their possession of a much more primitive 
capacity to experience other people’s emotional states known as emotional contagion which, 
unlike empathy, entails an emotional convergence of sorts whereby an individual is unable to 
differentiate between his or her emotional experiences and those of others (Hatfield, Rapson, 
and Le 19-20). Emotional contagion is also commonly observed in newborns who are yet to 
attain a sense of individuality, an aspect shared by the Neanderthals as previously shown, 
since their self-awareness is very much like that of a child in its early stages of development 
where it is easy for the boundaries that divide the self from others to get blurred and for the 
self to get lost in the mass of surrounding emotions, fears and identities (See de Waal, Good 
Natured 80). This lack of a sense of individuality is made worse by the fact that the people do 
not possess the advanced processing of memory necessary for the formation of a personal 
past that can contribute to clearly defining who they are and to consequently establishing the 
individual differences setting them apart from one another. In fact, it does not even seem that 
the Neanderthals are capable of breaking out of their fixation on the here and now, of 
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properly evaluating, reflecting on and connecting their memories and recollections to their 
present selves, or of imagining themselves beyond the immediate future. This limited 
capacity for an extended self perfectly shows in the old woman’s reaction to Lok’s helpless 
attempt at assuming the leadership role following Mal and Has’ death wherein she questions 
his decision of prioritizing hunting for food when there seems to be no immediate need for 
more:  
The old woman waited pitilessly. There was still food piled in the recess, though 
little enough was left [emphasis added]. What people would hunt for food when they 
were not hungry and there was food left to eat? (95).     
     What further limits the Neanderthals’ capacity for an extended self is their inability to 
dedicate their undivided attention to any picture, event or a change in their natural world if 
‘there seemed no danger in it’ (42). After all, a strong sense of consciousness of individual 
experience, past or present, is dependent on attention, and a stronger presence of the self 
requires taking the self as the target of attention. As a result, they are forced to adopt a simple 
perception of time made more static by their inability to consciously perceive a difference 
between past events and current ones which is why they find ‘[today] … like yesterday and 
to-morrow,’ and why they are unable to comprehend any past event, including Mal’s painful 
memory of the forest fire, that does not fit in with their conception of a static flow of time 
(47, 73). Their cognitive limitations, to put it briefly, have not only created a rigid perception 
of life that hardly conceives of changes in any ways, but also a static sense of identity that has 
no autobiographical memory, nor a distinct narrative of its own individual past aside from the 
one that defines the history of the group as a whole (35). Moreover, the Neanderthals’ 
dysfunctional memory along with their limited ability to rationalize have made it nearly 
impossible for each and every one of them to create their own personal interpretation of the 
world they occupy. As a result, everyone ends up ‘experiencing the exact same thing’ 
(Clements 78). This can be said to be advantageous to a certain extent because the absence of 
distinct individual experiences makes their knowledge about themselves almost identical to 
others, thereby maximizing their cognitive empathy or their capacity to interpret the mental 
states of those around them. Consequently, it is easy for them to converge into ‘one mind’ as 
they have empathically converged into one body, and to adopt the near-telepathic mode of 
picture sharing as their primary and most practical mode of communication, in addition to 
their less functional means of language and bodily gestures (Inheritors 38, 93). As 
advantageous as this particular aspect seems, however, especially when it comes to 
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promoting their sense of oneness and to reflecting their community as functioning as one 
whole organism rather than a mass of competing individuals brought together by the common 
purpose of survival, their near-telepathic cognitive empathy does not seem to have provided 
them with much of an advantage in dealing with the difficulties posed by their ecological 
realm or their hostile invaders. 
     Another aspect that further reinforces the Neanderthals’ lack of a clear identity and their 
subsequent and more primitive expression of their empathic tendencies is their fragmented 
consciousness which keeps their personal experiences from becoming fully incorporated into 
their awareness of their own individual selves.61 Lok, for instance, feels split between ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ Lok most of the time and is unable to properly integrate his instinctual 
cognition and his consciousness of his surrounding with his own self-awareness (124). This 
compromises whatever chance he might have been able to seize to break free from the 
mechanistic control of his instincts or to attain some semblance of flexibility in navigating the 
ecological realm. After all, his senses and instincts appear to be operating on their own and 
communicating with him through what Lok perceives as voices commanding him to do 
things. And since his self-awareness is almost useless in creating an executive I that can 
cohesively bring his conscious experience of his surroundings together, he has no choice but 
to surrender to the fragmented agencies governing his responses to the outside world most of 
the time: 
Now, more clearly than ever before there were two Loks, outside and inside. The 
inner Lok could look for ever. But the outer that breathed and heard and smelt and 
was awake always, was insistent and tightening on him like another skin. It forced 
the knowledge of its fear, its sense of peril on him long before his brain could 
understand the picture (141).62  
                                                          
61 One of the key aspects of the people’s consciousness that sets them apart from the Homo sapiens is that their 
awareness of their surroundings disappears even when they are awake. Golding describes this moment at first as 
a presence of ‘many minds in the overhang; and then perhaps no mind at all’ (34). Though their ears continue to 
pick up the sounds of the wind and the water, their ‘vaulted heads’ register nothing on their conscious awareness 
(62). It is only when Mal speaks that they get ‘called back into their individual skulls’ (34). 
62 In other words, what Lok perceives through his sense is not integrated into one whole experience, but is 
communicated to him as commands from distinct agencies that are not his own. His nose and ears, for example, 
are not under the direct control of an executive self, which as I have shown before is not quite distinguished, but 
are acting on their own. This raises the question of agency since Lok cannot seem to be able to govern his 
sensory faculties. He has little free will and is seen as following whatever his instincts dictate. This is made 
worse by the fact that rationality plays no role in his mental functions. His knowledge of the other, for example, 
was not ‘built up … by reasoned deduction but because in every place the scent told him—do this!’ (77).     
89 
 
One might deem Lok justified in his preference for his outside cognition over his inside one, 
considering how advanced Lok’s senses are compared to modern humans and how his 
reliance on an underdeveloped ‘inside Lok’ would put him at a disadvantage and 
compromise his relationship to the natural world. It is worth noting, however, that this 
preference serves a much deeper function than demonstrating the Neanderthals’ limited 
cognition and mechanistic animal intelligence because it reinforces Golding’s view of them 
as the naturally moral species of the novel. If the innocent simpleminded Lok had been more 
attuned to his self-awareness, he would have eventually come to develop a sharper sense of 
identity, making it impossible for him to keep himself from suffering the burden of isolation 
with its terrors and anxieties, or to even maintain the characteristic overemphatic tendencies 
that define the nature of the group as a whole. This means that as crucial as self-awareness is 
to morality and the evolution of empathy, its association with other advanced cognitive 
functions is highly likely to have encouraged the emergence of what could only be defined 
as malignant, selfish and narcissistic tendencies which would render morality and evil as 
inextricably connected to one another.63 The capacity for an extended self, for instance, or 
the ability to visualize the self in future scenarios, has been noted as one of the essential 
cognitive functions that promote control and consequently morality given how it makes it 
possible for an individual to imagine how certain actions can play out and whether they 
would negatively affect or harm others (Leary and Buttermore). However, as Josipovici had 
observed, ‘[i]f I can plan ahead then I can also desire what I do not at present have; I can 
envy what another man has and I have not; I can imagine the embrace of another man’s 
wife’ (‘Source’ 240-1). Such is precisely the kind of paradoxicality that characterizes the 
Homo Sapien community and sets it apart from the highly empathic sociality of the 
Neanderthals. 
     When Golding first introduces the Homo Sapiens through the innocent perspective of the 
cognitively challenged Lok, he not only brings out modern intelligence and self-awareness 
as the Wellsian virtues of evolution that aid the Homo Sapiens in mastering their ecological 
realm, but also highlights how such functions have encouraged the emergence of selfishness, 
hostility and aggression in both their in-group and out-group relations. In fact, their capacity 
to adopt cruelty is supposed to highlight the notion of moral devolution rather than 
progressive evolution since it brings the new people in stark contrast to the Neanderthals and 
                                                          
63 The association between evil, morality and modern intelligence has been explored in detail in the previous 
chapter.  
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their natural, indiscriminate and unenforced expression of empathy. Despite the selfishness, 
narcissism and self-centredness that mark the relations of the Homo Sapiens, however, there 
are instances in their social life such as those when Vivani nurses the kidnapped Neanderthal 
baby, or when the little Homo Sapiens girl Tanakil interacts with Liku that even the less 
intelligent Lok manages to recognize because he shares these basic empathic tendencies with 
the Homo Sapiens. Like the Neanderthals, the new people are capable of working for the 
good of the group as a whole, travelling through dangerous territories together, hunting as a 
group for food, and collaborating in rituals. There are moments, however, when concern for 
their own individual wellbeing overpowers their social instincts and goads them into putting 
their own needs above those of the others. Such self-serving tendencies are not possible for 
the Neanderthals to conceive because they lack the sense of identity that allows for their 
development. It is unlikely that the new people, however, might attain the state of unity and 
overactive empathy that characterize the Neanderthals’ community given their obvious 
possession of the kind of intelligence that allows for the evolution of distinct character 
which Lok naively senses in their individual scents and their different hairstyles (Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor 93; Inheritors 138-9). It is also possible to detect the Homo Sapiens’ 
individuality in their full reliance on language as their primary mode of communication, 
considering how it not only provides a testament to their cognitive superiority, but also 
highlights their incapacity to maintain the Neanderthals’ near-telepathic means of 
communication, an accomplishment that stems, as previously shown, from the kind of 
empathy that dissolves individual boundaries. This would make evolution appear as a force 
responsible for drawing modern humanity out of a state of unison into one of marked 
isolation where individuals, as highly conscious animals, are alienated from the natural 
world and from those around them by their consciousness of their own difference and their 
inability to wholly let others into their own existential experience of living. According to 
Gabriel Josipovici:        
[o]ne of the results of the fall, Golding suggests, is the creation of individual 
character. Indeed, the fall can be seen as man’s sudden consciousness of himself as 
unique and distinct from other men; and the fall is perpetuated because once this 
discovery has been made man is at pains to protect and nurse this unique self till all 
its desires are fulfilled, including the most basic desire of all, the desire to be 
immortal, to retain our consciousness of ourselves for ever and ever (‘Source’ 253). 
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     Being conscious of an individual self means being aware of its own individual needs, 
desires and wishes which are highly likely to give rise to conflicts and clash with the interests 
of others or those that benefit the group as a whole if they are allowed to be selfishly pursued 
unchecked. This explains why the Homo Sapiens’ society seems less cohesive and marked by 
apparent discord and strife, especially between the new people and their leader Marlan, 
whom they hold fully responsible for the hard conditions of fear, hunger and anxiety that they 
find themselves forced to undergo and endure. The new people are, of course, responsible in 
a sense for these difficulties, considering how they are the ones who ‘foolishly’ agreed to 
accompany him into the island in the first place, as Tuami has clearly indicated (Inheritors 
226). Still, their negative reaction can be somewhat justified by the fact that Marlan has 
proven himself to be a terrible and inadequate chieftain who fails to fulfil his duties or even 
consider putting the group’s interests above everything else. Unlike the Neanderthal leader 
Mal who is more of a loving father than a figure of authority, Marlan can be a selfish power-
hungry politician who is after the construction of a self-serving government that draws its 
authority from fear rather than respect. It is Marlan, after all, who is shown as having been 
driven by his blind desire to possess another man’s woman to elope with Vivani without 
concern for how his actions are going to affect the rest of his tribesmen. Marlan’s selfishness 
and failure to take responsibility for his actions also show in his choice to secretly appease his 
hunger by wolfing down the piece of meat that Lok has thrown to the captured Liku, instead 
of striving to do something about the people’s state of starvation. This indisputable 
expression of selfishness and corrupt leadership almost brings his tribesmen into a collective 
act of rebellion, a conflict that he temporarily manages to avert by reminding them of the 
authority he draws from the stag god and the threat that awaits them in the forest (165-7). 
Such sins, however, do not measure up in horridness to his crimes against the innocent forest 
dwellers who are not only made to suffer the death of most of their kin at the hands of his 
terrorized people, but also brought to experience the excruciating loss of their helpless 
children and their being reduced to pets and sacrificial offers to the stag god. After all, it is 
Marlan’s fear of the inevitability of the loss of his status as the clan’s head so long as his 
people’s hunger remains unappeased that directs him into adopting his most vicious and 
extreme measure of sacrificing the child Liku as a way of taking care of the people’s problem 
and his (168-9). Golding even asserts the brutality and viciousness of Marlan at the end of the 
novel through the tribal artist Tuami who cannot help but regard Marlan in the same manner 
by which he and his people have conceived the Neanderthals, that is as a reddish demon: 
‘The sun was blazing on the red sail and Marlan was red. His arms and legs were contracted, 
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his hair stood out and his beard, his teeth were wolf’s teeth and his eyes like blind stone’s’ 
(229). The scene is also crucial in that it exposes the real beasts in the novel as well as 
reinforces the irony of how even though there is nothing actually demonic about the new 
people’s appearance, it is their beastly nature that leads them into perceiving the innocent 
Neanderthals as dangerous forest demons that should be eradicated.   
      Such a representation helps in casting Marlan as the most egotistical and cruel out of all 
of the Homo Sapiens, but that does not mean that he is the only one capable of cruelty and of 
pursuing his selfish ends. Tuami is another crucial figure who perfectly depicts the 
complexity of human nature represented in its capacity to be moral and selfish at the same 
time. Though he does not appear to be openly opposing Marlan, he still holds so much hatred 
and disdain towards him to the point where he sharpens his knife in hopes of being able to 
murder the old man one day (226). He also has no qualms about going through the risk of 
quenching his lust by chasing after another man’s woman despite the feelings of contempt 
that he holds against her for being too vain (224-5).64 One could also say that his assistance to 
Marlan in giving the child Tanakil as an offering to the Neanderthals against her mother’s 
will classifies as a moral transgression that is as serious as Marlan’s merciless act of 
sacrificing Liku (229). It should be noted, however, that such heinous acts of sacrificing 
children would not have been carried out if the whole community was not in favour of them 
as a means by which to appease the stag god and the forest demons to the ultimate end of 
saving their individual lives. Contrary to the Neanderthals, who are seen as full of 
indiscriminate concern for one another, the Homo Sapiens’ community appears to be a less 
cohesive and more complex mass of individual interests brought together by the one intention 
of surviving a common threat which is ironically none other than the passive and innocent 
Neanderthals. This should make the formation and implementation of a basic system of laws 
more like a dire necessity to the intelligent Homo Sapiens since failure to do so might not 
only encourage the pursuit of selfish interests at the expense of others, but also disintegrate 
the unity of the group in the face of possible threats, including those posed by the imaginary 
forest demons. Not much is said, of course, about the possibility of their having a moral code 
given the fact that most of the events of the novel are reported through the innocent 
perspective of a Neanderthal who is not even capable of comprehending the behaviour of his 
                                                          
64 In fact, regarding a woman as belonging to one man, a conception that stands in opposition to the 
Neanderthals’ sex life, can be controversial and might even be seen as an argument against moral progress. This 
matter will become particularly manifested in Pincher Martin and Free Fall in the manner by which the 
protagonists of both novels exploit, control and mistreat the women they seek to possess, subdue and break.     
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intellectual superiors. However, it seems logical to assume based on the fact that they are a 
representation of modern humanity who possess the capacity for symbolic culture, religion 
and aggression, behaviours that are associated with advanced cognition and consequently 
morality, that the Homo Sapiens might have been capable, after all, of implementing a moral 
code that governs their in-group relations and their ties to the outside world. This might 
actually help in drawing them closer to Wells’ people, especially when brought in 
comparison to the Neanderthals in The Inheritors and their inability to formulate a 
sophisticated moral system. It should be noted, however, that the Neanderthal’s lack of such a 
capacity is not merely an outcome of the near absence of the higher cognitive functions that 
support it, but more of an expression of the fact that they do not have the evolutionary sins 
that demand its formation and development as a countermeasure in the first place. According 
to Sober and Wilson in their summary of Unto Others (1998): 
[p]eople can have specific likes and dislikes without this producing a socially shared 
moral code. And if everyone dislikes certain things, what is the point of there being a 
moral code that says that those things should be shunned? ... Behaviours that people 
do spontaneously by virtue of their own desires don’t need to have a moral code laid 
on top of them. The obvious suggestion is that the social function of morality is to 
get people to do things that they would not otherwise be disposed to do, or to 
strengthen dispositions that people already have in weaker forms. 
In other words, the lack of a moral code in the Neanderthal community, an aspect that Wells 
might have implied to reinforce his argument of moral progress, may have been nothing more 
to Golding than a testament to the Neanderthals’ innocence. This can be ironic in a sense 
because although the process of evolution in Golding’s novel is represented as having granted 
the Homo Sapiens the intellectual superiority that should have supposedly allowed for the 
development of morality, it has dulled their sense of empathy to a point where morality has 
become less of a natural impulse and more of system that has to be enforced for groups to 
survive.65 Judging by the Homo Sapiens’ unity against the imaginary threat posed by the 
Neanderthals, it seems logical to conclude that whatever system of laws, cultural practices 
and religious precepts might have been implemented for the enforcement or support of a 
moral code have succeeded to a certain extent in fulfilling its primary biological function of 
                                                          
65 I should stress that I am not suggesting that past phases of human evolution were more empathic, but this 
seems to be how Golding chose to communicate his view of evolution as being more about change and less 
about progress as previously indicated.    
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promoting group cohesion. However, for beings as intelligent as the Homo Sapiens, morality 
may also come to fulfil another crucial function that has to do with the anxiety arising out of 
an understanding of living in a world where events, disasters and victimizations are random 
and beyond someone’s control (Janoff-Bulman and Yopyk 126-7). This should bring the 
matter of religion into focus as a symbolic and cultural construct that is believed to have 
evolved for the purpose of neutralizing these kinds of anxieties. Such a conception of the 
world can also aid in highlighting religion as a crucial factor for the development of the 
notion of causal agency which can be particularly instrumental in the implementation of a 
moral code. 
     Most religions, if not all, involve a moral component that aids in reinforcing the social 
function of promoting group cohesion, creating a religious identity and establishing social 
order, in addition to their primary psychological function of providing a meaningful 
worldview that can help in addressing certain existential questions and concerns (Broom 26; 
Boyer 6; Batson and Stocks 145). These concerns may arise out of people’s awareness of the 
fact that the social and ecological realms which they occupy can make securing their needs 
and desires difficult if not life-threatening (145). As a result, people are usually gripped by 
anxieties over matters that can range from problems as simple as securing the most basic 
necessities for survival, such as food and shelter, to the much more complex desire to account 
for all the violence and agony in the world, the unpredictability of disease, death and 
tragedies, and the possibility of either becoming a random target for the violent tendencies of 
others or falling victim to the unforeseeable calamities of nature (145-6). In other words, an 
understanding of evil in terms of natural or moral suffering can be a great source of anxiety 
for beings who possess a clear sense of identity and the capacity to reason beyond the here 
and now (Paulson 5; Janoff-Bulman and Yopyk 126). One way of dealing with the cause of 
this anxiety is to first seek to understand it through creating an agent, a deity, that can be 
perceived as responsible for it, and to try to appease it through gifts and offerings for the 
hopeful outcomes of minimizing the unpredictability of evil and attaining some comforting 
illusion of control over it (Paulson 5; Batson and Stocks 147; Golding in Biles, Talk 111). 
This explains why some people normally resort to creating two deities or gods, especially 
since it allows them to hold one as commanding all that is good and benign in the world, and 
to deem the other as responsible for putting mankind through the evils of death, calamities 
and suffering (Paulson 5). When it comes to monotheist religions, however, there is the 
difficulty of reconciling the existence of evil with the presence of one kind god. This is 
usually dealt with through the construction of the common concepts of sin and punishment. 
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Such constructs can help in providing the same comforting illusion of control given how they 
contribute to maintaining the belief in a world ruled by a just deity where evil comes to those 
who disobey it and transgress against others (Paulson 6; Janoff-Bulman and Yopyk 127).66 
This allows subscribers to define the notion of evil in terms of ‘doing’ and ‘suffering’: the 
former being traced to abusing the gift of free will and misusing it to disobey god and to 
bring intentional harm to others, and the latter being god’s punishment for acts of 
disobedience and the moral transgressions of mankind (Paulson 4). Conceptions such as these 
can be particularly useful to reinforcing moral codes, considering how they help in creating a 
system of reward and punishment that can support the belief in divine justice, and 
consequently assist in neutralizing the anxiety resulting out of the awareness of the 
unpredictability of natural and moral evils (Paulson 8-9; Janoff-Bulman and Yopyk 127). But 
in order for these components of religion to evolve, certain cognitive demands must first be 
met. Such a notion can be said to have been utilized in the creation of the world of The 
Inheritors given Golding’s concern with the sins of modern intelligence and the fact that he 
intentionally represented one religion as remarkably more benign than the other.  
      Like the new people, the Neanderthals are capable of maintaining a religious worldview 
that aids them in understanding their own existence and defines their ties to the natural world. 
Still, what is uniquely distinct about the Neanderthals’ religion, aside from its justifiable 
simplicity, is the absence of any account that can adequately explain or provide a comforting 
illusion of control over many of the common concerns related to the problems of death and 
suffering. In fact, the people’s conception of their deity as a mother figure ‘in the continuous 
act of feminine creation’ not only attests to their fixation on or idealization of life (Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor 77), but also reflects how their incapacity to reason beyond the here and 
now has resulted in limiting their anxieties to attaining the immediate and most basic 
necessities for survival. Such a limitation might explain why the Neanderthals’ belief system 
does not offer a solid perception of an afterlife, evident in Fa’s puzzlement and confusion 
regarding the implications of a problem as complex as that of ceasing to exist: ‘Is one alive 
who was dead? Is one come back from Oa’s belly as it may be my baby that died in the cave 
by the sea?’ (Inheritors 70).67 It also explains why the Neanderthals’ closest vision of an 
                                                          
66 In the biblical account of the loss of the Garden of Eden, for instance, God is seen as punishing mankind for 
the first evil act of disobedience by condemning them to a lifetime of toil and hardships on earth where they are 
to experience the natural evils of death, disasters and sickness in addition to the likelihood of falling victim to 
the moral transgressions of others (Paulson 4-5).  
67 Though the Neanderthals follow the ritual-like burial of Mal where they place meat and water in his grave and 
ask him to drink when he is thirsty, and eat when he is hungry, the action is only significant in the context of the 
present (Inheritors 90-1). The burial is meant to return Mal to Oa’s belly so long as a concrete reminder of death 
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Edenic existence, depicted as involving a time ‘when it was summer all year round and the 
flowers and fruit hung on the same branch,’ is mostly catered to addressing their 
physiological needs rather than accounting for the more complex existential concerns of 
death, natural calamities and suffering.68 Their religion might be perceived as similar to 
Christianity in its conception of a deity in terms of parental affection and its construction of a 
paradisal genesis that brings to mind reminders of the biblical account of creation. 
Nevertheless, it remains as strikingly different in that it does not explain the loss of their 
Edenic state in terms of sin and punishment. This could be traced to their static view of life 
that excludes them from being gripped by anxieties over the randomness and unpredictability 
of natural disasters, and the need to explain and control them through the construction of 
notions such as those of natural evils and divine retribution, as previously shown. There is 
also the fact that the Neanderthals have an instinctive unenforced absence of selfishness, 
conflicts and in-group aggression that denies them the understanding of moral evil if it is to 
be interpreted in terms of making another conscious being suffer. As a result, they are 
incapable of rationalizing whatever misfortune or calamity that plagues the serenity of their 
lives such as the forest fire or the decline of their Garden of Eden as more than a natural 
disaster (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 77-8). It is also possible to see such an outcome as all 
the more plausible given how the development of the notion of natural evil or divine 
retribution is normally perceived as dependent on some understanding of moral evil or 
transgressions.69 The Neanderthals’ lack of some understanding of evil and aggression, to put 
                                                          
is still perceived. It should not be interpreted as an indication of a belief in the afterlife because the Neanderthals 
are not in the possession of the cognitive capacities that allow them to project themselves into the future and 
imagine possible scenarios as I have already shown. In fact, their inability to immediately perceive Ha’s death 
shows the large role that their unique perception of time plays in diluting their anxiety. When Nil first informs 
them of how she could not sense Ha’s presence in the forest and that she could only conclude that he is dead, the 
people find it difficult to see the picture and understand the weight of the tragedy she has communicated: 
‘[b]ecause they could not see what she saw they stood still and meditated formlessly the picture of no Ha. But 
Ha was with them. They knew his every inch and expression, his individual scent, his wise and silent face. His 
thorn bush lay against the rock, part of the shaft water-smooth from his hot grip. The accustomed rock waited 
for him, there before them was the worn mark of his body on the earth’ (68). His scent might have disappeared 
in the forest, but it continues to linger in his possessions along with other signs of his presence and because 
present is privileged in their temporal processing, they cannot help but dismiss the past that they have not 
witnessed, and the future that is muddled with the present signs of existence (69). As a result, only Nil is gripped 
by the anxiety of loss because she is the only one who has experienced the frightful disappearance of his scent 
and the subsequent implication of death.   
68 In addition to that, their perception of a life where there is no toil or hunger seems to be geared more towards 
the present and the nearest future. Following the people’s migration to the spring residence in the forest, Lok 
cannot help but believe that their goddess has awaited their return and that it would soon turn the frosty forest 
into the same bountiful garden that their ancestors enjoyed prior to the environmental changes that made it 
difficult for them to secure food or that caused the forest fire responsible for killing most of their tribesmen (31-
2). 
69 I should note that Paulson’s definition of evil is almost identical to the evolutionary one provided by Duntley 
and Buss which they associate with the severity of the fitness costs inflicted on other beings, as shown in the 
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it briefly, has not only contributed to maintaining their instinctual morality, but also denied 
them the existential anxiety of random victimization that demands the development and 
enforcement of notions of sin, divine retribution and moral laws as anxiety buffers. 
      When it comes to the Homo Sapiens, however, religion is not that simple. After all, the 
new people do possess the kind of intelligence that should supposedly be capable of 
perceiving, visualizing and addressing the complex existential concerns associated with the 
problems of death, natural and moral evil, and suffering. This means that although both 
religions are similar in the sense that they both are represented as addressing the social 
function of promoting group cohesion to some extent, especially in the case of the Homo 
Sapiens who lack the level of empathy that brings the Neanderthal community together, they 
remain as strikingly different in many respects due to their having emerged in response to 
each species’ concern with a different set of problems. Such differences can mostly be 
reflected in the Homo Sapiens’ fixation on symbolic practices associated with their fears and 
anxieties regarding the safety of the hunt and the eradication of the forest demons, as opposed 
to the Neanderthals’ fascination with the life-affirming force of Oa. In fact, the Homo 
Sapiens are seen as compelled by such concerns to appeal to some supernatural entity through 
blood offerings, possibly in the hopes of promoting the success of their endeavours and of 
exercising some control over any unpredictable problem that may arise. This supernatural 
entity is nothing more than a stag god to whom Pine-tree, for example, shows the willingness 
to have his finger cut as a blood offering (Inheritors 147). Given how unfulfilling and 
ineffective the practice eventually proves to be, however, particularly to Marlan, it soon 
grows to include the ritualistic killing of one of the demons’ own as a means of bringing evil 
and most importantly the problem of hunger under control.70 When this, too, proves 
ineffective, the new people eventually resort to presenting a more serious sacrificial offer to a 
                                                          
previous chapter (104). It is also important to note that the construction of the concepts of sin and punishment, 
according to Paulson, are an effort at reconciling the presence of evil with that of loving god, but since the 
Neanderthals have no understanding of evil whether natural or moral, they have no knowledge of an entity or a 
presence whose nature or existence conflicts with that of their mother goddess, and as such, they do not 
experience the need to create the notions of sin and punishment (Paulson 6). As the events of the novel progress, 
however, and as the Neanderthals come in contact with the aggressive Homo Sapiens, the people will begin to 
show signs of emotional and psychological turmoil at having to understand the aggressive nature of beings 
whose existence conflicts with the benign one of their Oa.  
70 The Neanderthals also follow the practice of offerings and they are seen as engaging in the act in order to help 
Mal recover (70), but they do not kill or shed blood to attain the benefits they desire. According to Boyer, the 
idea behind offerings in most religions seems to be modelled after the laws of social exchange which dictate that 
something of value must be given for a benefit of an equal value to be gained (207). This brings theory of mind 
and the fact that deities are normally anthropomorphised into focus as matters that could help highlight how 
each species has constructed its deity after its own nature, and why one deity demands the violent exchange of 
blood and the other does not.   
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different target, aside from that of the stag god which is probably no longer perceived as 
powerful enough to keep the demons away.71 This means that instead of giving up the 
practice of blood offerings after the failure of the ritual of eating Liku, the Homo Sapiens find 
themselves compelled by their fear and desperation to seek the more costly measure of 
human sacrifice as a much more proper price to pay for bringing evil under control. This 
results in giving their own child, Tanakil, to the Neanderthals rather than the stag god in an 
effort to rectify their mistake, placate the Neanderthals and have the demons leave them 
alone, especially after Lok and Fa invade the Homo Sapiens’ camp in search of their 
kidnapped children. Such a measure may be considered more appalling than that of offering 
Liku given the fact that Liku is perceived as nothing more than a demon that has to be 
annihilated in one way or another. However, the dire psychological need to bring evil under 
control seems to have not only made giving up one of their own for the purpose of saving the 
group as a whole justifiable, but also morally forgivable. This is actually significant in more 
than one way because it shows that religion can sometimes be more of a support to immoral 
practices rather than a hindrance, and that defining what is moral and what is not within a 
system of laws is susceptible to a number of factors, including those that prioritize the needs 
of certain individuals over others, no matter how brutal and unjust such prioritizing might 
seem.72 After all, the tendency to implement a moral code, evolutionarily speaking, is an 
adaptation promoted by natural selection to foster social cohesion for the purpose of 
maintaining the great advantage that group living could ensure for the survival and 
reproductive success of individuals (de Waal, Empathy Ch. 1; Rosas).73  
     This might ultimately brand morality as biologically selfish, but that should not be taken 
to mean that most moral actions are psychologically conniving, calculative and devoid of 
                                                          
71 This is, in fact, a normal psychological response. If the sacrifice failed to produce the desired effect, the 
rationalizing that follows is not that the practice should be dropped for proving useless, but that the ritual was 
not carried in the right manner, or that the offering was not given to the correct god (Boyer 321).    
72 The same thing can be said about evil. Behaviours that are normally classified as aggressive, selfish or evil are 
already established as biologically rooted, but to categorize an action as evil is more of a subjective matter 
dependent on personal or cultural points of view. The act of annihilating the Neanderthals might have seemed 
perfectly justifiable for the majority of the Homo Sapiens, but for readers who are familiar with the people’s 
innocent nature, such an act is most likely to be considered immoral.  
73 There had been debates among biologists and evolutionary psychologists regarding the implications of a 
biological morality with some considering morality as biologically selfish, and others declaring it as biologically 
altruistic if, and only if, considered in terms of group selection. The reasoning behind such a restriction, of 
course, is the difficulty of reconciling natural selection with morality if it were to be considered in terms of 
individual selection because it is mostly seen as limiting the freedom of the individual as long as it serves the 
greater good of the group (Rosas). For advocates of individual selection, however, morality is biologically 
selfish and had proven its adaptive value in situations of social exchange as I have previously explained (Rosas). 
A third possibility is that morality is biologically selfish, but psychologically altruistic because if it were not, the 
ability to detect ulterior motives would have prevented morality from prospering and fulfilling its function in 
promoting group cohesion (Rosas).  
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selfless and altruistic motivations (Rosas; de Waal, Empathy Ch. 1). Acts of kindness come 
naturally to both man and animal, a belief that even the seemingly pessimistic Golding 
subscribes to given his declared faith in the instinctual roots of morality which can still be 
clearly detected in the manner by which he chose to represent certain aspects of the Homo 
Sapiens’ life. Vivani’s maternal affection towards the Neanderthal baby, for instance, not 
only brings reminders of the compassionate Fa who, like Vivani, has been through the 
devastating experience of losing a child, but also shows how the Homo Sapiens are capable 
of being empathic towards ‘lesser’ beings, even if they have already been branded and 
declared by the group as devils.74 There is also the tribal artist whose experience of guilt over 
what he and his tribesmen have done to the people demonstrates that it is not only the 
egocentric Vivani who is capable of showing empathy, but also the arrogant Tuami who has 
proven on occasion to be as capable of selfishness and cruelty as Marlan.75 In fact, Tuami’s 
inability to rationalize guilt away, despite having done everything in accordance with the 
religious practices and laws of the group, actually shows the Homo Sapiens as still in 
possession of some level of the Neanderthals’ instinctual moral and empathic sense that does 
not require the forceful elicitation of a moral code.76 Their natural impulse for empathy, 
though, is different from the Neanderthals’ in that it does not operate indiscriminately; nor 
does it allow them to lose their individual sense of self the way the Neanderthals do, because 
they are still in possession of an acute sense of identity that allows them to perceive some 
clear boundaries between their own experiences and those of others. There is also the fact that 
despite the human ability to extend empathy to animals and other individuals, even in the 
absence of the emotional attachment that comes with being a part of a group, a family or a 
community, there still remains certain constraints that govern the conditions under which 
empathy and sympathy are to be readily shown to others given how they can be quite costly 
and unaffordable at times (de Waal, Good Natured 88). 
                                                          
74 Tuami, of course, cannot perceive her affection as genuine and can only conclude that her interest in the little 
Neanderthal is merely the result of her becoming possessed by him, an opinion that could be attributed to either 
his view of her as too vain and egocentric to care for others, or his belief that the Neanderthals are nothing more 
than devils (Inheritors 229). However, her vicious defence of the Neanderthal baby against Marlan’s schemes, 
an act that is shown as having resulted in sacrificing Liku instead of the new one, might be more of a support to 
a certain degree of genuine affection for the baby rather than a desire to keep him as a pet, especially since the 
measure of sacrifice is depicted as having been employed to save everyone in the group, including herself (168).  
75 The act of sacrificing Tanakil seems to have been done out of guilt. According to Golding, the Homo Sapiens 
‘propitiate because they have done something they know is at the very least against this kind of creature; they’ve 
eaten this girl, and eating a girl is a powerful affair’ (Golding in Biles, Talk 111).   
76 Despite the dark undertones in the ending, Tuami’s guilt seems to offer some hope for mankind given how 
guilt allows humans to work on themselves, a condition which Golding deemed as necessary for humanity to 
eradicate their moral ills (Golding in Biles, Talk 105).  
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     Judging by the circumstances that forced the Homo Sapiens into abandoning their former 
sanctuary and seeking the questionable safety of the forest, it might be logical to assume that 
whatever expression of hostility the Homo Sapiens have shown towards the Neanderthals 
might not have simply been brought about by an outright capacity for aggression, or an 
inability to show empathy to those who are not part of their social group. After all, the Homo 
Sapiens are represented from the moment they are first introduced into the novel as having 
been forced into a state of overwhelming anxiety, fear and terror that could have led their 
psychological defence mechanisms to overpower their natural sense of empathy, and to turn 
the innocent forest dwellers into a demonic presence that has to be annihilated at all costs for 
them to survive. This helps in showing the Homo Sapiens’ capacity for evil and violence as 
more of a transient condition of empathy erosion made possible by a number of factors, 
including their basic understanding of the human capacity for aggression and their utilization 
of it in their attempt at theorizing the thoughts and intentions of those around them.77 
However, as inadequate as that may seem in depicting the Homo Sapiens in a more 
favourable light, it is important to note that the lack of any capacity to suspend feelings of 
empathy can be quite disadvantageous given how it is represented as having made the 
Neanderthals unable to prioritize their survival, to put their basic needs first, to hunt for meat 
when necessary, and to deal with the threats posed by other beings and individuals in their 
surroundings.78 Such a lack or inability to control empathy is connected, of course, to the 
Neanderthals’ underdeveloped cognitive functions, an aspect which I have previously 
targeted as having helped in bringing the people’s nature closer to the innocence of children 
who have yet to attain an acute sense of identity with all its terrors and anxieties. As a result, 
it might be tempting to conclude that like the Neanderthals, modern children are born free of 
                                                          
77 It is also possible for people to force themselves into such a state of empathy erosion by dehumanizing and 
demonizing others through the use of the culturally constructed notions of good and evil. Though the 
Neanderthals are not particularly referred to as evil in the context of the novel, they are still regarded as demons, 
a conception that is basically the result of the Homo Sapiens’ externalizing their own evil as Golding had 
indicated. Conditions of empathy erosion can be, according to Baron-Cohen, either transient which applies to 
the Homo Sapiens, or at least Tuami who recovers from this condition after he and his tribesmen hit the safety 
of the water, or permanent which is more applicable to individuals who had their empathy switched off by some 
genetic disorder or some form of childhood abuse (6). The latter condition seems to be more applicable to 
Pincher Martin who fails to employ a double minded perspective and keep the feelings and emotions of others in 
mind most of the time as I will shows in the next chapter.   
78 Not all levels of empathy, or empathy erosion are adaptive though. According to Baron-Cohen, ‘moderate 
empathy levels are most adaptive. Being too other-centered means one would never pursue one’s own 
ambitions, or act competitively, for fear of upsetting or diminishing others. Being too self-centered has the 
advantage of pursing one’s own ambitions to the exclusion of all else… Striking the balance at majority levels 
of empathy may be an evolved adaption that confers on the individual the benefits of empathy without its 
disadvantages’ (181).  
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original sin, a concept that may help in viewing the fall as a later occurrence in life when the 
unfortunate yet necessary capacity for selfishness evolves and results in constraining 
humanity’s natural capacity for empathy. It is even possible to perceive Tanakil as a support 
for this notion, given how she is most probably the only person among the Homo Sapiens 
who is represented as having managed to establish some connection and exchange names 
with the Neanderthal Liku without letting the group’s assumption of her as a forest demon 
overpower her child curiosity or her natural sense of empathy. Tanakil is also different from 
her tribesmen in that she is not shown as attaching any murderous intentions to Liku’s 
actions, evident in her lack of reluctance to accept the fungi that Liku has offered just like any 
child who has never been taught to mistrust the intentions of others would under similar 
circumstances (Inheritors 155-7). However, seeing her retaliate against Liku’s hesitance to 
follow her across the water by taking a stick and beating the helpless Neanderthal girl with it 
until she is forced by the painful mistreatment to suppress her fear of water and to comply 
with the wishes of her intellectual superior, might lead us to reevaluate our initial conception 
of Tanakil and consequently, therefore, to begin questioning her innocence (161). Like the 
boys in Lord of the Flies, Tanakil’s innocence is different from that of the Neanderthals in 
that she carries the roots of modern humanity’s sin in her child self, a point that Golding 
believes to be manifested in the child’s tendency to turn selfish as soon as she ‘[develops] any 
capacity for acting on the world outside’ through the evolutionary ‘gift’ of intelligence (in 
Carey, ‘Talks’ 174). The evolutionary fall of humanity, then, remains the same as the biblical 
one for it is through the evolution of intelligence and the subsequent creation of unique 
identities that mankind come to embrace the regrettable capacity for selfishness which 
Golding deems as humanity’s original sin (174). And since the Neanderthals are denied such 
mental functions which would have allowed them to curb their empathy and to subdue others 
to their will and control, it should be safe to conclude that despite Golding’s reliance on 
biblical imagery, the Neanderthals remain as the unfallen species of the novel up to the very 
moment of their death and extinction. One cannot help but wonder, though, if the 
Neanderthals might have managed to maintain their innocence if they had continued to face 
the pressure of dealing with those harsh ecological conditions, or if they were left alive 
following their encounter with the aggressive Homo Sapiens.  
     There is no argument over the fact that the Neanderthals, particularly Lok, are represented 
as having experienced a noticeable change in the workings of their cognitive functions over 
the course of the novel as the challenges in their environment increase in complexity, 
especially with the arrival of the Homo Sapiens. This may have led certain critics such as 
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Peter Green to emphasize the biblical allusion to the fall, to interpret the Neanderthals’ 
encounter with the new people in terms of the account of creation and the temptation of 
Adam and Eve, and to regard the Homo Sapiens as the serpent whose actions bring the 
Neanderthals out of their state of innocence and into that of sin and corruption (68). Such a 
conclusion may even find its support in some of the adopted views regarding the 
Neanderthals’ intelligence that seem to classify the noted lack of higher cognitive functions 
in terms of ‘liabilities’, ‘deficiencies’, and ‘limitations’ that the Neanderthals eventually 
break out of as they come in contact with evil (De Paolo 64-5, Redpath 90). It is important to 
keep in mind, however, that most of the events of the novel are narrated through the 
perspective of the least perceptive member of the Neanderthals who cannot even measure up 
to the intelligence of the youngest member of his tribe or even rise to the expectations of his 
kindred following the death of Ha and Mal. In fact, Lok’s cognitive limitation seems to be a 
major source of frustration, not only for readers struggling to understand his point of view, 
but also for his fellow tribe members, including Fa, who cannot help but take charge of 
leading the helpless Lok through the rescue effort despite the fact that her action is in clear 
violation of the tribe’s tradition of leaving the leadership role to men. According to Baker, 
attempts at examining the Neanderthals’ cognitive capacities through Lok’s ‘level of 
receptivity’ may tempt readers ‘to dismiss the cave man as stupid, but such a judgement 
(common among the reviewers of the book) is inaccurate and highly dangerous as a basis for 
interpretation’ (Study 24). The Neanderthals may have been commonly perceived as the 
simple and innocent species that was forced by the new pressure of having to deal with their 
violent invaders into embracing the higher cognitive faculties associated with modern 
intelligence. However, the fact that they have shown signs of readiness for these changes well 
before the arrival of the Homo Sapiens not only raises doubts about the stability of their 
innocence, but also points to the possibility that the seeds of aggression may have already 
been biologically sown. The scene of the hunt is actually one of the most crucial scenes in the 
novel that could help reinforce this conclusion because despite the fact that it involves a dead 
prey that can experience no pain or suffering, the diction and style used to communicate the 
hunt’s details seem to raise some concern over the Neanderthals’ moral state:    
The doe was wrecked and scattered. Fa split open her belly, slit the complicated 
stomach and spilt the sour cropped grass and broken shoots on the earth. Lok beat in 
the skull to get at the brain and levered open the mouth to wrench away the tongue. 
They filled the stomach with tit-bits and twisted up the guts so that the stomach 
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became a floppy bag. … Now the limbs were smashed and bloodily jointed Liku 
crouched by the doe eating the piece of liver that Fa had given her. The air between 
the rocks was forbidding with violence and sweat, with the rich smell of meat and 
wickedness. … [T]here was a kind of darkness in the air under the watching birds. 
     Lok spoke loudly, acknowledging the darkness. 
     ‘This is very bad. Oa brought the doe out of her belly.’ 
     Fa muttered through her clenched teeth as her hands tore. 
     ‘Do not speak of that one.’ (54).  
Lok’s admission of his actions as ‘bad’ and his need to rationalize his deeds against a dead 
doe by stating that the hungry Neanderthals have no other choice but to hunt for meat might 
be noted as a support to his highly moral nature and innocence, as Kinkead-Weekes and 
Gregor have observed (80). But what is particularly concerning about the scene is not only 
the Neanderthals’ readiness to justify and dismiss possible moral transgressions the way 
Tuami and Marlan have done, but also their ‘marginal’ capacity to suppress their empathy in 
favour of their interests. This is evident in Fa’s reprehension of Lok for reminding the both of 
them that the being they are slaying and gutting is mothered by none other than the goddess 
they both love and revere. The Neanderthals, after all, are self-aware, and though their 
consciousness of their individual selves does not measure up to the complexity of the Homo 
Sapiens’, it still points to the possibility of their developing a distinct sense of identity that 
could lead them down the path of selfishness, sin and aggression in favour of self-
preservation. In fact, their capacity for language, as simple as it is, might draw attention to 
their diminishing unity to a certain extent, considering how it seems to have evolved to 
address the increasing difficulty they find in accessing and understanding each other’s 
pictures and private experiences sometimes. Though these instances pale in comparison to 
their major dependence on picture sharing as their primary mode of communication, they still 
highlight an evolving construction of a private self that could reinforce the conception of 
distinct individuality and compromise their unique possession of an overactive empathy. 
    The people might not have descended into sin, corruption and savagery within the course 
of the novel, even after encountering evil in their aggressive invaders. However, the mere fact 
that they have shown readiness to higher intelligence and a need to force some pattern on 
their changing environment that would make it understandable seem to point to the 
possibility that had they not been annihilated by their invaders, they might have been forced 
to embrace change no matter how immoral it may have seemed. This desire to understand is 
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represented in Lok’s discovery of ‘like’ or metaphorical language, a device which initially 
proves useful in helping him ‘grasp the white-faced hunters with a hand, [and] put them into 
a world where they were thinkable’ (194-5). Nevertheless, although ‘like’ aids Lok in 
developing an understanding of the new people by linking their aggressive nature to the 
dangers of the fire, the fall and the river, it still holds the threat of allowing the construction 
of the notions of sin, punishment and evil as elements by which he could attain some 
semblance of control over the madness that has disrupted the serenity of the island. 
Moreover, Fa’s inability to reconcile the evil she has witnessed with her tribe’s conception of 
Oa, and her subsequent conclusion that ‘Oa did not bring [the new people] out of her belly’ is 
equally if not more dangerous in that it signals her readiness to dehumanize, maybe even 
demonize, other beings if their existence does not fit in with her worldview (173). Of course, 
Fa is justified in her exclusion of the new people from a world where all living things are 
mothered by a loving and benign goddess. The fact that she begins exhibiting such a 
tendency, however, not only signals an evolving existential need to account for evil through 
the development of concepts such as sin, but also manifests the obvious affinity that her 
belief system would have eventually developed to modern religions, in general, and 
Christianity, in particular.  
     All of these aspects help reinforce the possibility that complex intelligence might have 
been within the people’s reach long before their encounter with evil, making the arrival of the 
Homo Sapiens more of a catalyst that hastens their cognitive development than a Satanic 
agent that tempts them into a new ‘fearsome and exciting’ world of sin and corruption (139). 
They can also help foreground the principle of biological continuity, not only by showing 
how the hostile Homo Sapiens came to maintain some of the instinctual empathic tendencies 
of the moral Neanderthals, but also by highlighting how the seeds of modern day aggression 
might just as well be located in an Edenic existence of purity and sinlessness. These 
arguments will prove vital to targeting Golding’s somewhat favourable depiction of children 
in Free Fall, especially since it shows Golding as similarly preoccupied with locating the 
problem of the fall in a later stage of cognitive development. However, before this complex 
issue of becoming is tackled, it is important first to develop an understanding of the gripping 
matter of being, through both an evolutionary and existential frame, by targeting man’s 
elemental narcissism in Pincher Martin.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Pincher Martin and Man’s Basic Narcissism 
 
Twenty-five hundred years of history have not changed man’s 
basic narcissism. … It is one of the meaner aspects of narcissism 
that we feel that practically everyone is expendable except 
ourselves. We should feel prepared … to recreate the whole world 
out of ourselves even if no one else existed. The thought frightens 
us; we don’t know how we could do it without others—yet at 
bottom the basic resource is there: we could suffice alone if need be 
… Our organism is ready to fill the world all alone, even if our 
mind shrinks at the thought. This narcissism is what keeps men 
marching into point-blank fire in wars: at heart one doesn’t feel that 
he will die, he only feels sorry for the man next to him. 
 
Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death.79 
 
 
 
Is it possible for consciousness and our unique sense of identity to survive after death? If the 
theological notion of hell is real, how would it look for someone who did not believe in it? 
‘What happens to somebody who exercises his free will and goes on exercising it’ even after 
death? (Golding in Biles, Talk 77). Such are the kind of questions that drove the construction 
of Golding’s third creation, Pincher Martin, a book which though it echoes Lord of the Flies 
and The Inheritors in its thematic concerns and some of its stylistic trends, is still regarded as 
representing Golding’s most religious and existential engagement with human nature 
(Clements 71; Carey, Golding 201, 204-5). The novel basically depicts the solitary struggle 
of a naval lieutenant, on a barren rock in the North Atlantic Ocean, against the looming threat 
of death, madness and the natural elements, following his apparent survival of a shipwreck 
that renders most of his crewmen dead. However, as familiar as the castaway’s plight may 
sound in light of the common plot patterns usually seen in survivalist fiction, Christopher 
                                                          
79 P. 2.  
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Martin’s predicament remains unique in that it communicates a purgatorial struggle for the 
purpose of addressing the metaphysical questions of consciousness, being, and the nature of 
reality. The novel, in other words, is a detailed imaginative construction of a nightmarish 
post-mortem experience, involving the disintegrating consciousness of a person who had in 
life, the text intimates, proven to be quite despicable on almost every level imaginable. As a 
result, it may be regarded as harbouring Golding’s first extensive engagement with 
metafictionality, the representational capacities of art and the problematic distortion of 
reality, in addition to an exceptionally powerful and unique statement on the fall of man and 
the moral condition of humanity. 
     No definite statement was provided, of course, as to whether the novel was written as a 
response to an earlier text in the same manner as Lord of the Flies and The Inheritors. It 
seems, however, that Golding was unconsciously engaging in an experimental reversal of an 
earlier text, written this time by Henry Tarpell Dorling, known as Taffrail, given how 
Golding is reported to have only come to realize the connection between the two novels when 
it was made clear to him by Ian Blake (Carey, Golding 195). Taffrail’s protagonist, much like 
Golding’s own, is an ordinary seaman in the royal navy whose ship gets torpedoed and 
destroyed following a disastrous clash with the Germans in the middle of the ocean. Though 
he fights with all his remaining strength to gasp for air and grab onto any floating object in an 
instinctual struggle for survival, he ends up sharing Christopher Martin’s fate of drowning in 
a cold, raging ocean before he even manages to take off the sea-boots that are weighing him 
down (Ch.11). The similarities between the two protagonists, however, do not go deeper than 
their seemingly sharing the unfortunate fate of drowning. Unlike Golding’s Martin whose 
nickname ‘Pincher’ serves more of a symbolic function for his despicable, greedy character, 
Taffrail’s Martin is actually a good man who ‘commands his soul to his maker’ and accepts 
the reality of death readily and without much dread or fear of what it may hold for him 
because he believes the compassion of death to be a better alternative to the excruciating and 
futile struggle for survival (Ch. 11).80 Ironically enough, however, Taffrail’s Martin’s 
readiness to accept his fate does not actually culminate in his demise. Golding’s Pincher, on 
the other hand, is given over to death almost from the start of the novel despite Golding’s 
                                                          
80 Taffrail’s Pincher’s struggle for survival compels him at a certain point to suspend his empathy in favour of 
staying alive: ‘Twice was Pincher clutched round the body, but each time he fought with the mad energy of 
despair, and wrenched himself free of the suffocating embrace of a shipmate less lucky than himself’ (Ch. 11). 
His lack of empathy at this particular point, though, is understandable and can actually be considered adaptive. 
After all, ‘[he] was no coward, but it was a case of each man for himself, and his desire to live was 
overwhelming’ (Ch. 11). Golding’s Pincher, on the other hand, is represented as having always preyed on 
people which shows that his lack of empathy is not a case of momentary suspension.  
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conferring on him an overwhelming desire to preserve his identity against all odds, evident in 
his pathological creation of an heroic illusion of endurance in a world that is grotesquely spun 
out of the memory of an old tooth: 
His tongue felt along the barrier of his teeth—round to the side where the big ones 
were and the gap. He brought his hands together and held his breath. He stared at the 
sea and saw nothing. His tongue was remembering. It pried into the gap between the 
teeth and re-created the old, aching shape. It touched the rough edge of the cliff, 
traced the slope down, trench after trench, down towards the smooth surface where 
the red lion was, just above the gum—understood what was hauntingly familiar and 
painful about an isolated and decaying rock in the middle of the sea (Pincher 174).  
      To grant his fragile world the authenticity that could preserve it against the annihilation of 
the dreadful God he detests, Christopher must go to great lengths to ‘protect [the] normality’ 
of his world and ensure that every detail in his intelligent creation runs in accordance with the 
accepted laws of nature (175). His carefully laid standards result in a highly realistic but 
almost entirely internal construction that not only fools him into forming a delusory 
conviction of its validity, but also leads readers, for much of the novel, into sharing his 
hopeful faith in the existential authenticity and ontological reality of his world. In fact, 
Golding’s reliance on the stylistic device of third person omniscient narration to 
communicate Christopher Martin’s struggle to overcome his predicament can be said to play 
an important role in tempting readers into adopting Martin’s belief in the reality of his 
delusion, given how it appears to provide some sort of objective validity for Martin’s illusory 
creation (Babb 68).81 However, as the story progresses, readers become gradually acquainted 
with the fictitious realism of Christopher’s endurance through the presence of some unusual 
narrative elements that defy rational explanation and help in guiding readers to the 
undisputed confirmation of death provided by the two officers, Campbell and Davidson, at 
the end of the novel. Christopher’s nightmarish account of survival is not, of course, a near 
death experience that dissipates with the force of the black lightning and the annihilation of 
the spirit, but is more the result of his ego’s defiance against losing his identity, accepting 
                                                          
81 Philip Redpath offers a similar perspective. He states, however, that third person narration might also help 
readers arrive at the conclusion that Christopher is actually dead and that his rock experience is a post-mortem 
one. He explains that by drawing a comparison between Pincher Martin and other survival tales such as 
Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Treasure Island (1883) where a first person narration is used. Reliance on first 
person narration can help indicate that the protagonist survives his predicament and goes back to civilization 
where he is able to write about his experience (159-60).  
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death and giving himself up to the timeless compassion of God. A confirmation of this 
conclusion and the fact that Christopher has been dead since the beginning of the novel is 
actually provided through Davidson’s ironic observation that Christopher’s death must have 
been quick and painless because ‘[he] did not even have time to kick off his seaboots.’ 
(Pincher 208). Unfortunately for Golding, however, most of the critics who read the novel 
following its publication in 1956 failed to read Davidson’s observation as such. As a result, 
they could not help but develop mixed opinions about the significance of the ending, in 
particular, and the quality of the novel as a whole.   
     Golding’s ‘gimmick’ or ‘trick’ ending, as it was initially perceived, sparked much 
controversy and confusion, evident in responses such as those of M. R. Ridley and John 
Metcalf who considered it a reflection of the ‘perverse misuse of [the] author’s rare powers,’ 
and an example of how an attempt at ‘straining after differentness’ can go wrong (qtd. in 
Carey, Golding 199, 201). In fact, it was Metcalf who considered Pincher Martin ‘a wrong-
headed bore’ that cannot be read despite the fact that it was ‘brilliantly written’ (qtd. in 199). 
There was also C. A. Lejeune whose contemptuous dismissal of the book as a whole and its 
pessimistic occupation with the ‘nasty’ and ‘horrid side’ of human nature led her to the 
candid conclusion that Christopher’s experience was ‘very badly described’ and that ‘the 
most beautiful thing to [her] mind [about] the book is the wrapper’ (qtd. in 200). Such 
negative responses, of course, were balanced by a number of positive reviews, including 
those of Richard Mayne and Philip Oakes, who praised Golding’s originality and brilliance at 
handling Christopher’s nightmarish ordeal, despite their reserved opinion about the way the 
novel ended. There were also other critics who were aware of the purgatorial aspect of 
Christopher’s experience, but who, nevertheless, thought it vital to indicate that Golding 
should have ‘“[used] his imagination” in a little more clear way’ (qtd. in 200). 
       Following this confusion, the book came to be published in the United States under the 
alternative title The Two Deaths of Christopher Martin in an effort on the publishers’ part to 
help communicate the fictitious realism of Christopher’s experience as well as the 
theological, psychological and moral aspects of the novel (Baker, Study 32). But according to 
James Baker, such an alteration had proven unhelpful in keeping American critics from 
slipping into the same confusion as that which had beset the English. He even adds that the 
title inaccurately captures the core premise of the work and endows the second death with an 
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air of certainty (‘Interview’).82  
     One can only imagine how Golding might have reacted to these critical opinions, 
especially since he made it clear at one point that he had gone to considerable lengths to 
make the basic premise of the novel and the theological aspect of the work clear enough:  
I would have said that I fell over backwards making that novel explicit. I said to 
myself, ‘Now here is going to be a novel, it’s going to be a blow on behalf of the 
ordinary universe, which I think on the whole to be the right one, and I’m going to 
write it so vividly and so accurately and with such an exact programme that nobody 
can possibly mistake what I mean.’ (qtd. in Baker, Study 32).   
Golding might have thought it necessary to obscure the fact that Christopher dies at the 
beginning of the novel in order to maintain his readers’ interest in Pincher Martin’s 
predicament. After all, it seems highly unlikely for readers to go on reading, as Babb has 
observed, if the protagonist is explicitly and ‘unambiguously’ revealed to be dead on the 
second page of the book (68). There is also the fact that the obscurity serves better in 
promoting believability in Christopher’s creation of the rock and his illusion of survival 
(68), and as such, it can be said to be vital to delivering the shock effect that Golding claims 
to have hoped to create with the final scene in the novel. Golding actually states in his 
interview with Peter Newington that he is particularly fond of shock endings because they 
provide an effective means of tempting readers into reading the work again, thereby 
highlighting the ideas and beliefs that he considers to be of a great and deep concern to him. 
Such a proclamation might initially be perceived as contradicting his claim to clarity, but it 
is important to note that the obscurity surrounding Christopher Martin’s death should not 
have blurred the basic premise of the work. In fact, the novel’s theological structure and the 
explicit analogy that Golding drew in relation to the biblical account of creation should have 
made the purgatorial aspect of Christopher’s experience clear enough. It is also important to 
consider that by focusing on the recollections of Christopher’s horrid past, Golding was 
actually trying to hint at the moral aspect of his protagonist’s plight and the connection 
                                                          
82 In his critical study of Golding’s novels, Baker indicates that the first death is the ‘bodily’ one occurring at the 
beginning of the novel and caused by Christopher’s drowning (36). The second death comes with the black 
lightning which shatters his self-created world and puts his ego to rest (38). However, according to Terry 
Eagleton, we cannot be certain that Christopher’s ego has ceased its struggle to maintain the identity and the 
world it has created (Evil 27). Christopher has been reduced to nothing but a pair of claws closing in on the 
centre of his identity in an effort to shield it from God’s obliterating compassion, but no confirmation is offered 
as to whether the black lightning succeeds in putting Christopher’s ego to rest (26-7). Golding’s conclusion 
about Pincher not being purged of his egotism and his being reduced to a pair of claws that might let go in time 
seems to support Eagleton’s conclusion (Baker, ‘Interview’). 
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between his selfish character and his present torment.     
     It seems, however, as Golding observed, that no one thought of Christopher’s tortured 
experiences as having been brought about by his monstrosity and his refusal to let go 
(Carey, Golding 201). This, Golding maintained, is possibly because of a ‘miscalculation’ 
on his part since he wrote the book believing that people ‘would have a natural interest in 
theology’ or some ‘amount of straightforward theological knowledge’ that would allow 
them to read the work as a post-mortem purgatorial experience of a person so consumed by 
greed, selfishness and egotism that he is unable to simply accept the reality of his death 
(Biles, Talk 70). Christopher Hadley Martin, according to Golding: 
had no belief in anything but the importance of his own life; no love, no God. 
Because he was created in the image of God he had a freedom of choice which he 
used to centre the world on himself. He did not believe in purgatory and therefore 
when he died it was not presented to him in overtly theological terms. The greed for 
life which had been the mainspring of his nature, forced him to refuse the selfless act 
of dying. He continued to exist separately in a world composed of his own 
murderous nature. His drowned body lies rolling in the Atlantic but the ravenous ego 
invents a rock for him to endure on. It is the memory of an aching tooth. Ostensibly 
and rationally he is a survivor from a torpedoed destroyer: but deep down he knows 
the truth. He is not fighting for bodily survival but for his continuing identity in face 
of what will smash it and sweep it away—the black lightning, the compassion of 
God. For Christopher, the Christ-bearer, has become Pincher Martin who is little but 
greed. Just to be Pincher is purgatory; to be Pincher for eternity is hell (qtd. in 
Kermode, Puzzles 208).    
     Christopher Martin’s recollections of a horrid past should have highlighted the moral and 
purgatorial aspects of his experience. But Golding’s critics might have failed to take note of 
the connection between the wickedness revealed in Christopher’s memories and his present 
suffering, and might have failed, as such, in perceiving his torment as warranted or deserved. 
The notion can also be said to have been further obscured by the fact that Christopher is 
unable to make the connection himself, choosing to view his present situation as more of a 
testament to his heroism in challenging an unjust God rather than accept it as proof of his 
monstrosity and lack of a moral sensibility (Baker, Study 43-4). This would make 
Christopher, as Baker observed, a Miltonic Satan who is so gripped by pride that he would 
rather create and rule his own hell than submit to the authority and compassion of a higher 
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power (40). As a result, he is unable to repent or express guilt and remorse over his past 
actions, preferring instead to play creator and agonize over the construction of his monstrous 
world for six days before he confronts God on the seventh and loses control over his fragile 
creation. What makes it possible for Christopher to act in such a manner and turn away from 
God is the fact that he is capable of free will. And although Golding does not specify the 
exact moment when Christopher ‘chose’ to go morally astray, Golding’s allusion to the 
woman in the cellar seems to trace Christopher’s fear and rejection of God to his 
childhood.83 
      The terror that is the woman in the cellar is a recurring nightmare that Golding shared 
with his protagonist Christopher Martin; but while it is nothing but a nightmare to little 
Golding, it serves a much deeper function in the novel. It captures mankind’s fear of the 
irrational and their desperate attempt to counter that terror through denying the existence of 
what defies the imposition of rationality and the human will (Baker, Study 43; Baker 
‘Interview’; Biles, Talk 75-6). As a result, man, with his freedom of choice, is tempted to 
turn away from God into the sinfulness of egotism, leaving God with what Golding believes 
to be a paradox of sorts, because although God is supposedly capable of preventing man 
from turning away from him, his stripping man of his freedom means reducing man to a 
being that would no longer be in God’s image (Biles, Talk 76-7). This would help establish 
Pincher Martin as a perfect precursor to Free Fall where Golding attempts to pinpoint the 
exact moment when man, through exercise of his free will, turns away from God and loses 
his childhood innocence. It also helps show the novel as sharing the religious overtones and 
preoccupations of its predecessors Lord of the Flies and The Inheritors, given how it 
exhibits its creator’s ongoing concern with the fall of humanity and its inherent sinfulness. 
Despite the theological aspect of the work, however, there seemed to be a good number of 
scholastic efforts that were not dedicated to solely regarding the work as a religious novel. In 
fact, there might have been something of a growing tendency to read Pincher Martin in light 
of the phenomenological and existential philosophies of Sartre, Heidegger and Husserl, 
given the work’s preoccupation with the elusive notions of free will, and its engagement 
with matters of alienation, isolation and death (Surette; L. Whitehead). One might even 
maintain that existential interpretations might have been particularly tempting, considering 
their persistence in past and modern scholarly efforts, in spite of Golding’s denial of having 
been influenced by any of these philosophical trends (Baker, Study 39; L. Whitehead; Biles, 
                                                          
83 See the notes that Golding jotted prior to writing the novel in Carey, Golding 194.  
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Talk 75).84 Such existential or commonsensical readings, states Baker, are to be considered a 
‘gross misinterpretation’ of the book, made possible by the age’s literary production along 
with its preoccupation with existential writings which ‘conditioned’ critics to interpret 
literary creations in a certain light (Study 39). After all, Golding’s exploration of the fall and 
the notion of freedom of choice is mainly theological, which would make Christopher’s 
plight primarily moral. But by shifting the interpretive frame to existentialism, Christopher’s 
delusion of heroism and his struggle to overcome his ‘unjust’ predicament become 
actualities (40). This would result, according to Baker, in: 
[erasing] the essential ironies Golding went out of his way to inject; and, if these are 
taken away, the theme is hopelessly obscured. Perverse in the extreme, Christopher 
Martin’s soul tries to survive on its own terms, and it pays for this conceit by 
perpetuating the misery it knew in life. … Pincher’s ‘heroism,’ therefore, is 
fundamentally absurd, and so the fable ends by inverting the existential formula 
certain of the critics wished to impose upon it. Instead of depicting the assault of 
reality on the hapless soul of a rational man, Golding shows the outrageous attack of 
a rational man, who is far more sick than heroic, upon nature and God (40).      
     Golding’s interest in questions that have long been associated with the realm of 
existential inquiries might explain why his novels are claimed ‘seemingly’ to have much in 
common with existentialism, and why the idea of the fall in Pincher Martin took on an 
existential dimension rather than a theological one. Moreover, the lack of what Golding 
notes as a ‘natural interest’ in theological knowledge among his generation seems to have 
created a marked preference for rational rather than biblical readings, despite his explicit 
disapproval of rationalism (in Biles, Talk 70). Golding’s employment of the dramatic shift in 
perspective, for instance, was used in more than one novel; but it seems to have been 
particularly controversial in Pincher Martin presumably because it obliges critics to 
entertain the idea that it is possible for a person’s consciousness to exist even after the body 
decays and dies (Surette). Of course, most critics nowadays acknowledge Golding’s claim 
about the book as mainly depicting the purgatorial experience of a despicable protagonist 
                                                          
84 Examples of these efforts are Margaret Walters’ ‘Two Fabulists: Golding and Camus’ and Ted E. Boyle’s 
‘Golding’s Existential Vision’. However, according to Surette, the most logical existential exploration of 
Pincher Martin can be said to be that of Lee Whitehead. It was Whitehead who found Golding’s work to be 
particularly reminiscent of the existential and phenomenological ideas of Sartre, Heidegger, and Husserl. He 
notes, however, that although Whitehead succeeds to a certain extent in presenting a logical argument regarding 
Golding’s possible familiarity with such existential views, he fails to note that the features he locate are also 
shared by philosophical and religious treaties across the ages.   
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who refuses to admit to himself that he is indeed dead, but such was not the case when the 
novel was first published (Surette). There were critical views in support of a more 
commonsensical reading of the plot, claiming an interpretation that entertains the common 
belief that a person’s entire life can flash before his or her eyes when they approach death 
(Baker, Study 37; Carey, Golding 196; Surette). In fact, it is highly possible that such a 
tendency was encouraged by the noted similarity between Golding’s Pincher Martin and 
Ambrose Bierce’s short story An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge (1890) since it shows its 
main character as conjuring a whole scenario of managing to escape hanging in the brief 
moment that precedes his death (Babb 66).85 Consequently, Christopher Martin’s ordeal had 
come to be considered as more the result of a drowning man’s hallucinations rather than the 
outcome of a post-mortem egotistical insistence on maintaining identity, even if it meant 
spinning and suffering a hellish nightmare. However, Babb notes that as appealing as this 
rational interpretation may be, it remains somewhat lacking, considering how it not only 
downplays the importance of Christopher’s highly egotistical self, but also neglects the fact 
that he is always struggling to overlook and suppress the dormant knowledge that he is dead 
(66). Moreover, Baker states that adopting a commonsensical reading of the novel poses a 
number of problems, one of which is the fact that by denying Christopher’s purgatorial 
experience, critics and readers alike would come to ally themselves with the rational officer 
Davidson whose logical conclusion that Christopher did not suffer because of his quick 
death is highly ironic in light of the painful ordeal that Christopher has evidently gone 
through prior to being annihilated (37). Entertaining such a reading might also require 
considering the possibility that Christopher’s suffering is likely to have been an extension of 
the brief moment of time that it took him to die, thereby suggesting that although his 
hallucinations seem painful and excruciating, they are not as prolonged and awful as they 
are made to appear (37). As a result, adopting such a reading, according to Baker, not only 
solidifies the ‘trick’ and ‘gimmick’ claims made against Golding, but also obscures the 
highly theological structure of the novel as well as downplays its moral implications (37). 
     Golding was initially insistent upon establishing the point that Christopher’s ordeal is a 
post-mortem experience. He went out of his way to lay down the basic premise of the novel 
                                                          
85 Some have even suggested, as in the case of Hilary Corke, that Golding removes the last line where it is made 
perfectly clear that Christopher dies at the second page of the book, but Golding believes that there is not a 
single element or line that he would think of as ‘irrelevant’ to communicating his basic premise, and that asking 
him to remove that line is like asking him ‘to take something that was stood on its head and put it the right way 
up again’ (Golding in Biles, Talk 69-70). He also adds that ‘[t]he whole point of the book is that it was stood on 
its head. [Corke] is, I suppose, a straightforward twentieth-century humanist, and this is not what I am, I don’t 
think, and this isn’t what the book is about. No, I wouldn’t change the ending’ (70-1).       
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on more than one occasion (Carey, Golding 196; in Newington; Baker ‘Interview’). 
However, his resistance to the age’s preoccupation with textual autonomy and its disregard 
of authorial intentions eventually softened, leading him to adopt the more flexible view that 
‘what is in a book is not what the author thought he put in, but what the reader gets out of it’ 
(in Biles, Talk 58). He also adds that it is highly possible for one to get ‘contrasting 
interpretations’ and that he is aware that ‘[there] comes a point of reading in. … If the story 
has any validity, any three-dimensional quality, then it must be susceptible to multiple 
interpretations. If it only had just one great message, why not write out the great message 
and not bother about writing the novel?’ (58). Such proclamations might prove sufficient in 
justifying different approaches and interpretations to the novel. Still, in order to present a 
more compelling argument for exploring Pincher Martin through a rational scope, critical 
objections to attempts at breaking out of the theological mould and to imposing 
commonsensical and existential readings need to be first addressed in detail.  
     In ‘Literary Sources and William Golding’, Jack Biles notes what seems to be a common 
tendency among Golding’s critics, and that is of engaging in attempts at tracing the possible 
sources that might have been particularly influential in shaping Golding’s fiction. Such 
attempts, though tempting, states Biles, should not be the focus of critical pursuits because 
whatever connections critics may find between Golding’s books and other sources are highly 
likely to be coincidental, and as such, mostly fallacious, particularly when considered in 
light of Golding’s affirmation of the fact that his books ‘have very little genesis outside 
[himself]’ (qtd. in Biles, ‘Sources’). Setting aside Bloomian anxiety of influence, one 
possible reason why critics find the endeavour compelling enough is the high probability of 
their detecting certain undeniable similarities between Golding’s novels and other literary 
creations, and sometimes even certain philosophical and psychological trends. As a result, 
they have not only become so adamant in insisting on proving a Freudian, Calvinist or 
existential influence on Golding’s texts, but also ended up drawing an association between 
Golding’s novels and some other prominent fictional productions such as Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness (1899) and Hughes’ A High Wind in Jamaica (1929), in spite of Golding’s denial 
of having read these works prior to writing his novels (Biles, ‘Sources’; Baker, ‘Interview’). 
According to Golding, such conclusions are highly logical in the sense that they provide a 
confirmation of the notion that ‘if people engage in writing about humanity, they're likely in 
certain circumstances to see something the same thing’ and that ‘it would really be very 
surprising if there weren't literary parallels to be drawn between this book and that,’ 
especially if these books are engaged in addressing the same issues and concerns (Keating 
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194-5).  
     Both twentieth-century existentialism as an already established literary and philosophical 
movement and Golding’s novels appeared to constitute reactions to the horrendous events of 
the Second World War; both, therefore, were brought about in response to similar concerns 
and moral interests erupting out of the same set of social, cultural and political 
circumstances. This might help explain the existential overtones in Golding’s novels, and 
why it is wrong to attempt to trace these ideas to one particular source or writer, especially 
considering how they might owe more to Golding’s interest in Judeo-Christian theology 
rather than a particular existential source. After all, most, if not all, religions revolve around 
components that can be said to have evolved to address certain existential concerns and 
questions in one way or another (Batson and Stocks 145). Consequently, one should not be 
quick to dismiss an existential reading because Golding’s interest in theological matters does 
not pose a major hindrance to carrying it, nor does it provide a solid basis for rejecting it 
altogether. One should also not succumb to the common misconception that the two 
schemes contradict one another, nor should one exclude the possibility of Judeo-Christian 
theology being one of the early roots of modern existential thought, in addition to classical 
philosophy and Greek tragedy which Golding confessed to having read and admired.86  
     One final problem that should be addressed if a rational or existential reading is to be 
pursued is that of denying or downplaying the mythical component of the novel associated 
with the biblical account of the fall (George 26). From this perspective, man’s sinful state 
will no longer be defined in terms of a ‘rupture’ in the bond between God and man, but will 
instead be traced to the evolutionary conditions that resulted in the creation of human 
identity, and in the emergence of selfishness, aggression and what Huxley is presumed to 
have defined as an ‘innate inability to live a proper and satisfactory life in a social 
circumstance’ (George 26; Baker, ‘Interview’). It is important to stress, however, that 
Golding did not object to commonsensical and rational interpretations of the fall and original 
sin as evident in his response to Julian Huxley; nor did he solely rely on the biblical 
understanding of these notions in his exploration of the sinful condition of man, especially in 
Lord of the Flies and The Inheritors. By taking the commonsensical approach, Christopher’s 
post-mortem experience will be addressed as near death hallucinations resulting out of a 
dormant existential death anxiety that is normally considered the unique price that humanity 
must pay for the evolution and attainment of high intelligence, self-awareness and 
                                                          
86 See Baker, ‘Interview’; Carey, Golding 221; Carey, ‘Talks’ 182-3; Lewis. 
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rationality.87 Consequently, developing an evolutionary existential reading might result in 
diminishing the theological aspect of the work in favour of a more rational understanding of 
Christopher’s sinful state. Such an interpretation, however, will not rob the work of its moral 
significance and make an existential hero out of Christopher Martin and his pathological 
delusion of survival. On the contrary, it will still highlight the illusion of biological progress 
and grant more credence to the rational concept of the evolutionary fall that Golding had 
first targeted in Lord of the Flies, and which he later came to explore extensively in The 
Inheritors.88  
The Pathologies and Anxieties of the Self-aware Animal 
When addressing a question on the rise of Nazism and its horrendous crimes against 
humanity, Golding emphatically indicated that the problem should not be narrowly defined in 
relation to Nazis in particular. He maintained that whatever evil the Germans were capable of 
back then could so easily have been replicated by any nation, group or race on the face of the 
earth if the right historical conditions presented themselves (in Biles, Talk 36-9). Since the 
problem basically lies in our inherent sinfulness and our biological propensity for violence, 
aggression and selfishness, we all hold the potential for succumbing to our innate aggressive 
drives in one way or another (38). Such a position, especially when taken in relation to Lord 
of the Flies where man is depicted as ‘a morally deceased’ animal, may initially be perceived 
as bleak and pessimistic (Baker, ‘Interview’). It should be noted, however, that the problem 
of evil in Golding’s fiction is not as deterministic, simple and straightforward as it may seem. 
Evil is not always consciously and intentionally pursued for the sake of gratifying some 
monstrous instinct that makes it possible to take pleasure in the suffering and misfortune of 
others, but can sometimes be more of an outcome of a momentary lapse of judgement or a 
desire to pursue good in the wrong way. This can be said to be clearly manifested in the new 
people in The Inheritors whose attempts at annihilating the gentle Neanderthals, as 
                                                          
87 See Becker, Death 26-7; Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski 18; Landau et al. 
88 This reading may initially seem to be more in line with the post-structuralist disregard for authorial intentions 
since it replaces Golding’s theological understanding of the fall of man with an existential and commonsensical 
one. It should be stressed, though, that despite Golding’s sole reliance on theology in communicating the moral 
condition of his despicable protagonist, Pincher Martin can still be considered a perfect example of a 
pathological extreme of the possession of self-awareness which Golding considers to be one of the biological 
roots of our sinful state (Baker, ‘Interview’). Of course, there is always the option of exploring the novel as an 
outcome of Golding’s traumatic war experience and his existential need to account for mankind’s capacity for 
evil, violence and aggression. This way it will not demand overlooking the supernatural and theological 
elements that Golding intended to highlight in Pincher Martin. However, employing an evolutionary existential 
approach can not only connect Pincher Martin’s plight to the biological roots of evil previously explored in The 
Inheritors, but can also highlight a rational dimension to Golding’s novels that is normally overshadowed by the 
theological scheme.  
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aggressive and merciless as they seem, are shown to be mainly driven by the instincts of fear 
and self-preservation rather than depicted as an outcome of an utter monstrosity. In fact, 
Golding clearly states that some of the new people’s actions are actually meant to 
communicate their awareness of the moral implications of their aggressive behaviour in 
addition to their capacity to experience guilt over wrong deeds, even if they are directed at 
the ogre-like beings whose mere existence is seen as a major source of threat (in Biles, Talk 
111).89 In other words, human nature to Golding is not only innately evil, but also 
instinctually and paradoxically moral. This might explain why the boys in Lord of the Flies 
and the new people in The Inheritors are not shown to be particularly evil at first, but are 
eventually placed in the kind of conditions that compel them to rely on their ‘dark side,’ free 
their ‘deficiencies’ and act on their prejudices, fears and violent drives (44, 34). 
     When it comes to Pincher Martin, however, Golding seems to have taken Christopher to 
an extreme that is markedly different from the Everyman characterization common in most of 
his fictional creations. Unlike his ancestors in The Inheritors, Christopher’s antagonism and 
aggression are not brought about by overwhelming conditions of fear and anxiety that 
overpower the instinctually moral in his nature, but are more the result of a repulsive, yet not 
uncommon, extreme where evil appears to be pursued for its own sake. Golding actually 
magnifies this aspect of Christopher’s character in an interview with Frank Kermode by 
stating that Christopher is ‘fallen more than most,’ and that he ‘went out of [his] way to damn 
Pincher as much as [he] could by making him the nastiest type [he] could think of’ (qtd. in 
Baker, Study 39). What Golding reveals to his readers through Martin’s flashbacks is not an 
ordinary man struggling for survival, but an excessively selfish, covetous, self-centred 
character whose nightmarish delusions of a persecuting God merely highlight his dormant 
awareness of the monstrosity of his nature. Most of Christopher’s crimes, of course, are not at 
the same level of intensity as that of the bloody rituals of the new people in The Inheritors or 
the children in Lord of the Flies. However, what marks Christopher’s crimes as particularly 
repulsive is the fact that they are pursued within the context of civilization and yet without 
any regard to the moral laws or the social codes of conduct that govern the realm which he 
occupies. There is also the worrying fact that Christopher is never once shown as capable of 
                                                          
89 One example that Golding mentions in support of this notion is that of offering Tanakil to the Neanderthals in 
exchange for Liku. Though it was more of a cruel act of self-preservation, the fact that they have resorted to 
such a measure shows that they are aware at some level of the moral implications of the cannibalistic ritual that 
involved Liku and that they are actually gripped by guilt over it. According to Golding, Homo Sapiens 
‘propitiate because they have done something they know is at the very least against this kind of creature; they’ve 
eaten this girl, and eating a girl is a powerful affair’ (in Biles, Talk 111).      
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taking moral responsibility for his actions, or of at least expressing guilt, shame or remorse 
over his unjust exploitation of those around him. This intensifies his affinity with the extreme 
margin that takes pleasure in the ‘crunch’ when it ‘clout[s] somebody over the head’ 
(Golding in Biles, Talk 47). It also marks him as a clear violation of Golding’s belief of how 
human nature is supposed to show its ‘bright side,’ even if it happens to be less balanced and 
more inherently predisposed to seek evil, so long as it remains integrated into a social system 
that governs its selfish and aggressive tendencies (44, 47). But why is it that Christopher is 
caught in this monstrous pincher condition that he is in?     
     Golding’s notes actually raise the exact same question, a matter that further reinforces 
Christopher’s unique moral state in comparison to Golding’s earlier characterizations of 
human nature. However, both the surviving notes and Pincher Martin’s flashbacks offer no 
clear answer as to why Christopher is the way he is or even pinpoint the exact moment when 
‘he went wronger than most’ (qtd. in Carey, Golding 194). There is, of course, a clear 
mention of mankind’s capacity for freedom of choice and its subsequent tendency to centre 
the world on itself and to turn away from God. But it seems that even Golding believes the 
root cause of Christopher’s moral condition to be of a much more complex nature since he 
clearly states in his notes that ‘running away from God… is no answer,’ and that there must 
have been a point in Christopher’s life that made the conversion to the permanent extremes of 
evil possible as opposed to the transient phases of aggression that Golding’s earlier characters 
underwent (qtd. in 194). One speculation that this reading could offer in light of the 
evolutionary understanding of the fall is that Christopher represents a narcissistic obsession 
with the self that could be regarded as evolutionarily recent given how it involves complex 
cognitive constructions of identity considered to be uniquely human (Holtzman and Strube 
212). This obsession, of course, does not explicitly manifest itself in his flashbacks, nor does 
it seem to be playing much of a role in his past immoral acts that continue to invade his 
favourable delusion of survival on the rock. It does, however, reveal itself rather clearly in his 
present rationalizations which he utilizes in order to ward off the distressing reality of his 
impending death. Christopher’s past recollections are certainly important to understanding his 
present suffering as self-inflicted, and to consequently apprehending the moral aspect of the 
novel. It should be noted, though, that the connection between Christopher’s past and his 
present should not be solely examined in this particular direction because the content of his 
present hallucinations can be just as illuminating in uncovering the root cause of his moral 
condition and to understanding why he is the utterly selfish pincher that he is.  
     One of the most prominent aspects of Christopher’s delusion of survival is the manner by 
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which he struggles to grant meaning to his existence and to assert his identity and importance 
as defence mechanisms against ‘the sheer negation’ of God’s heaven or the ultimate 
annihilation of death (Pincher 70). In order to accomplish the feat of endurance, Christopher 
is constantly gripped by the need to convince himself throughout the entirety of the novel that 
he cannot die because he is too ‘precious’ to perish, and that he will eventually be rescued 
sooner or later if he can only devise a scheme to help him endure long enough for that desired 
end to happen (14, 81). He makes it clear to himself that he certainly has what it takes to 
survive his present predicament: health, education and most importantly, intelligence, which 
he seems to be particularly preoccupied with as the one quality that will allow him to adapt 
the rock to his ways and to overcome whatever obstacle standing in the way of the ultimate 
end of survival (77, 86). He also takes his present agony as proof of his heroism and 
fantasizes about relating his admirable account of endurance which he believes to be reason 
enough to earn him a promotion to lieutenant-commander or commander following his 
eventual rescue (88). Such positive illusions, though only unique to Christopher’s case in 
terms of degree, can actually be regarded as common, considering how most people share the 
underlying compulsion to seek favourable illusions of themselves, to think optimistically 
about what lies ahead and to overestimate what they are capable of, to varying extents 
(Austin 120, McAlister et al.). In fact, reality distortions of this sort can prove highly adaptive 
given how they might serve to bolster people’s faith in their abilities, grant them a sense of 
control and motivate them into overcoming whatever problems they may encounter, 
especially in situations where over-attendance to reality might result in negativity, 
hopelessness and loss of motivation (Austin 121). There is also the fact that given the 
complexity of human consciousness and the subsequent awareness of the problematic and 
terrifying reality of death, its process and ramifications, there would be evident benefit in 
seeking a meaningful worldview that helps define identity, grant importance to people’s 
existence, boost their self-esteem and promote favourable illusions of what they ought to be 
or how they should be perceived by others.90 People are even capable of judging and holding 
certain opinions concerning the way they look and the manner by which they carry 
themselves which is but one of the many traits that not only mark the human race at a 
distinctively complex level above that of the animals, but also makes them, as de Waal has 
noted, the most narcissistic species on the face of the planet (Good Natured 96). 
     The claim that we are most likely in possession of what can only be described as 
                                                          
90 See Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski 22; De Waal, Good Natured 96. 
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narcissistic and self-serving tendencies as an inevitable consequence of the development of 
the human level of self-awareness and the creation of individual identity may initially seem 
off-putting. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that for people to possess some 
degree of narcissism is considered to be not only normal but also highly adaptive. A moderate 
level of ‘self-regard,’ after all, is closely associated with the development of self-preservation 
and the healthy expression and pursuit of personal interests without transgressing against 
others or violating their rights as people entitled to their needs and aspirations (McAlister et 
al.; Ronningstam 45-6).91 It is also considered vital for the development of a healthy measure 
of empathy and double-mindedness that does not lead one to excessive selfishness, or a 
maladaptive expression of altruism that could result in the constant disregard of the self for 
the sake of others (Baron-Cohen 91-2, 181). In fact, healthy narcissism can be said to play an 
important role in the dimming or the momentary suspension of empathy in certain conditions 
that call for aggression, or in circumstances in which failure to prioritize personal needs 
might result in diminishing an individual’s chances of survival and reproductive success.92 
Such is actually the case for the new people whose self-centeredness, as repulsive as it may 
initially seem, particularly when drawn in comparison to the selflessness of the highly 
empathic Neanderthals, is shown to be one of the very fundamental aspects of human nature 
that has made it possible for humanity to survive and replace the gentler species as the 
inheritors of the earth.  
     However, tracing Christopher Martin’s moral state to the same root cause of his ancestors’ 
moral ailment or the mere cognitive operation of the self-serving bias might result in 
oversimplifying his condition and in overlooking the psychological factors that are particular 
to his case. Christopher, for one thing, exhibits a clear lack of moral compass, evident in his 
incapacity to express guilt or experience shame over the very same past acts that continue to 
haunt him on the rock. There is also the fact that despite his vivid recollections of the crimes 
he has committed, he refuses to acknowledge his mistakes in ways one might expect from a 
dying man, or even consider a morally logical connection between his horrid past and his 
present suffering. In fact, Christopher prefers to go on entertaining a delusion of false 
heroism, choosing to view his self-induced agony as having been brought about by an 
                                                          
91 It has been indicated that possessing positive illusions about the self is actually adaptive. However, there is an 
‘optimal margin’ for how much distortion of reality is allowed (McAlister et al.). If individuals over-distort or 
under-distort, their tendencies might cease to be adaptive and might turn maladaptive instead. Those who under-
distort maintain an overly too realistic perspective which, contrary to common opinion, is believed to be 
maladaptive. Those who over-distort, like narcissists, might be blinded by their self-serving bias into developing 
an exaggerated and unrealistic perception of themselves and their capacities (McAlister et al).    
92 See Baron-Cohen 181; Ronningstam 45-6; Diamond, Yeomans and Levy 423-4; Becker, Death 2. 
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oppressive and unjust god whose tyranny is to be admirably challenged at all costs, rather 
than consider the possibility of divine retribution. What is more is that in his pathological 
effort to maintain a heroic image of himself, Christopher conveniently chooses to overlook 
the last crime he committed against his one and only friend, seconds before the ship was hit 
by a German torpedo. He decides to focus instead on the fact that had he not hesitated to 
carry the order ‘hard a-starboard’ sooner—in order to have the Wildebeest turn suddenly and 
hopefully throw Nat off the ship in the process—he would have become a hero for saving the 
ship from the torpedo that brought it down (Pincher 186). Such greed for admiration and 
idolization is mirrored in Christopher’s desire to maintain a grandiose self-image in his past 
through the pursuit of status or the conquest of ‘anything he can lay his hands on the best 
part, the best seat, the most money, the best notice, the best woman’ (120). In fact, it is 
through Christopher’s superior Pete that Golding first makes his clear reference to his 
protagonist's self-centredness and moral bankruptcy given the manner by which Pete 
associates Christopher with the seven deadly sins, particularly greed and pride, which he 
believes Christopher to be capable of playing ‘without a mask,…just stylized makeup’(119). 
Such qualities are, of course, not unique to the despicable Christopher Martin. It should be 
noted, however, that Golding might have wanted to target an exceptionally reprehensible 
state of sinful self-centredness through the creation of Christopher given the association 
drawn between pride and greed and their being manifested as an extreme, evident in Pete’s 
belief that it is ‘Greed’ that should make the acquaintance with the egotistical Pincher: ‘Think 
you can play Martin, Greed?’ (120).93 
     Christopher’s sins, in other words, might be more of a symptom associated with one of 
those instances when mankind’s inherent egotistical tendencies take on a pathological 
manifestation, leading to an overinflated image of the self that sets up unrealistic standards 
and expectations of what that self is entitled to and how it should be treated by others. In fact, 
Golding clearly communicates such a notion, first through Christopher’s heroic delusion of 
survival, and later through his obsession with his identity, evident in his reasoning for 
desiring to kill Nat, which he shamelessly and blatantly traces to not wanting to ‘lose his 
identity’ (Pincher 184).94 Golding also maintains in an interview with Baker that Christopher 
                                                          
93 Pride, after all, involves the deification of the self, and greed is more of a symptom of such a state, 
considering how it prioritizes fulfilling the self’s needs at the expense of others.  
94 Nat, after all, is the only person, along with Mary Lovell, to challenge Christopher’s superiority and his 
favourable view of himself, and though not intentionally perpetrated, his ending up with the one woman who 
rejected Christopher’s advances is what fuels Christopher’s jealously and sets him on the path of murder for the 
first time. This will be explained in detail shortly.  
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is more of an ‘egotist…than most,’ a statement which further aids in reinforcing Golding’s 
earlier conception of him as the most fallen of all his characters (Golding in Baker, Study 39; 
‘Interview’), rivalled only by his later creation of the psychopathic Sophie in Darkness 
Visible. This would place Christopher on the pathological end of the narcissism continuum, 
making his condition, unlike that of his ancestors, one of the perfect examples of how the 
evolution of self-awareness and the creation of individual identity can take on a morbid 
manifestation or result in an extreme of permanent malignancy.    
      Since a healthy measure of narcissism is usually associated with the healthy expression 
and suspension of empathy, a pathological extreme will result in not only a dysfunctional 
sense of identity, but also an abhorrent state of ‘single-mindedness,’ whereby it is difficult to 
maintain emotional empathy or relate to others as human beings (See Baron-Cohen 16; 
Pincus and Roche 32). In fact, it is highly possible for narcissists, given their intact 
possession of cognitive empathy, to use their Machiavellian intelligence for the selfish 
manipulation and exploitation of others if this means gratifying their desire for status and 
social dominance, and if it promotes their chances of attaining more power and success 
(Wallace 314; Tracy et al. 337-8). Such a tendency can actually be detected in the way 
Christopher is represented as putting on an act of humility and patriotism in order to be 
recommended for a commission in the navy (Pincher 94), or in the manner by which he 
sweet talks Helen into carrying on an affair with him in the hopes that it would improve his 
status in his acting career. The fact that Christopher’s primary profession is that of actor 
further reinforces the theme of narcissism, reflecting his excessive need for admiration and 
his readiness to put on a false front to exploit and manipulate those around him. His conquest 
of women, in particular, is significant, considering how sexual exploitations are generally 
regarded as a reflection of one’s thirst for dominance and control, a theme which Golding 
later explores extensively in Free Fall through Sammy’s sexual exploitation of the simple 
Beatrice, and in The Pyramid (1967) through Oliver’s relationship with the socially inferior 
Evie.95 Christopher’s victimization of women is also significant in that it is represented as 
providing him with more assurance ‘in his knowledge of the cosmic nature of eating’ and in 
his existence as a successful maggot (89).  
                                                          
95 This can actually be seen in Christopher’s encounter with Helen where he states that she is ‘not a person, 
[but]…an instrument of pleasure’ (Pincher 95). It also shows in the manner by which Christopher threatens 
Mary into letting him have his way with her (151-2). Golding clearly states in his notes, that for someone who 
desires power like Christopher, life ‘means power over things and power over the most expensive things called 
women’ (qtd. in Carey, Golding 194). Such a statement is actually in accordance with the observation that it is 
normal for narcissists to think of sex in terms of dominance, ‘manipulation and power,’ to develop ‘misogynistic 
tendencies’ and to engage in ‘coercive and sadistic sexual behavior’ (Holtzman and Strube 214). 
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     Golding’s referring to Christopher as a maggot perfectly captures Christopher’s life as an 
excessively egotistical, self-aware animal whose habit of eating and exploiting others in order 
to move ahead, regardless of moral implications, is fundamental to his narcissistic nature. It is 
important to note, though, that Golding’s reliance on the Chinese box metaphor does not 
simply serve the function of analogy, but also communicates what Christopher genuinely 
believes life to be like since he is constantly shown as obsessing over not wanting to be 
‘eaten’ or to fall victim to other people’s predatory habits the same way they have fallen for 
his (157). Life to Christopher, after all, is a Chinese box where maggots are crawling about 
with no other choice but to prey on one another to survive, making the ‘whole business of 
eating… peculiarly significant’ since ‘eating with the mouth,’ as Christopher puts it, ‘[is] 
only a gross expression of what was a universal process. You could eat with your cock or 
with your fists, or with your voice. You could eat with hobnailed boots or buying and selling 
or marrying and begetting or cuckolding’ (88). Such a conception helps reveal a paranoid 
dimension to Christopher’s character that is then projected onto those around him the same 
way the new people projected their capacity for aggression on the innocent forest dwellers. It 
also shows Christopher as prone to delusions of persecution and as living in a hell of his own 
making long before he is cast away on a rock in the middle of the Atlantic to suffer the 
questionable grace of a seemingly antagonistic god. 
     One might argue that even though Christopher manages to fool himself into believing that 
it does not bother him to live in accordance with the consequences of his selfish and immoral 
choices (71), there seem to be moments when Christopher is shown as forced to reconsider 
his decisions, assess the impact of his past actions and confront the ramifications of his unjust 
exploitation of others. An example of that presents itself rather late in the novel when the 
realization of how lonely it is to endure on a barren rock in the middle of the ocean finally 
takes its toll on him and forces him to relive the time when he became something of a social 
outcast through no one’s fault but his own (181). However, despite Christopher’s clear 
admission that it is because of what he did that he is ‘an outsider and alone’ (181), phrasing 
his confession in this manner seems to be more of an expression of frustration at how his 
choices have affected him than a manifestation of concern for those whom he victimized. 
Christopher, after all, is never once shown as exhibiting any interest in making amends or in 
asking for forgiveness, an aspect that helps highlight his confession as less of a sign of a 
guilty conscience and more of a clue to an abhorrent state of single-mindedness and an 
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inability to empathize.96 In fact, it is possible to see Christopher’s concern as mostly directed 
at the loss of the narcissistic supply that used to regulate his self-esteem, feed his sense of 
importance and promote his delusion of grandiosity. This perfectly shows in his monologue 
on the rock where he expresses his desolation at losing human contact and reminisces about 
all the experiences and sexual conquests that granted him a sense of purpose and defined who 
he is to himself and those around him: 
I could … assess the impact of Christopher Hadley Martin on the world. I could find 
assurance of my solidity in the bodies of other people by warmth and caresses and 
triumphant flesh. I could be a character in a body. But now I am this thing in here, a 
great many aches of bruised flesh, a bundle of rags and those lobsters on the rock. 
The three lights of my window are not enough to identify me however sufficient they 
were in the world. But there were other people to describe me to myself—they fell in 
love with me, they applauded me, they caressed this body they defined it for me. 
There were the people I got the better of, people who disliked me, people who 
quarrelled with me. Here I have nothing to quarrel with. I’m in danger of losing 
definition. I am an album of snapshots, random, a whole show of trailers of old films. 
The most I know of my face is the scratch of bristles, an itch, a sense of tingling 
warmth (132-3).    
     Although such a confession helps in reinforcing Christopher’s selfishness as a successful 
maggot to a certain extent, witnessing the confession delivered in such a manner, coupled 
with Christopher’s cries of despair at having to suffer the fate of isolation on a barren rock in 
the middle of nowhere, is likely to move readers into feeling empathy rather than contempt. 
This is ironic, though, in that readers are not only brought to accept the delusion of heroism 
of an exploitative and grandiose narcissist, but are actually being manipulated into 
overlooking the fact that had it not been for his lack of a moral sensibility and his 
pathological obsession with his sense of identity, Christopher would not have ended up 
isolated and alone in a hell of his own making in the first place. As stated earlier, having the 
ship torpedoed at the exact same moment when Christopher gave the order to kill Nat might 
have been intended by Golding to highlight the moral aspect of the novel and to grant more 
credence to the notion of divine retribution, as opposed to the co-occurrence being merely 
                                                          
96 Christopher’s pathological lack of empathy does not absolve him of the moral responsibility, though. The fact 
that he is aware that what he had done has caused people to shun him shows that he is aware of the moral 
implications of his actions. This point will be tackled in detail later.   
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coincidental. What Babb has observed, however, is that Christopher ‘bears a heavy 
responsibility for the sinking of the destroyer, and so for his own death, because—in pursuing 
his plan to kill Nat—he has sent the port lookout below, the man who might have seen the 
torpedo approach’ (Babb, 93; Pincher 185). As a result, he is not only depicted as unable to 
avoid the torpedo, save himself, and possibly the lives of many others who have been on 
board the ship at the time, but also shown as unable to spare himself the agony of isolation 
and the torturing delusion of survival that eventually follow his drowning.97  
      The destroyer incident, of course, is not the only example of Christopher’s tendency to 
focus on short-term gains, seek drastic measures, and overlook possible costs and 
ramifications that can be highly self-destructive, particularly in the long run. His affair with 
Helen, the producer’s wife, classifies as another clear example of this propensity given that 
he initiated the relationship for the sole purpose of using her to get ahead in his acting career, 
only to end up earning nothing but Pete’s antagonism and animosity. Indeed, it is because of 
this grave mistake that Christopher finds himself forced to abandon his profession as an actor 
and to enlist in the navy where he eventually meets his death. However, what makes the 
destroyer incident particularly revealing, aside from its being the one incident that sheds light 
on Christopher’s last moments as a supposedly successful maggot, is that it highlights a 
psychopathic dimension to his character, represented in his willingness to kill the one person 
who has been nothing but a friend to him simply because of the threat that his mere existence 
posed to Christopher’s self-image (184). Unlike Golding’s earlier characters, Christopher’s 
attempt to kill Nat is not a measure resorted to under circumstances of fear or terror, but is 
more of an outcome of his intolerance to an existence that compromises his ego and puts his 
own identity in question. This may seem uncharacteristic at first, even to Christopher himself, 
considering the low opinion that he holds of Nat, evident in the manner by which he fixates 
on Nat’s ‘spider-length’ (50), ‘fool innocence’ (101), ‘womanish’ demeanour and his 
inability to act as a seaman (50).98 It should be noted, however, that by marrying Mary, Nat 
                                                          
97 Christopher falling victim to his own murderous nature actually reveals the maladaptiveness of the 
pathological extreme of narcissism in Christopher’s case. 
98 It should be noted that one of the common views on why narcissists are particularly sensitive or intolerant of 
injuries to self-esteem is that they have constructed their grandiose self-image as a means to cover and protect 
their underlying damaged or low self-esteem (Vater et al.). In other words, narcissists have high explicit self-
esteem, but a markedly low implicit self-esteem. The dynamics involved in these two particular aspects of the 
self are too complex to address here, but it should be noted that the problem basically lies in how these two 
aspects are brought or combined together rather than in the fact that one aspect is high while the other is low 
(Vater et al.). This is claimed to be the reason why narcissists are severely defensive when it comes to their self-
image. However, Wallace believes that the narcissistic sensitivity to injuries to self-esteem and the likelihood of 
a narcissist’s engaging in aggression in defence of his self-image might be more of a sign of frustration at 
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has unintentionally delivered a serious blow to Christopher’s ego, not only because Mary is 
the one woman Christopher has never been able to possess or control, but also because 
Christopher has apparently never considered the innocent and friendly Nat as an equal, much 
less a threat, capable of attaining what he could never devour or subdue. Christopher’s 
incapacity to tolerate injuries to his self-image also shows in his attempt at and possible 
success in raping Mary whose existence he is also represented as having been incapable of 
tolerating, particularly following her rejection of him. This may actually bring the extreme 
Christopher is occupying closer to what could only be considered as psychopathic, especially 
since both conditions of psychopathy and narcissism are noted as sharing a ‘grandiose sense 
of self-worth, callous/lack of empathy, and failure to accept responsibility for … actions’ 
(Lynam 227; Baron-Cohen 92; Marissen, Deen and Franken).99 Nevertheless, to say that 
Christopher shares the psychopath’s lack of understanding of moral responsibility, or the 
incapacity to note the distinction between the conventional and the moral, would be an 
overstatement since he is represented as clearly aware at some level that Nat, in particular, 
does not deserve to be antagonized and hated to such a blinding extent (Pincher 104-5, 103). 
This shows in what Babb considers as the only ‘uncharacteristically’ unselfish moment in 
Christopher’s life where he is shown to be warning Nat about himself after the latter naively 
asks him to be his best man and to look after Mary when he dies (Babb 81; Pincher 157-8). 
The possibility that Christopher could have felt differently about antagonizing Nat might 
seem all the more likely given that Nat is the one person who never abandons Christopher 
during the time he is shown as having been overwhelmed by a sense of being a social outcast. 
Nat is also, ironically enough, the only person, aside from Christopher’s mother, whom 
Pincher calls for help when he finds himself facing the serious threat of drowning following 
the torpedo incident. Despite this dormant awareness, however, Christopher cannot help but 
‘[find] himself cursing an invisible Nat, cursing him for Mary, for the contempt in old Gin-
soak’s face’ (102-3). Consequently, he cannot help but justify and hold on to his hatred than 
let go of it: 
                                                          
having to be constantly seeking self-aggrandizing experiences and at having these attempts thwarted rather than 
a sign of a fragile self-esteem (321).   
99 In fact, narcissism has been classified as one of three traits comprising what is known as the ‘Dark Triad’ 
which is basically a group of malignant traits that include psychopathy and Machiavellianism and that is 
supposed to designate ‘a socially malevolent character with behavior tendencies toward self-promotion, 
emotional coldness, duplicity, and aggressiveness’ (Paulhus and Williams). It has even been claimed that 
antisocial personality disorder could possibly be a ‘subtype’ of narcissistic personality disorder (Marissen, Deen 
and Franken). 
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The centre, looking in this reversed world over the binnacle, found itself beset by a 
storm of emotions, acid and inky and cruel. There was a desperate amazement that 
anyone so good as Nat, so unwillingly loved for the face that was always rearranged 
from within, for the serious attention, for love given without thought, should also be 
so quiveringly hated as though he were the only enemy. There was amazement that 
to love and to hate were now one thing and one emotion. Or perhaps they could be 
separated. Hate was as hate had always been, an acid, the corroding venom of which 
could be borne only because the hater was strong. 
     ‘I am a good hater’ (103).       
     This same love-hate dynamic can also be said to underlie Christopher’s relationship with 
Mary who seems, through no fault of her own, to be more hated by Christopher than Nat, 
given how he clearly admits at one point to have held no feelings towards her except those of 
hate (149). However, as he tries to understand what it is about her existence that made him 
develop an obsession with her to the point where he actually contemplates killing her, he 
considers the possibility that he, too, might be in love with her, but is, nevertheless, still being 
eaten by the same corroding ‘acid’ of hate that fuels his antagonism to Nat: 
Ever since I met her and she interrupted the pattern, coming at random, obeying no 
law of life, facing me with the insoluble, unbearable problem of her existence the 
acid’s been chewing at my guts. I can’t even kill her because that would be her final 
victory over me. Yet as long as she lives the acid will eat. She’s there. In the flesh. In 
the not even lovely flesh. In the cheap mind. Obsession. Not love. Or if love, 
insanely compounded of this jealousy of her very being. Odi et amo. (103-4).  
This may help to reveal Christopher’s distorted perception of love, especially when examined 
in relation to his admission to loving Nat against his very nature before he finally decides to 
give the order that was supposed to kill him (184). There is more to this confession, however, 
than highlighting the possibility of his incapacity to love or revealing the depth of his 
antagonism to the very same people whom he believes that he held some semblance of 
affection towards at a certain point in his life. Christopher has clearly stated that he is jealous 
of Mary’s ‘very being’ (103). He also seems to have indirectly admitted to harbouring the 
same emotion towards Nat when he stated that he is ‘additionally furious’ with him, ‘not 
because of Mary…but because he dared sit so, tilting with the sea, held by a thread, so near 
the end that would be at once so anguishing and restful like the bursting of a boil’ (101).   
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     What Nat and Mary might have done to Christopher, aside from threatening his sense of 
importance, is that they have shown him through their benevolent existence the 
meaninglessness of his own and the stark emptiness of ‘running after [his] identity disc all the 
days of [his] life’ (193). Christopher, after all, has never cared about maintaining a 
meaningful engagement with life or sustaining honest and reliable relations as much as he has 
cared about getting ahead and fulfilling his every need, desire and ambition even as that has 
involved exploiting and stepping on others. This leaves him envious of those who are, 
contrary to him, capable of finding a sense of purpose. Though he chooses not to admit that 
to himself seeing that this would confer no advantage in maintaining his self-image, his 
feelings of resentment and envy show in the manner by which he negatively fixates on Nat 
and Mary’s innocence and the moral sense that made it possible for them to ‘[make] a place 
where [he] can’t get’ or possibly ever understand (100-1). There is that moment, of course, 
when Nat confronts the alienated and lonely Christopher about his need for some sort of 
direction because he could see that he is not happy (70-1). Christopher, however, only comes 
to openly admit to having lived an aimless and immoral life near the end of the novel when 
his delusion of survival finally takes its toll, and forces him to confront the monstrosity of his 
egocentricity and the cruel ramifications of his choices. Unfortunately, Christopher’s 
confession does not convey the slightest hint of an intention to take responsibility for the 
choices he made or even reflect any regret at not being able to make amends to those who 
were affected by his actions. What it shows, instead, is that Christopher is willing to entertain 
his torturing hallucinations, even go as far as conversing with the conjured God he did not 
believe in, as long as he could locate the problem outside his grandiose self:        
You gave me the power to choose and all my life you led me carefully to this 
suffering because my choice was my own. Oh yes! I understand the pattern. All my 
life, whatever I had done I should have found myself in the end on that same bridge, 
at that same time, giving that same order—the right order, the wrong order. Yet, 
suppose I climbed away from the cellar over the bodies of used and defeated people, 
broke them to make steps on the road away from you, why should you torture me? If 
I ate them, who gave me a mouth? (197).  
     Christopher’s failure to admit moral responsibility seems to be frighteningly reminiscent, 
as previously indicated, of the psychopath’s tendency to dismiss the suffering of others and to 
remain focused instead on the self’s own wellbeing. In fact, it might be tempting to argue that 
since Christopher is trapped in a state of single-mindedness that prevents him from showing 
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emotional empathy to those around him, it is possible not only to deem his moral compass 
defective, but also to absolve him of the moral responsibility that comes with the choices he 
makes. It is important to note, though, that emotional empathy should not be simplistically 
equated with moral sensibility, nor should it be considered the sole condition governing the 
development of the moral sense and the capacity to take responsibility for one’s own 
actions.100 As a result, it is difficult to consider Christopher’s state of single-mindedness as an 
argument in favour of absolving him of responsibility, especially since he has clearly shown 
on one occasion that he is perfectly capable of moral reasoning and of twisting and 
manipulating the circumstances so that he would not be condemned for his actions. In fact, 
his conversation with God reveals his awareness that exploiting others the way he did was 
certainly an immoral thing to do. Still, the best example that perfectly captures Christopher’s 
understanding of the moral consequences of his choices as well as his inclination to evade 
responsibility is shown in the moment when he is contemplating how he should kill Nat 
without being detected and without risking being held accountable:  
[S]ay one nudged circumstances—not in the sense that one throttled with the hands 
or fired a gun—but gently shepherded them the way they might go? Since it would 
be a suggestion to circumstances only it could not be considered what a strict 
moralist might call it— 
     ‘And who cares anyway?’ … 
     The corrosive swamped him. A voice cried out in his belly—I do not want him to 
die! The sorrow and hate bit deep, went on biting. He cried out with his proper voice. 
     ‘Does no one understand how I feel?’ (104-5).101 
     Christopher’s cry for understanding—which seems like a desperate attempt on his part to 
suppress his moral reasoning and to search for more justifications that would make killing his 
best friend excusable—might be perceived as quite reminiscent of Tuami’s anguished cry in 
The Inheritors since he, too, is shown as trying to convince himself that he and his people had 
no other choice but to kill the demons in order to survive.102 However, despite this particular 
                                                          
100 In fact, there are cases, such as those of autism, where a moral sense develops despite the marked absence of 
cognitive and emotional empathy (Baron-Cohen 95), thereby reinforcing the argument that empathy is but one 
component to morality. 
101 Further support to this point can be found in Golding’s notes where he states that Christopher ‘[p]lans to 
bump him [Nat] off in one of the safe ways that war makes easy. Who would suspect? Best friend!’ (qtd. in 
Carey, Golding 194).    
102 Christopher’s expression of despair at not having someone who can understand how he feels also appears to 
communicate his state of phenomenological isolation. After all, the evolution of self-awareness and the creation 
of individual identities have made it difficult for individuals to share their full existential experience of living 
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similarity and the fact that Christopher mirrors Tuami’s egotism, greed, lust and contempt to 
a certain extent, it is still possible to argue that Tuami is more recognizably human than 
Christopher, especially when readers adopt his perspective and develop an understanding of 
the psychological state of terror that made the momentary suppression of empathy 
possible.103 This would make Christopher’s narcissism, as previously indicated, an extreme 
condition that can be markedly associated with a malignant set of behavioural tendencies that 
include social manipulation, exploitation, evident selfishness, high competitiveness, intense 
jealousy, total absence of empathy and a noticeable propensity for violence and aggression 
(See Holtzman and Strube 212). It should also mark Christopher as a clear exception to the 
norm, even if he is shown to share an affinity with his ancestors in terms of original sin, 
because the behaviours that have been listed, and which are believed to have been favoured 
by natural selection for their adaptive value are driven to an immoral and repulsive extreme 
that can no longer be considered adaptive, particularly in Christopher’s case.104 Pathological 
                                                          
with those around no matter how close their social ties are (Pyszczynski et al. 7). This has been contrasted with 
a prior state of oneness that binds the Neanderthals together in The Inheritors. As Baker has noted in his 
discussion of The Inheritors, the islands in Golding’s novels are supposed to stand for mankind’s state of 
isolation from those around and their alienation from the natural world (Study 26).   
103 Tuami does express the desire to kill Marlan who, contrary to Nat, is actually a despicable person, but Tuami 
is shown as unable to bring himself to do it. He does carry on an affair with Vivani, and is shown in one scene 
as being aggressive towards her. His aggression, though, seems to have been brought about by alcohol. He also 
does not appear, judging by Lok’s limited perspective, to be forcing himself on her or to be raping her. More 
importantly, he is the one person who is shown to be as highly critical of himself and of his people’s aggressive 
tendencies. Marlan, on the other hand, is shown as more focused on how his actions are going to benefit himself 
than on how they are going to affect others, an aspect that actually brings him closer to Christopher Martin. It 
would be difficult to come to the conclusion that he, too, might be representing an extreme of egotism because 
of the epistemological difficulty posed by Lok’s limited perspective. Still, his over preoccupation with his own 
needs perfectly exemplifies both the adaptive and the maladaptive outcomes of being closer to the narcissism 
end of the continuum. He is represented, after all, as the leader of his tribe, and he does seem to have more 
access to most of the resources held and acquired. On the other hand, Marlan is hated by his tribesmen to the 
point where Tuami actually contemplates killing him, raising the possibility that it might only be a matter of 
time before he is overthrown or even killed. 
104 It is important to remember that most of the traits that are characteristic of pathological narcissism are 
actually highly adaptive in moderation which explains why it is difficult to define narcissism in the singular 
terms of adaptivity or maladaptivity (Tracy et al. 437-8; Watson and Biderman). As previously shown, it pays 
for human nature to be capable of selfishness, exploitation and aggression to a certain extent. One might 
wonder, though, why intensively narcissistic traits continue to persist despite natural selection’s preference for 
cooperation, altruism and sociality, considered by a number of evolutionary theorists to be more effective at 
countering common threats than a view of individual survival as paramount (Holtzman and Strube 210). It has 
been noted that narcissism is highly likely to be an evolutionary variation of dominance that allows individuals 
to attain more control over the social realm and gain more access to resources that are valued in mate selection 
(265). This view actually supports Golding’s own regarding power and dominance, and how it is only when they 
take over in human relations that the sin of exploitations occurs (Golding in Haffenden 116). There are also 
findings that are in support of the notion that because narcissists might initially be perceived as attractive, their 
seemingly malignant traits can be said to aid in reproductive success (268). Such benefits, though, are not long-
term and are likely to wane as the narcissist’s ‘disagreeableness’ begins to show (269). In fact, narcissistic traits 
are only successfully sustained through short-term mating rather than pair-bonding, a notion that has been 
reinforced by the observation that narcissism is more common in males than females, and that narcissists are 
actually predisposed to engage in ‘coercive’ sexual behaviour (267-8). However, one should still keep in mind 
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narcissism might have initially proven its adaptive value for Christopher since it made it 
possible for him to pursue his ambitions and to attain social and sexual dominance among 
other things. However, most of the benefits that Christopher initially manages to gain are 
short-lived because it is his narcissism that is responsible for his antisocial tendencies, his 
loss of empathy and his lack of a moral sensibility, as well as the subsequent incapacity to 
establish solid relations or attain a meaningful engagement with life. It is also Christopher’s 
egocentricity and single-mindedness that is shown as having cost him his job as an actor, 
forced him to enlist in the navy and finally led to his drowning in the middle of the Atlantic. 
This should emphasize the moral dimension of the novel given that it is Christopher’s 
egotism that ultimately leads to his downfall and suffering, something that readers are 
presumably supposed to find morally appropriate since it conforms to what is typically 
considered to be fair or just. It seems, however, that readers cannot help but empathize with 
Pincher as he struggles to survive hell, even as he has created it himself. As a result, critics 
such as Kermode have concluded that readers actually see something of themselves in 
Pincher Martin that makes their feelings of empathy more like those of ‘self-pity,’ and that 
Christopher is actually more of an Everyman figure than previously thought (qtd. in Carey, 
Golding 202).  
Pincher Martin as an Everyman 
One of the demands that Golding seems to have made as a novelist in Pincher Martin is that 
readers reevaluate all the conclusions they have drawn throughout the entire novel as they 
come to the shocking realization that the protagonist’s struggle to survive has never actually 
taken place the way it was made to appear or the way they were led to believe. However, as 
difficult as such a demand is, judging by the level of frustration that marked the initial critical 
response to the novel, it does not appear to be as challenging as the demand that readers 
suspend their empathy for the man who is trying his hardest to overcome death and the 
natural elements, and to hang on to the safety of the rock in the hopes of getting rescued. In 
fact, we are highly likely to go on empathizing with Christopher Martin despite whatever 
knowledge we come to attain of his immoral past because the desire to survive against all 
odds is one that defines the entire human race, and one that we are less likely to condemn 
Christopher for, even if it takes on a perverse manifestation as a hallucinatory after-death 
experience the way Golding intended it to be.  
                                                          
that debates surrounding biological and evolutionary explanations for the emergence and persistence of 
personality disorders and narcissism are yet to be settled.  
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    This certainly does not mean that it is simply the survival drive that is being depicted as the 
one sinful possession that allows us to see ourselves in Christopher. We are not the only 
species on the planet that has been hardwired accordingly, nor are we the only animals in 
Golding’s creations who are depicted as seeking certain behaviours for the purposes of 
survival. After all, even Golding’s innocent Neanderthals, who are granted animal 
intelligence for the most part, and who are denied the complex cognitive functions that 
Golding believed to be associated with our sinful nature, are shown to be carrying the self-
preservation instinct just like any other complex or simple organism. In fact, common 
possession of the survival drive can most readily be seen in the almost universal responses of 
pain and fear which are evolutionarily believed to be crucial in steering animals away from 
contact with threatening conditions or entities in their environment. It has been observed, 
however, that animals are designed by natural selection ‘to act as if they were motivated to 
achieve some goal when, in fact, they are not’ (Batson and Stocks 155). This means that even 
though animals are usually seen as trying ‘to escape or avoid pain or discomfort,’ their 
behaviour is only meant to ‘produce the result of self-preservation without that result being 
their goal’ (155).105 Such a tendency can also be said to apply to humans to some degree 
because they, too, have been programmed by natural selection to avoid life-threatening 
conditions through certain ‘hard-wired … (amygdala) based’ fear responses that are not 
unique to their species (155). However, what sets the human drive for survival on a different 
level compared to that of the animals is that it has incurred what might be considered to be a 
more complex dimension through its association with their high level of intelligence. As a 
result, it has become possible for mankind to comprehend the ramifications of their failure to 
survive and to strive to avoid those undesirable outcomes at all costs. Humans, after all, are 
perhaps the only species with a paradoxical existence (Scimecca). They are the only animals 
capable of perceiving the full conscious experience of living as distinct individuals with their 
unique sense of identity while still being able to understand and contemplate the eventual 
reality of their demise (Scimecca; Becker, Death 87). According to Batson and Stocks: 
[w]ithout a concept of self or individuality, and of one’s own death, it makes no 
sense to speak of an inclination toward self-preservation, or fear of death, or fear of 
                                                          
105 It should be stressed that this might be the case for Lok. Fa, however, who is shown as cognitively superior 
to Lok, seems to be capable of maintaining the goal of survival in mind, especially while keeping watch over the 
Homo Sapiens who can be classified as a novel threat for the Neanderthals. This exemplifies the difficulty of 
arriving at a definite statement regarding the Neanderthals’ intelligence and their capacity for self-awareness 
based on Lok’s limited perspective alone. It also shows that the difference between the Neanderthals and the 
Homo Sapiens is one that should be tackled in terms of degree, not of kind, as previously explained.   
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annihilation. There may be relatively hard-wired fears … [like] fear of heights, dark 
places, loud noises, or certain animals (e.g., snakes). But a fear of death or 
annihilation requires more than an amygdala; it also requires concepts that rely on 
the (prefrontal) cortex and are likely uniquely human. Even in humans, these 
concepts only develop after several years of life. … Rather than being a primitive 
and ancient motive shared with other species, our concern for self-preservation is 
almost certainly a recent evolutionary development. It is dependent on the cognitive 
capacities to (1) understand oneself as an existing person and (2) imagine the 
radically altered reality in which this person no longer exists’ (155).  
     This would make the existential anxiety associated with the knowledge of the terrifying 
realities of death and annihilation a uniquely human experience and a clear example of the 
costs individuals are forced to pay for their possession of high intelligence. And since the 
existential dilemma of death is the kind of anxiety that cannot be considered adaptive, people 
have found themselves forced to seek out certain defences by which they can guard 
themselves against the dreadful and overwhelming knowledge of their eventual demise 
(Landau et al.). One of these defence mechanisms, of course, is people’s fundamental 
narcissism, represented in their striving to maintain some sense of importance through certain 
shared beliefs and delusions such as the biased perception of themselves as occupying a 
unique status in the universe that sets them above the animals and grants them the right to 
impose their will on the natural world.106 There are also the symbolic constructs and cultural 
worldviews that not only help in setting standards of value that feed mankind’s basic 
narcissism, but also aid in maintaining a certain conception of the world that provides 
humanity with the hope of transcending death and the promise of immortality (Solomon, 
Greenberg and Pyszczynski 18). Such perceptions, of course, do not necessarily conform to 
reality because reality is highly likely to overwhelm individuals with the anxiety of their 
insignificance and their eventual death.107 This explains why people are usually hostile or 
aggressive to the oppositions, or sometimes even mere existence, of any person, group or 
belief system that undermines the credibility of their own worldview or that brings the 
authenticity of their standards of self-importance into question (Landau et al.). It should also 
reveal another dark dimension to humanity’s capacity for aggression represented in its 
‘narrow and uncritical performance of the social fictions [it] has created’ (Scimecca), and its 
                                                          
106 See Becker, Death 3; Goldenberg and Roberts 74; Koole and Van Den Berg 96. 
107 See Becker, Evil 124; Scimecca; Janoff-Bulman and Yopyk 128.  
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readiness ‘to kill or die purely for the sake of an abstract set of ideas,’ or for a fragile but 
powerful distortion of reality (Jost, Fitzsimons and Kay 269). In short, man’s unique 
existence as the only animal capable of an awareness of death as a problem has not only 
made his denial of it through the relentless pursuit of self-esteem and a meaningful 
worldview a possibly vicious endeavour, but has also taken his survival drive to a higher 
point of aggression where he is willing to kill to ‘affirm his…life’ and ‘ward off the flow of 
his own blood’ (Becker, Evil 111; Scimecca). 
     Such aspects of the human drive for survival can most clearly be seen in The Inheritors, 
where Golding depicts the vicious annihilation of the gentle Neanderthals as having been 
brought about by our highly intelligent, violent and self-aware ancestors. This helps in  
showing Golding as possibly harbouring a conception of the human desire to survive at all 
costs as one of the sinful outcomes of our cognitive development or our evolutionary fall.108 
It is even possible to see Pincher Martin as granting further credence to the notion, 
considering Golding’s depiction of Christopher’s monstrous obsession with exploiting and 
‘crunching up’ people and his refusal to let go of his rock delusion, even if it meant sparing 
himself excruciating mental torture (90). The fact that Golding chose to communicate 
Christopher’s ‘extraordinary capacity to endure’ through the grotesque imagery of the 
maggots that are trapped in a tin box with nothing to prey on but one another to survive might 
indeed be taken as Golding’s way of highlighting the repulsive aspects of self-preservation 
and the immoral dimension to humanity’s aggressive drive for survival (71). In other words, 
although Christopher has been shown to be occupying an extreme on the egotism scale 
compared to his ancestors in The Inheritors, his character remains a gross reflection of the 
same inherent tendencies that Golding believed to be fuelling the Homo Sapiens’ aggressive 
drive for survival as opposed to the passive and animal-like Neanderthals. We may, of 
course, continue to condemn Christopher for his immoral past despite sharing the root cause 
of his sinful tendencies since his immoral condition can still be considered a violation of the 
norm. But we are not likely to condemn him for wanting to go on living because the realities 
of death and annihilation are as much of a threat for us to accept as for Christopher Martin. 
Consequently, we cannot help but empathize with his plight, believe in the authenticity of his 
                                                          
108 Referring to self-preservation as an instinct is only meant, as Landau and colleagues have clarified, to 
indicate ‘the general orientation toward continued life’. It does not mean that the view expressed does not 
acknowledge survival at the level of the genes, nor does it deny the fact that there are certain self-destructive 
behaviours that are more in the service of reproductive success than survival. It should be stressed, however, 
that it pays for the organism in most cases to survive long enough for it to attain reproductive success and to 
care for its own offspring (Landau et al.), which means that the focus on survival should not be considered 
misplaced or unjustified.        
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creation, or hope for its survival against the will of the seemingly cruel God that wants to take 
it all away. We may even end up admiring Christopher for the same monstrous will 
responsible for his immoral past for it is the one thing fuelling his delusion of survival and 
keeping him going in a seemingly heroic frenzy against the negating force of the ‘black 
lightning’ that is constantly threatening to annihilate him along with his creation. After all, 
argues Becker, the fact that we do not know how we are ever going to handle or conquer the 
terror of negation, or if we are ever going to be brave enough to confront the threat of 
annihilation, is one reason why ‘[we] admire most the courage to face death,’ and why one 
perception of the hero across different centuries and civilizations is that of a man ‘who could 
go into the spirit world, the world of the dead, and return alive’ (Death 12). 
     There is certainly the fact that Christopher continually insists on acting the roles of the 
great tragic heroes as he continues to entertain his torturing delusion of survival that helps to 
explain why it is possible to perceive his futile struggle in a rather positive or heroic light. It 
is important to note, though, that such an act of heroism on Christopher’s part can also be 
said to stem from the same existential anxiety motivating us to empathize with Christopher or 
to accept his account of endurance as a testament to his courage and heroism. In other words, 
Christopher’s heroic delusion is not merely a manifestation of his narcissistic personality 
disorder, but is also a gross expression of the human narcissistic preoccupation with the 
symbolic self that people seek to immortalize through their adoption of particular symbolic 
worldviews, or what Becker came to label as the cultural ‘hero system’ (Death 4; Evil 124). 
According to Becker, ‘heroism is first and foremost a reflex of the terror of death’ (Death 
11). And when an individual insists on playing a particular role that would bolster his self-
esteem or mark his existence as meaningful or significant in one way or another, he is in 
effect engaging in his own ‘causa-sui’ or heroic project in accordance with the standards and 
guidelines set by his own culture or worldview (Death 11).109 Accomplishing an immortality 
project implies the successful engagement in an act or a role that is deemed by cultural 
standards to be an act of heroism whether it is ‘the “high” heroism of a Churchill, a Mao, or a 
Buddha, ... the “low” heroism of the coal miner, the peasant, the simple priest; [or] the plain, 
everyday, earthy heroism wrought by gnarled working hands guiding a family through 
                                                          
109 It has been previously suggested, of course, that Christopher’s narcissism is largely responsible for directing 
his delusion of survival in such a manner; however, it is important not to overlook the fact that narcissism itself, 
or rather the healthy measure of self-centredness or self-esteem, has been basically indicated as one of 
mankind’s essential defences against the terror of death or annihilation (Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski 
19; Becker, Death 3). 
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hunger and disease’ (4-5).110 It is possible, therefore, to consider Christopher’s delusion of 
endurance as a desperate attempt at bolstering his sense of importance and engaging his self-
esteem defences in accordance with both his narcissistic standards of value and those of his 
own worldview against the potential anxiety associated with the repressed knowledge of his 
impending death.111 This highlights yet another reason why Christopher is repeatedly seen as 
priding himself in his strength, education and intelligence as these are the kind of assets 
valued by the rational worldview that he seems to have willfully subscribed to in his rejection 
of the mystical and his revulsion for the irrational. It is also ironic that even though 
Christopher humbly denies being a hero at an earlier point in the novel (77), he cannot help 
but act the roles of the great Greek heroes ‘for whom the impossible was an achievement,’ 
and cast his suffering in a manner resembling theirs, especially when his hallucinations 
become particularly threatening (164). Christopher, in the end, is an Everyman, born with the 
original sin of egotism and forced to live with a terror exposed by the same gift he believes to 
have set him above the other animals. His only defence against the crippling terror of 
annihilation, of being preyed upon by death, or maybe even God, the same way he has preyed 
on others, is to give into the unconscious operation of his mind and watch his near death 
hallucinations turn into delusions, not of transcendence offered by the comfort of religion, but 
of a nightmarish survival fuelled by the darkness of human nature and its greed for life. 
     It is hard to detect the degree of Christopher’s ingenuity on reading the novel for the first 
time, especially if he is thought of as another castaway who was unfortunate enough to end 
up on a barren rock with no resources to utilize for survival or for bringing himself ‘virtually 
all the comforts of home’ the same way the famous Crusoe did (S. Boyd 51). However, 
although Christopher is seen as incapable of making the most of his poor environment or of 
going beyond naming certain parts of the rock after places back home, he remains a far more 
resourceful and creative villain than Robinson Crusoe. After all, Christopher has not only 
‘invented the island upon which he is stranded’ (51), but also succeeded in rooting his 
creation within the illusion of a normally functioning world, ‘obeying the laws of nature to 
                                                          
110 Most of Ernest Becker’s views have resulted in the creation of Terror Management Theory (TMT) which 
sought to establish the denial of death through carefully designed experiments and tests as a powerful force 
directing the psychological and existential aspects of different cultures and worldviews. (Solomon, Greenberg 
and Pyszczynski). 
111 One of the interesting points raised by Becker in The Denial of Death is that mental illness can be analysed in 
terms of the dysfunctionality or abnormality of one’s immortality project (208-9). Depression, for example, is 
viewed as an outcome of the failure of one’s hero project, leaving the individual more prone than ever to 
experience the terror of existence (210). 
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the last drop’ (Pincher 180).112 The life that Christopher Martin creates on the rock is a 
highly realistic one with every sensation of touch, hearing and taste carefully recalled, and 
with every detail and element cautiously constructed so as not to expose the fragility of his 
creation or raise doubts about its existence. Still, despite all the trouble that Christopher goes 
through to grant his invention a sense of normality, he finds himself incapable of preventing 
certain elements that are in clear violation of all that is logical or sensible from intruding into 
his seemingly functional world and from exposing its terrifying reality. Some of these 
elements, such as the reptile birds and the red lobsters, are easily dismissed and initially 
overlooked by readers because Christopher does not struggle to rationalize them, nor does he 
fixate on them as obvious threats that have to be directly dealt with to mask the hallucinatory 
nature of his rock (57, 111).113 In fact, he finds it sufficient to simply assert the illusion of 
normality by directing his attention to the chores that he has already assigned to himself for 
the same particular purpose: from ‘keeping [his] body going’ by providing it with the much 
needed food and sleep, to building the unnatural seaweed pattern and stone figure that he 
believes are going to help alert planes and ships to the possibility of a survivor being on the 
rock (81). 
      This measure initially proves functional to a certain extent because Christopher is in 
desperate need of engaging in tasks that can promote the false hope of rescue, in addition to 
helping him maintain a sense of a meaningful existence against the overwhelming terror of 
annihilation. However, as his hallucinations continue to spiral out of control, threatening with 
every inexplicable intrusion to bring an end to the god pretence he is hoping to maintain for 
an eternity, he finds himself forced into a frantic search for rationalizations that will not 
jeopardize the integrity of his creation or risk the disintegration of his identity. This explains 
why he struggles to keep on reaffirming the normality of his world by denying that there is 
anything strange in what he perceives, and by asserting that it is all part of ‘the ordinary 
experience of living’ (82). When this tactic fails, he resorts to seeking the more desperate 
                                                          
112 Crusoe may have been a colonial hero. It seems, however, that he has more in common with Christopher than 
the simple determination to survive. Both Christopher and Crusoe, for one thing, share an immoral past that 
leads to their creators’ forcing them into conditions of isolation and suffering. Both also appear to be despicable 
characters in the same way. According to Gurnow, Crusoe is ‘an unapologetic racist, imperialist, fickle theist, 
and megalomaniac par excellence.’ His megalomania is, for the most part, a translation of an Anglo-Saxon 
heritage that deems itself superior to other races and constructs its morality accordingly.    
113 That does not mean, however, that Christopher does not find them threatening at all because they seem to fill 
him with a deep sense of repulsion and fear every time he fails to direct his attention away from them. After all, 
the gulls are seen as ‘flying reptiles’ because he is thinking of them in terms of evolution (56-7). The lobsters 
that are ironically ‘different in colour’ also betray the artificiality of his world because the only lobsters he has 
seen are those that were already boiled and sold on the fishmongers’ stands (Pincher 111; Golding in 
Newington). 
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narratives of sickness as a means by which he can account for all the irrational aspects of his 
experience that can no longer be overlooked or ignored. After all, rationalizing his experience 
as having been caused by an illness still holds the promise of locating his anxiety-arousing 
problem ‘in a place where it can be purged,’ even if it holds the risk of undermining his 
positive self-image by ‘mingl[ing] the heroic, the pathetic, and the comic grotesque’ (Pincher 
82; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 145). However, as much of a possible risk as such a 
rationalization may hold, it remains a far less harmless measure than a narrative of madness. 
It does not, after all, pose the threat of undermining Christopher’s intelligence which is 
basically the only possession holding the promise of restoring the illusion of normality as 
much as it threatens to take it away. Christopher is aware, of course, of the grave risk that 
madness holds. He even states that he does not want to go mad, but feels that ‘he will have to 
… because the sea is a terror—the worst terror there is, the worst imaginable’ (Pincher 187). 
Still, as every other rationalization fails him, Christopher eventually finds himself compelled 
to abandon his sanity and succumb to whatever comfort that a narrative of madness can offer. 
Madness, after all, can easily ‘account for everything, lobsters, maggots, hardness, brilliant 
reality, the laws of nature, film-trailers, snapshots of sight and sound, flying lizards, [and] 
enmity’ (190). Its greatest danger is that it robs Christopher of whatever illusion of control he 
has left and turns him into a helpless spectator who can only watch in terror as his creation 
falls apart.    
     What these series of rationalizations mainly show, given that they all share the common 
purpose of denying the fictional nature of the rock experience, is that whatever beliefs or 
interpretations Christopher has chosen to impose on his hallucinations at the moment of his 
drowning are mostly directed by the anxiety of negation and by the deep-seated terror of 
death and annihilation. Such concerns can also be said to be at work in the readers’ minds, 
affecting their response to Christopher’s rationalizations and goading them, the same way 
they goaded Christopher, into overlooking, or maybe even attributing, the irrational aspects 
of Christopher’s delusions to his seemingly unfortunate descent into madness. This should 
explain, as Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor have observed, why it may at first not seem 
important to us what kind of person Christopher is as we are stranded on the rock with him to 
share his terrors and anxieties (130). Still, it is important to note that though Christopher’s 
fear of death remains the most crucial factor affecting the content of his hallucinations, there 
are other elements in his rock experience that can only be accounted for if we construct his 
past identity from his recollections. It is important to demonstrate, in other words, how his 
beliefs, memories and past experiences have resulted in the cognitive biases shaping 
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Christopher’s hallucinations and directing his interpretation of them as supposedly 
comforting narratives of survival. 
      The process of creating the rock should provide the clearest example showcasing the 
effects of Christopher’s cognitive biases. After all, it has been explicitly stated that 
Christopher’s fabrication of it has been mainly influenced by the memory of an old rotten 
tooth whose recall Christopher is desperately trying to block. One can also consider 
Christopher’s belief in a rational worldview, rather than a mystical or a religious one, to be a 
major factor dictating the construction of almost every element on his rock and providing the 
illusion of a seemingly functional creation that is in accordance with the common laws of 
nature. In fact, Christopher’s obsessive desire to comply with what is considered to be logical 
or rational may well be one reason why he ends up stranding himself on a barren rock in the 
middle of the ocean, rather than granting himself the far more comforting but complicated 
illusion of a ship. Another reason is that he is unable to summon the mental resources that 
might explain its unreasonable shape or movement in a manner that would make the 
hallucination believable: 
But what ship was ever so lop-sided? A carrier? A derelict carrier, deserted and 
waiting to sink? But she would have been knocked down by a salvo of torpedoes. A 
derelict liner? Then she must be one of the Queens by her bulk—and why lop-sided? 
The sun and the mist were balanced against each other. The sun could illumine the 
mist but not pierce it. And darkly in the sun-mist loomed the shape of a not-ship 
where nothing but a ship could be (Pincher 20).  
It also seems that, despite the ingenuity that makes it possible for Pincher Martin to turn his 
hallucinations into a delusion that could grant him the most needed hope of rescue, he cannot 
allow himself the experience of the paradisal island common in most of the castaways’ 
adventures. Doing so, after all, would require violating what he already knows about the 
‘single point of rock’ located ‘many miles away from the Hebrides’(30-1), the only place that 
should logically exist in that particular location in the Atlantic, and the only place that will 
rationally serve as a stage for his heroic delusions as he awaits rescue (31).114  
     This leaves Christopher with the task of reconstructing and maintaining an identity 
capable of withstanding the barren and harsh conditions of a fictional world in a 
                                                          
114 In fact, the rock that Christopher creates is supposed to be the famous Rockall as Golding had 
indicated in his interview with Biles (73). It has also been implied in the novel through the mention of 
the expression ‘near miss’ to signify the name that Christopher was never able to recall and which 
basically sounds like a common obscenity (Pincher 31; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 135). 
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narcissistically heroic manner so as to counter the impending reality of death and keep it from 
intruding on his delusion. The problem, however, is that what we call a self or identity is 
basically a form of deception, a powerful illusion whose construction and maintenance is 
dependent on a set of cognitive processes closely associated with autobiographical memory, 
and largely reliant on the presence of a social mirror that helps define the self and 
acknowledge its existence in any given world (Wilson and Ross; Hood 184-5). Christopher, 
of course, is denied the crucial presence of the social context which once provided him with 
‘assurance of [his] solidity in the bodies of other people,’ especially those whom he had used 
and exploited (132). This means that both Christopher and his creation lack one of the crucial 
elements that could establish the validity of the rock or reinforce the aspects of identity that 
he desperately wishes to maintain against the threat of negation. As a result, he has no other 
alternative but to rely solely on his memory resources for these particular purposes, and to 
seek out the recollections that might aid in reinforcing the predatory side of his nature so as to 
maintain hope in his capacity to overcome whatever obstacle may stand in the way of 
survival. This should further explain Christopher’s fixation on his immoral past as being less 
of a sign of a guilty conscience, and more of an outcome of his need to assert his existence as 
a successful maggot in an unkind world created out of his obsession with devouring people. 
After all, the process of recalling autobiographical memories for the purposes of identity 
construction and maintenance is believed to be largely governed by present goals and 
‘desired self-views’ (Wilson and Ross). This may grant further credence to the reason why 
Christopher is repeatedly seen as biased towards recalling his past crimes, and why he is 
sometimes shown as urging himself to reminisce about those particular incidents as his 
delusion threatens to collapse. Such a tendency can most clearly be seen in that one episode 
where Christopher grows aware of his incapacity to sleep and starts worrying about losing his 
sanity to insomnia: 
He lay still and considered sleep. But it was a tantalizingly evasive subject. 
Think about women then or eating. Think about eating women, eating men, 
crunching up Alfred, that other girl, that boy, that crude and unsatisfactory 
experiment, lie restful as a log and consider the gnawed tunnel of life right up to this 
uneasy intermission. 
     This rock. (Pincher 90).   
It is possible to argue, of course, that Christopher’s intention of contemplating his own life 
tunnel may well be taken as a sign of a dying man’s effort to understand the kind of choices 
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and circumstances that led to his becoming the despicable person for whom the manipulation 
and exploitation of others are proof of existence. However, such a conclusion is not likely to 
be the case for Pincher, especially since it has been emphasized that no matter what the 
circumstance, Christopher would have ended up making the same immoral choices 
responsible for distorting his near death hallucinations into a torturing delusion, and for 
turning his life into a hellish tale of excruciating endurance up to the moment of his 
annihilation (Pincher 197). Pincher Martin, after all, is a novel that is more concerned with 
addressing the questions of being and its ‘implications’ rather than those associated with 
‘cause and effect’ or becoming (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 158). This might explain why 
most of the memories and recollections that Christopher appears to be fixated on are ‘static’ 
(159), focused on emphasizing the innateness and unchangeability of Christopher’s 
monstrosity, and on highlighting the permanence of a state of predatory being rather than that 
of becoming (157).115 This is crucial because establishing a sense of permanence to a fiendish 
existence is basically what is fuelling Christopher’s monstrous drive for survival: 
‘Christopher Hadley Martin. Martin. Chris. I am what I always was!’ 
     All at once it seemed to him that he came out of his curious isolation inside the 
globe of his head and was extended normally through his limbs. He lived again on 
the surface of his eyes, he was out in the air. … The solid rock was coherent as an 
object, with layered guano, with fresh water and shell-fish. … 
     ‘I don’t claim to be a hero. But I’ve got health and education and intelligence. I’ll 
beat you.’ 
     The sea said nothing. He grinned a little foolishly at himself. 
     ‘What I meant was to affirm my determination to survive.’ (Pincher 76-7).  
It is highly ironic, though, that as advantageous as such a state of predatory being has proven 
to be for Christopher Martin, it has been shown as the one thing turning his delusion into a 
hellish nightmare, and robbing it of whatever sense of momentary comfort it was initially 
able to provide. As stated earlier, the content of delusions and hallucinations can be clearly 
influenced by a person’s consciously and unconsciously held beliefs and convictions (See 
Kent and Wahass; Morrison). Since Christopher is the kind of person who has always lived 
                                                          
115 The extreme Christopher represents, much like that of Nazism, is one of potentiality, so even though 
Christopher does not appear to be an Everyman, he is shown to be a ‘permanent’ possibility for what Everyman 
may end up like; permanent because unlike the Children in Lord of the Flies and Tuami in The Inheritors, 
Christopher’s descent into an extreme and his marked lack of empathy do not appear to be caused by a 
momentary lapse of judgement that he is capable of expressing guilt, shame or remorse over. 
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his life as a maggot, preying on others and obsessing over not wanting to be devoured, it 
makes sense to see some of the elements in his delusion as corresponding with those 
particular aspects of his nature. The rock, for example, is created out of the memory of a 
tooth, an element that denotes the function of eating and that signifies Christopher’s 
determination to overcome death and annihilation at all costs. The problem with resorting to 
such a source for inspiration, however, is that it reduces whatever sense of comfort 
Christopher can get out of it because it holds the potential for devouring him as much as it 
promises safety. This would make the anxiety of not wanting to be eaten and defeated by his 
own creation another major reason why Christopher is constantly seen as trying to mask the 
source of his inspiration, evident in both his dread and repulsion by the supposedly harmless 
thought of naming a group of rocks in his created world ‘the Teeth’ (Pincher 90-1).116  
     It has already been established that there are no antagonistic forces in Pincher Martin’s 
world that can be classified as a serious threat jeopardizing his momentary sense of safety or 
exposing the reality of his delusion aside from those of his past self, beliefs and crimes. This 
does not mean, however, that Christopher’s paranoid mind is incapable of conjuring an 
antagonistic presence that it can then associate with the memory of the black lightning in 
order to create a hateful God with an incessant striving to devour Christopher whole and put 
an end to his existence. In fact, it is possible to see Christopher’s antagonism towards God 
and his creation of him in his own image as being greatly reminiscent of his ancestor’s 
behaviour in The Inheritors; both are largely dictated by the human tendency to project its 
nature on others and to read its own darkness and intentions in the behaviour and actions of 
those around. As a result, Christopher cannot help but slip into a racking state of 
hypervigilance, the same way his ancestors did following their encounter with the forest 
demons, and risk the normality of his creation by denying himself the crucial illusion of 
sleep. Sleep, after all, entails ‘a consenting to die, to go into complete unconsciousness, the 
personality defeated’ (91). Ironically, however, Christopher’s state of hypervigilance 
eventually proves to be as destructive as the dreadful illusion of sleep, if not more so, because 
it forces him into a sharper state of awareness that makes it difficult to keep on ignoring all 
the discrepancies in his creation without feeling the need to account for them in one way or 
another. Rationalizations do work to a certain extent; still, they cannot remain effective 
                                                          
116 Such a conclusion is in accordance with Golding’s view that people’s experience of purgatory is one that is 
shaped by their beliefs and nature prior to death: ‘My point is really this you see … If you’re not a Christian and 
die, then if the universe is as the Christian sees it, you will still go either to heaven or hell or purgatory. But your 
purgatory, or your heaven or your hell won’t have the Christian attributes … they’ll be the things you make 
yourself, and that’s all there is to it’ (qtd. in Baker, Study 39).  
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because the anxieties responsible for Christopher’s hypervigilance are closely associated with 
a destructive force that has always been a part of mankind’s dark nature, and that Christopher 
is never able to master, govern or overcome. 
     Such a desire to distort is again undertaken in Free Fall where Golding explores the 
ramifications of forcing a falsifying pattern on the world through a protagonist who has more 
in common with Christopher than meets the eye. In fact, the novel engages with most of the 
concerns expressed in Pincher Martin, including those of identity construction, reality 
distortion, freedom of choice and the sinful exploitation of the innocent. The only difference 
is that instead of tackling such matters as static aspects of one’s state of being, Golding 
actually engages with the much more complex questions of becoming through a less fabular 
construct that marks an abandonment of the limiting and carefully constructed conditions of 
his previous novels.        
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Free Fall and the Perils of Freedom and Identity 
 
As soon as you look at the world through an ideology you are finished. 
No reality fits an ideology. Life is beyond that. That is why people are 
always searching for a meaning to life. But life has no meaning; it cannot 
have meaning because meaning is a formula; meaning is something that 
makes sense to the mind. Every time you make sense out of reality, you 
bump into something that destroys the sense you made. Meaning is only 
found when you go beyond meaning. Life only makes sense when you 
perceive it as mystery and it makes no sense to the conceptualizing mind. 
Anthony De Mell, Awareness, the Perils and Opportunities of Reality.117 
 
 
In an interview with Owen Webster in 1958 before Free Fall (1959) was published, Golding 
stated that one of the crucial tasks of the writer is to ‘get people to understand their own 
humanity’ by demonstrating their state of self-deception and their misapprehension of the 
human condition (in Webster 5; Biles, Talk 39). However, for such an endeavour to be 
pursued properly, this assumes that the writer is capable of seeing things for what they truly 
are or of interrogating and challenging the normative, rather than accepting things the way 
they are presented (in Webster 5). Such a demand can be considered particularly difficult, 
given how it necessitates ‘[scraping] the labels off things,’ and not ‘[taking] anything for 
granted’ (5). It dictates that the writer holds at a distance powerful political, religious or 
rational belief systems like Marxism, orthodox Christianity, or even progressive evolution as 
still in many ways controversial science. It also requires that the author recognizes how each 
system may induce the projection onto the world of holistic and rigid patterns that distort 
reality and deny those aspects of human existence that cannot be accommodated or explained 
(in Webster 5; Biles, Talk 103). Moreover, Golding may have emphasized ‘intransigence in 
the face of accepted belief’ as one of the crucial conditions that a writer must strive to obtain 
because the ‘furtive optimism’ inherent in some of these systems like Marxism and Wellsian 
                                                          
117 p. 148.  
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evolution may detract attention from the real roots of humanity’s ailments. They may 
promote hope in social and biological perfectibility while ignoring that problems such as war, 
aggression and violence are not the kind of problems that can merely be externalized or 
traced to a faulty social system (in Biles, Talk 50; in Webster 5-6; Carey, Golding 220). Our 
reality, Golding suggests, is that of a cosmic chaos that we are tempted to deny by having it 
simplistically reduced or explained away by our belief systems. Still, if there is one thing that 
modern man must learn, it is ‘to live fearlessly with the natural chaos of existence, without 
forcing artificial patterns on it’ (Golding in Webster 5). This key notion had always been an 
integral part of Golding’s past engagements with human nature; but since it was never fully 
grasped by critics of his generation,118 Golding might have thought it necessary to dedicate 
his next project, Free Fall, to tackling this aspect of human existence with a greater depth and 
intensity, and to illustrating the sheer ‘patternlessness of life before we impose patterns on it’ 
(5).  
      The novel was initially intended by Golding to stand ‘as a bit of imagery for a whole 
baffled generation, meant to convey planlessness, chaos and impotence’ before it turned into 
what may be considered as the most comprehensive endeavour at depicting the complex 
reality of human experience (qtd. in Carey, Golding 220). In searching and narrating episodes 
of his past, Sammy Mountjoy hopes to find an answer to the one question that the dark world 
of Pincher Martin was never able to provide; how he had come to lock himself in a 
permanent and arrested state of being, tied inextricably to sin, guilt and responsibility. The 
conclusion he arrives at is not so different in essence from what Golding’s past characters 
have discovered. However, what marks Free Fall’s protagonist as distinct, and as possibly 
even more aware compared to his predecessors, is that his apprehension of the human 
condition is more the result of a willed conscious search for the truth and less of an outcome 
of a forced or unintended confrontation with it. Like Golding, Sammy the artist holds a firm 
belief in the limitations of human understanding and the insufficiency of their belief systems. 
Consequently, he expresses an outward rejection of them as he attempts to undertake the task 
of searching his past for the purpose of seeing his existence for what it truly is and for 
understanding why his life turned out the way it did. In the opening chapter of the novel, 
Sammy clearly conveys how he had come to find that none of the systems he subscribed to at 
one point of his life were useful, true to reality or sufficient:   
                                                          
118 See Baker, Study 47; Clements 81; Gregor and Kinkead-Weekes 116.  
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I have hung all systems on the wall like a row of useless hats. They do not fit. They 
come in from outside, they are suggested patterns, some dull and some of great 
beauty. But I have lived enough of my life to require a pattern that fits over 
everything I know; and where shall I find that? Then why do I write this down? Is it 
a pattern I’m looking for? That Marxist hat in the middle of the row, did I ever think 
it would last me a lifetime? What is wrong with the Christian biretta that I hardly 
wore at all? Nick’s rationalist hat kept the rain out, seemed impregnable plate-
armour, dull and decent. It looks small now and rather silly, a bowler like all 
bowlers, very formal, very complete, very ignorant (Fall 2-3).  
Sammy’s admission of the insufficiency of forcing distorting patterns on reality while still 
maintaining that it is only human to want to seek a comprehensive pattern that could bring his 
whole experience into unity may show the problem in a rather bleak or pessimistic light. It 
carries the implication that people are condemned to search, to ‘crawl towards the light’ 
despite their knowledge that ‘[they] may never get there’ (Golding in Biles, Talk 102). But it 
is important to note that despite such an acknowledgement of the depth and complexity of the 
problem, Sammy the amateur novelist genuinely believes that it is possible to find a pattern if 
he attempts to re-engage with episodes of his past, just as Golding had expressed that a 
solution is possible if one attempts to develop an awareness of the depth of the problem (in 
Biles, Talk 104). Such implicit indications of hope, despite Sammy’s failure to find a 
connection between the contradictory aspects of his experience, may not be easily detectable 
at first. They might, however, become so once an association is made with what may be 
considered to be Golding’s clearest effort at depicting a hopeful perspective of humanity’s 
moral condition following the fall. To come out of the monstrous world of Pincher Martin 
into Free Fall, is to come to discover a brighter side of human nature, represented this time in 
a protagonist who though initially succumbing to his dark sinful side, expresses an honest 
desire to be forgiven and absolved. 
      Free Fall is in essence, to use Golding’s words, ‘a confession’ (qtd. in Carey, Golding 
226), an attempt on the narrator’s part to go over his past mistakes in the hopes of 
understanding why he has become the sinful monster he perceives himself to be. There is, 
nonetheless, more to Golding’s use of the word than a simplified statement of what the book 
is basically about. Free Fall is a work of a highly autobiographical nature, evident in certain 
episodes of the novel that were inspired by events and people considered to have played a 
crucial role in Golding’s life. For one thing, there is the character of the rational atheist, Nick 
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Shales, whose kindness is partially responsible for young Sammy’s rejection of the spiritual 
realm the same way Golding’s kind father was responsible for his son’s atheism despite his 
struggling against it as a child (227). There is also the cruel religious teacher Rowena Pringle 
who, in many ways, is reminiscent of Golding’s most disliked teacher, Miss Pierce, described 
by Carey as ‘a puritanical spinster’ who, much like Golding’s own father, was certainly prone 
to over regarding sexual propriety and the detection of potential sexual indecency (32, 227). 
Another crucial episode of Golding’s life that found its way into Free Fall is his encounter 
and falling in love with Mollie Evans, represented in the novel as the virtuous, pure and 
innocent Beatrice Ifor who ends up in a mental asylum following Sammy’s abuse and 
abandonment (76-7, 227). Like Beatrice, Mollie, who was engaged to Golding at one point, 
was found to be ‘pretty,’ ‘unthinking’ and ‘frigid,’ and was soon abandoned when Golding 
met Ann in one of the Marxist meetings he attended before the war (77, 227).119 This may 
mark both Sammy Mountjoy and William Golding as one and the same in many ways, 
especially since Golding had clearly expressed that he used his own life as a source for 
structuring most of the events in the novel. It is important to note, however, that although this 
had clearly been the situation, there are certain aspects of Golding’s life that were ‘stood on 
their head’ as is usually the case for most of the sources Golding utilized in the creation of 
some of his novels (Golding in Biles, Talk 80). Sammy, for example, unlike Golding, was not 
brought up by a kind schoolmaster, but is shown instead as an illegitimate child raised by a 
single mother in the dirty slums of Rotten Row before he is later adopted by the guilty 
paedophile, Father Watts-Watt. In an interview with Jack Biles, Golding stated that: 
Free Fall was an invention from beginning to end, a deliberate invention. All the 
terms of my life were turned upside down … I said to myself, ‘you were in the navy; 
well this man has to be in the army. You are a writer; you’ll have to make this man a 
painter.’ And so, all the way around, the whole thing was an invention in much the 
same way that Envoy Extraordinary was an invention. Even so far as the question of 
‘What was there that happened to people during the war?’ which brought the whole 
question of freedom of action up in the most poignant way (79-80).      
     Free Fall, of course, is not the only novel that exhibits Golding’s tendency to incorporate 
some autobiographical elements into his creations, nor is Sammy Mountjoy the only 
                                                          
119 It is interesting that Golding would remember Mollie as such because Alec, Golding’s father, does not recall 
her in the same way. To Alec, Mollie is a ‘bright girl’ who was ‘good at languages’ (Carey, Golding 77). This 
may in a way highlight how Sammy later comes to remember Beatrice and how he considers himself a fool for 
not perceiving her existence as more than empty.  
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character who shares Golding’s life experiences and self-castigation over what he perceived 
to be his sins and crimes. There is also Christopher Martin whose despicable nature is in 
many ways a translation of Golding’s extreme sense of guilt and what he perceived to be his 
‘greed, lust, egotism, cruelty and ambition’ (Carey, Golding 193).120 However, it would 
certainly be wrong to consider Christopher, or even Sammy, as faithful depictions of their 
creator, even if both characters seemed like ‘a self-defaming self-portrait’ (193), because both 
are meant in the end to be Everyman figures, with Sammy representing the hope of 
repentance, and with Christopher symbolizing the possibility of a state of permanent 
malignance. Their affinity with Golding, in other words, which is partially responsible for 
establishing some commonalities between the two, especially when it comes to their 
obsession and abuse of an innocent being, should be targeted as more of an expression of 
their own humanity than a possible attempt on the author’s part to draw a self-portrait.   
     Though it had been noted as distinctive because of its unique form and structure, Free Fall 
is often seen as closely connected in terms of content to its predecessor, and in many ways 
represents an expansion of certain notions that have already been specifically highlighted 
within the dark world of Christopher Martin. If Pincher Martin depicts Golding’s concern 
with the theological aspect of free will and the exercise of choice following death, Free Fall 
can be considered to be more of an ambitious exploration of the complex existential, 
theological and philosophical realities of guilt, responsibility and the limitations of man’s 
freedom through yet another fallen character, haunted by the darkness of his sinful nature and 
the crimes of his past. Like Christopher Martin, Sammy Mountjoy, the narrator of Free Fall, 
and the protagonist through whom we perceive most of the events of the novel, is a tortured 
soul who finds himself at some point of his life forced to relive images of his static past, 
revealing the sinful depths to which he had sunk as he has continued, time and time again, to 
make the same choices that have driven him further away from the moral and the spiritual 
realm. However, although both characters are shown through their own recollections to have 
not been particularly different in terms of their lack of morality or the inability to take 
                                                          
120 Pincher seems to have been drawn to be Golding in more than one way. John Carey shows that Pincher was 
driven to acting, much like Golding. His childhood nightmares were also translated into Pincher’s old woman. 
Golding’s own acquaintances, crushes, friends, were mostly transformed into characters in the novel, and his 
feelings towards each and every one of them were monstrously portrayed. Mary, for example, who is one of the 
many people exploited by Christopher, is reminiscent of the real life Mollie Evans towards whom Golding felt a 
strange attraction (Carey, Golding 193). Similarly, Nat is none other than Golding’s friend Adam Bittleston 
whom Golding believed to have exploited when he sold one of his books to buy a ticket for Hamlet. 
Christopher’s attempt to kill Nat, according to Carey, ‘depicted not what [Golding] had done, but what he 
believed he had the capacity to do’ (194). He even seemed to believe, as Carey had concluded based on 
Golding’s exchange with Stephen Medcalf, that ‘all wickedness could be found in his heart’ (194).  
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responsibility for their cruelty, their motivations for putting themselves in a state of fixation 
on their reprehensible past help establish one as a more sympathetic character than the other. 
For Christopher Martin, who has become a pincher by rejecting the Christ within him 
(Golding in Carey, Golding 226), memory searching is by no means a sign of a guilty 
conscience, but is rather a desperate measure to try to gain definition as he engages in a 
solitary struggle against the obliterating mercy of death and the threat of negation. When it 
comes to Sammy, however, the process starts taking on a greater moral significance given 
that it stems from a dormant sense of guilt that cultivates the desire to understand how he lost 
his innocence in the first place and allowed himself the conversion to the experiential world 
of sin, moral anguish and responsibility. This makes Sammy ‘a subtilized Pincher’ (Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor 165), who manages to spare himself the excruciating agony of the 
irredeemable Christopher Martin by embracing the traumatic revelation of the darkness of his 
sinful nature and admitting an honest desire for confession, redemption and forgiveness as his 
narrative progresses to a close. By seeking to find the one defining moment that has marked 
his conversion into what seems like a permanent state of sinfulness, Sammy’s narrative not 
only engages in the crucial existential questions of being previously raised in Pincher Martin, 
but also takes on the much more challenging notions of becoming in a deterministic universe, 
governed by the laws of nature as much as it is governed by a divine higher power whose 
presence defies the grasp of reason and rationality.121 
     Though Golding considered Free Fall an important novel possibly because it targets one 
of the basic problems of the twentieth century intellectual, that is being in a state of free fall 
(in Biles, Talk 80-1), the critics at the time did not appear to share Golding’s opinion, very 
much evident in its negative reviews, some of the worst that Golding ever received (Carey, 
Golding 233). Some of these reviews showed complete dissatisfaction with the book, 
describing it as ‘dull, and dull in the most disturbing way,’ and pronouncing it as ‘a failure in 
almost every direction’ (See Toynbee). Other reviews, as noted by Babb, tended to represent 
the work as an unsuccessful fable, an incessant or ceaseless ‘comment … on the myth’ rather 
than a dedicated attempt to dramatize it or have ‘a convincing reenactment’ of it (Kermode, 
‘Novels’ 118-9; Babb 98). There were, of course, positive critical responses that considered 
Free Fall as Golding’s ‘most interesting novel’ (Perrott), a ‘fiercely distinguished book’ 
(Kermode in Carey, Golding 233), and a ‘brilliant and obscure’ creation (Baker, Study 55). 
                                                          
121 It was Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor who noted Pincher Martin as a novel about being and Free Fall as a 
book about becoming (165).  
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However, their somewhat positive acknowledgement did not exclude an admission of the 
novel’s weaknesses since even these positive reviews tended to view Free Fall as ‘a triumph 
in one respect,’ but ‘a failure’ in another (Baker, Study 55; Babb 116-7). This can most 
clearly be seen in the fact that in most of the critical reviews, the doubts surrounding the 
incisiveness of the prison scene were also congruent with so much praise for the delicacy and 
brilliance that went into the writing of the seduction episode, considered by Toynbee to be the 
novel’s ‘only redeeming feature’ (Toynbee; See Beddoe in Carey, Golding 233-4). There had 
also been some concerns raised in relation to Golding’s abandonment of the overt artifice of 
the fable and his apparent shift to the conventions and familiar realm of the social novel, 
glimpsed only in the torturing flashbacks of Christopher Martin. The complaint is interesting 
given that, according to Biles, Golding had already perhaps decided to comply with the 
repeated requests from certain critics to place the novel in more recognizable conditions (Talk 
78). It seems, however, that it is the bold choices that followed the switch to the social novel, 
changes which Carey notes as having emerged after much deliberation and repeated attempts 
at rewriting and revising the work for final publication, that did not sit well with critics at the 
time (Carey, Golding 229). 
     One of the first things that readers are bound to notice as different about Free Fall is that 
it is the first novel where Golding utilizes the first person perspective, thereby forgoing the 
advantageous aspects of third person narration, so often associated with the dramatic shift in 
perspective crucial to the communication of Golding’s basic thematic concerns. The change 
may have come about in order to allow Golding the freedom to search Sammy’s past while 
highlighting at the same time the confessional aspect of the work and the difficulty of 
communication that is inherent in humanity’s entrapment within the self. Despite these 
advantages, however, the choice did not come without costs. For Babb, the change may have 
fostered a limitation closely connected to what he perceives as flaws in characterization most 
obviously apparent in the way Beatrice is constructed and portrayed (118). Because she is 
mostly represented to readers the way Sammy perceives her, that is as an empty dull being, 
she does not arouse readerly sympathy as much as she should, even when readers are made 
aware that their blindness to her true being is basically Sammy’s, and that Beatrice is more 
than what Sammy claims her to be (118). Josipovici also offers a supporting opinion, stating 
that Golding’s decision led him to be ‘trapped in the fluid consciousness’ of his protagonist 
without allowing himself some external means of representing his argument or of reinforcing 
man’s imprisonment within ‘the toils of his own subjectivity’ (‘Source’ 247). This becomes 
particularly clear when compared to the dual perspective of his previous more fabular novels 
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which, according to Josipovici, was more effective in communicating the sense, for example, 
of ‘the new men and Pincher Martin both from within and from without’ (247). Free Fall’s 
narrative mode, however, lacks this kind of flexibility, and might be seen, therefore, as 
disallowing or failing to arouse sufficient empathy for Sammy’s victim, or even of expressing 
his own egocentricity and solipsism with the same efficacy and intensity demonstrated in the 
past more fabular works (Babb 118; Josipovici, ‘Source’ 247). It should be noted, however, 
that while the mode of third person narration, or rather the dramatic shift in perspective, 
allowed for more clarity and efficacy in delivering Golding’s thematic concerns, Free Fall’s 
chaotic, obscure and selective narrative mode remains crucial in that it reinforces Golding’s 
growing belief in the incommunicable mystery of existence and the difficulty of ever 
knowing the truth. The device is also important in that it reinforces Sammy’s narrative as a 
traumatic one, emerging out of both the trauma of the age and Sammy’s own, especially 
considering how characteristic elements of indescribability and obscurity are of traumatic 
narratives, in general, and the Holocaust accounts of the age, in particular (See Brockmeier). 
The representation of Beatrice might also be considered as strategic in that it reinforces 
Sammy’s perception of her as a subhuman, and then establishes the readers’ affinity with the 
sinfulness of Sammy by allowing them no other perspective of seeing her for what she truly 
is except his. In fact, the technique might be perceived as all the more crucial once readers 
come to understand Sammy’s abuse of Beatrice in light of Nazism and the crimes of 
eugenics. If empathy is withheld because of Sammy’s perception, then Golding can be said to 
have succeeded in allying readers with the malignancy of Nazism, and in consequence 
reinforcing his point that the problem of evil is not specific to one race, nation or individual.   
     Another recurring complaint about the book had to do with the disruption in the 
chronology of the events despite the fact that this was by now a commonly reiterated 
modernist technique (Carey, Golding 231). It was actually claimed, according to Carey, to 
have contributed to the difficulty of the novel without serving any particular purpose (234). 
The flashbacks Sammy engages in are basically an interruption in the present time sequence 
in which Sammy narrates his tale and are not so different, considering their static nature, 
from the recollections of Christopher Martin. The difficulty lies, however, in the fact that 
these flashbacks are not revealed to the reader in a clear chronological order as is the case 
with Pincher Martin, but are rather presented in a confusing scheme where Sammy goes back 
and forth in time, fully engaging in one episode before he abandons it in search of another. It 
is possible to detect a clear purpose to the arrangement of the first couple of episodes in the 
novel, given how they are directed to painting a clear image of ‘the little boy, clear as spring 
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water,’ before they reveal the guilt and burden of the ‘stagnant pool’ Sammy believes that his 
adult self to have become (Fall 6). As the narrative progresses, however, the organizational 
scheme starts assuming a less ordered and more chaotic feel that makes it difficult to 
understand the significance of certain episodes or even pinpoint a clear purpose to the 
interruption or placement of certain other flashbacks. It might be interesting to note that such 
disruptions were not originally part of Golding’s plan, considering that the earlier version of 
the novel had more in common with the imposed chronological order employed in Pincher 
Martin than with the published version of Free Fall (Carey, Golding 229). Still, to state that 
the disruptions were not intended to aid in communicating Golding’s basic premise would be 
an overstatement. For one thing, divergence from a clear chronological order is noted as a 
common feature in traumatic narratives, aimed at communicating the inadequacy of the 
traditional and conventional modes of storytelling in capturing the depth and intensity of the 
trauma (See Brockmeier 25), or in Golding’s and Sammy’s case, the war experience. 
Consequently, it might be possible to note the device as having aided in mirroring Sammy’s 
perception of chaos and loss of order following the traumatic revelation at the Nazi camp, and 
the disintegration of the distorting pattern that used to invest his world with an illusion of 
structure and normality. There is also a sense of realism to the reliance on temporal 
disruptions, inherent in the understanding of time as ‘two modes. The one is an effortless 
perception native to us as water to the mackerel. The other is a memory, a sense of shuffle 
fold and coil, of that of the day nearer than that because more important’ (Fall 2). Sammy, in 
other words, is different from the damned Pincher in that he is an active explorer, licensed for 
the seemingly erratic, disorganized or chaotic searching of his past in the hopes of 
establishing some link between his earlier state of innocence, his past crimes and his present 
condition. As a result, it logically follows that certain moments, along with the truths they 
hold, can only be revealed after certain other episodes are recalled, a process that is 
particularly evident in Sammy’s capacity to locate the moment when he has lost his 
innocence only after he has recalled the revelation of the fall in the prison camps (Gregor and 
Kinkead-Weekes 121). 
     It should be noted, however, that there might be more to Golding’s formal choices than 
simply that of highlighting the particular aspects of the novel previously explored. In their 
defence of the novel, Gregor and Kinkead-Weekes suggest that one of the main reasons why 
Free Fall was negatively received is that it was wrongly assumed to be an attempt at writing 
a social novel (117), a realistic piece of ‘modern’ fiction (Halio 117), or rather ‘a philosophic 
and symbolic fiction, but still a fiction’ nonetheless (Biles, Talk 78). Still, the fact that 
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Golding decided to abandon the artificial conditions of the fable in favour of the more 
realistic circumstances of the social novel does not mean that Free Fall is more concerned 
with tracing the life of one particular individual rather than using that individual and his life 
experiences as a commentary on the universal condition of man (Gregor and Kinkead-
Weekes 117-8). Each of Golding’s previous novels is, in one way or another, an expression 
of the same dedicated concern with the study of humanity, and Free Fall is not that different 
in that particular regard. Nevertheless, what has contributed to the uniqueness of each 
individual creation is that Golding had conducted his careful examination of human nature by 
concentrating on one particular aspect of human existence for each and every one of his 
projects:   
Lord of the Flies gives a grim endorsement to the child as ‘father of the man’; The 
Inheritors sees man in relation to the life which preceded him, Pincher Martin, in 
relation to the life that awaits him. What has been carefully excluded is the central 
relationship of man in relation to man. It is precisely to this subject that Mr. Golding 
addresses himself in Fee Fall. The autonomy of the book is not compromised by 
saying that the three novels which preceded it have created the meaningful space into 
which it must fit. Inevitably, it takes up and re-orchestrates themes from the earlier 
novels. Lord of the Flies makes its ghost-presence felt in the school-room world; The 
Inheritors in the distinction between ‘the innocence’ of Johnny Spragge and ‘the 
evil’ of Philip Arnold; Pincher Martin in Samuel (the chosen one of God) becoming 
Sammy, using people for his own pleasure, turning the spiritual Beatrice into Miss 
Ifor, another creation of the murderous self (117).     
     Free Fall, in other words, is a ‘logical culmination’ of the past three fables, meant to 
deliver ‘a frontal attack’ on a target defined by its predecessors. As a result, it may have 
seemed sensible for Golding to employ a new plan and a new set of techniques in order to 
tackle certain notions in a more efficient manner (Gregor and Kinkead-Weekes 116; Baker, 
Study 47). One such notion is the chaos of existence and the futility of forcing artificial 
patterns upon it which Golding seems to have intended through Christopher’s rejection of the 
‘chaos of death,’ and his insistence on hanging on to the ‘pattern of civilization’ deliberately 
drawn and imposed on the rock (Golding in Webster 5-6). The fact that this particular notion 
has often been overlooked, or misinterpreted is claimed by Baker to be another reason why 
Free Fall came to possess its unique form and structure, given how it might have been 
Golding’s way of leading the readers through another process of discovery aimed this time at 
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mirroring the chaos of existence and the patternlessness of life (Baker, Study 56). This would 
make the disruption in the chronology of events and the subsequent difficulty of finding a 
connection between Sammy’s scattered images not only a reflection of humanity’s patternless 
existence, but also an expression of the resulting incoherence Sammy struggles to 
communicate, and which exasperates him as much as it exasperates the reader (Baker, Study 
58; Fall 5).122  
     The decision, of course, did not come without challenges. The struggle with the realism of 
expressing this particular aspect of human experience necessitated that the work be a 
reflection of man’s patternless existence while simultaneously maintaining its 
comprehensibility as a fictional construct (Baker, Study 56). As a result, it seems that it 
became necessary for Golding to adopt the first person narrative of a protagonist who 
possesses an awareness of the futility of the patterns he had adopted over his entire life while 
still maintaining his need for some semblance of a pattern that would at least include him, 
‘even if the outer edges tail into ignorance’ (Baker, Study 56; Fall 5-6). This means that both 
the disruptions in the chronology of events and the reliance on the first person perspective 
were instrumental in communicating Golding’s basic premise. If there are any claimed 
shortcomings resulting from Golding’s reliance on such devices, it remains contestable how 
much these shortcomings undermine the fulfillment of Golding’s goal. Given the cognitive 
preferences of human intelligence and its orientation towards the kind of narratives that do 
not necessarily have to conform to the truth, one can develop an understanding to some extent 
of why Free Fall came to receive such a negative reception: 
[W]e commonly gravitate toward narratives that we can understand, that have a 
definite linear structure, that resolve all of the issues they raise, and that make us feel 
better when we are through. This often describes our fictional narratives, but it rarely 
describes the world we live in (Austin 79).  
                                                          
122 The disruption in the chronology of the events could in a way be interpreted as a rejection of a distorting 
pattern, an attempt at communicating, as Baker has noted, that ‘patternlessness is the only pattern’ (Baker, Study 
58). One cannot deny, however, that the whole construct, despite its attempt to mimic reality, is one of 
artificiality. For one thing, the disruptions in the sequence of events seem to serve, at a time, another crucial role 
aside from reinforcing the controlling theme of incoherence and that is of juxtaposing certain elements of 
Sammy’s experience in order to highlight their connection despite their emergence at different points in 
Sammy’s life. This can most clearly be seen in the placement of the flashback depicting Sammy’s fear of the 
dark as a boy and which was made to follow Sammy’s imprisonment in the dark cell at the Nazi camp to 
experience the darkness of mankind’s soul. This function also appears to have been Golding’s intention behind 
adding the final scene of the novel which, according to Carey, ‘juxtaposes Nick, the good atheist, Miss Pringle, 
the bad Christian, and Sammy the redeemed sinner’ (Carey, Golding 231). 
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Golding’s choices, in other words, have not only succeeded to a large extent in mimicking 
something that might be considered to be closer to the actual reality of the human condition, 
‘which is often messy complicated and devoid of closure’ (79), but have also made it 
possible, especially through denying the readers a sense of resolution, to create the emotional 
effect of anxiety crucial to delivering the novel’s basic thematic concerns.  
     In Free Fall, Golding raises several questions regarding reality distortions, ideological 
insufficiency, the moment of the fall, and the possibility of finding a bridge between the 
spiritual and the rational. As readers come to the end of the novel, however, they find that 
there are no sufficient answers provided to any of these questions, an observation that is 
sometimes noted as one of the reasons why the novel was negatively received, and why it 
was sometimes deemed as a failure compared to its predecessors (McCarron, Golding 20; 
Gregor and Kinkead-Weekes 123-4). It should be noted, however, that Free Fall is not as 
inconclusive as it was made to appear. It does, after all, provide some sense of resolution to 
one of Sammy’s dilemmas by hinting at the moment when he made the decision to sacrifice 
everything to possess Beatrice as the one defining moment that marked his sinful state of 
being. This leaves out the solution to Sammy’s struggle of finding a bridge between the 
rational and the spiritual, a problem that is sometimes taken to be Golding’s failure based on 
the belief that successful novels are those that offer a satisfying answer or a semblance of 
resolution to the issues they raise and tackle (McCarron, Golding 20). Still, it is possible to 
say that the lack of a resolution to this particular problem serves a crucial function in arousing 
the kind of anxiety that not only internalizes a deeper awareness of the seriousness of the 
matter, but also awakens an honest desire to find a solution that could adequately bring it to 
an end. This aspect of the novel is not specific to Free Fall, but can be said to be present in 
all of Golding’s past creations, given how none of them actually provides a sense of closure 
in the conventional sense. In Lord of the Flies, the arrival of the naval officer does not fulfil 
the promise of putting an end to the children’s descent to barbarism because the children’s 
war is fought within the context of a bigger and a much more serious war, threatening both to 
nourish and maintain the moral descent that first manifested itself on the island. A similar 
sentiment can be found in The Inheritors which, despite its hinting at the death of the last 
remaining Neanderthal, still leaves the reader questioning the prospects for humanity’s 
evolution and the possibility of moral progress. Pincher Martin is also similar in not 
affording closure because it also does not provide a conclusive answer to whether 
Christopher has accepted the reality of his death, or if he still stubbornly insists on 
maintaining the existence of his purgatorial rock and whatever remained of his identity. To 
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put it simply, it is possible to consider the lack of a resolution in Free Fall to be instrumental 
in not only fostering the anxiety the construct has initially evoked with Sammy’s questions at 
the beginning of the novel, but also arousing the kind of awareness that cannot be dismissed 
or ignored.  
     Finally, it is important to remember that despite the overt pessimism inherent in Sammy’s 
incapacity to find a bridge, Free Fall, in particular, can be considered to be a more optimistic 
account of the human condition than the previous fables. There is, after all, the implicit 
indication of a hope for humanity after the fall which Golding communicates through a 
protagonist with a higher moral sense and a sharper awareness of the reality of existence than 
his predecessors. It is also important to note that though there may not be a clear solution to 
the problem within the confines of the novel, ‘to be aware of [the] situation,’ as Golding once 
indicated, ‘may possibly be, in some ways, a bit of a solution or tending towards a solution’ 
(in Biles, Talk 104). This should reflect Golding’s assertion that even if he had not shown 
himself to be the naive sort of optimist, he is ‘more optimistic about man than people think’ 
(105), and that if there is anything he believes in, it is that ‘the bridge exists’ (Golding, 
‘Nothing’). Sammy and Golding might not have stumbled upon the existence of the bridge, 
but to have created Free Fall to ask this kind of question hopelessly does in a way indicate 
that ‘there is hope’ (Golding in Biles, Talk 101). 
The Noble Savage 
In his interview with Carey, Golding suggested that one of the common patterns or 
misconceptions that people usually create to escape evil or to externalize it in denying its 
innate reality is the myth of the innocent noble savage whose fall and moral corruption is 
more the result of some external factors than a kind of an inherent readiness to abandon a 
virtuous existence and to progress towards a state of malignance (in Carey, ‘Talks’ 174; 
Golding in Biles, Talk 39-40). As a result, Golding came to dedicate his first two novels to 
tackling two common fallacies that he believed to be directly connected to this notion. One is 
more oriented to tracing innocence to an earlier phase of people’s lives. The other is focused 
more on establishing it in archaeological terms through locating it in an ancestral point of 
history never to be regained or acclaimed (in Biles, Talk 40). The method Golding follows for 
the effective deconstruction of these notions is subtle, yet complex. It dictates that these 
misconceptions might be first entertained through drawing a representation of a pure 
existence that is in close adherence to people’s beliefs regarding the notion of innocence 
before it is later brought in sharp contrast with the reality of the fallen nature of man and his 
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innate sinfulness. This can most clearly be seen in The Inheritors where an innocent childlike 
image is first created to communicate a moral ideal, only to be allocated to a different species 
whose existence is ironically eradicated by none other than the ancestors people tended to 
idealize and admire. The same pattern can also be detected in Lord of The Flies where 
common notions of childhood innocence are first employed only to be gradually 
deconstructed with the children’s slow descent into savagery, aggression and violence.  
     One can see how the shock effect that Golding hoped to create by turning these 
misconceptions on their head had been highly effective in both cases, especially in Lord of 
the Flies since it involves a stage of human existence that is more accessible to people and 
that had long been held up as an icon of innocence. When moving to Golding’s fourth novel, 
Free Fall, however, a somewhat different image emerges. While the method given in tracing 
the progression from innocence to sinfulness is still in many ways reminiscent of The 
Inheritors and Lord of the Flies, there remains a noticeable change in the manner by which 
Golding tackles what he once considered to be a comforting myth and a dominant 
misconception about childhood and humanity. Unlike his past creations, there is now a 
positive representation of the child that emerges in stark contrast, not only to the adult who 
reminisces on his lost innocence with a Wordsworthian lament, but also to the vicious 
children in Lord of the Flies whose aggression is evidently intended to highlight humanity’s 
innate capacity for evil. This positive representation might have been something of a gradual 
conversion on Golding’s part seeing that he depicted the Homo Sapiens’ child in The 
Inheritors as someone who does not hold the misgivings and suspicions of the rest of her 
people. In fact, Tanakil is the only member of her tribe who is shown as genuinely capable of 
establishing a connection with another being and of managing to perceive Liku as more than 
a demonic existence to be feared and subdued. There is, of course, this one single instance 
when she shows her aggressive side against Liku for refusing to comply with her wishes. 
Such a depiction, however, is subtly linked to her mother’s aggressive response upon 
discovering that her daughter had been a bit too trusting of the Neanderthal girl, thereby 
suggesting that it is the adults’ influence that induces children to act in an aggressive manner. 
This could bring Golding’s conception of the fall closer to the biblical representation of it as 
something that occurs at a later point in life when a serpentine agent tempts man out of a 
perfect state of innocence into one of sin, violence and aggression. The connection can even 
be made all the more plausible once these corrupting agents are located within the different 
worlds of Golding’s creations in analogy with the biblical account of the fall and the 
temptation of Adam and Eve. However, as plausible as such a conclusion may be, it remains 
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far too simple an interpretation given how it engages cultural and social conditions while 
downplaying their much more complex interaction with heredity, history and free will.123 In 
fact, Golding specifically emphasized that though such factors could explain why only certain 
people find themselves seeking a malignant extreme, it is vital to note that it is the interaction 
of these factors with ‘all the beastly potentialities of man’ that give them ‘free rein’ (36-9). 
This may well establish Free Fall as Golding’s attempt at highlighting the complexity of the 
problem of evil given the questions it raises in relation to the possible choices that Sammy 
would have made had he perhaps found himself in different circumstances, or had he been 
brought up at a different time when war, uncertainty and scientific rationality did not have 
that much of an influence on people’s lives. When it comes to Sammy’s innocence as a child, 
however, a more comprehensive explanation can be provided once a link is established with 
the evolutionary account of the fall which had been given its most elaborate expression in 
The Inheritors, as previously explained.  
     To read Free Fall in light of The Inheritors and its Darwinian account of aggression is 
once again to establish an association between the beginning of evil, the creation of morality 
and the emergence of mankind’s rational capacities which Golding had been so adamant in 
condemning in his past creations. This means that Sammy’s childhood innocence might be 
explained as an outcome of the near absence of a certain degree of cognitive development 
that not only allows the adult the capacity to employ reason, exercise free will and assert 
control, but that also makes it possible to develop some sense of responsibility or perhaps 
suffer the developmentally advanced emotions of guilt, shame or regret.124 A support to such 
a notion can be found in the fact that the nature Sammy is given as a child is, in many ways, 
reminiscent of the innocent nature of the less intelligent species in The Inheritors whose lack 
of the complex cognitive capacities that make mankind’s sins possible has rendered them 
incapable of perceiving evil or of adopting it as means to a selfish end. As a result, they are 
drawn to a more simplistic worldview that does not involve the externalization of evil, nor 
does it demand accounting for the complex existential realities that are normally associated 
with the distressing awareness of its presence in their world. The same simplicity can also be 
detected in Sammy’s innocent perception as a child which can most clearly be seen in those 
recollections when he was not gripped by the inexplicable fear of the darkness that Golding 
usually associates with the gradual loss of innocence and the growing psychological defects 
                                                          
123 Golding’s views on human nature might have been given their most comprehensive expression in his 
interview with Biles (30-52).  
124 See Elliot on the development of guilt and moral responsibility in children. Also check Tangney, p. 9.  
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compromising a once pure vision. Sammy’s dreamlike perception, in other words, can be 
described as a natural outcome of his child self’s creating the world in the image of a nature 
that is as free of the knowledge and understanding of evil as Golding’s innocent, naive 
Neanderthals were (Baker, ‘Interview’). The possibility may even be further reinforced by the 
fact that both the Neanderthal and the child regard their somewhat defective world in an 
Edenic light that is surely impossible for the rational adult mind to maintain.125 It should be 
stressed, however, that although Golding wanted to emphasize the quality of innocence by 
engaging common Wordsworthian conceptions of childhood and granting his Rousseauian 
Neanderthals a childlike mentality, there remain certain essential differences between the two 
that can most clearly be seen in the fact that the child is not afflicted with the same cognitive 
limitations as the Neanderthals. Sammy’s innocence, in other words, is different to a certain 
extent because he carries the roots of his adult sinfulness in his child self, making his lack of 
understanding of evil as a child more of a developmental state of ignorance than an outcome 
of a deficiency in the intellectual capacities that make evil possible. This can be further 
reinforced by the statement that Golding made to Carey regarding the notion of original sin 
where he not only addresses the reasoning behind the positive representation of children that 
followed Lord of the Flies, but also clarifies what his understanding of childhood innocence 
basically entails:  
I think that because children are helpless and vulnerable, the most terrible things can 
be done by children to children … without knowing that they are injuring 
themselves, without knowing that [they are engaging in] an antisocial action – that is 
ignorance. And we confuse it with innocence. I do myself. But I still think that the 
root of our sin is there, in the child. As soon as it has any capacity for acting on the 
world outside, it will be selfish; and, of course, original sin and selfishness – the 
words could be interchangeable (‘Talks’174).   
    Golding’s conception of the child’s tendency towards antisocial actions is eventually 
revealed to the readers of Free Fall as associated with a later stage of development. In fact, it 
can be detected at the moment when Sammy finds himself dragged into the world of boyhood 
where violence, aggression and perhaps even guilt are granted a more noticeable presence 
                                                          
125 In his interview with Baker, Golding maintained that the Neanderthals have a ‘Rousseauesque picture of the 
universe’ because they are ‘making it in their own image.’ The same principle can be said to apply to the 
childhood phase in Free Fall, given the innocent view that both Johnny and Sammy held of their reality as little 
boys, and which can be said to have been fully manifested in those scenes at the hospital ward and the general’s 
garden.   
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than before. For the first time in the novel, now, Sammy is shown as developing with some 
unfortunate affinities to the children in Lord of the Flies, represented in his growing capacity 
to steal, bully and resort to aggressive behaviour if it means securing the objects he wants or 
the social recognition that he desires. This definite change which Sammy sorrowfully 
experiences as ‘a gap between the pictures’ of the child who idolized Evie, and the boy who 
later becomes devoted to his gang mates, Philip and Johnny, may once again be simply 
explained in terms of the influence or peer pressure that those two children, or more 
specifically Philip, exerted on the young naive boy that Sammy was (Fall 50). However, 
although Sammy has marked Philip as the one person who had ‘altered’ his life like nobody 
else (50), he seems to be aware that there had been some innate cognitive readiness to 
abandon his innocent rationale-free existence as a child when he found himself at one point 
facing an inexplicable fear of the dark that was never once part of his earlier childhood (185). 
This terror or fear of the dark is one of the most commonly recurring themes in Goldings’s 
novels which he admits to have based on his personal recollections of a boyhood spent in an 
ancient home whose innocent cellars and adjacent graveyard had been particularly distressing 
to his developing mind (Carey, Golding 15; Golding, Gates 156-7). As a result, it became ‘a 
convenient metaphor’ for the child’s reenactment of the fall in Pincher Martin where 
Christopher’s nightmare of running away from the woman in the cellar is supposed to 
communicate the child’s growing capacity to exercise the gift of choice and to turn away 
from the irrational mysticism associated with the realm of God and the spirit (Baker, 
‘Interview’). Golding’s waking nightmare also appears to be serving a similar function in 
Sammy’s boyhood, given that it signals some growing understanding of evil and a gradual 
abandonment of a naivety and a trusting innocence strongly reminiscent of the less intelligent 
beings whose lack of rational thought is held by Golding to be inextricably connected to their 
state of innocence. Both Christopher and Sammy, of course, do not provide an account of 
why and how they came to be gripped by such an irrational fear during the later years of their 
childhood; the reasoning Golding offers in ‘The Ladder and the Tree’, however, traces these 
terrors to a growing exercise of logic that had, in his case, forced a hostile presence on the 
innocent and sunlit ruins the same way the new people had forced a demonic perception on a 
harmless apelike being who is not even capable of understanding evil or aggression (Gates 
157). 
     This should further reinforce the notion that, unlike the biblical account of creation, there 
are no satanic agents or factors in Golding’s novels that are responsible for tempting mankind 
out of a perfect state of innocence and luring him into the world of sin, guilt and experience. 
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It should be stressed, however, that there are almost always catalysts represented in either 
certain devious characters or uncontrollable circumstances that hasten the moral descent of 
man, even if he were supposedly constrained by the context of civilization as in the case of 
Sammy Mountjoy.126 This catalyst is given a subtle representation in Lord of the Flies in the 
violent conditions of war that the children were sent on a plane to escape. It can further be 
linked to the unfortunate presence of the power-hungry Jack and the aggressive Roger who 
both can be described as more inherently predisposed to seek evil than others. A subtle 
expression of the catalysts may also be located in The Inheritors where some of the actions of 
the Neanderthals are hinted to have been encouraged by the conflict that the hostile presence 
of the Homo Sapiens had posed for the innocent species. It can be detected, too, in the 
example that the violent, corrupt adults were setting for the little Homo Sapien girl, Tanakil. 
Similarly in Free Fall, Sammy manages to spot Philip Arnold—the boy who suffered a lack 
of affinity at such a young age with the innocent irrationality that marked the childhood of 
both Sammy and Johnny—as the catalyst that may have hastened Sammy’s moral descent, 
given how he is the first to provide Sammy with the opportunity to gain first-hand experience 
of guilt and exploitation.  
      When Sammy first introduces Philip as the biggest influence in his life, he describes him 
in what may seem a rather sympathetic light given his initial reflection on those particular 
moments when Philip appears as more of a victim than a villain. He is recalled as a 
vulnerable boy who ‘was always to hand’ if somebody ‘wanted something to hurt’ possibly 
because he was held in contempt for never being capable of physically defending himself or 
of standing up to his bullies, even when cornered and beaten like a ‘sack’ (Fall 50). However, 
although Philip had repeatedly managed to come across as a coward and to fall as a target to 
the boys’ aggressive pranks and games, he was not, Sammy asserts, as ‘simple’ or helpless as 
he may initially appear (51). For one thing, we are told that Philip was a ‘political 
philosopher’ at such a young age (51). He knew exactly how to manipulate the circumstances 
                                                          
126 This explains why some of the interpretive efforts are drawn into reading the novels in light of the biblical 
account of creation where the temptation of Adam and Eve is mostly highlighted as being an outcome of a 
satanic agent who had made it his purpose to corrupt the innocent. The Neanderthals’ gradual adoption of some 
understanding of evil, for example, is sometimes drawn in association with the arrival of the Homo Sapiens and 
their corrupting influence. However, it does not seem that Golding believed in the role of the serpent in the 
creation and emergence of sin and evil. As I have already shown in my discussion of The Inheritors, the 
Neanderthals would have eventually fallen, even without encountering the hostile presence of their intellectual 
superiors, had they somehow managed to survive the challenging ecological conditions of the island. Free Fall 
seems to be also concerned with the same notion. The only difference is that it is targeting the fall from 
innocence in a developmental sense rather than an evolutionary one.  
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in his favour and to pluck himself out of difficult situations, including sparing himself the 
constant beating he received without having to rely on the brute force he was never capable 
of (50-1). This does not necessarily cast him in a bad light. The truth of the matter, however, 
is that although Philip had always been capable of ‘[turning] the other cheek’ when faced 
with hostility, according to Sammy, he did not cower away from inflicting pain whenever he 
found himself in a position of power (51). In fact, Philip is represented as one of those people 
who relish the presence of violence when it involves someone besides themselves (51). He is 
even marked as lacking the simplicity, naivety and ignorance of Sammy and Johnny Spragg 
who, though physically stronger than him, are shown as incapable of resisting the mental grip 
that Philip has held over them without their realizing it (52). Sammy in his boyish simplicity 
admits that he thought he had found a ‘henchman’ in Philip (52). He sadly states, however, 
that although the ‘fists and the glory’ were his, he was merely acting as Philip’s own ‘fool … 
clay,’ and protection (52). Philip, to put it shortly, is a ‘cruel … clever, [and] complex,’ 
individual who is a ‘living example of natural selection,’ a parasitical being that is ‘as fitted 
to survive in this modern world as a tapeworm in an intestine’ (52).  
     This may once again bring in the observation that it is Philip who acts as the satanic force 
struggling to tempt Sammy out of his innocent existence, and who, in the end, aids in keeping 
Sammy in a state of free fall, given how he is balancing the positive ‘pull’ exemplified in the 
presence of the good and simple Johnny (Halio 122). However, although it is possible to see 
Philip as the ‘snake’ in Sammy’s Edenic childhood world (Aarseth), considering his success 
in getting Sammy to engage in the altar incident that can only be construed as having been 
instigated by anyone but a child, there seems to be a deeper purpose to his existence in the 
novel aside from serving as the external force that brings in the knowledge of exploitation to 
the clueless Sammy. His rationality, for one thing, is emphasized in more than one way, even 
as a young boy. And since evil to Golding is associated with the possession and use of 
intelligence, he can be said to belong hereditarily to a whole unique order that is different 
from that of the neutral Sammy or the simple Johnny, and that has more in common with the 
narcissistic Pincher or the domineering Jack. Philip, in other words, exemplifies Golding’s 
belief that it is possible to have people who are not balanced between good and evil, and who 
are more inherently predisposed to seeking one extreme over another (Golding in Biles, Talk 
47). Such an aspect is further reinforced by Sammy’s observation of him as having ‘never 
[been] a child’ (Fall 52), thereby denying him the quality of innocence that both Johnny and 
Sammy possessed despite their mindless capacity to bully and fight. It is also possible to say 
that the presence of a character such as Philip in the novel may further highlight Golding’s 
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mistrust of politicians ‘no matter how good’ (Golding in Biles, Talk 49), considering the fact 
that it is the little devious ‘Machiavelli,’ described by Sammy as a ‘far more dangerous’ boy 
than the outward bullies, who grows up to capitalize on his knowledge of people and seize an 
important governmental position (Fall 51-2, 284). This should further tie in Free Fall with 
the political aspect of Lord of the Flies given how it highlights Golding’s belief that one of 
the prominent dilemmas ‘we are faced with … on the whole [is that] the politician is likely to 
be a Jack … [or] at best, a Ralph, [but] never a Simon’ (in Biles, Talk 49). One can even 
regard Philip in light of Jack’s character, despite the lack of overt similarities between the 
two, because both are evil geniuses who are capable of encouraging or bringing out the worst 
in people in one way or another when allowed to be in a position of power. This can be said 
to be particularly evident in the manner in which Philip manages to convince the young 
Sammy into bullying the younger boys for their fagcards, even stealing them if necessary, or 
in the way by which he manipulates Sammy into disrespecting the church and spitting on the 
altar for Philip’s own benefit. Interestingly, however, although Philip had definitely 
succeeded in familiarizing the young Sammy with the knowledge of exploitation through 
exploiting him for his personal gains and through introducing Sammy to the means by which 
he could use and manipulate others, Sammy still insists that that particular point of his life 
does not mark the moment of his moral or spiritual fall.  
     For Aarseth, Sammy’s mistakes as a boy are supposed to stand for the child’s unconscious 
reenactment of the fall which is eventually followed by the adult’s conscious freedom to 
succumb at one point or another to his evil tendencies rather than choose to act otherwise. 
This much had already been hinted at, as previously explained, in both Pincher Martin and 
‘The Ladder and the Tree’. It can even be sensed in the distressing awareness of guilt induced 
in the young Sammy by the head teacher’s involvement in the fagcard incident (Fall 55). 
However, although these particular moments of Sammy’s childhood do signal a moral 
regression of sorts, there remains an assertion that the ‘insufficiency and guilt’ of the Rotten 
Row boy are not Sammy’s simply because Sammy does not perceive the child as still being a 
part of his adult self (76). This affirms, as Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor have observed, the 
‘sheer gulf’ existing between the unconscious child and the sinful adult, and that each resides 
in a state of being that is markedly different from that of the other (173). It is also possible to 
maintain that while the existential dimension of the argument is plausible, the change can be 
associated with the eventual cognitive maturity that denies the adult the kind of innocence, or 
rather ignorance, associated with the child’s lack of autonomy and the subsequent absence of 
a more realistic or haunting expression of guilt and responsibility. Childhood, in other words, 
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cannot be the point Sammy is searching for because it does not mark the beginning of the 
intellectual competence that makes morality, choice and responsibility possible. Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor also propose a similar argument, stating that despite the unintentional 
transgressions of the child, there is still an evident absence of ‘calculation, choice, 
responsibility, and without these there is lacking a dimension essential to evil and guilt. Philip 
has it, but that is why he is never a child’ (173). Moreover, Babb suggests that one of the 
reasons why Sammy’s mistakes as a child do not ‘mark Sammy spiritually’ is that he was 
‘rather acting under Philip’s influence than exercising his personal freedom to choose 
deliberately’ (116). This should grant a whole new dimension to Sammy’s explanation of 
why he does not feel accountable for his childhood mistakes. But can the lack of autonomy 
really be one of the crucial aspects of the ‘threshold’ which Sammy believes to have enabled 
him to evade responsibility as a child (Fall 6)? 
     Asserting that a child cannot be held accountable for his actions based on the observation 
that children are, for the most part, incapable of perceiving the long-term consequences of 
their actions seems like the most plausible conclusion in Sammy’s condition. One reason why 
this might be the case is Golding’s belief in the child’s state of ignorance, and how it is 
mostly associated with standard notions of innocence, as previously mentioned. When it 
comes to the issue of autonomy, however, denying the child’s freedom does not seem to carry 
the same weight in the freedom to fall argument mainly because childhood is the lamented 
phase that serves as the point of comparison against which Sammy is measuring his fading 
experiential and existential sense of freedom. Still, it is important to keep in mind that while 
the adult does seem to be overly occupied with a loss in one way or another, a notion that 
sceptics may simply dismiss as being an illusion, his lack of freedom cannot be regarded in 
the same manner as that of the little boy.127 Children, for one thing, lack the cognitive 
maturity that allows them the adequate resistance to certain external pressures such as 
poverty, parental or adult authority, and peer influence (Elliott). And while certain factors or 
figures may definitely be considered to have a positive impact on the development of the 
child’s moral character such as the head teacher in Sammy’s case, others may balance or 
                                                          
127 Positions regarding the controversial notion of free will can roughly be divided into four categories. One is 
the eliminativist’s position which basically denies free will altogether. Another is the libertarian position which 
argues for an opposing extreme and deems ‘indeterminist free will’ as possible. There is also the incompatibilist 
view which basically deems free will as irreconcilable with a deterministic universe. And most importantly, 
there is the compatibilist view which basically considers free will as possible in a deterministic universe 
(Nichols 10-11). Given Golding’s views in Free Fall regarding free will, guilt and responsibility, his orientation 
towards the religious and his somewhat deterministic conception of human nature, it might be safe to say that he 
was most probably a compatibilist.  
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override the benign influence with their negative presence. There is also the fact that children 
are not governed by the internal constraints necessary to keep bad behaviour in check; nor are 
they in possession of a fully developed moral sense or a deeply ingrained set of ideals or rules 
against which they can measure and plan their actions or make proper choices (Elliott; Barrett 
77). 128 Golding actually maintained in his interview with Keating that one of the reasons why 
the boys’ society breaks down in Lord of the Flies is that children are ‘too young to look 
ahead and really put the curbs on their own nature and implement them’ as opposed to adults 
(190). This explains why Sammy’s first experience of guilt is represented as having been 
externally induced rather than solely motivated by an internal moral compass. It also explains 
why Sammy as a child is shown as never capable of resisting the influence of Philip who is 
represented as the malevolent comrade capitalizing on Sammy’s poverty, his sense of 
inferiority and his lack of a father figure in order to manipulate him into the immoral acts of 
stealing and bullying.129  
     This may initially put the adult at an advantage, especially since he is supposed to be in 
possession of the cognitive maturity that should aid him in overcoming most of the obstacles 
keeping the child from exercising freedom of choice. However, it is important to note, as 
Sammy has clearly maintained, that although the limitations on freedom present themselves 
rather externally in the child’s case, they do so more internally or ‘mentally’ in the case of the 
adult: ‘I was still the child from Rotten Row and if I had no freedom it was taken away 
physically not mentally’ (Fall 179). Such types of authority can be covert, subtle, and 
complex, and since they are hardly perceived or detected as limitations, they are capable, 
under certain conditions, of having debilitating effects to a much higher extent than external 
authority (Fromm, Escape Ch. 5). Interestingly enough, most of these limitations emerge for 
Sammy as a consequence of his adoption of a system, making it possible to conclude that 
Sammy’s loss of freedom might, after all, be inextricably connected to the cognitive maturity 
that makes identity, guilt and freedom of choice possible, and that necessitates, as such, the 
adoption of an ideology or a worldview.     
                                                          
128 This may in a sense bring Sammy closer to the Neanderthals whose lack of the cognitive complexity that 
makes autonomy possible has rendered them incapable of resisting the external stimuli in their surroundings. 
However, while the lack of freedom in the Neanderthal’s case contributes to maintaining their innocence due to 
their essential goodness, it mainly absolves the child of the responsibility for any of his or her misdeeds. 
129 ‘Philip commiserated, rubbed in my poverty [emphasis added]; pointed out the agony of my choice—never to 
have any more kings of Egypt or else exchange those I had for others and thus lose the first ones for good. I 
toughed Philip up mechanically for insolence but knew he was right’ (Fall 53). This shows Philip as capable of 
using Sammy’s poverty and sense of inferiority to talk him into resolving his problem by stealing.  
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Identity Construction and the Psychological Function of Ideologies 
One of the most notable engagements with the matter of freedom in the aftermath of the 
Second World War is that of Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom, which was mainly 
dedicated to exploring humanity’s complicated relationship with the notion in the hopes of 
developing some understanding of why most individuals willingly give it away. Fromm, 
whose views Golding is reported to have been made familiar with, particularly in relation to 
the biblical fall (Carey, Golding 122), maintains that because man is the only animal who 
manages to disrupt his harmonious animal existence by breaking free from the control of 
nature and his instincts, he is the only animal who is left to suffer a load of psychological and 
existential burdens from which he could never run or escape (Sane Society 22-5). One 
particularly daunting problem is that of freedom which, though it generally represents a kind 
of desired state that people are usually willing to fight for, still holds the threat of 
compromising people’s sense of identity and of disrupting their conventional guides for 
action (Fromm, Sane Society 56, 65; McGregor 187-8). Children, of course, are not usually 
gripped by such concerns because they do not yet exist as individuals, capable of setting 
themselves apart from the world they occupy and of compromising the ‘primary bonds’ that 
defines their existence in terms of the parental figures or prominent individuals in their 
surroundings (Escape Ch. 2). Consequently, it is only when they have reached a state of 
individuation that they begin to seek some means by which they can reduce the burden of 
drifting in an absurd world that ‘does not provide a priori guidance about what kind of person 
to be’ (McGregor 187), and to willingly sentence themselves to some form of overt or covert 
imprisonment, mostly without realizing it (Fromm, Escape Ch. 4). One particularly 
dangerous form of imprisonment is that of ‘anonymous authority,’ represented in the 
invisible control of ‘common sense, science…normality, public opinion’ and rationality 
which, according to Fromm, can be difficult to fight because ‘it does not demand anything 
except the self-evident’ and ‘it seems to use no pressure but only mild persuasion’ (Ch. 5). 
Golding also appears to be offering a similar argument in A Moving Target where he tackles 
the erection of ‘cages of iron bars’ and the ‘mental straightjacket’s of Darwinism, Marxism 
and Freudianism as the kind of price people have to pay for the benefits gained from the 
development of the human intellect (186). This allows readers, as Fromm had done, to 
consider the problem in a biological frame and to conceive its universality as well as its 
possible eventuality.  
     There is, however, some cultural and social specificity to the problem, represented in 
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Fromm’s engaging in the notion out of the desire to understand the kind of circumstances that 
fostered the emergence of fascism in Germany. It can also be detected in Golding’s 
characterization of Sammy in a manner that hints at the atrocities of Nazism as well as 
critiques what Crawford considered to be the left and right wing totalitarianism of the time 
(85). In fact, Crawford seems to believe the subtle link that ties Sammy’s sins to his 
adolescence to be particularly significant, considering how it might have been Golding’s way 
of hinting at the youthful aspect of fascist and totalitarian regimes, and how it is easy for 
dictators to manipulate adolescents into supporting their seemingly heroic, yet destructive 
cause (57, 107). Sammy’s adolescence can also be considered as echoing the kind of 
observation Fromm made in relation to Nazism in Escape from Freedom, a matter which was 
later psychologically tackled as possibly associated with a state of ‘personal uncertainty’ or ‘a 
kind of identity crisis,’ resulting in the growing need to develop a clear conception of who 
one is before one is capable of taking the defined identity as a ‘guide for action’ (McGregor 
188, 200). After all, it is with adolescence that individuals gain a heightened access to the 
cognitive complexity necessary for the emergence of ‘identity versus role confusion,’ and for 
the understanding of ‘wholeness, unity and integration’ as gripping identity problems that 
demand resolution (McAdams 188-90). Moreover, Golding can be said to be specifically 
targeting the problem as particularly daunting to the war generation given his choice to 
abandon the universal setting of the fable and to opt, instead, for reflecting the conditions of 
uncertainty, doubts and ambiguities of the war years. The switch to the social setting might 
have also been crucial in that it helps reinforce the connection between the inevitability of the 
problem of validating identity and the increasing intellectual, cultural and economic 
liberation of man that distinctively began with the rise of modernism.130  
      According to Golding, Sammy’s state of uncertainty is supposed to mirror that of the 
‘model intellectual of the twentieth century’ who finds himself in a state of ‘free fall,’ so to 
speak, due to his not being capable of attaining the gravitational pull or guidance made 
possible by the adoption of a system or a pattern (in Biles, Talk 81). Science, after all, had 
struck down most of the ‘old supports’ and systems (in Baker, ‘Interview’), leaving 
individuals no choice but to either confront the terror of alienation, aimlessness and 
uncertainty, or to seek some other means or patterns by which these overwhelming aspects of 
one’s existence may be masked. One solution that Sammy is represented as having opted for 
is that of group conformity or of joining the Communist party, a decision which though it 
                                                          
130 See Fromm, Sane Society 60. Also consider McGregor 187 and McAdams 189 
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may simplistically be dismissed as in keeping with the conditions of poverty that marked 
Sammy’s childhood at Rotten Row, is still not as simple as it may initially seem. In fact, 
although Sammy admits to having developed an interest in politics due to the influence of 
Nick Shales (106), he does not appear to be as committed to the Marxist ideals as might be 
expected. The group he joins, for one thing, is not represented as particularly interested in 
politics as much as it is concerned with the pursuit of freedom in a sexual sense (Fall 101; 
Babb 105). There is also the fact that among the teachers, students and librarians who make 
up the majority of the Communist party, there are no members of the working classes save 
for one individual who has ironically joined for no other reason but to ‘[advance] himself 
socially’ (Fall 106). Sammy’s lack of political commitment may further be detected in the 
admission that his becoming a communist at the time was simply an outcome of his looking 
for ‘the social security of belonging to the tribe’ (Fall 246), and that had it not been ‘for Miss 
Pringle’s nephew who now was high up in the blackshirts,’ he would have been a blackshirt 
himself (106). This presents the adolescent Sammy as experimenting with Marxist thinking 
for purposes not strictly political, a tendency which according to Fromm is highly common 
given its role in ameliorating one’s sense of alienation and in defining the parameters by 
which one’s identity can be constructed (Sane Society 26).131 Despite these benefits, however, 
detectable in Sammy’s confession of having experienced ‘a sense of martyrdom and a sense 
of purpose’ in ‘being a communist’ (139), there remains the risk of distortion previously 
addressed and associated with the reductive tendencies of such systems, and how they 
normally deny the aspects of human experience that cannot be reconciled or accommodated 
with their vision (Golding in Biles, Talk 103). There is also the malignant possibility that 
given the right social and historical conditions, some of these espoused systems are highly 
likely to result in dangerous biases, narcissistic tendencies and immoral outcomes such as 
those created by fundamentalist ideologies in general, and the Stalinist or Nazi regimes in 
particular (Golding in Biles, Talk 36-9; McGregor 187).132  
      In Escape from Freedom, Fromm contends that one of the prominent reasons why Nazism 
                                                          
131 Such views were later expounded upon by McGregor who believes that even people in individualistic 
cultures may find themselves looking up to the group and adopting its views, ‘narratives’ and ‘ideals’ as a 
means of resolving their personal uncertainty because groups are capable of providing ‘a template for self-
construction’ that ‘reduces the need for self-analysis and deliberation’ (192). Groups are also capable of 
bolstering an individual’s sense of self-worth, purpose and control by helping the individual define a clear set of 
values and goals which might then be pursued following an ‘internalized guide’ for action made possible by the 
group’s own behavioural templates (192). 
132 In fact, Crawford notes that Sammy’s decision of adopting Communism is a way for Golding to critique the 
Communist Party of Great Britain, highlight the atrocities of Stalinism as well as show how such systems, just 
like that of Nazism, can appear equally appealing to ‘totalitarian’ personalities, Sammy’s included (104-5). 
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was not met with widespread rejection from the German people, especially the younger 
generation, is the promise it held of promoting self-worth and restoring national pride for a 
population that had been so markedly overcome with anxiety and uncertainty in the aftermath 
of the First World War that it was willing to give into a leader such as Hitler (Ch. 6). A 
similar argument was proposed by Golding in an interview with Biles where he particularly 
blames the war for the emergence of the kind of psychological conditions of uncertainty and 
inferiority that allowed Hitler the control of the German people and the creation of Nazism, 
especially in the absence of the sense of social identity that could have helped in managing 
the problem or in toning it down (37-8). Fromm also argues that the control of a person, a 
group or an ideology may initially appear helpful in masking or reducing man’s sense of 
aimlessness and isolation because it does target some of the immediate manifestations of the 
existential and psychological concerns of the individual. However, given how the root cause 
continues to be inadequately diagnosed or addressed, the promises of security and freedom 
that such systems or figures of authority hold remain false and delusive (Escape Ch. 6). This 
can, in fact, be clearly seen in the adolescent Sammy’s misguided conception of freedom or 
his ‘absurd declaration of independence,’ following his adoption of Communism, which 
ironically involves ‘behaving as much as Alsopp,’ the leader of the Communist party at the 
time, ‘as possible’ (Fall 101). The problem can also be detected in the development of 
Sammy’s pathological obsession with Beatrice, considering the existential dimension to the 
relationship which can be targeted as still betraying a desire to overcome a maddening state 
of uncertainty and alienation through controlling another individual and gaining a semblance 
of meaning out of the newly attained sense of dependency and power.    
     Though Golding did not generally confirm any existential influence on his writings, 
particularly when it came to his engagement with the matter of identity in Pincher Martin, 
and later on Free Fall, the existential dimension to Sammy’s relationship with Beatrice 
cannot be denied. After all, most of the interactions, interrogations as well as the questions 
that Sammy recalls subjecting the innocent Beatrice to are shown as centred on gripping 
identity matters that are difficult if not impossible to address: ‘How far do you extend? Are 
you the black, central patch which cannot examine itself? Or do you live in another mode, not 
thought, stretching out in serenity and certainty?’ (117). They are also depicted as initially 
aimed at understanding Beatrice and resolving the mystery of her being, possibly for the 
purpose of attaining a sense of existential sharing which given the reality of the human 
condition, the limitations inherent in our means of communication, and the difficulty of 
accessing another person’s experiential sense of the world, can never be fully realized or can 
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only be attained as an illusion. Sammy’s interrogation of Beatrice, in other words, is surely 
presented by Golding as a desperate attempt to break free from a state of phenomenological 
isolation, to promote a sense of existential connectedness, to attain ‘fusion and identity,’ and 
‘to understand and to be understood’ (117). The more Beatrice denies him those needs, the 
more he becomes assertive in his interrogation of her and the more he grows obsessive over 
matters like her identity, femininity, her state of being, and how the world presents itself to 
her: ‘What is it like to hold the centre of someone’s universe, to be soft and fair and sweet, to 
be neat and clean by nature, to be desired to distraction, to live under this hair, behind these 
huge, unutterable eyes?’ (115). After all, existential isolation can be one of the most daunting 
and anxiety-arousing conditions to be deemed as inevitable or inescapable to an extent 
because it involves the individual’s sense of their personhood or identity and the fact that 
there are aspects of one’s existence that can never be fully shared or accessed by others.133 
This is perfectly captured by Sammy at the beginning of his narrative where he not only 
fixates on the failure of art in fully communicating his experience, but also expresses the 
reality of an existence where an individual is doomed to alienation and condemned to be free. 
Like Edwin in Darkness Visible (1979) who believes humanity to be ‘wrapped in delusions 
and illusions,’ and to be ‘mad and in solitary confinement’ (280), Sammy holds that:  
[w]e are dumb and blind yet we must see and speak. … Our loneliness is the 
loneliness not of the cell or the castaway; it is the loneliness of the dark thing that 
sees as at the atom furnace by reflection, feels by remote control and hears only 
words phoned to it in a foreign tongue. To communicate is our passion and our 
despair (4). 
     Golding’s representation of Sammy’s desire to attain a sense of unity with Beatrice may 
initially be perceived as in keeping with the common conception of close relationships as the 
most ‘basic’ and fundamental means of attaining a sense of meaningful existence.134 After all, 
they do precede the emergence of other defence mechanisms, including cultural and 
ideological ones, in both a developmental and an evolutionary sense, given their early 
expression in infancy as well as their undeniable manifestation in the animal kingdom 
(Mikulincer, Florian and Hirschberger 302). The problem with Sammy, however, is that his 
relationship is not only shown as a dysfunctional one that does nothing to pluck him out of 
his state of alienation, but is also revealed as the one sin that further compromises his sense of 
                                                          
133 See Pyszczynski, Greenberg and Koole 6-7; Pinel et. al. 359.  
134 See Mikulincer, Florian and Hirschberger 295, 302; Pinel et. al. 362. 
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freedom and that tortures him with guilt, shame and regret his entire life. Like Christopher, 
who gains definition by devouring or stepping over the bodies of those whom he has 
exploited, Sammy eventually comes to forcefully seek ‘unity and substantial identity’ through 
pressuring Beatrice into ‘sexual sharing,’ or rather exploitation, using the promise of 
marriage as a means to that particular end (Fall 132).135 As much as such an episode helps in 
reinforcing Sammy’s state of sinfulness, however, it is not hinted at as the moment that marks 
his fall because he is shown as having already made the decision to possess Beatrice sexually 
and ‘to make [whatever] appropriate sacrifice’ necessary for that to happen (267). This not 
only reinforces Sammy’s affinities with Pincher Martin, but also helps highlight the religious, 
and by association evolutionary, dimension of the novel, represented in Sammy incurring the 
sin of pride, much like the despicable Pincher, and entering a state of self-deification or 
selfishness which Golding considers to be humanity’s original sin.136 In fact, Christopher and 
Sammy are similar in that their crimes are sexual in nature, a matter that Golding reinforces 
by highlighting their perverse conception of love and by associating their perception of sex, 
much like that of Golding’s other characters, with the notion of eating. Christopher, for 
example, is a predatory being whose conscious recollection of his victimization and sexual 
exploitation of others is represented as providing him with more assurance ‘in his knowledge 
of the cosmic nature of eating’ and in his existence as a successful maggot (Pincher 89). The 
association between sex and exploitation can also be detected in The Inheritors where Tuami 
                                                          
135 The only problem, however, is that the gulf that Sammy perceives as dividing him from Beatrice can in no 
way be bridged through sex or a physical union, not only because she was rendered ‘impotent’ by her 
upbringing, but also because she was brought up in the kind of security that makes it difficult for her to 
understand the complex doubts and existential burdens afflicting the young Sammy (134, 124). This could 
provide more explanation as to why Sammy, and by association Pincher, are shown to experience feelings of 
jealousy over their obsessions’ state of being. Both Beatrice and Mary enjoy an existence that is free of the kind 
of anxieties and psychological concerns targeting Christopher and Sammy due to their beliefs and their state of 
spiritual relatedness. This can be reinforced by Sammy’s observation that Beatrice’s ‘innocence was an obedient 
avoidance of the deep and muddy pool where others lived. Where I lived’ (125). There is also the suggestion 
that Beatrice ‘was at peace’ because, contrary to him, she had the ‘chapel with its assurances…behind her’ 
(124). It is also possible to conclude that the instinctual goodness of both characters might have been an 
additional reason that aggravated both Sammy and Pincher, given Sammy’s admission to having once been in a 
similar situation to that of Miss Pringle who hated Nick because ‘he found it easy to be good’ (241). Finally, it 
is important to note that both points are intricately associated with the problem of existential isolation and how 
both Pincher and Sammy are incapable of understanding the objects of their obsession, not only because their 
worldview denies the mystical, but also because they belong to a whole different state of being from that of 
Mary and Beatrice.   
136 Although Golding maintained that it was the scientific undertones that he had in mind when he decided to go 
for the title, Free Fall, considering how it helps in communicating his basic idea about freedom, he did not mind 
the religious interpretation because he did engage with such matters in the novel (Golding in Biles, Talk 81). In 
fact, it is possible to see the religious and by association the evolutionary interpretation of Sammy’s fall as 
subsuming the scientific one because it is with the emergence of the self and the beginning of the process of 
individuation that humanity is sentenced to a state of self-centredness or selfishness which Golding regards as 
humanity’s original sin. It is also with the emergence of the self and individuality that humanity comes to 
perceive the existential burdens of isolation, alienation and freedom.    
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is perceived by the innocent Lok as ‘not only lying with the fat woman but eating her as well’ 
(175). Similarly, Sammy describes the experience of sex in the Communist party as ‘a little 
furtive pleasure like handing round a bag of toffees’ before he eventually comes to objectify 
Beatrice brutally and before he abandons her for a fellow communist member named ‘Taffy’ 
(Fall 101). 
     This may initially show Golding as attempting to communicate the notion of sexual 
experiences being a sin, especially given his continued engagement with the matter in his 
subsequent novels, particularly The Pyramid, Rites of Passage (1980) and The Paper Men. 
Golding strictly maintains, however, that he does ‘believe and know that love-making can be 
enhancing,’ thereby emphasizing the notion that it is ‘the exploitation, not the sex’ that is 
‘sinful,’ and that a ‘diseased situation’ is only possible once power ‘takes over in a sexual 
relationship’ (Biles, Talk 111; Haffenden 116; Baker, ‘Interview’). He clearly notes to Baker 
that Sammy’s abuse of Beatrice is an attempt to highlight the potentially negative and drastic 
outcomes of close relationships, and how they can be a ‘dangerous… human position [that] 
could go wrong more easily than any other’ because they almost always involve ‘people 
putting themselves in each other’s power’ (Baker, ‘Interview’). This difficulty of selfless love 
seems to echo that of Fromm, who though he expresses belief that human relations can 
provide some constructive means of dealing with one’s existential condition (Sane Society 
30-1), still maintains that not every notion of love and not every attempt at establishing a 
human relation is as constructive, selfless, and genuine as is claimed to be (32-5). 
     As previously stated, the difficulty of maintaining selfless relations can be found in the 
inherent selfishness of the human race, a matter which Golding addresses in most of his 
novels, especially his early fables, through establishing the biological roots of humanity’s 
ailments and tracing their development back to their evolutionary genesis. When it comes to 
Free Fall, however, Golding seems to be more invested in locating the problem in the social 
and cultural conditions, and in linking it with the violence of the war as well as the political 
and existential climate of the age. In an interview with Frank Kermode, Golding maintained 
that the relationship between Sammy and Beatrice is supposed to be ‘a twentieth century 
equivalent of the Dante and Beatrice story’ in La Vita Nuova (qtd. in Carey, Golding 226). It 
is a collection of poems that follows on the courtly love tradition in recounting Dante’s 
encounter and falling in love with his Beatrice, and how that experience resulted in the 
elevation of Dante’s life to hers. As a result, it came to be regarded as one of the important 
sources that inspired the creation of Free Fall and that provided the model that was basically 
reversed and turned on its head for the purpose of depicting the ‘obsessive’ and ‘pathological’ 
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nature of Sammy’s affection, as opposed to the purity and innocence of Dante’s devotion 
(Fall 131).137 It should be stressed, however, that although Golding had confessed to there 
being an association between Dante’s love story and his, it does not appear that the reversal 
was aimed this time at exposing the inadequacy or inaccuracy of the views expressed by the 
source’s creator, as in most of Golding’s earlier novels. According to McCarron, it is 
Golding’s Free Fall this time, or rather Sammy’s pathological infatuation with Beatrice, that 
is held as ‘inferior’ to the source. This makes it possible to conclude that whatever 
commonalities the plot shares with Dante’s La Vita Nuova, they were most likely meant to 
highlight the extent of Sammy’s selfish exploitation as opposed to the selflessness of Dante’s 
devotion (Golding 19). It is also possible to conclude that given the age’s absorption in the 
cruelty, viciousness and savagery of war, Golding may have wanted to highlight how it is 
possible for human relations to take on morbid manifestations and for people to find 
themselves ‘caught in the terrible net where … [the] guilty are forced to torture each other’ 
(Fall 284). This can, in fact, be detected at an early stage of the novel in the departure from 
the elegance of Dante’s poetry and the gracefulness marking his expression of love for his 
Beatrice to the intensity and violence of Sammy’s emotions. Rather than filling him with a 
sense of transcendence, Sammy’s proclaimed affection compels him, as he makes his way to 
see Beatrice, to will the people standing in his way ‘to die, be raped, bombed or otherwise 
obliterated’ (Fall 87). The effects of the age can also be detected in the subtle association that 
Golding draws between Sammy’s abuse of Beatrice and the atrocities of Nazism or eugenics. 
They are implicit, as Crawford notes, in the questions that Sammy raises in relation to 
Beatrice’s humanity, and in his coming to describe her at a later point of their relationship as 
‘more dog-like’ as a way of implying her subhuman status (Crawford 110-11; Fall 135, 137-
8). Such an association, states Crawford, is later reinforced by an image of a catatonic 
Beatrice, locked in asylum and regarded as an animal in much the same way as the 
handicapped girl, Minnie. This mentally challenged girl from Sammy’s childhood is also 
conferred the status of an animal for urinating on the inspector’s shoes before she is later 
escorted out of the school, never to be seen again, in a manner that resonates with the victims 
of the Holocaust (Fall 34-5; Crawford 110). Beatrice’s fate, in other words, is in keeping with 
an age defined by the crimes of eugenics and the extermination of the unfit, a notion that 
Sammy asserts when he notes the simple, kind, and loving nature of Beatrice and many 
others as unfortunate in a sense, given how it does not hold much ‘political importance,’ 
                                                          
137 See S. Boyd 65; Medcalf 26; McCarron 18-9; Carey, Golding 226-7. 
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allow its ‘owners much success,’ or even keep them from being victimized in a materialistic 
and vicious world that has neither the capacity, nor the understanding for spiritual truths or 
relatedness (Fall 215).138 
     There are moments, of course, when Sammy’s love appears in a manner that may be 
deemed to be Dantean, considering the religious overtones that pervade his proclamations of 
affection towards the simple Beatrice. This helps, to a certain extent, in bringing a semblance 
of genuineness to his love for her: 
I was trembling regularly from head to foot as if my button had been pressed. There 
in the winter sunlight, among the raindrops and rusted foliage I stood and trembled 
regularly as if I should never stop and a sadness reached out of me that did not know 
what it wanted; for it is part of my nature that I should need to worship, and this was 
not in the textbooks, not in the behaviour of those I had chosen and so without 
knowing I had thrown it away (121).   
Such moments, however, do not seem to be aimed at highlighting Sammy’s affinity with the 
Italian poet as much as they are meant to draw attention to the moral and spiritual sterility of 
the age as well as the pathological aspect of Sammy’s love. Reliance on poetic and religious 
overtones, for one thing, measures the extent to which Sammy’s perception of Beatrice has 
sunk. It helps grant her the status of a goddess worthy of worship before she is later shown as 
having been reduced to a dog forced into a sadomasochistic reliance and robbed of her own 
state of independences, freedom and integrity.139 It also helps highlight Sammy’s condition of 
imprisonment as that of a deification and idolatrous worship, not of Beatrice whom Sammy 
claims to have sought to idolize at one point of his life, but of the self, its obsessions and 
sexual urges. This can be said to have been reinforced by Sammy’s perception of his world as 
‘a savage place in which man was trapped without hope, to enjoy what he could while it was 
going’ (256). Moreover, reliance on religious overtones seems to signal a lamented and 
                                                          
138 In fact, Golding seems to have a tendency to have his innately good characters such as Nat and Simon killed 
perhaps to prove this very same point which he initially made in The Inheritors through the extermination of the 
innocent Neanderthals. 
139 It is interesting that as poetic as the conception of Beatrice as a goddess is, it shows Sammy as having been 
blinded to her true being from the very beginning, a conclusion which Sammy reinforces at one point by 
wondering if his perception of her is simply an instance of the ‘mind’s self-deception’ (143). He even adds that: 
‘[h]ad all young men been as I, the ways where she went would have been crowded’ (104). This is perhaps 
another factor why he is shown as having never been capable of establishing a genuine connection with her. In 
fact, his initial perception of her as a goddess is what might have possibly led to the disappointment that 
followed, and that eventually culminated in his deteriorating perception of her as a dog. This further blinds him 
to Beatrice’s true nature and forces him into perceiving her as nothing more than a body to be objectified and 
exploited for his own pleasure until the moment he meets Taffy, the fellow communist whom he ends up falling 
in love with and abandoning Beatrice for.   
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mourned loss of religiousness and a subsequent conversion to a rationalistic and egocentric 
extreme that is targeted by Golding as contributing to the victimization of Beatrice. The loss 
is, in fact, represented as having promoted the abandonment of morality and the adoption of 
the moral relativity that allows Sammy to justify his exploitation of Beatrice and to put his 
abuse in perspective. As a result, it might be possible to conclude that Golding might have 
been in agreement with Fromm regarding his view of the twentieth century as ‘a peculiarly 
inhospitable environment for morality and virtue’ (Baumeister and Exline; Fromm, Escape 
Ch. 4). The two can also be said to be similar in that they both trace this problem to the 
regression of ‘humanistic religions,’ as opposed to the rise of the spirit of individualism, 
consumerism and capitalism that Golding is later seen to be critiquing viciously in Darkness 
Visible and The Paper Men (qtd. in Batson and Stocks 152; Fromm, Sane Society 342).140 
After all, it is with the complex interplay of such factors that the pursuit of individual 
interests is encouraged to a point that used to be deemed as sinful by Christianity. It is also 
possible to regard the same factors as responsible for the promotion of individuality and self-
actualization to a level that makes it ‘difficult for morality to retain its traditional function of 
restraining the self’ (Baumeister and Exline; Geyer and Baumeister 412; Fromm, Sane 
Society 160).141 This should further explain the difference between the pathology of Sammy’s 
feelings and the purity of Dante’s affections as having been brought about by the influence of 
the kind of historical and social conditions that governed the lives of both protagonists and 
that contributed, in one way or another, to shaping them into the kind of person they turned 
out to be.  
      This may show Golding as attempting to explore the view that while interpersonal 
                                                          
140 The same conclusion had also been proposed by social psychologists Baumeister and Exline regarding the 
role of religion in promoting ethics and how the regression in morality in the modern world might be traced to a 
number of factors that include, but are not limited to, ‘the secularization of society and…the loss of the spiritual 
context’ that makes selflessness, virtue and morality possible. In fact, they consider religion to be an important 
element in the process of self-regulation or the control of the ‘moral muscle’ since it helps in regularly 
exercising it, and in consequently allowing it to grow stronger (Baumeister and Exline; Geyer and Baumeister 
412). Religion, after all, offers a ‘framework that supports self-control,’ especially given its perspective on what 
classifies as virtues or vices, and how most, if not all, of these notions are constructed in terms of the success 
and failure of self-control (Geyer and Baumeister 412)  
141 It is possible to interpret the effects of moral relativity on freedom in terms of a serious disruption in the 
process of ‘self-regulation’ whose failure is believed to be equally dependent on the breakdown of any of its 
closely interlinked components, including moral standards, self-monitoring, and the capacity to modify 
behaviour (Baumeister and Exline). This means that if some people were to lose their values or ideals, for 
instance, as in the case of Sammy, they would no longer find it possible to keep their behaviour in check or to 
alter it in an acceptable manner because they would basically lose the ideals against which behaviour is to be 
measured, maintained or modified (Baumeister and Exline). In other words, the adoption of a rational extreme, 
in Sammy’s case, has not only engendered the rejection of the moral standards that are normally associated with 
religious belief, but also resulted in the loss of one of the basic components that are necessary for the 
development of virtue and for the exercise of control over the self and its egocentric tendencies. 
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connectedness is not at all impossible in the absence of religion, it may be difficult to 
maintain as an effective and non-exploitative means of quelling one’s psychological and 
existential burdens because it is religion, suggests Golding, that provides one of the necessary 
components for the expression, maintenance or development of morality.142 In fact, such a 
conclusion can help justify the arrangement of Sammy’s episodes, to a certain extent, given 
how it explains why Sammy is shown as continuing the search for the moment that marked 
his abandonment of religiousness, even after locating the episode which he suspects to have 
marked his fall and loss of freedom. One reason why Sammy’s loss of religiousness is not 
targeted as the moment of his fall, despite Golding’s depicting the repercussions of such a 
decision as particularly dreadful in his protagonist’s case, is that Sammy does not believe that 
‘rational choice stood any chance of exercise’ at the time (Fall 245). He is shown then, after 
all, as having been a young boy whose innocent mind is incapable of keeping the miraculous 
world which he believes to have inhabited by nature from being distorted by the cruelty of its 
proponent, Miss Pringle, and the fact that she did not find it at all reprehensible to torture and 
‘crucify a small boy’ (236). Sammy may also be deemed as justified in rejecting the religious 
realm as a child given his incapacity at the time to see each world for what it actually is and 
to perceive the problem as anything more than a simple ‘choice between good and wicked 
fairies’ (245). The fact that Sammy’s decision is presented in terms of the manner by which 
each worldview is depicted seems further to reinforce the notion that Sammy cannot be 
deemed as fallen at that particular point because it is ‘Nick’s instinctive goodness’ that he is 
represented as having chosen, rather than ‘the tortured and torturing spinster’ whose cruelty 
came to be inextricably associated with the worldview she is advocating (Kinkead-Weekes 
and Gregor 187-8).  
     This should help absolve Sammy of some of the responsibility of breaking the helpless 
Beatrice and of possibly driving her to madness by showing Sammy’s spiritual parents, 
Rowena Pringle and Nick Shales, as ‘part reasons’ for why the adolescent Sammy ended up 
the way he is (Fall 241). After all, it appears to be Miss Pringle’s wretched crucifixion of the 
young boy of Rotten Row that results in the emergence of the destructive association between 
the notions of sex and religion on the one hand, and the negative emotions of hate, guilt and 
shame on the other. It is also the rationalism of Nick Shales that is targeted as having 
indirectly allowed for the abuse of Beatrice, considering its role in drawing Sammy into the 
full adoption of rationalism and the kind of relativist morality that deems notions of good and 
                                                          
142 See Golding’s views on religion and morality in Biles, Talk 85.   
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evil as manmade or ‘decided by majority vote’ (218).143 This means that although Sammy is 
shown as having hinted at the moment when he made the decision to pursue Beatrice as the 
one moment when he had allowed himself to succumb to his fallen nature and to give up his 
freedom wilfully without realizing what the decision may entail, such a moment cannot be 
simplistically labelled as the moment of his fall. In fact, it might be a little misleading to 
perceive Sammy’s tragic loss of both freedom and innocence as anything but a gradual 
process that has come about as a result of accumulated choices, shaped by the social, 
economic and political conditions as much as they are shaped by Sammy’s psychological 
state and internal struggle. This gradational sense of loss can actually be detected at an early 
stage of the narrative when Sammy recalls himself as an ‘[almost] but not entirely’ free 
adolescent, driven by the need for ‘personal validity’ into joining the Communist party, and 
into developing the obsessive desire to possess and sexually exploit Beatrice for his own 
personal gains (Fall 87; Golding in Haffenden 104). As a result, none of Sammy’s episodes is 
to be dismissed as less significant to highlighting his state of loss, considering how they help 
contrast his guilty condition with that of an innocent one, as well as reveal a state of being in 
the making, stripped of a layer of freedom with every choice willfully made or a decision 
compulsorily pursued. Sammy may not have had much of a choice in submitting to the 
dangers of the covert authority of rationality, logic and common sense that came with Nick’s 
world, or in giving in to the control of Alsopp, his communist group and the false promise of 
freedom that they held. But he most definitely had a choice in not carrying his affair with 
Beatrice to a sadistic extent, given how he is shown as having been warned about the 
ramifications and costs of such extreme decisions by the headmaster of his school. This 
explains why he suspects the moment he made the decision to pursue Beatrice to be the point 
that marked his fall, especially since it involves victimizing another individual, 
compromising her state of autonomy and forcing her into a sadomasochistic relation where 
neither of them is able to maintain the degree of freedom and independence by which they 
first walked into the relationship. Reflecting on his sinful past, Sammy maintains sorrowfully 
that:  
                                                          
143 Nick, of course, is not presented as so extreme in his rationalism for he is shown as a highly moral person 
whose kindness, as Golding had clearly indicated, is not ‘deducible from the system which [he] held to apply’ 
(Golding in Biles, Talk 85). In fact, Golding describes Nick in the novel as the kind of person who ‘had a saintly 
cobbler as his father and [who] never knew that his own moral life was conditioned by it’ (Fall 255).  
He is, after all, based on Golding’s father who is described by Golding as a ‘profoundly moral man’ despite his 
belief in a ‘system in which there was no place, logically, for right and wrong’ (85). Golding goes on to add that 
‘even Marxism is founded basically on Christian morality’ (85). This shows Golding as holding a view of 
religion as a powerful support for morality.  
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[once] a human being has lost freedom there is no end to the coils of cruelty. I must I 
must I must. They said the damned in hell were forced to torture the innocent live 
people with disease. But I know now that life is perhaps more terrible than that 
innocent medieval misconception. We are forced here and now to torture each other. 
We can watch ourselves becoming automata; feel only terror as our alienated arms 
left the instruments of their passion towards those we love. Those who lose freedom 
can watch themselves forced helplessly to do this in daylight until who is torturing 
who? The obsession drove me at her (Fall 128).144  
Such a state of compulsive sinfulness seems to further reinforce Sammy’s affinity with 
Christopher Martin, given how both are represented as sharing the ‘obsessive if not 
pathological’ conception of sex and their perception of it as an appetite that ‘must’ be 
fulfilled at all costs (131). It is also possible to see the confession as highlighting Sammy’s 
condition of ‘automata’ as that of a heightened state of self-centredness and single-
mindedness, represented first through the development of a similar expression of greed and 
entitlement to that of Pincher, and traced second to the emergence of what could only be 
described as shame more so than guilt. Such a conclusion can, in fact, be reinforced by 
Sammy’s reference to the blurred lines between the tortured and the torturer, as well as his 
early fixation on ‘the grey faces that peer over his shoulder,’ and which he believes are 
impossible to ‘expunge or exorcise’ (3). Consequently, it might be possible to signal the 
resulting sense of shame, and perhaps to a certain extent guilt, as having contributed not only 
to sentencing him to a lifetime of regret and self-condemnation, but also to automatizing his 
abuse against Beatrice instead of keeping him from exploiting her. 
     Both shame and guilt, of course, are ‘self-conscious’ self-punishing emotions that are 
inextricably associated with one’s capacity for empathy, and that are, as such, brought about 
by the same factors, conditions and moral situations. Still, although guilt and shame are 
highly similar in terms of their dependency on the possession of a moral sense and the 
understanding that one has violated the norms of moral behaviour, they remain as two 
distinctively different moral emotions, with guilt being deemed as a more adaptive 
                                                          
144 This carries some resonance with Fromm’s conception of the hollowness of a sadomasochistic reliance. In 
Escape from Freedom, Fromm maintains that the ‘sadistic person needs his object just as much as the 
masochistic needs his. Only instead of seeking security by being swallowed, he gains it by swallowing 
somebody else. In both cases the integrity of the individual self is lost. In one case I dissolve myself in an 
outside power; I lose myself. In the other case I enlarge myself by making another being part of myself and 
thereby I gain the strength I lack as an independent self. It is always the inability to stand the aloneness of one's 
individual self that leads to the drive to enter into a symbiotic relationship with someone else … In both cases 
individuality and freedom are lost’ (Ch. 5). 
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experience than shame.145 This is possibly the case because guilt is normally expressed in 
relation to the action rather than the self, thereby allowing individuals to tackle and condemn 
the behaviour in question without risking a serious damage to their image or self-esteem 
(Leith and Baumeister; Tangney 8). When it comes to shame, however, there is an intense 
sense of distress and condemnation which, though it may originate with a particular action, is 
believed to grow to a point where it mercilessly, and sometimes even destructively, engulfs 
the self as a whole and renders it incapable of rectifying its wrongs and misdeeds (Leith and 
Baumeister; Tangney 7). This explains why shame is frequently targeted as a highly painful 
and frustrating moral emotion that is more likely to turn maladaptive, especially considering 
the difficulty of resolving a situation where the whole self is held as a problem as opposed to 
that where the focus is primarily on a particular behaviour or action. There is also the 
possibility of this fixation on the self resulting in resolving those feelings of distress through 
antagonizing and degrading the victim rather than seeking amends or some proper means by 
which the problem can adequately be tackled or resolved (Leith and Baumeister; Tangney 7). 
     Taken in the context of Free Fall, it is possible to explain Sammy’s feelings of distress 
prior to the prison experience as more associated with shame than guilt given Sammy’s 
incapacity at the time to put an end to his abuse or to attempt to rectify the situation through 
less drastic means. Caught in the bounds of egocentricity, or rather a state of an idolatrous 
fixation on the self where the focus is more directed at how the poisoned relationship is 
affecting him rather than Beatrice, Sammy can only address his feelings of shame and guilt 
by more abuse and degradation. In fact, his prioritizing the resolving of his feelings of 
distress can be said to have compelled him to direct some of the antagonism and hostility 
away from himself and towards his victim, instead, in an effort to dull the intensity of the 
experience and to gain some sense of assurance that he is justified after all in his behaviour. 
This can most clearly be seen in those particular instances when Sammy antagonizes Beatrice 
and questions if she is a human or ‘a person at all’ for not being capable of providing a valid 
emotional response to his sexual advances, or of adequately addressing his intellectual 
inquiries in a manner that would quell his sense of alienation (Fall 135). Sammy’s selfish 
fixation on resolving his feelings of shame can also be clearly seen in his cowardly avoidance 
of Beatrice and his disregarding her letters, particularly after meeting Taffy, in the hope that 
avoiding the problem might help lessen his feelings of distress or at least push them out of 
focus: 
                                                          
145 See Leith and Baumeister; Silfver; Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton; Tangney 7-9. 
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I was sorry for her and exasperated by her. I tried to hide this; hoping that time 
would produce some solution but I was just not callous enough to get away with it. 
… Perhaps if I had had the courage then to look her down in the eye I should have 
seen all the terror and fear that did not get into my pictures of her; but I never met her 
eye for I was ashamed to. … I opened the letter and the first lines were a plea for 
forgiveness; but I read no further because the sight of the first page stabbed me with 
a knife. … What else could I have done but run away from Beatrice? (141-5).   
Such moments may be interpreted as attempts on Sammy’s part to escape responsibility and 
to direct some of the blame on Beatrice in about the same way that Christopher Martin is seen 
as blaming God for giving him the mouth by which he has ended up devouring the victims of 
his past. However, although both experiences are represented as attesting to Christopher’s 
and Sammy’s understanding of their actions as serious moral transgressions, it does not 
appear that Christopher’s attempts are motivated by the same feelings of moral distress that 
take Sammy’s sense of self-condemnation to an unbearably excruciating level. Sammy is, of 
course, shown as having managed for some time to put his abuse in perspective and to deem 
it as insignificant in the context of war: ‘Why bother to murder in private capacity when you 
can shoot men publicly and be congratulated publicly for it? Why bother about one savaged 
girl when girls are blown to pieces by the thousand?’ (Fall 147). In fact, his rationalizations 
carry strong resonance with those of Christopher who contemplates using the conditions of 
war to mask his intention of wanting to kill his friend, Nat, and to consequently avoid being 
held accountable. Despite this initial success, however, Sammy still finds that he is incapable 
of wholly dismissing the cruelty of his ways, especially after the spiritual and moral 
awakening that follows the prison experience and that allows him, for the first time in years, 
to break free from his egocentric fixation on the self and to abandon the distorting system of 
relativist morality that is responsible for twisting, sometimes even suppressing, his empathic 
responses. This makes it possible for Sammy to finally understand the consequences of his 
choices and to seek Beatrice out in an effort to confront the problem, make amends and 
apologize for the abuse that was unjustly and selfishly inflicted. Unfortunately, however, he 
discovers that Beatrice is no longer capable of providing forgiveness because she has been 
rendered catatonic by hereditary factors that may have been aggravated by Sammy’s abuse 
and abandonment. This helps highlight why Sammy’s shame-based thinking lingers and why 
he appears at times to be holding his whole self in a rather negative light, detectable in his 
describing his life and existence as that of a ‘muddy’ or ‘stagnant pool’ as he continues to 
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narrate his story and reminisce on those particular moments that marked his fall from 
innocence (6, 125). Still, the fact that the experience has taken a more positive turn, 
represented in Sammy’s capacity to try to make amends, offer forgiveness and locate the one 
action or choice that has resulted in sentencing him to a lifetime of regret and self-reproach, 
does, in a sense, show that there is more guilt to Sammy’s post-war experience than shame.146  
     This should further highlight Sammy’s somewhat autobiographical account as a 
confessional narrative stemming out of an awareness of the moral transgression he has 
committed, and which is responsible, as such, for the morbid and guilt-ridden condition he 
finds himself caught in. However, given the elements of trauma in Free Fall and the fact that 
Sammy’s struggle to put his traumatic revelation in the Nazi camp across is, to a certain 
extent, a translation of Golding’s own, it might be tempting to regard the confessional 
account in a different light, and to tackle it as more of a traumatic narrative aimed at dealing 
with an agitating post-war experience. Golding and Sammy, after all, share the history of 
having subscribed to a rational worldview which they later come to discover as distortive, 
selective and insufficient in capturing, explaining and dealing with the atrocities of the war. 
Both are also gripped by an intense sense of guilt that compels them to ruminate on the 
negative episodes of their past, and to find themselves succumbing to bouts of self-blame and 
condemnation. And most importantly, both are post-war artists who, though highly aware of 
the limitations of language as well as the patterning and distorting effects of art, are still 
compelled by the intensity of their trauma to create art and to seek a semblance of a pattern 
that could put their whole experience in perspective. Tackling this line of argument, 
therefore, may not only highlight the confessional aspects of Sammy’s narrative as an attempt 
at understanding why something as painful as his mental torture at the Nazi camp had to 
                                                          
146 But not every experience of guilt within the confines of the novel is shown as completely advantageous or 
prosocial. After all, there is the distressing mix of shame and cultural guilt that can be noted to have existed 
from the beginning of the novel given the views of Sammy’s spiritual parents regarding sex. They can be said to 
have influenced the adolescent Sammy’s perspective just as much as Beatrice’s own was shaped by her religious 
upbringing. Such culturally rooted distress can actually be said to have contributed to the subsequent abuse as 
mentioned. After all, Sammy’s reference to the abuse of Beatrice as having been the ‘joint work’ of his and Miss 
Pringle’s is not only expressed in relation to how she is the one who began the cycle of torture (284), or how she 
is the one responsible for driving him away from the moral certainties of the religious realm, but is also 
associated with how she has contributed, along with Nick, to linking the experience of sex to that of cultural 
guilt. In fact, although Nick does not subscribe to any religious views, he is shown as holding the belief that ‘if 
the Devil had invented man he couldn’t have played him a dirtier, wickeder, a more shameful trick than when he 
gave him sex!’ (261). It is also possible to find a maladaptive expression of guilt in Golding’s choice to sentence 
his protagonist to an eternal experience of moral distress, torture and imprisonment which he associates with the 
‘grey faces that peer over [Sammy’s] shoulder’ and that would not leave him alone (3). Sammy’s experience of 
guilt, in other words, is represented as being associated with the experience of being subjected to the full 
scrutiny of a conscience that rules with a much harsher and crueller authority than any external conditions of 
restraint or confinement. 
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happen to him, but also help reveal a cognitive dimension to reality distortions, represented in 
the unreliability of trauma memories and the instability of past recollections, especially when 
drawn in a state of guilt. This may be reinforced by the manner in which Sammy’s 
recollection of his interrogation of the simple Beatrice and his memory of being interrogated 
by Doctor Halde are represented, and which seem to have been made terrifyingly reminiscent 
of each other, possibly for the purpose of reflecting a punishment that fits the crime, or of 
perhaps distorting the crime so that it fits the punishment. Like Beatrice who is shown as 
incapable of answering Sammy’s existential and intellectual inquiries with anything but an ‘I 
don’t know’ or a ‘maybe’ (132), Sammy eventually finds himself recalling a time and a 
situation where he could do nothing but rely on the same responses to address the mentally 
taxing inquiries of his interrogator and torturer. Sammy’s experience with the Gestapo 
officer, in other words, can be interpreted in two ways. It can be tackled as a distorted and 
unreliable episode that was made to appear as such due to Sammy’s understanding of the 
extent and depth of his sins against Beatrice. A different way would be to regard the 
experience as having influenced and shaped Sammy’s recollections of his sins in a manner 
that makes him seem deserving of being mentally tortured. Either way, the moral dimension 
to the novel will not be lost because both readings reflect an expression of guilt that is 
provoked by the growing knowledge of the extent of the cruelty that Sammy, and by 
association humanity, are capable of.  They both help reinforce the association between 
morality, the inevitability of guilt and mankind’s inherent brutality. Both readings can also be 
considered as fostering a sense of uncertainty regarding the validity of representation and the 
possibility of ever attaining truth. In fact, such a notion can clearly be detected at an earlier 
point of Sammy’s narrative through Golding’s reliance on the elements of metafictionality. It 
can also be said to have been later reinforced through Sammy’s post-war realization that 
Beatrice might have been justified, after all, in her indefinite responses: ‘For maybe was sign 
of all our times. We were certain of nothing’ (120).    
     Concerns with the problems of truth and representation might have begun with the 
modernist self-consciousness of Golding’s earlier fables, particularly in the illusory world of 
Pincher Martin, where doubts regarding the truth status of our conscious perception of our 
world are given a much clearer manifestation than in Lord of the Flies or The Inheritors. It is 
with Free Fall, however, that Golding abandons the strict conditions of the fable and opts, 
instead, for the kind of techniques and structure that eventually allow for a fuller engagement 
with such notions as a way of asserting the complexity of both the human experience and art.    
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CONCLUSION 
The Later Golding: A Universal Pessimist and a Cosmic Optimist 
 
We need more humanity, more care, more love. There are those 
who expect a political system to produce that; and others who 
expect the love to produce the system. My own faith is that the 
truth of the future lies between the two and we shall behave 
humanly and a bit humanely, stumbling along, haphazardly 
generous and gallant, foolishly and meanly wise, until the rape of 
our planet is seen to be the preposterous folly that it is.  
William Golding, ‘Nobel Lecture 1983’.147 
 
 
So much has been written and published about Golding with little attention to how the 
author’s scientific or rather evolutionary knowledge had factored into the creation of his 
novels. In fact, it is possible to see the scholarly efforts dedicated to understanding Golding’s 
works as roughly belonging to either the realm of traditional, theological or general criticism, 
or to an interdisciplinarity, which though acknowledging the existential, still downplays the 
biological, evolutionary or rational in keeping with the religious overtones that pervade the 
majority of his works. This is, of course, understandable given the author’s hostility to the 
rationality of the sciences and the fact that two of his major works, namely Lord of the Flies 
and The Inheritors, were written as a response to a reductive pattern of progress promoted by 
the scientific ethos of the Victorian age. As shown throughout my analysis, however, relying 
on an approach that takes account of the cognitive, the biocultural and the existential does not 
necessarily entail undermining the dominant theological or biblical notions of the fall and 
original sin that are normally relied on by the author in describing the reality of the human 
condition. On the contrary, such a perspective can be seen as having proved helpful in 
lending credence to Golding’s claims of the universality of the problem of evil, especially 
considering how it reinforces the association that Golding had first drawn between egotism 
                                                          
147 In A Moving Target, 213.   
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and biology within the context of The Inheritors, or how it highlights the inescapable 
eventuality of the problem in both a developmental and an evolutionary sense. The approach 
can also be seen as having proved helpful in showing Golding’s early works as providing a 
rich source for thinking about some of the issues that cognitive science, and to a certain 
extent, existential psychology deal with, particularly when it comes to matters of empathy, 
memory and moral judgements or the existentially gripping problems of identity, ideology, 
religion and death. Moreover, examining Golding’s early works in such a frame can help in 
maintaining a sense of the relevance of his creations, especially considering how it involves 
taking the ethical arguments in his work beyond the typical realm of traditional or general 
criticism, investigating them in light of current rational, psychological and philosophical 
conceptions of human nature, and understanding their development in relation to those that 
were occupying the intellectual and scientific spheres of his time. But can such an approach 
continue to prove helpful when taken beyond the realm of Golding’s early concern with the 
universal reality of evil to his much more complex and gradual endorsement of 
postmodernism, its vehement disavowal of objective reality and its intense and insistent 
denial of the truth status of both art and grand narratives? One way of addressing this 
question is to develop an understanding of how Golding continues to pursue his modernist 
preoccupation with the problems of patterning, solipsism and reality distortions in a 
postmodernist frame in his later engagements before linking such conceptions with a 
cognitive understanding of the mind that acknowledges its role in constructing and distorting 
the world we live in. But before such a task is undertaken, it is useful first to target the 
emergence of postmodernism in the post-war years in light of trauma theory and to link its 
narrative techniques and art to the trauma of the age and the shattering revelations of the 
Holocaust.  
      Examining Golding’s later novels in comparison to his early fables may initially show 
him progressing from a post-war fixation on the darkness of man’s heart to a much more 
inclusive engagement with the totality of man and his flashes of religious experience. This 
does not mean, however, that such interests were never an integral part of his past fables as is 
evident in the religious awareness of his characters which can be said to have been given its 
earliest manifestation in Simon’s confrontation with the pig’s head in Lord of the Flies. It 
also should not be taken to mean that Golding’s interest in exploring the fallen nature of 
humanity had ceased or diminished in the later novels simply because there is a marked 
absence of the earlier moral certainties by which the darkness of a man’s heart was to be 
judged. Golding’s engagement with the fallen nature of man remains a necessary part of his 
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growing awareness of the paradoxical reality of life. Despite the persistence of such 
engagements, however, which can be said to have bound Golding’s works together just as 
much as his interest in the numinous, it does not appear that they are invested with the same 
hopelessness and pessimism as before. The tone by which such matters are handled, for one 
thing, appears to have become much lighter and less serious as Golding’s creations continued 
to progress towards a more inclusive and less tragic dimension. Humour had also become 
more of a recurring element in the later fictions, particularly in Rites of Passage, which for all 
its serious implications was meant, as Golding had clearly noted, to be read as a black 
comedy, a funny and entertaining treatment of the inherent flaws of man that haunt his 
adopted systems and infect his social relations (Baker, ‘Interview’). Even works such as 
Darkness Visible, which presented a ferocious attack on contemporary society that echoes the 
seriousness of the earlier fables, have been invested with the kind of humorous moments that 
sometimes help in undermining the pessimism of their premise and in promoting more of a 
hopeful outlook regarding the fate of humankind.  
     When asked about his later creations and why they became less focused on all the beastly 
potentialities of man, Golding maintained that he had begun writing fiction at a point when 
the war experience and the destruction of his liberal or rather naive Rousseauesque view of 
humanity were still fresh in his mind (in Haffenden 112-3; Biles 50). He explains in ‘Fable’ 
that he went into the war with a belief in ‘the perfectibility of social man; that a correct 
structure of society would produce goodwill, and that therefore you can remove all social ills 
by the reorganization of society’ (Gates 78-80). But then he came to discover the strain of 
malignancy in the human race and became gripped ever after with an utter sense of 
pessimism and hopelessness that then found its fullest expression in his earliest fables (Gates 
78-80; Golding in Haffenden 113; Biles 50). The objective purpose driving the creation of 
those books was, as stated earlier, the need to highlight the state of self-deception masking 
man’s innate sinfulness from himself, but Golding maintains that there is also a personal 
dimension, represented in the act of writing as offering some means of helping, healing, or 
perhaps even forgiving oneself (in Haffenden 115). He admits to Haffenden that there was no 
guarantee that he would not have become a member of the Nazi party had he perhaps been in 
Germany at the time, and that the writing of Lord of the Flies, in particular, might have 
partially come about as a result of an attempt at ‘purging [himself] of that knowledge’ (115). 
This helps highlight Golding’s early fables as having possibly been a way of dealing with his 
own war trauma, not through a direct representation of it, which given the limitation of 
language and the patterning effects of art may be highly difficult if not impossible to execute, 
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but through creating a construct that could at least communicate the feelings and realizations 
associated with the experience of war. Hence the ‘sheer grief’ by which the subject matter 
was handled, the emotionally laden ‘theme [that] defeats structuralism,’ and the tragic and 
mournful tone that laments ‘the lost childhood of the world’ (Golding, Target 163). In a 
Moving Target article, Golding maintains: 
The Second World War came near to demolishing all the assumptions of the first one 
and uncovered entirely different areas of indescribability. The horror of the brewed 
up tank, the burning plane, the crushed and sinking submarine—all that is difficult to 
describe but the job can be done. The experience of Hamburg, Belsen, Hiroshima, 
and Dachau cannot be imagined. We have gone to war and beggared description all 
over again. Those experiences are like black holes in space. Nothing can get out to 
let us know what it was like inside. It was like what it was like and on the other hand 
it was like nothing whatsoever. We stand before a gap in history. We have invented a 
limit to literature (102). 
This struggle with the problem of indescribability in recounting a traumatic experience is not 
specific to Golding, of course. It is a common concern shared in most trauma accounts by 
traumatized individuals who, though they may wish to draw on the self-healing aspects of 
narratives and writing, are usually seen as struggling with the incomprehensibility, 
elusiveness and disorderly quality of the traumatic event, and the difficulty of addressing its 
full complexity without distorting it (Brockmeier 28).148 The problem can also be detected in 
post-war fictional creations, including those of Golding and particularly Free Fall, where 
Sammy Mountjoy is shown as attempting to put his whole life in perspective in the aftermath 
of his experience in the Nazi camp, only to find himself burdened by the utter difficulty of 
expressing the indescribable, or of at least communicating ‘in part’ what the sheer enormity of 
the situation might have entailed (5). As a result, it is common to see both fictional and 
nonfictional traumatic accounts as violating the norms of conventional narratives, or 
reflecting the utilization of techniques such as ‘blackouts’ or ‘fuzzy temporalities’ for the 
                                                          
148 Ruth Leys seems to trace this indescribability problem to how memory works or rather to the possibility of 
the traumatic experience never ending up being processed properly and never getting stored in memory, as such, 
given, of course, the shocking effect of the event (8). Others such as LaCapra believe the experience to be laid 
down at a much more basic level, allowing it to re-emerge in ‘nightmares, flashbacks, anxiety attacks, and other 
forms of intrusively repetitive behavior’ (89). Such accounts help link the difficulty that Golding is reporting in 
attempting to describe his war experience to how memory works, a point that should make reading Free Fall, in 
particular, in light of trauma theory and memory research particularly interesting, considering how it is centred 
on the recollection of a war survivor who has so much in common with Golding. 
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purpose of conveying the intensity of trauma and mimicking its effects and shattering 
outcomes (qtd. in Brockmeier 28-9). In fact, it is possible to see the abandonment of the 
highly organized structure of the fabular mode and the disruption of the chronological order in 
Free Fall as delivering something of the same effect. They help reflect Sammy’s struggle to 
impose a semblance of meaning on life in the aftermath of the war, as well as suggest an 
association between the disorderly aspect of the narrative and the chaotic and irreducible 
elements of both life and the traumatic experience. The effects of trauma can also be said to 
have been already delivered in Golding’s highly structured or fabular novels since they do not 
offer a resolution or a solution to our fall, but are rather more oriented towards denying the 
reader a sense of closure in the conventional sense. This is, of course, typical of most fictional 
and nonfictional accounts of trauma because ‘presenting the experience as complete and 
completed,’ or providing the kind of ending where conflicts are resolved and justice is finally 
attained, would simply entail ‘betray[ing] what happened’ (Frank, 122).   
     Denying the characters a sense of resolution to their dilemmas is an aspect that Golding 
chose to maintain in the later novels because he believed that providing closure in the 
conventional sense might, in some way, suggest the provision of a solution or some sort of 
knowledge of how to work towards the goal of perfecting man (in Haffenden, 112). This 
should not mean, however, that Golding was still incapable of abandoning his previous stance 
in Lord of the Flies and of reverting back in the opposite direction where there was hope for 
man’s redemption after all, especially after he had ‘moved further away from Belsen and 
Hiroshima and all the rest of it’ (Golding in Biles, 50-51). The prospect of social 
perfectibility, in other words, had not only become something that Golding could conceive of 
‘intellectually,’ albeit still not ‘emotionally,’ but had also made it possible for him to reject his 
view of man as a ‘morally diseased creation’ (in Haffenden, 110; Baker, ‘Interview’). It 
helped him further his interest in the social setting, in figuring out how to make society work 
and in understanding how to live in society without exploiting other people (in Haffenden, 
119). Such questions had, of course, begun with Lord of the Flies whose political and social 
dimension cannot be denied. Still, given that Golding’s interest at the time was mainly 
directed at highlighting the folly of examining social systems for the roots of evil, it became 
necessary for him to cast his characters in conditions of isolation, away from the civilizing 
force of modern society, where it was impossible for man to hide ‘behind a…pair of political 
pants’ (Golding, Gates 78). This aided in casting society as something of a benign factor that 
helps to bring out the good in people and in channeling their evil in a positive direction. The 
notion can even be further reinforced by Golding’s representation of Jack as a relatively good 
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boy prior to being cast away on the island, considering how he is shown as having managed in 
the presence of an ‘off-white’ social scheme to become head of a boys’ choir (Golding in 
Biles 46-8). If there is a dark dimension to society in the early books, it is perhaps attributable 
to the fact that Golding intended his early fables to trace the flaws of society to the flaws of 
the individual. Golding might have also wanted to subtly highlight the notion that it is the 
creation or emergence of society itself that testifies to the innate sinfulness of man because it 
reflects a dormant awareness of the necessity for restraining people’s nature and for limiting 
their expression of freedom. Such notions remain, of course, in the subsequent novels, 
particularly in The Pyramid (1967), where the loveless society of Stilbourne is meant to 
reflect its inhabitants’ incapacity to love or to view others as anything but a means to an end. 
What changes in the later engagements, however, is that Golding comes to place more 
emphasis on the notion that it is possible for the organization of society, sometimes, to affect 
its individuals and to direct them towards a more destructive path. 
     Introducing the social context as providing a scheme that can restrict people’s freedom for 
better or for worse may, in a sense, be an acknowledgement by Golding that there are now 
factors beyond the individual’s control that might sometimes overpower the innate goodness 
of man just as much as they are capable of suppressing his instinctual evil.149 Consequently, it 
is difficult to pass moral judgements with the same certainty as before, particularly in those 
moments when the social circumstances are represented by Golding as something that would 
have allowed the characters to act or turn out differently had they perhaps been extinguished 
or made less constricting.150 This shift from the moral certainties of the early fables to the 
difficulty of passing moral judgements is further reinforced by Golding’s growing interest in 
                                                          
149 In responding to readers and commentators who detected an increasing level of optimism in the later novels, 
Golding maintained that the optimism in the sea trilogy, in particular, might have been inescapable to some 
extent because all three volumes are supposed to be the work of Edmund Talbot, ‘an intelligent but brash and 
optimistic young man’ who has every reason to convey such optimism in his writing given the triumph of 
Britain in the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent promise of Britain ruling the world for another century or 
more (Ends 7-8). Golding warned, however, that such a proclamation should not be taken to validate the charges 
of pessimism that were directed against him because it was ultimately his ‘own optimism which gained the 
upper hand’ and made both him and Talbot ‘less and less inclined to portray life as a hopeless affair in the face 
of…tragic circumstances’ (7-8). 
150 This clearly shows in Free Fall, of course. Another good example is Darkness Visible where Golding 
highlights the difficulty of passing moral judgements by forcing the reader to revaluate the crimes, sins and 
intentions of his three principal characters Matty, Sophie and Mr. Pedigree. Golding engages with this matter 
repeatedly throughout the course of the novel. It is through Mr. Pedigree, however, that Golding clearly brings 
this issue to the fore, especially given how Pedigree’s remorse and cry for help is drawn in stark opposition to 
Sophie’s psychopathic indifference to her sins: ‘There’ve been such people in this neighbourhood, such 
monsters, that girl and her men, Stanhope, Goodchild, Bell even, and his ghastly wife—I’m not like them, bad 
but not as bad, I never hurt anybody— they thought I hurt children but I didn’t, I hurt myself. And you know 
about the last thing the thing I shall be scared into doing if I live long enough—just to keep a child quiet, keep it 
from telling—that’s hell Matty, that’ll be hell—help me!’ (283).  
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the indeterminacy inherent in mysticism, art and language, an interest which may in itself be 
considered as attesting to Golding’s growing optimism, considering how it marks a 
diminishing engagement with the war and its traumatic revelations. It should be noted, 
however, that given how such concerns are not only related to matters of representation, but 
also shared by a post-war generation that found itself gripped by the difficulty of 
communicating the traumatic atrocities of the Holocaust, it might be sensible to regard them 
as still betraying a traumatic dimension, albeit not in the same intensity as before.151  
     Golding’s concern with the difficulty of representation in the aftermath of the war had 
always been an integral part of his late modernist exploration and his experimentation with 
different fictional modes by which he could convey the limitations of the conventional forms 
of fiction in communicating the horrifying revelations of the war. It can clearly be seen in the 
self-consciousness of his early novels, for example, employed for the purpose of exploring the 
relationship between fiction, truth and reality, of stressing the notion of self-deception and 
reality distortion, and of highlighting the state of uncertainty and the loss of meaning 
associated with the subsequent breakdown of belief systems.152 What happens in the later 
novels, however, is that a less intense preoccupation with some of these effects continues, but 
with increasing reliance on the metafictional mode as direct engagements with the war 
diminish,153 changes which again make it possible to detect something of a decreasing 
pessimism on Golding’s part.154 Still, although Golding is noted as having relied on the 
metafictional mode to ‘playfully’ explore issues relating to the claimed ‘“truth” status’ of both 
art and history, represented in The Paper Men and the sea trilogy respectively (Crawford 16), 
it seems that the mode does, in the end, promote an air of indeterminacy typical of 
postmodern fiction whose techniques are noted by Anne Whitehead as ‘overlapping’ with 
                                                          
151 This can most clearly be detected in the manner by which Golding has his characters express their struggle 
with language and the patterning effects of art in their attempt to communicate their vision of the mystical and in 
their fear of imparting an air of normality to an otherwise unique vision or experience. Matty, for example, 
prefers silence to speech partly because he was brought to do so, and partly because he cannot say what he 
means (Darkness 96-7); Sammy can only hope to communicate ‘in part’ because the quality of his terror in the 
Nazi camp cannot be recreated, much less shared (Fall 5); Barclay feels that he has ‘nothing to speak with 
but…metaphor’ in addressing his spiritual experience because ‘words are too weak’ (Paper 132-3, 52); and 
Jocelin feels that he needs ‘three tongues to say three things at once’ as he struggles to come to terms with the 
complexity of the motivations driving his vision (Spire 214, 218). 
152 The mode is highlighted through Christopher Martin’s construction of an artificial world from the resources 
of his own mind and consciousness, the children’s innocent belief that the boy’s life on the island will be 
analogous to another naive fictional adventure: ‘It’s like in a book…Treasure Island … Swallows and Amazons 
… Coral Island’ (45), and Sammy Mountjoy’s struggle against the distorting patterns of art and form in search 
of a meaningful narrative.  
153 They are writings, in other words, that ‘implicitly’ reflect the effects of Golding’s war experience even 
though the war is rarely mentioned.    
154 Darkness Visible is an exception, of course. This may be attributed to the fact that Golding began writing the 
novel in 1955 (Carey, Golding 367), around the same time he wrote his early fables.  
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those usually employed in traumatic narratives (3). Self-consciousness is, of course, an 
intrinsic aspect of the process of fictional creation and can be said to have existed in less 
noticeable forms long before it came to prominence in modernist and postmodernist 
productions (Waugh 5). Still, its emergence in the form of metafictional narratives in an age 
that ‘has been singularly uncertain, insecure, self-questioning and culturally pluralistic’ is of 
particular interest because it fosters the notion of a fictitious reality which, in turn, functions 
‘to foreground the difficulty of representing trauma and the resulting aporias’ (Waugh 6-7; 
Gibbs 81). 
     For trauma theorists such as Dominick LaCapra and Patrick Bracken, conceptions of 
uncertainty or indeterminacy that are normally associated with postmodernism can be one of 
the major aspects that help tie in the writings of the age with reported accounts of trauma 
survivors. Both, after all, involve the disintegration of a belief system or a frame of reference 
that used to provide life with meaning prior to the traumatic event.155 This disintegrated frame 
of reference for the postmodernists is located in the Enlightenment and its conception of 
science, rationality and reason as holding the hope of improving human societies, of putting 
an end to all problems and of fostering an increased sense of ‘sensitivity’ to any kind of 
‘suffering and injustice’ that may arise (LaCapra 176-7). One possible reason why the 
Enlightenment eventually came to be perceived as irredeemably irreconcilable with the 
trauma of the age, aside from its failure in keeping a tragedy of the scale and enormity of the 
Holocaust from happening, is the indirect role it played in promoting the supposedly scientific 
ideology that eventually resulted in the extermination of those perceived as racially inferior. 
In fact, LaCapra notes, that it is because of the Enlightenment’s conception of western 
civilization as representing the highest point of progress ever attained that it became difficult 
for people to make sense of the atrocities of the Second World War or to even ‘come to terms 
with the Holocaust within that frame of reference’ (176). As a result, it is common to see 
postmodernist texts as relying on the mode of the fantastic or the magic realist as a way of 
challenging or questioning the very same discourse of rationality, logic and reason that held 
the false hope of progress or that contributed to the escalations of war in the first place. 
Fantastical elements can also be said to be a commentary on the novelty of the traumatic 
experience, how it defies ordinary modes of expression and how despite the air of unreality 
                                                          
155 The destruction of belief systems in the wake of trauma is noted by Janoff-Bulman and Yopyk as a common 
psychological response (125), an observation that further reinforces the association between accounts of trauma 
and postmodernism and its distrust of grand narratives. For Bracken, however, reports of a loss of meaning in 
the aftermath of the trauma of the Second World War are culturally specific and cannot be handled as a common 
universal response to traumatic events in general.  
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that surrounds its occurrence, it is still undeniably and inarguably real (Kerman, Adam 12). 
     For Golding, reliance on the fantastic and the magic realist might have begun as a way of 
challenging the established rationalist discourse of the western world and of promoting an 
awareness of the metaphysical dimension of existence that is typically suppressed by the 
supremacy of such rational systems. In fact, it is the perception of the numinous itself that is 
regarded by Golding as an outcome of the traumatizing experience of the war and the 
destruction of the pattern of social perfectibility and Wellsian rationality that had earlier 
blinded him to the miraculous and irrational elements of one’s existence, and robbed him of 
his privileged access to the spiritual realm as a child. However, although most of Golding’s 
novels display elements of the fantastic in one way or another, there seems to be a marked 
difference in the manner by which Golding chose to handle the mystical and the spiritual in 
his later creations, both in terms of technique and intensity. This is especially evident in the 
narrative mode which seems to aid in marking a pattern of gradual conversion from clarity to 
obscurity. Examining Lord of the Flies, for example, shows Golding as struggling against the 
restrictive form of the fable and its conditions of clarity, economy and precision in 
communicating his vision of the mystical. In fact, the difficulty can be detected in his 
portrayal of Simon, in particular, which although ‘toned down’ in accordance with Monteith’s 
advice to make Simon ‘explicable in purely rational terms’ (154-5), is still noted by some 
critics such as Bernard Dick as marking an unfortunate flaw in the intricate design of a highly 
acclaimed masterpiece (25). This changes in the later novels, however, especially in Darkness 
Visible, given Golding’s clear reticence regarding the humanity, existence and moral status of 
his protagonist, Matty. It also shows clearly in Golding’s refusal to provide readers with any 
conclusive hint within the confines of the novel as to whether his protagonist is supposed to 
be read as a spiritual prophet, a religious fanatic or even an attribute of the numinous itself. 
Relying on a reticent narrator, after all, is one way by which Golding disrupts the balance 
between direct communication and discovery in favour of obscurity, or what LaCapra might 
describe as a ‘dosage of the illness itself’ (154). It aids in countering the difficulty of 
representation and the limitations of the conventional forms of fictional creation in capturing 
both the richness of our world and the depth and intensity of the traumatic revelations of the 
war. Reliance on a reticent narrator is also a means by which Golding realizes the desire to 
make readers understand their own limitations, the reductiveness of ultimate explanations and 
the defectiveness of rational modes of thinking. The device does, after all, involves allying the 
reader with a limited character who is caught in a state of self-deception and who is, as such, 
oblivious to certain crucial aspects of both life and reality (Redpath 29-30). This is 
192 
 
accomplished in The Spire, for example, through bringing readers to share Jocelin’s initial 
confusion regarding the authenticity of his vision and the reality of his motive for building the 
spire, a matter that continues to torment and deny him from seeing the beauty of his creation 
up to the last moment of his life. It can also be said to have been delivered in the sea trilogy, 
first through Talbot’s adoption of an Augustan view of life that denies the mystical; and later 
through his succumbing to an episode of madness that further compromises the reality of his 
vision and that highlights, as such, the inevitability of distortions in both our conscious 
experience of the world and our fiction. 
      Golding’s reliance on the distorted point of view of a limited character can, of course, be 
detected in his early fables as in the case of Christopher Martin who continues to deny the 
reality of his death; or the Neanderthal Lok who lacks the advanced cognition and the 
linguistic faculties of his intellectual superiors. However, what marks Golding’s early 
engagements as different in that particular regard is the manner by which he handled the 
technique, evident in his insistence on delivering his basic premise as clearly and 
emphatically as possible through the dramatic shift in perspective. This had to change in the 
later novels, of course, particularly since the scope began to grow and incorporate much more 
complex aspects of human existence that even Golding felt he had no full grasp of, but which 
he believed he had to express nonetheless. 
      Such techniques and concerns may have grown out of the preoccupations of earlier 
modernist writers’ sense of uncertainty and modernism’s innovative literary productions and 
modes of expression. However, given the extent to which these techniques were utilized and 
explored in the later stage of Golding’s literary career, it seems plausible to regard them as 
gradually becoming affiliated with the postmodernist trend whose productions are noted by 
trauma theorists as having something in common with traumatic narratives (A. Whitehead 3). 
Postmodernist productions are even regarded sometimes as holding the possibility of being 
read as ‘post-Holocaust’ creations, ‘struggling to come to terms with the trauma that called 
them into existence’ (LaCapra 179). This turn to postmodernism, according to McCarron, is 
noted as having begun for Golding with Darkness Visible (Coincidence 9). The statement is 
further supported by Paul Crawford who believes the novel to reflect Golding’s antagonism to 
the trend towards postmodernism since he relies on its techniques ‘to run his novel into the 
ground, [and] construct a failing work’ as a way of highlighting the challenges he faces as an 
artist ‘in an age that so radically calls into question the significance of fiction and its truth-
telling powers’ (170). Such antagonism, however, seems to have gradually dimmed in the 
subsequent novels, particularly in the sea trilogy, where Golding is seen as fully endorsing 
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common postmodern techniques for the purpose of deepening his exploration of the 
patterning tendencies of art and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of avoiding its distorting 
effects on the experience that art is supposed to capture. The antagonism may even be 
considered to have noticeably diminished already in The Paper Men, which though it carries 
an attack on postmodernism and postmodernity, as Darkness Visible does, still exhibits a 
certain degree of advocacy of some of its notions, particularly those relating to the author’s 
authority and control over his creations (McCarron, Golding 49; Crawford 172). Golding 
being a moralist, of course, addresses these notions in a spiritual and moral frame by rejecting 
the possibility of art as ever offering an alternative to spirituality in the post-war age, and by 
challenging any consideration of the artist as a moral example (McCarron, Golding 49).156 
There is, however, another dimension to Golding’s engagement in the matter which manifests 
itself in the paradoxical answer that Golding provides within the confines of the novel in 
response to the question of whether the author does possess a privileged understanding of his 
creation, more so than the critic or the reader.   
    When asked about the Lawrentian dictum ‘Never trust the teller, trust the tale,’ and whether 
he agrees with the general opinion that writers might, after all, know less about their work 
than what they actually think, Golding strictly maintained that he believed the dictum to be 
‘absolute nonsense’ because writing for him was all about authors controlling their creation in 
the same manner as a painter who ‘can entirely visualize a painting, and then just paint what 
he’s visualizing’ (Kermode, ‘Meaning’ 9-10). He states to Kermode that:    
the man who tells the tale if he has a tale worth telling will know exactly what he is 
about and this business of the artist as a sort of starry-eyed inspired creature, dancing 
along, with his feet two or three feet above the surface of the earth, not really 
knowing what sort of prints he's leaving behind him, is nothing like the truth (9-10).  
Years later, however, Golding came gradually to abandon such a view, not only in 
encouraging readers to think first about what they believe the book is about, but also in 
denying the author, or rather himself, any sort of knowledge, or god-like status over his 
creations (54, 56). He is even reported as having stated to Baker that the reason why his 
books are deemed so obscure is that he is not particularly clear about what he is trying to say, 
                                                          
156 In fact, Golding is reported by Grove as having rejected the common tendency to forgive artists their 
mistakes just because they are artists: ‘We can forgive anybody provided they've got a bit of genius -- which is 
absolute fatuity, of course…I mean, when Beethoven promised one overture to two different publishers, he was 
a con man. He may have been a genius but he was also a moral slob’.  
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and that the best thing he could do is ‘translate obscurity into—modified—obscurity’ (qtd. in 
Redpath 36). Carey also notes Golding as having made a similar statement to Monteith 
regarding Darkness Visible, probably the most complex and obscure of his creations, which 
he believes could help explain why it is the one novel that Golding refused to talk about, and 
why it had gone through ‘the longest incubation period of any of his books’ (Golding 367, 
378). However although obscurity in Golding’s later creations seems to have come about as a 
necessary condition to handling and highlighting a subject matter so abstruse, there appears to 
be an additional purpose to Golding’s desire to maintain it, especially in The Spire, which 
resists hermeneutic reduction to one particular pattern or reading. In discussing the different 
explanations that were put forth regarding Jocelin’s motivation, Golding maintained: 
what the hell does it matter what the writer thought of his the book? The book is on 
its own. But I am well aware of all those choices you mention. Whether the character 
is a psychopath or a dedicated mystic who is chosen – like Ezekiel, if you like – to 
construct a spire which will stand as a sign to the faithful … The writer is aware of 
that whole spectrum, but he doesn’t choose between them. What does the right 
choice matter, so long as the spectrum is there? (Haffenden 109).157 
As previously stated, such a step is vital for Golding not only for the sake of ‘leaving his 
options open’ as a writer, but also for providing a much more accurate depiction of ‘what life 
is like’ (109), that is reflecting the mystery and irreducible complexity of man and the art he 
produces to the best of his abilities (115). In this light, Jocelin’s final cry ‘It’s like the apple 
tree!’ is not merely a testament to the elusiveness of his near-death revelation regarding the 
spire and the difficulty of putting it into words. It is a support for the intricacy of human 
motivation, the tangled relations between cause and effect, and the resulting difficulty of 
providing a reading that can ‘encompass’ all the possible reasons, impulses and truths that a 
statement as seemingly simple as this may suggest (Spire 223; See Redpath 35; Clements 98-
9). A similar effect can also be detected in Darkness Visible whose structure is reported by 
Carey as having been intentionally designed to deny readers any grasp on certainty, and to 
invite them into contemplating different possible interpretations for what the book may be 
                                                          
157 Golding’s views regarding the author’s authority or control were mixed, particularly in The Paper Men. 
There are moments, as explained in the introduction, when Golding seems to be arguing against the Barthesian 
death of the author. There are also moments in the novel, as already shown, when Golding appears to be 
celebrating the author’s death. Judy Carver, daughter of William Golding, notes that although her father had 
intellectually come to accept the notion that the writer has little control over his books once they are published 
and that readers are entitled to their own reading, he did not totally come to terms with it emotionally. He still 
found misinterpretations frustrating because he really wanted readers to see what he meant.  
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about (Golding 367). It can even be said to be operating under the cloak of simplicity in a 
book as direct and straightforward as The Pyramid given what Redpath believes to be a ‘gap 
between the text and the title’ that seems to have invited many different readings and 
interpretations over the years (31). Further support for the conclusion can be found in the fact 
that Golding had actually thought of including the subtitle ‘As you like it’ along with The 
Pyramid, in an attempt to draw readers’ attention to the fact that the book may, after all, be 
much more complicated than how it seems on the surface (Tiger 214). In an interview with 
Haffenden, Golding states: 
I would be very happy to meet someone who could tell me one single, incontestable 
truth. I’ve never found one …The twentieth century is the ambiguous century and 
I’m a child of my century. I don’t feel any enormous, ultimate certainties, except 
perhaps these tenuous ones I’ve been talking about – this cosmic view, the multiple 
universe I guessed at. I think I’m right to present my books in this ambiguous way, 
because any given universe is partial (113).  
     This might once again suggest that Golding might have partially been motivated to create 
his later novels in a manner that allows for numerous simultaneous readings in order to reject 
the reductive tendencies of ultimate explanations or interpretations, and to highlight the 
insufficiency of forcing a pattern on an irreducible reality. Carrying a cognitive, evolutionary, 
or an existential reading, as such, may prove problematic, especially given Golding’s 
antagonism to scientific rationalism, its tendency to rely on a ‘language with the grey 
precision of an electronic computer,’ and its incapacity to deal with the kind of questions that 
can be ‘answered only by the methods of philosophy and the arts’ (Golding, Gates 121). It 
should be noted, however, that Golding’s position regarding science was as mixed as his 
stand regarding the author’s control or authority. Though he repeatedly expressed 
dissatisfaction with the reductionism of science and the scientists’ tendency to apply it 
everywhere (Golding in Haffenden 114; Baker, ‘Interview’), he still maintained some sense 
of ‘appreciation,’ perhaps even respect, ‘for what it could accomplish’ (Dick 62). It might 
even be possible to conclude, given Golding’s clear affirmation of a desire to get back in 
touch with the scientific scene rather than the literary one (in Baker, Study 94), that he might 
still have held too much respect for science to dismiss it entirely or to regard it through the 
same lens of skepticism as the postmodernists’. It also appears from his Nobel prize lecture 
that he was still concerned with bridging the gap between the two cultures, or more precisely 
the miraculous and the scientific, rather than dismissing the scientific realm altogether, an 
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endeavour which he admits having pursued in Free Fall, only to end up making ‘a mess of it’ 
(Target 204).  
     Golding’s writings may have taken a postmodernist turn at a later point in his career, 
particularly in relation to the truth status of representations, reality distortions and the 
patterning effects of both art and language. Such notions and beliefs, however, are not exactly 
irreconcilable with what have been uncovered in the sciences, or more specifically in the field 
of cognitive psychology. Both postmodernists and cognitive scientists, after all, are skeptical 
of the representational capacities of our narratives and constructs and regard them as poor 
reflections of the external reality that we occupy. But whereas postmodernists trace this 
particular problem to language which they regard as ‘imprecise, self-referential and subject to 
individual gaps between the signifier and the signified’ (Austin 38), cognitive scientists tend 
to locate the problem in our conscious perception which they perceive as fragmented, 
impoverished, biased and undeniably selective (Austin, 38; Metzinger, Intro.; Blackmore 17-
24; Dennett 366). 
     When describing the subjective phenomenon of human consciousness, Thomas Metzinger 
explains that one of the common misconceptions we draw from the genuine, unified and 
coherent awareness of being situated in a world here and now is that we are actually in direct 
contact with reality (Ch.2). The truth of the matter, however, is that we are ‘born naive 
realists’ who are incapable of detecting that our vivid and conscious experience of our 
surroundings is merely a product of neural and cognitive processes compensating for an 
otherwise fragmented, maybe even impoverished, perception of the world (Metzinger Ch.1; 
Blackmore 17-24; Dennett 366). Our senses, after all, are ‘limited’ and ‘selective’ (Metzinger 
Intro.). Since they are more oriented to processing the world for purposes of survival rather 
than depicting it the way it actually is, they are likely to result in ‘a low-dimensional 
projection of the inconceivably richer physical reality surrounding and sustaining us’ 
(Metzinger Intro.; Austin 133-4). This means that ‘what we see and hear, or what we feel and 
smell and taste, is only a small fraction of what actually exists out there’ (Metzinger Intro.). 
Consequently, it would be more fitting to label the experience that is consciousness as ‘not so 
much an image of reality’ as ‘a tunnel through reality’ (Intro.). 
      Such findings are, of course, not established with the utmost certainty or even 
corroborated in a less controversial frame than the one provided by the fields of 
Consciousness Studies and Philosophy of Mind. Still, to highlight the basic possession of 
consciousness as the kind of asset that involves creating a model of the world rather than 
depicting it accurately, is to expose the reality distortion problem, if one could describe it as 
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such, at a much deeper and fundamental level than imagined. Contrary to common belief, 
accuracy is not always the privileged criterion that grants individuals the adaptive edge when 
dealing with their surroundings, not only because there is a limitation inherent in the amount 
of information the brain can store and process, but also because the absence of functional 
selectivity is likely to overwhelm the brain with data and subject it to information anxiety 
(Austin 71). This explains why certain cognitive processes such as compression and 
schematization are particularly important as methods by which the brain can tackle the 
limitation problem, especially when it comes to the amount of information it can store and 
use (30-1). However, one resulting side effect of the development of such processes is that 
the content of the brain’s mental storage is likely to be for the most part undetectably unstable 
(31-3). Certain amassed details or experiences are likely to be modified, distorted, reshaped, 
or deleted because ‘the value of compressing information outweighs the value of getting all 
of the information right’ (33). The same principle can also be said to apply in a psychological 
sense, considering how it may sometimes serve people to have certain aspects of their 
recollected experiences modified in a manner that would either promote an adaptive state of 
self-deception, or enhance a positive image of the self (Trivers Ch. 7; McAllister et al.) After 
all, there is little truth in the notion that the more people are attuned to reality, the healthier 
they are (Austin 121), and since people have always been found to be in possession of the 
kind of positive illusions that would allow them to overcome difficulties and cope with their 
surroundings, it should come as no surprise to say that such self-biased distortions do serve a 
highly adaptive function (Austin 120; McAllister et al.). Unfortunately, however, the 
instability of the processes of mental storage does not always work in the individual’s favour. 
Certain psychological factors such as guilt or trauma are also capable of jeopardizing the 
authenticity of remembered events, leading individuals, in some cases, to magnify the 
negative aspects of their experience rather than suppress or alter them in a manner that could 
ease their distress (McAllister et al.; Laney and Takarangi). It is also possible for these 
tendencies to interfere, and not in a positive way, with people’s perception of themselves or 
their sense of identity, especially since identity is, in the end, a ‘life story,’ a construct that is 
largely dependent on people’s ‘reinterpretation’ or ‘reconstruction’ of their memories, and 
how they chooses to tie in the defining moments of their past with their present (Morin; 
McAdams 195-6; McAllister et al.).  
     Such a line of argument may be particularly tempting to explore in relation to Free Fall, 
and by extension Pincher Martin, given that both Sammy’s overwhelming sense of guilt and 
Christopher’s single-minded desire to survive are shown as controlling factors that govern the 
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selection, and possibly the reconstruction, of the kind of experiences they find themselves 
forced to relive and remember. What should be highlighted for now, however, is that both 
postmodernists and cognitive scientists seem to share the belief that narratives and 
representations should not be evaluated in terms of accuracy, but rather in terms of 
usefulness, or to use a term more Darwinian, adaptiveness (Austin 39). However, contrary to 
postmodernists, cognitivists do not hold the extreme position that our narratives and 
representations are ‘always paradoxical’ and ‘misleading’ (Spolsky). Taking a rather 
evolutionary view, they maintain that ‘relatively reliable’ data are necessary for our species to 
function; so while they do agree with postmodernists in that they are not perfect, they believe 
them to be ‘reliable enough’ for the species’ survival (Spolsky; Austin, 39). As a result, it is 
possible to say that cognitive and evolutionary arguments do not necessarily undermine the 
postmodernist views expressed by the key advocates of the theory, or conveyed by Golding 
within the confines of his later creations. On the contrary, they can lend credence to most of 
these claims as well as provide an illuminating lens through which postmodernist productions 
can be examined.  
     Golding’s antagonism to the reductionism of science may still fuel arguments against 
carrying a rational interpretation of texts that were not meant to be read rationally. However, 
judging by Golding’s attack on critics in The Paper Men as well as his confession that he had 
had never read a criticism of his work that adequately addresses the full complexity of books 
‘far more complicated than [they] look’ (Golding in Haffenden 105), it might be safe to 
assume that Golding might have been antagonistic to most critical approaches to his novels 
for basically the same reason. Such reductionism is, of course, inescapable given what 
Nordlund describes as ‘the “unimaginable complexity” of interpretation,’ which he attributes 
to the infinite possibilities involved in the categories of reader and world combining with the 
finite category that is text.158 There is also the fact that the desire to know or understand is an 
innate tendency that cannot be denied, and that any attempt at ‘producing real knowledge’ is 
likely to result in seeking a much deeper level of analysis, or in searching for the ‘underlying 
regularities’ lurking beneath the intricate exterior of art or any phenomenon for that matter 
(Carroll, Reading 29). As a result, it might be plausible to deem reductionism as almost 
inevitable or unavoidable, but not necessarily falsifying or limiting, especially if there is a 
                                                          
158 According to Nordlund, the relationship between these three elements is governed by three different theories: 
a theory of reading between text and reader, a theory of context between text and world, and a theory of reality 
between world and reader. If a critical endeavor jeopardizes this complexity and addresses only one theory or 
relation, it will be reductive, and so far, most literary approaches are classified as such. 
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willingness to admit that there is more than one way of examining an argument, and that each 
possesses the advantage of highlighting a particular angle. It might even be possible to argue, 
given Golding’s views on the complexity of art as a reflection of the complexity of the artist 
himself, that providing a rational interpretation is but one of the many perspectives that help 
shed light on the divide between the rational and the religious in Golding and that contribute, 
as such, to reinforcing his later interest in the simultaneous validity of multiple readings, 
more so perhaps than the reductivity of a single interpretation.  
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